Thursday
Dec102009
Iran Analysis: Are Rafsanjani and National Unity Plan "Spent Forces"?
Thursday, December 10, 2009 at 4:17
Many thanks to readers and EA colleagues who gave valuable feedback and criticism on yesterday's analysis of the meetings between clerics and Hashemi Rafsanjani discussing moves for a National Unity Plan manoeuvring between the Ahmadinejad Government and the Green opposition.
A basic but, I think, important start to a reply: there is a big difference between questioning whether meetings took place and questioning whether those meetings will be effective.
Iran Exclusive: Clerics and Rafsanjani Plan The “Third Way” of Unity
The Latest from Iran (10 December): Reading the Chessboard
Almost all the reaction has focused on that second question. Some readers noted, quite rightly, that Nasser Makarem-Shirazi is the only Ayatollah who has gone public, and then in general terms regarding "unity" rather than in reference to the meetings. That's a fair point, even though we have information that other senior clerics have been involved in the discussions.
Some readers have questioned whether any Plan can get the approval of the Supreme Leader or, alternatively, the Revolutionary Guard.
Again, that is a necessary challenge, but any Plan is likely to be a tactical move against the authority of the President rather than a strategic approach for re-alignment or major change in the Iranian system. The question then becomes not whether Ayatollah Khamenei will defy any proposal revising velayat-e-faqih but whether he will side with the "third way" against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (I agree that, if the Revolutionary Guard rather than the Supreme Leader are in charge that even this is problematic, but I don't start from that assumption at this point.)
Note: there is a related issue here as to whether the Supreme Leader is in an unshakeable position where he can wield a veto without any repercussions on his position. So far, I think that is true, but there have been rumblings during this crisis aimed at Khamenei's undisputed authority. While these seemed to have been quelled, a firm No No No by the Supreme Leader to a Plan which has wide support could risk a backlash such as that against his 19 June speech trying to close off the Presidential election.
Perhaps the most significant criticism, however, is that neither the clerics nor Rafsanjani now have that much influence. As one EA colleague put it bluntly yesterday, Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi is a "spent force" and Rafsanjani "no longer has substantial power".
That, to me, is a telling statement. Throughout this crisis, one of the recurrent assumptions has been that Rafsanjani --- the master political operator, "the Shark" --- could play a decisive role in this conflict. That assumption underlay the excitement around his mid-July Friday Prayer speech and the disappointment over his non-appearance at prayers in August (and since) and the weak statement of the Assembly of Experts under his leadership.
In September, however, protesters were chanting on Qods Day, "Hashemi, where are you?". The possibility arose that they were chanting this not because they needed Rafsanjani but because they now felt they could get along without him.
In October we carried the news, offered by Habibollah Asgharoladi, that Rafsanjani had taken the National Unity Plan to the Supreme Leader. Since nothing more was heard, that approach was probably rebuffed.
So, to me, it is quite likely that Rafsanjani has tried to re-establish not only the Plan but his own place in Iranian politics with the recent meetings. Arguing that the Plan is likely to go nowhere implies that Rafsanjani, amidst the continued threats to his family and his own retreat from public apprearances since August, is likely to go nowhere. He is now an isolated as well as a spent force.
But is that the case? An EA source reports that Asgharoladi, in addition to his recent meeting with Rafsanjani, also saw the President. He criticised Ahmadinejad for his weak relationships with the senior clerics and Rafsanjani and for his support of the controversial former 1st Vice President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.
An EA colleague cautions that Asgharoladi and his party are now marginal political actors, but the Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar renewed his attack on Ahmadinejad yesterday. He criticised Ahmadinejad for the way the President has dealt with and treated the parliament, and he also derided the interference of the Revolutionary Guard in politics and the economy. It may be far from incidental that Bahonar had been a supporter of the National Unity Plan earlier in the autumn.
An EA colleague may have gotten to the heart of the matter and any "Third Way": "The one element that could tip the balance, as said in the past, would be the Larijani brothers swaying towards the Rafs camp. That has hasn't happened yet."
Yet. Ali Larijani, as Speaker of Parliament, could be a catalytic force given the hostility to Ahmadinejad amongst key Parliamentary members. His brother Sadegh, head of Iran's judiciary, may also have a role: yesterday, the newspaper Jomhoori Islami --- owned by Masih Mohajeri, who accompanied Rafsanjani to the Mashhad meetings last week --- asked Sadegh Larijani, "Why don’t you take action against Ahmadinejad and his friends who corrupt and play with people's religious beliefs?"
After 24 hours of reflection, the easy decision is to stand by the exclusive we published yesterday: at least in the eyes of those who met last week --- clerics, Asgharoladi, and Rafsanjani --- the National Unity Plan is not a "spent force".
The tougher analysis is: what next? Given the caveats that readers put yesterday, it is time to put away any thought of Rafsanjani --- for all his past prowess --- being the Shark who changes the political waters. More big fish are needed.
But will they surface?
