The Latest on Iran (29 December): A Desperate Swing of the Fist

1930 GMT: Kill Them. Abbas Vaez-Tabasi, a member of the Expediency Council and the Assembly of Experts has declared on state television, "Those who are behind the current sedition in the country ... are mohareb (enemies of God) and the law is very clear about punishment of a mohareb [execution]."

Today's Show of Support for the Regime? If you believe Peyke Iran, it wasn't much. The website reports that residents in Rasht ridiculed a demonstration of 300 plainclothes Basijis chanting slogans for the execution of reformists like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi.

1850 GMT: Javan Farda reports that Shiraz University was closed today.

1845 GMT: The Arrests Move Higher. Government forces have arrested Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief aide Alireza Beheshti. Beheshti, the son of one of Iran's most commemorated martyrs, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, was also detained briefly in September when the regime tried to disrupt preparations for Qods Day demonstrations.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Today’s University Protest (29 December)
NEW Iran: A List of the Ashura Detainees
NEW Iran: The Regime's Fightback?
Latest Iran Video: Obama Condemns “Violent & Unjust Suppression” (28 December)
Iran: Ashura’s Message “Iranians Are Not Punching Bags” (Josh Shahryar)
Iran: A Point of No Return?
The Latest from Iran (28 December): The Regime’s Arresting Strategy

1830 GMT: The Karroubi Family Speaks Out (Cont.): Mehdi Karroubi's son Taghi has added to the criticisms by Karroubi's wife and son Hossein of regime restrictions on his father. He said that Government-provided security has stopped protecting Karroubi when he leaves the house. This is effectively a ''quasi-house arrest'.'

Karroubi's car was attacked on Saturday by assailants.

1815 GMT: Attacks on the Clerics. Ayatollah Sane'i now appears to be a primary target of the regime: assaults on his offices by plainclothes men have been reported in Tehran, Mashhad, Kerman, Sari, Gorgan, and Shiraz.

Attacks in Shiraz on the Qoba Mosque and the residence of Ayatollah Dastghaib have also been reported.

1730 GMT: "Western" Media and the Green Movement. A reporter from The Times of London has asked us to clarify our opening update (0710 GMT). While we mentioned the newspaper as part of "a chorus of affirmation that this opposition is on the point of victory", he/she wants to make clear that it should not be included in our preceding reference that "most of [the Western media] had written off the opposition only a month ago".

1720 GMT: The Elm-o-Sanat Protest. We've posted three clips from today's demonstration at Elm-o-Sanat University in Tehran. Gooya reports that more than 10 students were injured in clashes with security forces.

1650 GMT: Mahmoud Speaks. President Ahmadinejad has surfaced to comment on the Ashura protests: "The Iranian nation has seen a lot of such masquerades. A Zionist (Israeli), and American ordered [nauseating] masquerade."

1645 GMT: The Karroubi Family Protests. Back from a break to find that the family of Mehdi Karroubi striking out at Government restrictions. Karroubi's son Hossein has announced that his father is “partially imprisoned” because security personnel refuse to cooperate with him. Karroubi's wife Fatemeh writes that her family has been threatened by “nightly attacks of arbitrary forces” She says that she will hold the government responsible for any incident that may affect members of her family.

1225 GMT: Reading Iran from the US. We've just posted the analysis of Karim Sadjadpour and Trita Parsi of the Ashura protests on the Public Broadcasting Service.

1224 GMT: Reports that journalist Nasrin Vaziri, who works for ILNA and Khabar Online, has been arrested.

1214 GMT: Tehran's Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi said that seven people were killed in Ashura clashes (which is kind of strange, since the official line on Monday was that 10 "terrorists" had been slain).

1210 GMT: Here Come the Guards. The Revolutionary Guard jump into the regime's fightback against the Ashura protests: "The...foreign media...has staged a psychological war. Trying to overthrow the system will reach nowhere...designers of the unrest will soon pay the cost of their insolence...The opposition, which has joined hands with the foreign media, is backed by foreign enemies."

1205 GMT: Only a matter of time before this "analysis" was attempted --- the editor of Kayhan, Hossein Shariatmardari, has accused Mir Hossein Mousavi of planning the assassination of his nephew.

