Iraq: 127 Dead in Five Bombings

Juan Cole reviews yesterday's deadly attacks in Baghdad:

Five large bombs were detonated throughout Baghdad on Tuesday, killing 127 persons and wounding 500, and damaging important government buildings. Three of the five were suicide bombs.

Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that the bombings targeted the ministries of the interior and of finance, as well as a popular market and a court house. They hit on either side of Karkh and Rusafa districts. The first bombing struck at the gates of a Technical Institute in Dora, about 10:05 am, and then a courthouse in Karkh. The final bombing occurred in the Western Sunni district of Mansur, striking near a federal police building and a publicity office of the US military. The Ministry of Finance building hit on the edge of a market was the one employees moved into when the original Finance offices were destroyed by a massive bombing in October. Over-all, many of the dead were police or officers.

The streets were eerily empty in the aftermath of the attacks, and American helicopters hovered above the sites that had been bombed, according to al-Zaman. Al-Sharq al-Awsat says that security at checkpoints was redoubled after the bombings.

Parliament's Security Committee announced that it would question security-related cabinet ministers on December 17 as to how this serious lapse in security occurred. Hadi al-Amiri, chair of that committee, is head of the Badr Organization, a Shiite paramilitary related to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a pro-Iran, fundamentalist Shiite party. ISCI took a bath in last January's parliamentary elections, facing a strong challenge in Baghdad and Basra from Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's Dawa or Islamic Mission Party. Some of the outrage directed at the government is probably related to the upcoming parliamentary elections, in which attempts will be made to depict al-Maliki and Dawa as ineffective in providing security. Al-Zaman, reporting in Arabic, says that Baha' al-A'raji, a Sadrist MP, also slammed the government for failing to stop the bombings....

US-Turkey Analysis & Transcript: The Significance of the Obama-Erdogan Meeting from Israel to Afghanistan

On Monday, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in the Oval Office meeting President Barack Obama. The leaders talked about  bilateral economic relations, Turkey's Kurdish opening, Turkish-Armenian relationship, the "energy corridor", Turkey's PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) problem, Iran's nuclear energy programme and Washington's war in Afghanistan.

Having underlined the concept of "Model Partnership", in which it was agreed to develop bilateral economic and trade relations, Washington expressed satisfaction with Ankara's role in the Nabucco energy pipeline project and encouraged Turkey to step forward both in democratization and in advancing relations with Armenia.

As for the PKK problem, after a "terrorist" attack killing 7 Turkish soldiers, Obama reiterated Washington's "common ground" in the "war on terror" and called PKK aa "terrorist organization". This, along with Washington's encouragement for further democratic improvements, is considered by the Turkish pubic as a commitment to disband PKK in northern Iraq.

On the Iranian nuclear energy programme and further sanctions, Washington was again satisfied with placing Ankara's current role in maintaining relations with Tehran ahead of any discussions on tougher sanctions. Although it is still unclear how Ankara will react to any UN Security Council vote on sanctions, Turkey's "dialogue first" approach with Tehran is not only indispensable to Ankara's "zero-problem with neighbours" agenda but is also a very effective bridge between Washington and Tehran.

The second half of this "Model Partnership", applying it to the "war on terror",  was on military-intelligence cooperation. Ankara is allegedly going to receive three Hebron unmanned aerial vehicles from Washington after Israel held up delivery of the aircraft.

So does this have political implication, with the US siding with Ankara's harsh statements on Tel Aviv  to put more pressure on Israel? After the meeting in Washington, Ankara's criticism continued in an Erdogan speech at the John Hopkins University. He stated that Israel had killed children with phosphorous bombs and even hit hospitals, and he called Gaza as an open-air prison.

Beyond the Middle East, Ankara has already increased its force in Afghanistan from 900 to 1,700, but it is wary of where they will be posted.  Turkish soldiers are not to be used in the fight against Taliban forces but to be used in reconstructing the government and helping Afghan people develop their institutions. Despite the claim that Obama is demanding fighting forces from Turkey, the increase outside the mission area is likely to be acceptable given the symbolism of Turkey as a "Muslim" ally of the US.

Full Transcript:

PRESIDENT OBAMA: I want to extend the warmest of welcomes to Prime Minister Erdogan. I'm glad that I, personally, and the American people have a chance to reciprocate the wonderful hospitality that was extended to me when I visited Turkey in April.