A basic but, I think, important start to a reply: there is a big difference between questioning whether meetings took place and questioning whether those meetings will be effective.
Iran Exclusive: Clerics and Rafsanjani Plan The “Third Way” of Unity
The Latest from Iran (10 December): Reading the Chessboard
Almost all the reaction has focused on that second question. Some readers noted, quite rightly, that Nasser Makarem-Shirazi is the only Ayatollah who has gone public, and then in general terms regarding "unity" rather than in reference to the meetings. That's a fair point, even though we have information that other senior clerics have been involved in the discussions.
Some readers have questioned whether any Plan can get the approval of the Supreme Leader or, alternatively, the Revolutionary Guard.
Again, that is a necessary challenge, but any Plan is likely to be a tactical move against the authority of the President rather than a strategic approach for re-alignment or major change in the Iranian system. The question then becomes not whether Ayatollah Khamenei will defy any proposal revising velayat-e-faqih but whether he will side with the "third way" against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (I agree that, if the Revolutionary Guard rather than the Supreme Leader are in charge that even this is problematic, but I don't start from that assumption at this point.)
Note: there is a related issue here as to whether the Supreme Leader is in an unshakeable position where he can wield a veto without any repercussions on his position. So far, I think that is true, but there have been rumblings during this crisis aimed at Khamenei's undisputed authority. While these seemed to have been quelled, a firm No No No by the Supreme Leader to a Plan which has wide support could risk a backlash such as that against his 19 June speech trying to close off the Presidential election.
Perhaps the most significant criticism, however, is that neither the clerics nor Rafsanjani now have that much influence. As one EA colleague put it bluntly yesterday, Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi is a "spent force" and Rafsanjani "no longer has substantial power".
That, to me, is a telling statement. Throughout this crisis, one of the recurrent assumptions has been that Rafsanjani --- the master political operator, "the Shark" --- could play a decisive role in this conflict. That assumption underlay the excitement around his mid-July Friday Prayer speech and the disappointment over his non-appearance at prayers in August (and since) and the weak statement of the Assembly of Experts under his leadership.
In September, however, protesters were chanting on Qods Day, "Hashemi, where are you?". The possibility arose that they were chanting this not because they needed Rafsanjani but because they now felt they could get along without him.
In October we carried the news, offered by Habibollah Asgharoladi, that Rafsanjani had taken the National Unity Plan to the Supreme Leader. Since nothing more was heard, that approach was probably rebuffed.
So, to me, it is quite likely that Rafsanjani has tried to re-establish not only the Plan but his own place in Iranian politics with the recent meetings. Arguing that the Plan is likely to go nowhere implies that Rafsanjani, amidst the continued threats to his family and his own retreat from public apprearances since August, is likely to go nowhere. He is now an isolated as well as a spent force.
But is that the case? An EA source reports that Asgharoladi, in addition to his recent meeting with Rafsanjani, also saw the President. He criticised Ahmadinejad for his weak relationships with the senior clerics and Rafsanjani and for his support of the controversial former 1st Vice President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.
An EA colleague cautions that Asgharoladi and his party are now marginal political actors, but the Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar renewed his attack on Ahmadinejad yesterday. He criticised Ahmadinejad for the way the President has dealt with and treated the parliament, and he also derided the interference of the Revolutionary Guard in politics and the economy. It may be far from incidental that Bahonar had been a supporter of the National Unity Plan earlier in the autumn.
An EA colleague may have gotten to the heart of the matter and any "Third Way": "The one element that could tip the balance, as said in the past, would be the Larijani brothers swaying towards the Rafs camp. That has hasn't happened yet."
Yet. Ali Larijani, as Speaker of Parliament, could be a catalytic force given the hostility to Ahmadinejad amongst key Parliamentary members. His brother Sadegh, head of Iran's judiciary, may also have a role: yesterday, the newspaper Jomhoori Islami --- owned by Masih Mohajeri, who accompanied Rafsanjani to the Mashhad meetings last week --- asked Sadegh Larijani, "Why don’t you take action against Ahmadinejad and his friends who corrupt and play with people's religious beliefs?"
After 24 hours of reflection, the easy decision is to stand by the exclusive we published yesterday: at least in the eyes of those who met last week --- clerics, Asgharoladi, and Rafsanjani --- the National Unity Plan is not a "spent force".
The tougher analysis is: what next? Given the caveats that readers put yesterday, it is time to put away any thought of Rafsanjani --- for all his past prowess --- being the Shark who changes the political waters. More big fish are needed.
But will they surface?
tagged Ali Larijani, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, Habibollah Asgharoladi, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, Jomhoori Islami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Masih Mojaheri, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, National Unity Plan, Sadegh Larijani in Middle East & Iran
Ali Larijani, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, Habibollah Asgharoladi, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, Jomhoori Islami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Masih Mojaheri, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, National Unity Plan, Sadegh Larijani in Middle East & Iran 
2140 GMT: A Special Note for Closing (and for Opening Tomorrow). In another portion of his press confernce, Iran Prosecutor General Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei