Iran Analysis: Why Current US "Smart Sanctions" Aren't Very Smart (Kashani/Sadra)

Two US-based Iranian attorneys, using the pseudonyms "N Kashani" and "M Sadra" write for Tehran Bureau:

...The goal of sanctions was never, at least explicitly, to target the Iranian people, let alone the Iranian diaspora. The economic sanctions were set up with the understanding that there are approximately one million Iranian Americans residing in the United States, and that regardless of a long-running governmental spat and resultant commercial economic embargoes, the practicalities of life dictate that money will need to be transferred to settle estates or to provide assistance to family members.

Accordingly, our laws allow for remittances involving noncommercial transfers, among family members in the United States and Iran, and undertaken within the banking system. However, this obviously breaks down when there are no banks willing to receive wire transfers from even the nonsanctioned, private Iranian banks....

Iranian Americans are exemplary spokespeople for U.S. foreign policy and democratic ideals. The majority are immigrants who arrived in the United States during the past 30 years. They maintain deep ties with family and friends in Iran. Placing unnecessary pressures on Iranian Americans and creating unintended hardships may not only close that vital line of communication, but also create negative impressions regarding U.S. support for democracy in Iran....

The U.S. government should not stick its head in the sand and pretend that Iranians won't send remittances back to their relatives in Iran, or that parents or relatives won't ever need to send money to their loved ones here. Rather than criminalize remittances undertaken through informal means, as the law currently does, the government can shift its policy back toward a sensible recognition of reality by --- ironically enough --- taking a page from its Cuba policy. While the U.S. approach to Cuba is outdated in many ways, it does recognize the need for a remittance program: that sanctions system expressly includes a provision for the licensing of remittance providers that act as a legal means by which to send money to Cuba. The Treasury Department should either designate specific U.S. banks that are authorized to handle remittances to and from Iran, or alternatively, license specialized remittance providers that would operate under sufficient oversight to allay any concerns of sanctions busting. This pragmatic step would prevent innocent individuals, like Banki and other Iranian Americans, from being ensnared in the enmity between the U.S. and Iranian governments.

As recently as February, several gross incongruities between U.S. sanctions and its democracy promotion rhetoric were brought to the Treasury Department's attention --- most particularly, the prohibition over widely used Internet communications software. The Obama administration did the right thing by quickly moving to license Twitter, Facebook, and other information-sharing software tools for use in Iran.

Likewise, the U.S. government should move swiftly to bridge this gap in its sanctions policy. Without addressing this fundamental flaw, we risk alienating a domestic community that is vital to the success of U.S. policy concerning Iran, as well as the Iranian people generally. Reza Banki should not have been prosecuted by the Department of Justice. His imprisonment is now representative of a sanctions policy that needs to change before it seriously undermines the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy goals.

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