As I said when I had the great honor of addressing the Turkish Parliament in Ankara, I am strongly committed to creating the best possible relationship between Turkey and the United States.

Turkey is a NATO ally, which means that we are pledged to defend each other. There are strong ties between our countries as a consequence of the Turkish American community that has been established here. We have had the opportunity to work together during this recent financial crisis, given Turkey's role as a member of the G20. And given Turkey's history as a secular democratic state that respects the rule of law, but is also a majority Muslim nation, it plays a critical role I think in helping to shape mutual understanding and stability and peace not only in its neighborhood but around the world.

During the course of our discussions here, we've had the opportunity to survey a wide range of issues that both the United States and Turkey are concerned about. I thanked Prime Minister Erdogan and the Turkish people for their outstanding contributions to stabilizing Afghanistan. We discussed our joint role in helping Iraq achieve the kind of independence and prosperity that I think has been advanced as a consequence of the election law finally being passed over the weekend.

We discussed issues of regional peace, and I indicated to the Prime Minister how important it is to resolve the issue of Iran's nuclear capacity in a way that allows Iran to pursue peaceful nuclear energy but provides assurances that it will abide by international rules and norms, and I believe that Turkey can be an important player in trying to move Iran in that direction.

And we discussed the continuing role that we can play as NATO allies in strengthening Turkey's profile within NATO and coordinating more effectively on critical issues like missile defense.

I also congratulated the Prime Minister on some courageous steps that he has taken around the issue of normalizing Turkish/Armenian relations, and encouraged him to continue to move forward along this path.

We reaffirmed the shared commitment to defeat terrorist activity regardless of where it occurs. I expressed condolences to the Prime Minister and the Turkish people for the recent terrorist attack that was taken there and pledged U.S. support in trying to bring the perpetrators of this violence to justice.

And finally, I complimented the Prime Minister for the steps that he's taken, often very difficult steps, in reintegrating religious minorities and ethnic minorities within Turkey into the democratic and political process, and indicated to him that we want to be as supportive as possible in further steps that he can take, for example, assuring the continuation of the Halki Seminary and addressing the vital needs of continuing the ecumenical patriarchy within Turkey.

Over all, just to summarize, I am incredibly optimistic about the prospect of stronger and stronger ties between the United States and Turkey that will be based not only on our NATO relationship, our military-to-military relationship, our strategic relationship, but also increasing economic ties.

And one of the concrete outcomes of this trip is to follow through on discussions that I had with both Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul in Turkey to stand up a strategic working group around economic issues and improving commercial ties. That will be launched with the participation of Secretary of Commerce Locke and our U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Ron Kirk, along with Turkish counterparts. And we think that there is enormous potential for us to grow trade and commercial ties between the two countries.

Turkey is a great country. It is growing in influence around the world. And I am pleased that America can call Turkey a friend, and I'm pleased that I'm able to call Prime Minister Erdogan personally a friend. I'm grateful for his trip here and look forward to many years of collaboration with him to observe both the prosperity of the American people and the Turkish people.

Thank you.

PRIME MINISTER ERDOGAN: (As translated.) Thank you very much. I'm very grateful for the hospitality that both myself and my delegation have been shown since our arrival here. And I would like to once again express my thanks for that hospitality.

The fact that the President visited Turkey on his first overseas trip and that he described and characterized Turkish-U.S. relations as a model partnership has been very important for us politically and in the process that we all look forward to in the future as well. And important steps are now being taken in order to continue to build on our bilateral relations so as to give greater meaning to the term "model partnership."
Of course, there are many sides to the development of this relationship -- be it in the economic area, in the areas of science, art, technology, political areas and military areas.

We have also appointed two people from our side to act as counterparts in order to liaise with their American counterparts to continue on this process. Those two people are the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Ali Babacan; and the Minister of State responsible for economic affairs, Mr. Zafer Caglayan on the Turkish side. I do believe that this group is going to work to take the Turkish-American relations forward, not just in the economic area, but in all areas in general.

We, of course, have -- we take joint steps on regional issues. This is in the Middle East, in Iraq, with respect to the Iranian nuclear program. We continue to have joint activity in Afghanistan, and the Turkish armed forces have taken over the command of the forces there for a third time with the additional support that we have sent to Afghanistan in the last couple of months. And there are steps that we have taken with respect to training activity and other activities in the context of provisional reconstruction teams, and we continue on that. We've had an opportunity to continue discussing those issues during our visit here.

Another important area, of course, is energy. Turkey is a transit country for energy issues. And the agreement has been signed for Nabucco and we are ready to take some important steps with respect to Nabucco.

We continue to talk with Azerbaijan. I do believe that positive progress will be made in this area. In addition to Azerbaijan, of course, there is the importance of companies like Statoil, Total, and British Petroleum and others.

We have also discussed relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which is of great importance. This is important in the context of Turkish-Armenian relations. We have discussed the Minsk Group and what the Minsk Group can do -- the United States, Russia, and France -- to add more impetus to that process. I can say that to have more impetus in the Minsk process is going to have a very positive impact on the overall process, because the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia is very much related to these issues. As the administration in Turkey, we are determined to move forward in this area.

Another important issue with respect for us in Turkey is the fight against terrorism. And there was a statement that was made in this very room on the 5th of November 2007, which was very important in that context, because at the time we had declared the separatist terrorist organization as the common enemy of the United States, Turkey, and Iraq, because terrorism is the enemy of all mankind.

Our sensitivity and response to terrorism is what we have displayed when the twin towers were hit here in the United States. Wherever a terrorist attack takes place our reaction is always the same, because terrorism does not have a religion -- a homeland. They have no homeland, no religion whatsoever.

We have also had opportunity to discuss what we can do jointly in the region with regard to nuclear programs. We as Turkey stand ready to do whatever we can to ensure a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue in our region. And we stand ready as Turkey to do whatever we can do with respect to relations between Israel and the Palestinians, and Israel and Syria, because I do believe that, first and foremost, the United States, too, has important responsibility in trying to achieve global peace.

And we, too, must lend all kinds of support that we can in our regions and -- in our respective regions and in the world in general in trying to achieve global peace, because this is not the time to make enemies, it's the time to make friends. And I believe that we must move hand in hand towards a bright future.

Thank you once again.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Thank you.

All right, where's Ben Feller? There you are.

Q Thank you sir. I'd like to ask you briefly about a domestic issue, that being the economy, heading to your speech tomorrow. Do you support the use of federal bailout money to fund job creation programs? Is that an appropriate use of that money? Is that something that you plan to support tomorrow?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: You know, Ben, it would be a mistake for me to step on my speech tomorrow by giving you the headline today.

Q Not that big a mistake. (Laughter.)

PRESIDENT OBAMA: But let me speak generally about what we've seen. On Friday we got the best jobs report that we've gotten in a very long time. And it significantly beat expectations. At minimum, it showed that for all practical purposes, we've stopped losing jobs. And that's consistent with the fact that in the third quarter we saw the economy grow.

My first job when I came into office was to make sure that we got the financial crisis under control and that we tried to limit the devastating effects that it was having on the real economy. We have had a very tough year, and we've lost millions of jobs. But at least now we are moving in the right direction.

What my speech tomorrow will focus on is the fact that having gotten the financial crisis under control. Having finally moved into positive territory when it comes to economic growth, our biggest challenge now is making sure that job growth matches up with economic growth. And what we've seen is, is that companies shed jobs very quickly, partly induced by the panic of what was happening on Wall Street, and they are still tentative about hiring back all those people who were laid off. Also what we're seeing is some long-term trends where companies are becoming so efficient in terms of productivity that they may feel that they can produce the same amount of goods or services without as many employees.

So those present some particular challenges, given the fact that we lost over 3 million jobs just in the first quarter of this year before any of the steps we took had a chance to take effect.

With respect to TARP specifically, I think you saw stories today and you've seen stories over the last several weeks that TARP has turned out to be much cheaper than we had expected, although not cheap. It means that some of that money can be devoted to deficit reduction. And the question is are there selective approaches that are consistent with the original goals of TARP -- for example, making sure that small businesses are still getting lending -- that would be appropriate in accelerating job growth?

And I will be addressing that tomorrow. But I do think that, although we've stabilized the financial system, one of the problems that we're still seeing all the time -- and I heard about it when it was in Allentown just this past week -- was the fact that small businesses and some medium-sized businesses are still feeling a huge credit crunch. They cannot get the loans that they need to make capital investments that would allow them to then expand employment. And so that's a particular area where we might be able to make a difference.

Is there somebody in the Turkish delegation that wants to call on a reporter?

Q Mr. President, is there any new and concrete U.S. action plan for disarmament and the elimination of the PKK terror organization in northern Iraq? Thank you, sir.

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, what the Prime Minister and I have discussed is coordinating closely in dealing with the problem of the PKK. We have stated before and I have reaffirmed since I came into office that the United States considers PKK a terrorist organization, and that the threat that it poses not only in Turkey but also in Iraq is one that is of deep concern. And as NATO allies, we are bound to help each other defend our territories. More broadly, I think that it is important for us to have a consistent position with respect to terrorism wherever it takes place.

So we discussed how we can coordinate militarily. I will tell you that with respect to the issue of the PKK, I think that the steps that the Prime Minister has taken in being inclusive towards the Kurdish community in Turkey is very helpful, because one of the things we understand is, is that terrorism cannot just be dealt with militarily; there is also social and political components to it that have to be recognized.

With respect to Iraq, I think the degree to which the Kurdish population within Iraq feels effectively represented within the central government in Baghdad, to the extent that we can resolve some long-term pressing issues like Kirkuk, the more I think that Kurds will recognize that their interests are not in supporting any kind of military activity but rather in working through conflicts politically, in a way that allows everybody to be prosperous. And that's the kind of process that we would encourage.

Okay? Thank you very much, everybody. Happy holidays.

Iran: A Discussion on "Engagement" and The State of the Regime (Sadjadpour and Lucas)

With all the developments of and beyond 16 Azar, we have had to put our analysis of US-Iranian relations on the back burner (especially given that the US Government seems to have taken no official notice of this week's demonstrations). So we thank an EA reader who has brought this dimension back to the forefront by sending us Karim Sadjadpour's analysis, in an interview with Middle East Progress, of the current state of "engagement". Points from the interview that I think merit further discussion:

1) Sadjadpour's portrayal is of a regime that, primarily because the Supreme Leader remains beyond challenge, has successfully ostracised "opposition within" such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, despite the hostility that he notes to President Ahmadinejad.

My own view is that the regime is more fragmented than he portrays. As we have highlighted today, there are moves from within the Establishment against President Ahmadinejad in the name of "national unity", but this is not just a case of removing one political figurehead. Simply placing an unchallenged Supreme Leader on top of this system --- apart from the fact that the Supreme Leader has himself been challenged on occasion "from within" since June --- obscures this fragmentation.

2) So Sadjadpour is on the mark that the prospect of a resolution between the US and Iran on uranium enrichment is receding, albeit not because the Iranian regime is unified under Ayatollah Khamenei but because it is riven with divisions. Indeed, if you put the nuclear issue in a wider context, those divisions come out in Sadjadpour's answer on the issue of subsidies and Ahmadinejad's economic plans.

3) Sadjadpour is right that the Obama Administration will now be "bumped", especially by Congress, into putting forth sanctions proposals. However, I think he is too optimistic about international acceptance, especially from Russia and China. The more pragmatic Obama officials recognise this, I suspect, and will try to limit the sanctions package as well as taking it outside the United Nations Security Council.

4) The most interesting part of the interview, perhaps ironically given the initial attention to "engagement", is Sadjadpour's return to the internal politics beyond the influence (and possibly cognizance) of the US Government. Thus the observation without immediate answers, as this is a marathon, not a sprint:

Both the government and the opposition are in precarious positions....I think the regime’s legitimacy will continue to decay, and they will be forced to rely on repressive measures to keep order....At the same time, the opposition leadership, partly by design, has not defined a clear game plan or end game, a clear alternative vision for Iran.

5) Speaking personally, while I may have differences in interpretation from Sadjadpour, I am alongside him on this sentiment (with the provision that one has to be very careful in explaining what it means to "facilitate...political change"):

This is an incredibly important time in Iran’s history and we want to be able to look back years from now and say we were on the right side of history. I sometimes fear that we may look back years from now and see that there was a tremendous opportunity to help champion and facilitate the cause of political change in Iran, but rather than taking it seriously we focused all of our attention on the nuclear issue.