1155 GMT: Report coming in that Reza Tajik, journalist and religious activist, was arrested today in front of the Etemaad newspaper Building. Photojournaist Sam Mahmoudi has also reportedly been arrested.

Another activist reports that Dr. Housein Mousavian, a member of the National Front, has been arrested.

1120 GMT: Did Trees Have to Die for This? A Mr Will Heaven seeks his 15 seconds of attention with this blotting of the pages of The Daily Telegraph, "Iran and Twitter". I have more important things to do, such as using Twitter as a portal to keep up with and report on the latest developments inside Iran, so let me respond Tweet-style:

@WillHeaven: U know nothing of #Twitter, #IranElection, or #Iran (& u rip off #Salon, who tried this shtick last week)

1115 GMT: We have posted a list of Ashura detainees, compiled by Tehran Bureau's Muhammad Sahimi last night before the latest reports of arrests.

1040 GMT: Arrest Them All. The latest detainees include journalist Mohammad Javad Saberi and Shahpour Kazemi, the brother of Mir Hossein Mousavi's wife Zahra Rahnavard. Kazemi was detained for months earlier in the crisis before his release in the autumn.

Journalists Badrosadat Mofidi, Nasrin Vaziri, and Keyvan Mehregan have also been detained.

1020 GMT: Ali Larijani --- No Compromise. Speaker of Parliament Larijani, commenting on the Ashura protests, has told lawmakers that officials should "arrest offenders of the religion and mete out harshest punishments to such anti-revolutionary figures with no mercy".

The rhetoric isn't significant: it matches that coming from pro-regime media and "hard-line" MPs (see 0850 GMT). The political symbolism is: Larijani --- who has clashed with President Ahmadinejad throughout this crisis and was reportedly involved in the discussion of a National Unity Plan ---is now declaring that confrontation takes priority over any attempt at a negotiated resolution.

And he is doing so even as the Supreme Leader (is Larijani serving here as a spokesman for Khamenei?) and Ahmadinejad remain publicly silent.

0850 GMT: "Cut Off Their Hands". Scattered hard-line noises out of Iran's Parliament. Mohammad Karamirad, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, said that the committee will hold a special meeting on Wednesday to discuss the Ashura protests. Security officials from the Interior Ministry, the Intelligence Ministry, and the police will be invited.

Don't be fooled that this is an impartial enquiry into the demonstrations, however. Karamirad declared, "Rioters who took to streets are challenging the very foundations of the ruling system....They insult Islamic beliefs, and it is our duty to cut off the hands behind such seditious acts and bring an end to the events that endanger the safety and security of the people." He also called on Iran's judiciary to prosecute the leaders of the protests.

Hossein Sobhaninia, another member of the committee, joined that call. He said that events, in which the sanctities of Islam were disrespected and government officials were insulted, would not end if the judiciary did not deal with the seditious acts.

750 GMT: Which Way Forward? Following up on our snap 5-point analysis of the significance of the Ashura protests, an EA reader directs us to the thoughts of Ebrahim Nabavi in Rah-e-Sabz. Nabavi searches for a positive outcome to the conflict, advising the opposition to leave enough space for the regime to prevent a fierce confrontation.

0710 GMT: We begin this morning with a summary and analysis of the Government's attempt to restore some credibility through the rather crude tactic of arresting lots of people it does not like or trust. One of the latest names to emerge is Nushin Ebadi, the sister of the Nobel Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi.

Meanwhile, it is stunning how the Western media --- most of whom had written off the opposition only a month ago --- are now a chorus of affirmation that this opposition is on the point of victory. The Times of London proclaims "the tipping point of revolution". Abbas Milani in The Wall Street Journal announces "The Tipping Point in Iran". (Note to EA readers: if we ever use "tipping point" in an analysis, pull us aside for a journalistic flogging for the crime Resorting to Overused Cliche.) The Washington Post has the variant of "Iran's Turning Point". The New York Times offers support through an editorial denouncing "Iran's War on Its People".

Latest Iran Video: Warning and Protest (29 December)

Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani: "Imprisonment of Infidels"

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IYmRP2YxfYM&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

Elm-O-Sanat University, Tehran "Clashes with Basiji"

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUnWlJXB4r0[/youtube]

The Latest on Iran (29 December): A Desperate Swing of the Fist
UPDATED Iran Video: The Ashura Protests (27/28 December — 3rd Set)

Elm-o-Sanat University, Tehran

[youtube]/2009/12/29/latest-iran-video-todays-university-protest-29-december/[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ynlF6HPAjHE&feature=channel[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-KfGX7XIJd0[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4vjDnPL5Rvg&feature=channel[/youtube]

Iran: "Arrests" and the Regime's Sword of Damocles

It is now 9:30 a.m. in Tehran, and the arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi has still not occurred. After a weekend of tension, nervousness, and speculation, he remains free, or rather restricted given the Government's efforts to limit his mobility and communications. The students are still demonstrating on their campuses, and plans are still being made for a show of protest during the holy month of Moharram, beginning Friday.

At the same time, the warning from the regime was clear. Perhaps the line on the Revolutionary Guard's website about punishing the leaders of dissent can be dismissed as bluster, but the Supreme Leader's speech yesterday, even with its invocation to his audience to "keep calm", has to be recognised --- with the live broadcast and attendant publicity --- as a high-profile message to those who continue to take to the streets and defy the injunction to be quiet.

Iran Analysis: Sifting the Propaganda – Government About to Arrest Opposition Leaders?

So what does it all mean, if we are still in this state of political suspension, the Sword of Damocles still dangling above the head of the Green movement(s)?

First things first: threats like these are not made from a position of strength. If victory is assured or imminent, you don't need to keep up the fist-shaking. Instead, you can strike a tone of triumph or  even reconciliation with vanquished foes. Ayatollah Khamenei may have put on his "Dirty Harry" face --- as Mr Smith summarised, it was a "Make My Day" speech --- but he did so after six months of failure to put away the bad guys.

More and more it appears that the protests of 16 Azar have shaken the regime. At first glance, I found that curious because the demonstrations were largely confined to students on and around campuses. Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami were nowhere to be seen, and even amidst the tens of thousands who turned out last Monday, there was the hanging question, "Where next?" with the objectives of the movement.

But, trying to read it from the regime's side, even that defiance is beyond a disturbance and verging on a perpetual threat. We have written repeatedly of the Supreme Leader, the President, the Revolutionary Guard, and other security forces throwing their best punch and failing to knock out the opposition. So it proved again on 16 Azar. And this time, there were the visual signs that the protesters were upping the political challenge --- once again, Khamenei's image was defaced and mocked and now Iranian flags without the central symbol of the Islamic Republic were being waved.

So anxious and worried, the regime's media began running over and over again the one video clip that showed not only Khamenei but Imam Khomeini being symbolically immolated, their portraits lit up by a "protester" with a lighter. We may never know if that incident was genuine --- what mattered is that it would now be displayed as the "real", ugly face of the Green movement for days by the regime. And what mattered even more is that it seems to have failed to extinguish the protest. Indeed, it does not even seem to have tarred it as "anti-Republic"; after a series of statements from prominent individuals and groups denying the burning of Khomeini, his picture was being waved with acclamation by demonstrators yesterday.

So anxious and worried, elements in the regime began muttering that it was time to stop this once and for all. Hard-line newspapers raised the rhetoric against Mousavi and Karroubi. State television devoted blocks of broadcast time to the "threat". The Revolutionary Guard made its threat. This might not have constituted a "plan" to detain Mir Hossein Mousavi, but it was enough for his website to issue its alert on Saturday night.

And then, most importantly, the Supreme Leader decided to give a partial stamp of approval to the threats with his speech yesterday.

(There may or may not be a dramatic side issue here: as the regime was playing its Khomeini card, the claimed letter/audio from Army and Air Force units, "standing with the Iranian people" if violence continued, emerged. It is still a matter of heated debate whether the letter and audio are genuine. The point is that, if the regime believes it might be genuine, then the prospect of military dissent arises. And this in turn might have been a supporting catalyst for the Supreme Leader's invocation for everybody to shut up and get in line.)

We've been here before. A week after the election, Khamenei stood up at Friday prayers in Tehran and said it was time to accept the election and stop the complaining. He stretched out a hand to Hashemi Rafsanjani but made it clear that all should accept President Ahmadinejad.

The outcome? The next day there were mass protests in Tehran. Neda Agha Soltan was killed and became a symbolic martyr. And a crisis of days had become one of weeks and possibly months.

Strategically, Khamenei's move yesterday may also be compared with a private initiative he took in September, despatching Ali Larijani to Mehdi Karroubi to tell the cleric to stay out of sight before the protests of Qods Day in Spetember. In that sense, the escalation of private message to public warning yesterday could be a "decapitation" strategy: split off Mousavi and Karroubi from the Green movement and, leaderless, it will run itself into the ground.

It should not be underestimated that, to an extent, the regime has achieved this aim since June. Through the disruptions of the high-level reformist and Green organisations, extending to the detentions of its top officials, it has fragmented the demonstrations, preventing a single, mass gathering. It has kept Mousavi, Khatami, and, more recently, Karroubi off to the side of those demonstrations.

Ironically, however, that partial success may have led to a risky miscalculation. It is not just the possibility that Mousavi's arrest might spur the Green movement(s) through the creation of a political martyr. Even more, it is the belief that the movement cannot exist without a publicly-active Mousavi.

All the opposition discussion of "Where Next?", with its heated and sometimes confused consideration of objectives, should not obscure one of the emerging motives for that discussion: the belief that the movement is now beyond a single figure like a Mousavi. Ironically, that belief has only been reinforced with the regime's efforts to suppress and decapitate the opposition: the marches still took place, they still had an impact even as its supposed leaders were shut away in their offices.

So Mousavi and Karroubi may not have to risk a central presence in the forthcoming public activity from the start of Mosharram (18 December) through Ashura (27 December) and beyond. They can issue statements from a distance and let the "grassroots" of the movement take the public lead.

Then the crunch question: what if, despite the Supreme Leader's threats, the protesters still come out? What if they persist in challenging the legitimacy of this regime (but not necessarily the "Islamic Republic")?

What does the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard then do with a Sword which, for all the detentions and all the propaganda, dangles not as a sign of its threat but of (for now) its impotence?

Iran Analysis: Are Rafsanjani and National Unity Plan "Spent Forces"?

Many thanks to readers and EA colleagues who gave valuable feedback and criticism on yesterday's analysis of the meetings between clerics and Hashemi Rafsanjani discussing moves for a National Unity Plan manoeuvring between the Ahmadinejad Government and the Green opposition.

A basic but, I think, important start to a reply: there is a big difference between questioning whether meetings took place and questioning whether those meetings will be effective.

Iran Exclusive: Clerics and Rafsanjani Plan The “Third Way” of Unity
The Latest from Iran (10 December): Reading the Chessboard

Almost all the reaction has focused on that second question. Some readers noted, quite rightly, that Nasser Makarem-Shirazi is the only Ayatollah who has gone public, and then in general terms regarding "unity" rather than in reference to the meetings. That's a fair point, even though we have information that other senior clerics have been involved in the discussions.

Some readers have questioned whether any Plan can get the approval of the Supreme Leader or, alternatively, the Revolutionary Guard.

Again, that is a necessary challenge, but any Plan is likely to be a tactical move against the authority of the President rather than a strategic approach for re-alignment or major change in the Iranian system. The question then becomes not whether Ayatollah Khamenei will defy any proposal revising velayat-e-faqih but whether he will side with the "third way" against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (I agree that, if the Revolutionary Guard rather than the Supreme Leader are in charge that even this is problematic, but I don't start from that assumption at this point.)

Note: there is a related issue here as to whether the Supreme Leader is in an unshakeable position where he can wield a veto without any repercussions on his position. So far, I think that is true, but there have been rumblings during this crisis aimed at Khamenei's undisputed authority. While these seemed to have been quelled, a firm No No No by the Supreme Leader to a Plan which has wide support could risk a backlash such as that against his 19 June speech trying to close off the Presidential election.

Perhaps the most significant criticism, however, is that neither the clerics nor Rafsanjani now have that much influence. As one EA colleague put it bluntly yesterday, Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi is a "spent force" and Rafsanjani "no longer has substantial power".

That, to me, is a telling statement. Throughout this crisis, one of the recurrent assumptions has been that Rafsanjani --- the master political operator, "the Shark" --- could play a decisive role in this conflict. That assumption underlay the excitement around his mid-July Friday Prayer speech and the disappointment over his non-appearance at prayers in August (and since) and the weak statement of the Assembly of Experts under his leadership.

In September, however, protesters were chanting on Qods Day, "Hashemi, where are you?". The possibility arose that they were chanting this not because they needed Rafsanjani but because they now felt they could get along without him.

In October we carried the news, offered by Habibollah Asgharoladi, that Rafsanjani had taken the National Unity Plan to the Supreme Leader. Since nothing more was heard, that approach was probably rebuffed.

So, to me, it is quite likely that Rafsanjani has tried to re-establish not only the Plan but his own place in Iranian politics with the recent meetings. Arguing that the Plan is likely to go nowhere implies that Rafsanjani, amidst the continued threats to his family and his own retreat from public apprearances since August, is likely to go nowhere. He is now an isolated as well as a spent force.

But is that the case? An EA source reports that Asgharoladi, in addition to his recent meeting with Rafsanjani, also saw the President. He criticised Ahmadinejad for his weak relationships with the senior clerics and Rafsanjani and for his support of the controversial former 1st Vice President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

An EA colleague cautions that Asgharoladi and his party are now marginal political actors, but the Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar renewed his attack on Ahmadinejad yesterday. He criticised Ahmadinejad for the way the President has dealt with and treated the parliament, and he also derided the interference of the Revolutionary Guard in politics and the economy. It may be far from incidental that Bahonar had been a supporter of the National Unity Plan earlier in the autumn.

An EA colleague may have gotten to the heart of the matter and any "Third Way": "The one element that could tip the balance, as said in the past, would be the Larijani brothers swaying towards the Rafs camp. That has hasn't happened yet."

Yet. Ali Larijani, as Speaker of Parliament, could be a catalytic force given the hostility to Ahmadinejad amongst key Parliamentary members. His brother Sadegh, head of Iran's judiciary, may also have a role: yesterday, the newspaper Jomhoori Islami --- owned by Masih Mohajeri, who accompanied Rafsanjani to the Mashhad meetings last week --- asked Sadegh Larijani, "Why don’t you take action against Ahmadinejad and his friends who corrupt and play with people's religious beliefs?"

After 24 hours of reflection, the easy decision is to stand by the exclusive we published yesterday: at least in the eyes of those who met last week --- clerics, Asgharoladi, and Rafsanjani --- the National Unity Plan is not a "spent force".

The tougher analysis is: what next? Given the caveats that readers put yesterday, it is time to put away any thought of Rafsanjani --- for all his past prowess --- being the Shark who changes the political waters. More big fish are needed.

But will they surface?

Iran: A Discussion on "Engagement" and The State of the Regime (Sadjadpour and Lucas)

With all the developments of and beyond 16 Azar, we have had to put our analysis of US-Iranian relations on the back burner (especially given that the US Government seems to have taken no official notice of this week's demonstrations). So we thank an EA reader who has brought this dimension back to the forefront by sending us Karim Sadjadpour's analysis, in an interview with Middle East Progress, of the current state of "engagement". Points from the interview that I think merit further discussion:

1) Sadjadpour's portrayal is of a regime that, primarily because the Supreme Leader remains beyond challenge, has successfully ostracised "opposition within" such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, despite the hostility that he notes to President Ahmadinejad.

My own view is that the regime is more fragmented than he portrays. As we have highlighted today, there are moves from within the Establishment against President Ahmadinejad in the name of "national unity", but this is not just a case of removing one political figurehead. Simply placing an unchallenged Supreme Leader on top of this system --- apart from the fact that the Supreme Leader has himself been challenged on occasion "from within" since June --- obscures this fragmentation.

2) So Sadjadpour is on the mark that the prospect of a resolution between the US and Iran on uranium enrichment is receding, albeit not because the Iranian regime is unified under Ayatollah Khamenei but because it is riven with divisions. Indeed, if you put the nuclear issue in a wider context, those divisions come out in Sadjadpour's answer on the issue of subsidies and Ahmadinejad's economic plans.

3) Sadjadpour is right that the Obama Administration will now be "bumped", especially by Congress, into putting forth sanctions proposals. However, I think he is too optimistic about international acceptance, especially from Russia and China. The more pragmatic Obama officials recognise this, I suspect, and will try to limit the sanctions package as well as taking it outside the United Nations Security Council.

4) The most interesting part of the interview, perhaps ironically given the initial attention to "engagement", is Sadjadpour's return to the internal politics beyond the influence (and possibly cognizance) of the US Government. Thus the observation without immediate answers, as this is a marathon, not a sprint:

Both the government and the opposition are in precarious positions....I think the regime’s legitimacy will continue to decay, and they will be forced to rely on repressive measures to keep order....At the same time, the opposition leadership, partly by design, has not defined a clear game plan or end game, a clear alternative vision for Iran.

5) Speaking personally, while I may have differences in interpretation from Sadjadpour, I am alongside him on this sentiment (with the provision that one has to be very careful in explaining what it means to "facilitate...political change"):

This is an incredibly important time in Iran’s history and we want to be able to look back years from now and say we were on the right side of history. I sometimes fear that we may look back years from now and see that there was a tremendous opportunity to help champion and facilitate the cause of political change in Iran, but rather than taking it seriously we focused all of our attention on the nuclear issue.

Middle East Progress: The Iranian government has yet to agree to the IAEA proposal for enrichment of Iran’s low enriched uranium in a third country. What do you think are the aims of the government with regards to the proposal?

Karim Sadjadpour: Over the last several years—and especially since last June’s tainted presidential elections—any remaining moderates or pragmatists that were once part of the Iranian government’s decision-making structure have essentially been purged from the system.

Today the country is being run by a hardline Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who is surrounded by likeminded ideologues who have two overarching instincts: mistrust and defiance. They generally perceive proposals and overtures that are endorsed by the United States as poison pills. Individuals who were capable of deal-making—like former President Hashemi Rafsanjani—are now on the outside looking

MEP: But what about someone like Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani, who seemed willing to make deals when he was Iran’s nuclear negotiator, but is now sounding more strident?

Sadjadpour: Larijani is a good litmus test. While less than a decade ago he was referred to in the Western press as an arch hard-liner, in the current context he’s thought of as a pragmatist. If the color spectrum of the Iranian regime now ranges from pitch black to dark grey, Larijani is dark grey. But given that Larijani’s rise to power has been based on his fealty to Khamenei, he’s not going to say anything out of step with the Leader.

MEP: What do you make of the recent announcement about the ten new uranium enrichment plants?

Sadjadpour: I think it’s mostly bluster. To put it into perspective: it has taken Iran over two decades to complete the enrichment facility at Natanz, and it’s still not fully operational. Creating ten Natanz-size enrichment facilities, at a time when they’re facing more international scrutiny than ever, would take decades, and is certainly not an imminent threat. To the credit of the Obama administration they’ve projected the poise of a superpower and have largely chosen to ignore Iran’s bombast.

MEP: If the IAEA proposal doesn’t lead anywhere, what are the options for next steps for the United States and the international community?

Sadjadpour: I think the door of dialogue and engagement will remain open, but the Obama administration will be forced into policies—sanctions and other punitive measures—they would have liked to avoid.

In contrast to the Bush administration, I think the Europeans, and even the Russians and Chinese, recognize that since Obama’s inauguration last June the United States has made numerous overtures to Iran, made a good-faith diplomatic effort to change the tone and context of the U.S.-Iran relationship, but Tehran was either unable or unwilling to reciprocate. For this reason the Obama administration is in a much better position to attain a robust international sanctions regime than the Bush administration was.

MEP: You spoke a little bit about Russia and China. What is your sense of how far they are willing to go in terms of putting pressure on Iran?

Sadjadpour: Both countries are instinctively opposed to sanctions, but Iranian intransigence has put them in a bind. In the last few years, Russia’s modus operandi has been to endorse sanctions against Iran that they themselves have watered down. This way they can claim to the U.S. and EU that they’re supportive of their position, while privately also reassuring the Iranians that they’re sympathetic to Tehran’s position. U.S. officials feel more confident than ever that Russian patience with Iran is waning, but it remains to be seen what that means in concrete terms.