Middle East Progress: The Iranian government has yet to agree to the IAEA proposal for enrichment of Iran’s low enriched uranium in a third country. What do you think are the aims of the government with regards to the proposal?

Karim Sadjadpour: Over the last several years—and especially since last June’s tainted presidential elections—any remaining moderates or pragmatists that were once part of the Iranian government’s decision-making structure have essentially been purged from the system.

Today the country is being run by a hardline Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who is surrounded by likeminded ideologues who have two overarching instincts: mistrust and defiance. They generally perceive proposals and overtures that are endorsed by the United States as poison pills. Individuals who were capable of deal-making—like former President Hashemi Rafsanjani—are now on the outside looking

MEP: But what about someone like Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani, who seemed willing to make deals when he was Iran’s nuclear negotiator, but is now sounding more strident?

Sadjadpour: Larijani is a good litmus test. While less than a decade ago he was referred to in the Western press as an arch hard-liner, in the current context he’s thought of as a pragmatist. If the color spectrum of the Iranian regime now ranges from pitch black to dark grey, Larijani is dark grey. But given that Larijani’s rise to power has been based on his fealty to Khamenei, he’s not going to say anything out of step with the Leader.

MEP: What do you make of the recent announcement about the ten new uranium enrichment plants?

Sadjadpour: I think it’s mostly bluster. To put it into perspective: it has taken Iran over two decades to complete the enrichment facility at Natanz, and it’s still not fully operational. Creating ten Natanz-size enrichment facilities, at a time when they’re facing more international scrutiny than ever, would take decades, and is certainly not an imminent threat. To the credit of the Obama administration they’ve projected the poise of a superpower and have largely chosen to ignore Iran’s bombast.

MEP: If the IAEA proposal doesn’t lead anywhere, what are the options for next steps for the United States and the international community?

Sadjadpour: I think the door of dialogue and engagement will remain open, but the Obama administration will be forced into policies—sanctions and other punitive measures—they would have liked to avoid.

In contrast to the Bush administration, I think the Europeans, and even the Russians and Chinese, recognize that since Obama’s inauguration last June the United States has made numerous overtures to Iran, made a good-faith diplomatic effort to change the tone and context of the U.S.-Iran relationship, but Tehran was either unable or unwilling to reciprocate. For this reason the Obama administration is in a much better position to attain a robust international sanctions regime than the Bush administration was.

MEP: You spoke a little bit about Russia and China. What is your sense of how far they are willing to go in terms of putting pressure on Iran?

Sadjadpour: Both countries are instinctively opposed to sanctions, but Iranian intransigence has put them in a bind. In the last few years, Russia’s modus operandi has been to endorse sanctions against Iran that they themselves have watered down. This way they can claim to the U.S. and EU that they’re supportive of their position, while privately also reassuring the Iranians that they’re sympathetic to Tehran’s position. U.S. officials feel more confident than ever that Russian patience with Iran is waning, but it remains to be seen what that means in concrete terms.

One of the reasons why Russian support is so important to the U.S. is because China has tended to follow Moscow’s lead on Iran policy. The China-Iran relationship is a more straightforward commercial relationship—China needs Iran’s energy—and I don’t think anyone believes that China will completely sever its economic ties with Iran. That said, though China has signed a lot of seemingly lucrative memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with Tehran, few deals have actually been executed, and because of the headaches of dealing with Iran the Chinese have increasingly sought out energy relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In essence, China will not be willing or able to singlehandedly fill the enormous vacuum left behind by Western companies in Iran.

MEP: What do you think is going on with the Ahmadinejad government’s plan to phase out the subsidies? Do you think that’s linked to sanctions?

Sadjadpour: Phasing out the subsidies has been discussed for years but has always been seen as too risky a move for any Iranian politician. Ahmadinejad’s idea is to discontinue the blanket subsidies on food items and petrol—which cost the government as much $100 billion per annum—and instead dole out some of that money directly to lower income classes that need it most.

There is a great deal of opposition to the plan from across the political spectrum; many lawmakers, including some Ahmadinejad supporters, fear that it will cause rampant inflation and further alienate middle class Iranians whose cost of living will rise dramatically but who will not receive government stipends. At a time when the government is seeking to restore stability, they fear that phasing out the subsidies could provoke further unrest.

It’s unclear how much the timing of the subsidy withdrawal debate is linked to the sanctions debate. I’m sure some elements of the regime believe that if they phase out the subsidies at the same time they’re hit with sanctions, they can blame foreign powers for the economic tumult. They may be playing with fire, however; in my experience living in Iran I always found that people overwhelmingly cited mismanage and corruption as the primary culprits of the country’s economic malaise, not sanctions. Post-June I think the government will get even less benefit of the doubt.

MEP: What is your sense of the regional perspective on Iran and what role Iran’s neighbors could play, or are playing?

Sadjadpour: I think Arab governments were happy to see the Iranian regime get its nose bloodied after last June’s elections, but they are concerned about the prospect of profound change in Tehran for a couple reasons. First, the arrival of a democratic Iran has potentially problematic implications for a predominantly autocratic region. Second, many Arab countries are deeply ambivalent if not down-right opposed to the prospect of Iran—with its vast natural and human resources—finally emerging from its largely self-inflicted isolation and beginning to realize its enormous potential.

With regards to the nuclear issue, in a nutshell, Arab governments don’t want Iran to get the bomb, and they don’t want Iran to get bombed. Their strategy is to essentially let the United States take care of the problem, though in recent weeks I’ve heard Arab officials express concern that the U.S. hasn’t presented them with a clear Iran strategy, and how they fit into that strategy.

Regarding the Arab public, there is an inverse correlation between U.S. and Iranian popularity in the region. Meaning, when the U.S. is most unpopular, Iran’s ideology resonates the loudest. Opinion polls indicate that since Obama’s arrival, Ahmadinejad and Iran’s stock has dropped among people in the region. I suspect that the post-election tumult also dismayed many Arabs who once romanticized Iran as a popular government intent on fighting injustice.

MEP: Israel has so far let the United States take the lead in dealing with Iran. What is your sense of their perspective?

Sadjadpour: The Israelis are impatient; by all accounts Prime Minister Netanyahu genuinely believes that a nuclear-armed Iran poses an existential threat to Israel, so they obviously have a far greater sense of urgency. While U.S. officials take the prospect of an independent Israeli strike against Iran seriously, I think many Israelis understand that the ramifications would likely be calamitous, particularly within Iran. I sincerely believe that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad would welcome an Israeli strike on their nuclear facilities; it is perhaps the only thing that could mend internal political rifts, silence the opposition movement, and entrench the most radical elements of this regime for years to come.

MEP: Where do things stand internally in Iran six months after the election?

Sadjadpour: Both the government and the opposition are in precarious positions. The regime hasn’t recouped its lost legitimacy, and will continue to lose supporters as the economic situation deteriorates. They increasingly resemble a military junta, and there is serious dissent among them; even folks close to Khamenei, like Larijani and Tehran mayor Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, would like to get rid of Ahmadinejad.

As for the opposition, its leadership and brain trust remains either in prison, under house arrest or unable to freely operate. Though the scale and frequency of popular protests has subsided, the millions who took to the streets post-election have not been pacified or co-opted. Smaller-sized protests, especially at universities around the country, have continued with great intensity, as we witnessed again yesterday.

MEP: What do you see happening? Where do you see things heading?

Sadjadpour: I think the regime’s legitimacy will continue to decay, and they will be forced to rely on repressive measures to keep order. I don’t question their willingness to shed blood to stay in power. Khamenei is unwilling to make any meaningful compromises with the opposition, for he believes it will make him look weak. Whatever they choose to do, history is not on their side.

At the same time, the opposition leadership, partly by design, has not defined a clear game plan or end game, a clear alternative vision for Iran. They’re taking a very deliberate approach, trying to recruit as many people as possible under the tent of the green movement, including disaffected clerics and Revolutionary Guardsmen.

It remains to be seen whether the current opposition leadership—Mousavi, Karoubi, and Khatami—has the will to see this movement through, or whether they will eventually have to hand the baton off to new blood.

Just as nobody predicted that millions would take to the streets post-election, it’s a fool’s errand to try and foretell how this might play out. I think the opposition could remain on simmer for quite some time—years even—but we could reach a tipping point that could change things quite abruptly.

MEP: How do you think that the United States and the international community can strike the right balance between moving forwards and dealing with the Iranian government but also being sensitive to what you’re talking about?