One of the reasons why Russian support is so important to the U.S. is because China has tended to follow Moscow’s lead on Iran policy. The China-Iran relationship is a more straightforward commercial relationship—China needs Iran’s energy—and I don’t think anyone believes that China will completely sever its economic ties with Iran. That said, though China has signed a lot of seemingly lucrative memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with Tehran, few deals have actually been executed, and because of the headaches of dealing with Iran the Chinese have increasingly sought out energy relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In essence, China will not be willing or able to singlehandedly fill the enormous vacuum left behind by Western companies in Iran.

MEP: What do you think is going on with the Ahmadinejad government’s plan to phase out the subsidies? Do you think that’s linked to sanctions?

Sadjadpour: Phasing out the subsidies has been discussed for years but has always been seen as too risky a move for any Iranian politician. Ahmadinejad’s idea is to discontinue the blanket subsidies on food items and petrol—which cost the government as much $100 billion per annum—and instead dole out some of that money directly to lower income classes that need it most.

There is a great deal of opposition to the plan from across the political spectrum; many lawmakers, including some Ahmadinejad supporters, fear that it will cause rampant inflation and further alienate middle class Iranians whose cost of living will rise dramatically but who will not receive government stipends. At a time when the government is seeking to restore stability, they fear that phasing out the subsidies could provoke further unrest.

It’s unclear how much the timing of the subsidy withdrawal debate is linked to the sanctions debate. I’m sure some elements of the regime believe that if they phase out the subsidies at the same time they’re hit with sanctions, they can blame foreign powers for the economic tumult. They may be playing with fire, however; in my experience living in Iran I always found that people overwhelmingly cited mismanage and corruption as the primary culprits of the country’s economic malaise, not sanctions. Post-June I think the government will get even less benefit of the doubt.

MEP: What is your sense of the regional perspective on Iran and what role Iran’s neighbors could play, or are playing?

Sadjadpour: I think Arab governments were happy to see the Iranian regime get its nose bloodied after last June’s elections, but they are concerned about the prospect of profound change in Tehran for a couple reasons. First, the arrival of a democratic Iran has potentially problematic implications for a predominantly autocratic region. Second, many Arab countries are deeply ambivalent if not down-right opposed to the prospect of Iran—with its vast natural and human resources—finally emerging from its largely self-inflicted isolation and beginning to realize its enormous potential.

With regards to the nuclear issue, in a nutshell, Arab governments don’t want Iran to get the bomb, and they don’t want Iran to get bombed. Their strategy is to essentially let the United States take care of the problem, though in recent weeks I’ve heard Arab officials express concern that the U.S. hasn’t presented them with a clear Iran strategy, and how they fit into that strategy.

Regarding the Arab public, there is an inverse correlation between U.S. and Iranian popularity in the region. Meaning, when the U.S. is most unpopular, Iran’s ideology resonates the loudest. Opinion polls indicate that since Obama’s arrival, Ahmadinejad and Iran’s stock has dropped among people in the region. I suspect that the post-election tumult also dismayed many Arabs who once romanticized Iran as a popular government intent on fighting injustice.

MEP: Israel has so far let the United States take the lead in dealing with Iran. What is your sense of their perspective?

Sadjadpour: The Israelis are impatient; by all accounts Prime Minister Netanyahu genuinely believes that a nuclear-armed Iran poses an existential threat to Israel, so they obviously have a far greater sense of urgency. While U.S. officials take the prospect of an independent Israeli strike against Iran seriously, I think many Israelis understand that the ramifications would likely be calamitous, particularly within Iran. I sincerely believe that Khamenei and Ahmadinejad would welcome an Israeli strike on their nuclear facilities; it is perhaps the only thing that could mend internal political rifts, silence the opposition movement, and entrench the most radical elements of this regime for years to come.

MEP: Where do things stand internally in Iran six months after the election?

Sadjadpour: Both the government and the opposition are in precarious positions. The regime hasn’t recouped its lost legitimacy, and will continue to lose supporters as the economic situation deteriorates. They increasingly resemble a military junta, and there is serious dissent among them; even folks close to Khamenei, like Larijani and Tehran mayor Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, would like to get rid of Ahmadinejad.