Sadjadpour: I think the United States should be more outspoken about Iran’s inability to adhere to international standards of justice—a word that Iran’s leadership frequently uses—and human rights and President Obama SHould be more outspoken in expressing solidarity with the Iranian people. I know that young people in Iran would like to see President Obama make it more clear that he’s not indifferent to their cause, that he’s rooting for them.

I think there is a way to dialogue with the Iranian government on urgent national security issues—like nuclear proliferation, Afghanistan, and Iraq—without betraying the millions of Iranians who view their government as illegitimate and continue to strive for political change. U.S. dialogue with the Soviet Union during the 1980s is perhaps a useful template.

This is an incredibly important time in Iran’s history and we want to be able to look back years from now and say we were on the right side of history. I sometimes fear that we may look back years from now and see that there was a tremendous opportunity to help champion and facilitate the cause of political change in Iran, but rather than taking it seriously we focused all of our attention on the nuclear issue.

MEP: Part of the reason that it appears that the U.S. and Iran continue to be unable to communicate with one another is that they don’t trust one another. How then do you balance the fact that in supporting the opposition you would be playing into the exact fears of the Iranian regime while trying to communicate with them?

Sadjadpour: The short answer to that question is I don’t think the regime, particularly Khamenei, wants to be disabused of their mistrust of the United States. It is politically and ideologically expedient for them to have the U.S. as an adversary, so they have a convenient culprit when, among other things, their population rises up, economic malaise worsens, or ethnic minorities agitate.

President Obama has made more effort than any U.S. president in the last three decades to try and build confidence with Tehran—including writing two private letters to Khamenei—and the U.S. took great pains not to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs at a time, post-election, when they were most vulnerable. I think this is clear to most Iranians, and most European, Russian, and Chinese officials I encounter acknowledge as much.

For many years now, so many of us have argued that if the U.S. can engage Iran and reintegrate it in the international community and open up its economy, this would foment political reform in Tehran. I think people fail to realize that Khamenei understands that argument very well, in fact he probably agrees with it, and for precisely that reason he’s resisted confidence building with the U.S.

MEP: Then the question is do you think there is any chance of progress, if accommodation is Khamenei’s ultimate fear?

Sadjadpour: I’m very skeptical about the prospect of a major diplomatic breakthrough with this Iranian government. I believe the underlying problem we have with Iran has more to do with the character of its regime than its nuclear ambitions. In other words, as long as Khamenei is leader and Ahmadinejad is president, Tehran will not be able or willing to meet us half-way, or even a third Of the way, on our various issues of contention.

Iran Exclusive: Clerics and Rafsanjani Plan The "Third Way" of Unity

Written with EA correspondent Mr Azadi:

Even as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was using a world tour and speeches to bolster his position, even as senior Parliament figures were fighting the President over his economic plans and approaches in nuclear talks, even as the Green Waves were planning the protests of 16 Azar, there was another strategy being developed behind closed doors in Tehran, Qom, Mashaad, and Hamedan.

It is a strategy linking senior clerics and former President Hashemi Rafsanjani. And, in their vision, it is the strategy to bring Iran out of political, social, and religious disaster.

Here's the story:

Last week Habibollah Asgaroladi, the secretary-general of the Islamic Coalition Party, a member of the Expediency Council, and the head of Imam Khomeini's Committee, met former President Hashemi Rafsanjani to discuss a National Unity Plan.

Of course, this is not the first consideration of a Unity Plan since the 12 June election. Throughout the autumn, there were discussions and manoeuvres amongst conservative/principlist members of Parliament, Rafsanjani, and clerics to present a proposal that would reform the Iranian system, in particular curbing the authority of President Ahmadinejad, without risking significant changes to the Islamic Republic. At some point, however, the initiative ground to a halt, whether because of Ahmadinejad's resistance, the opposition of other factions, or the objections of the Supreme Leader.

The Asgaroladi-Rafsanjani meeting, however, marked the start of another big push for the Plan. Rafsanjani met clerics in Mashhad to discuss the possibilities. Last Friday, the leader of Mashhad's prayers, Ayatollah Alamalhuda proclaimed that Rafsanjani was part of the Islamic Revolution, having been close to Imam Khomeini and promoted Ayatollah Khamenei as a Supreme Leader. (In June, Alamalhuda, known as a supporter of Ahmadinejad, had said, "Hashemi is guilty and responsible for the Supreme Leader being oppressed.")

This was not the only clerical speech endorsing Rafsanjani. In Hamedan, Seyed Ahmad Khatami --- not to be confused with Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, the Tehran prayer leader who fervently backs the Government --- declared, "Hashemi is a brother of the Supreme Leader, and it is a falsehood to attack him."

The biggest clue, although we didn't know it at the time, came in an interview that Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi gave last Thursday. Makarem-Shirazi, known as a "conservative" cleric in Qom, has been following a middle way since June, challenging the Ahmadinejad approach while remaining distant from the Green Wave, but he went further last week. In the context of what we now know about Rafsanjani's talks with the clerics, this could not be a clearer signal of the new political effort:

When we talk about unity, we are talking about people who believe in the constitution, leadership, Islam, and the interests of the country. Those who believe in those issues can reach unity. However, the precondition is to create a calm environment and then some people, who are respected by society and are moderate thinkers, should agree on the principles of unity. I do not believe that we have reached the end of the road, there is no deadlock.

These discussions and proclamations underlay Rafsanjani's speech on Sunday, emphasizing unity while criticising the Government for its post-election measures and calling on the protesters to show restraint.

So, even though 16 Azar has occurred and continues in the form of university protests, there may be another political battlefront, one in which the protagonists are distinct from the "opposition" (indeed, the other way to look at this move is an attempt by clerics to split Rafsanjani from other Green leaders like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi).The Government's recent threats against Rafsanjani's family, embodied in yesterday's warning by Tehran Prosecutor General Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei of the prosecution of Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi, indicate that they take the prospect of a revived National Unity Plan very seriously.

The immediate question is whether the clerics, Rafsanjani, and other political allies (where stand you, Larijanis?) break cover and promote the Plan publicly. Alternatively, they may wait for yet another round of protests at Moharram, beginning 27 18 December, to shake the Government further.

And beyond that is the tougher nut to crack: given that it may have been the Supreme Leader who objected to the previous incarnation of the Plan, given that Ahmadinejad is a battler, given that the Revolutionary Guard is also a political actor, how does Unity emerge from confrontation?

UPDATED Iran's 16 Azar: The Arrest of Majid Tavakoli

Setareh Sabety sends us a report on an event which we briefly noted yesterday:



UPDATE 9 December 1115 GMT: Human Rights Activists in Iran have posted more information on Tavakoli's arrest.

UPDATE 9 December: Setareh Sabety notes that Fars News has tried to discredit and degrade Tavakoli (as well as insulting women), with this "report": "The leader of Mousavi`s rioters was captured while in disguise and fleeing the security forces.Dressed as a pious woman and even sporting a purse to complete the look,he failed to reach his target and was arrested by the security forces."

This does not even deserve the label of propaganda, let alone news

Majid Tavakoli, a student at Polytechnic (Amir Kabir) University in Tehran, was arrested on his way out of the University after he gave a moving speech at ceremonies/protests held on the National Student's Day in Iran.

Iran: The Arrest of Majid Tavakoli “His 16 Azar Speech on Video”
Iran’s Arrest of Majid Tavakoli: “Khamenei in Hejab/We Are All Majids”

According to the Amir Kabir student newsletter, Tavakoli was arrested last winter and served three months in jail after an appearance at commemoration ceremonies for former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. Tavakoli also spent over a year in jail after a 2007 arrest, and according to sources, he was tortured.

A human rights activist who has been working in Iran for years told me that Tavakoli's arrest does not bode well because the regime may try to make him a scapegoat, painting him as the leader and instigator of the massive protests that took place today. “His only chance is that the international community supports him,” claimed the activist. That is a dramatic statement: usually families and friends of a prisoner take a back-door route to getting release orders; an appeal to the international community comes only to cases that look hopeless.

This was Tavakoli's last entry on Facebook, posted on Saturday:

Only two more days (to 16 Azar). I have spent ten exhausting days on the road with more than 100 hours of driving and now I have to leave for Tehran. Looking at my mother's tearful eyes and father's anxious glances and despite all the difficulties only the true wish for freedom can maintain my drive and steadfastness. And so once again I welcome and accept all the dangers, standing next to my friends with whom I am honoured and proud to be on 16 Azar shoulder to shoulder we will shout against tyranny. For Freedom.