As for the opposition, its leadership and brain trust remains either in prison, under house arrest or unable to freely operate. Though the scale and frequency of popular protests has subsided, the millions who took to the streets post-election have not been pacified or co-opted. Smaller-sized protests, especially at universities around the country, have continued with great intensity, as we witnessed again yesterday.

MEP: What do you see happening? Where do you see things heading?

Sadjadpour: I think the regime’s legitimacy will continue to decay, and they will be forced to rely on repressive measures to keep order. I don’t question their willingness to shed blood to stay in power. Khamenei is unwilling to make any meaningful compromises with the opposition, for he believes it will make him look weak. Whatever they choose to do, history is not on their side.

At the same time, the opposition leadership, partly by design, has not defined a clear game plan or end game, a clear alternative vision for Iran. They’re taking a very deliberate approach, trying to recruit as many people as possible under the tent of the green movement, including disaffected clerics and Revolutionary Guardsmen.

It remains to be seen whether the current opposition leadership—Mousavi, Karoubi, and Khatami—has the will to see this movement through, or whether they will eventually have to hand the baton off to new blood.

Just as nobody predicted that millions would take to the streets post-election, it’s a fool’s errand to try and foretell how this might play out. I think the opposition could remain on simmer for quite some time—years even—but we could reach a tipping point that could change things quite abruptly.

MEP: How do you think that the United States and the international community can strike the right balance between moving forwards and dealing with the Iranian government but also being sensitive to what you’re talking about?

Sadjadpour: I think the United States should be more outspoken about Iran’s inability to adhere to international standards of justice—a word that Iran’s leadership frequently uses—and human rights and President Obama SHould be more outspoken in expressing solidarity with the Iranian people. I know that young people in Iran would like to see President Obama make it more clear that he’s not indifferent to their cause, that he’s rooting for them.

I think there is a way to dialogue with the Iranian government on urgent national security issues—like nuclear proliferation, Afghanistan, and Iraq—without betraying the millions of Iranians who view their government as illegitimate and continue to strive for political change. U.S. dialogue with the Soviet Union during the 1980s is perhaps a useful template.

This is an incredibly important time in Iran’s history and we want to be able to look back years from now and say we were on the right side of history. I sometimes fear that we may look back years from now and see that there was a tremendous opportunity to help champion and facilitate the cause of political change in Iran, but rather than taking it seriously we focused all of our attention on the nuclear issue.

MEP: Part of the reason that it appears that the U.S. and Iran continue to be unable to communicate with one another is that they don’t trust one another. How then do you balance the fact that in supporting the opposition you would be playing into the exact fears of the Iranian regime while trying to communicate with them?

Sadjadpour: The short answer to that question is I don’t think the regime, particularly Khamenei, wants to be disabused of their mistrust of the United States. It is politically and ideologically expedient for them to have the U.S. as an adversary, so they have a convenient culprit when, among other things, their population rises up, economic malaise worsens, or ethnic minorities agitate.

President Obama has made more effort than any U.S. president in the last three decades to try and build confidence with Tehran—including writing two private letters to Khamenei—and the U.S. took great pains not to intervene in Iran’s internal affairs at a time, post-election, when they were most vulnerable. I think this is clear to most Iranians, and most European, Russian, and Chinese officials I encounter acknowledge as much.

For many years now, so many of us have argued that if the U.S. can engage Iran and reintegrate it in the international community and open up its economy, this would foment political reform in Tehran. I think people fail to realize that Khamenei understands that argument very well, in fact he probably agrees with it, and for precisely that reason he’s resisted confidence building with the U.S.

MEP: Then the question is do you think there is any chance of progress, if accommodation is Khamenei’s ultimate fear?

Sadjadpour: I’m very skeptical about the prospect of a major diplomatic breakthrough with this Iranian government. I believe the underlying problem we have with Iran has more to do with the character of its regime than its nuclear ambitions. In other words, as long as Khamenei is leader and Ahmadinejad is president, Tehran will not be able or willing to meet us half-way, or even a third Of the way, on our various issues of contention.