The Untold Story Behind a Death Sentence: Iraq, a US Failure, and a Man Named Tariq Aziz

David Ryan, one of the world's leading historians on US foreign policy, reviews unpublished American documents to put this week's events in 30 years of context:

Last week Tariq Aziz, the former Iraqi Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, was sentenced to death by hanging. Unrepresented in court, his Nuremburg-like defence --- I was only carrying out the orders of others --- fell on deaf ears. His son, Ziad, claimed the sentence was motivated by revenge administered by the Da'wa Party of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.

One man, after almost a half-century of political manoeuvres, sitting in a prison cell awaiting his execution. One man whose fate provokes debate not only over his responsibility for the deaths in Iraq but over the past and future of the country. One man whose personal story is only part of a wider tale of leaders and countries who have pursued and failed to achieve influence and dominance.

Da'wa Party recently agreed a deal, brokered by Iran, including the cleric Muqtada al-Sadr; the arrangement, which will see a disproportionate number of Ministries and posts go to Sardists, swung the support of most Shi'a parties behind Maliki.Iran’s supports solidifies Maliki’s position and extends their regional influence, an outcome something that they could not achieve during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War or during the so-called "dual-containment" and "off-shore balancing" of the Clinton Administration in the 1990s.

Even though some US officials in Baghdad have claimed that Iran is responsible for up to 25% of US casualties in Iraq, Washington had to accept the Maliki-Sadr bargain, as the Prime Minister had signalled that he would not extend or "renew [any bases] or give any facilities to the Americans or British after the end of next year". With the US disengaging, American officials quoted in The Guardian of London ruefully observed that the Sadarist worldview and their view of US-Iraqi relations ‘is totally incompatible with any relationship that we could have." One considered it "nothing less than a strategic defeat" for Washington; "they could not have got this more wrong if they tried".

And so the US runs the downward slope of its attempt at regional influence. Washington backed the Shah’s Iran to offset nationalisms in the area and Soviet influence, then cultivated relations with Iraq in the 1970s, and moved to enhance that relationship after 1979 to contain the new regime. After 1990 the US went to war with Iraq, contained both Iraq and Iran through the 1990s, invaded Iraq for unnecessary reasons in 2003 --- at the cost of more than 4425 American lives, 30,000 further casualties, and more than $600 billion, strategically undermined its global standing, "surged" to an inconclusive space that permitted talk of "victory", began the drawdown, and opened the door to the Iranian influence they sought to counter. Not bad for 60 years of effort.

Twenty-six years ago this month Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz met President Ronald Reagan. In a telling comment, Aziz, promoting the idea of a "Board of Directors" for the Middle East stressed that the region "could not accept the idea of a single leader". He argued, "It has been a mistake to try to turn Iran under the Shah into a mini-superpower. These excessive responsibilities had caused his regime to collapse like an overloaded truck."

Now Aziz was offering a new partnership. Iraq had broken relations with Washington during the 1967 War between Israel and Egypt. Eight years later, Secretary of State Kissinger met with Sadun Hammadi, his Iraqi counterpart, to rekindle relations. The Iraqis were reluctant because of two issues: US support for the Kurds and Washington's backing of Israel. Kissinger reassured Hammadi that the United States did not seek to use Israel "to get a bastion of imperialism in the area". He indicated that its borders could be discussed, reducing its size, and in "ten to fifteen years Israel will be like Lebanon – struggling for existence, with no influence in the Arab world".

Despite President Reagan’s amicable stance on Israel, by 1982 Iraq --- now at war with Iran, sought improved relations, paving the way for a restoration of full diplomatic status by 1984 and bringing the Aziz visit to Washington in November.

The objective of the visit was to "set a cooperative but realistic approach to our re-established diplomatic relations". The American "Issues and Objectives" paper identified "a new pragmatism" in Iraq that had been induced by the war with Iran: "national defense, rather than conflict with Israel, Iraq’s primary foreign policy objective" was now paramount. The Soviet reticence to supply Baghdad with weapons at the early stages of the war had brought Iraqi caution over Moscow, and withthe Iranian intransigence on negotiations and a ceasefire, Baghdad sought Western support.

The State Department concluded, "Recognizing the value of our support, Iraq has moderated its policies on some issues (terrorism, UN issues) and has been willing to discuss continuing differences on others (Israel, chemical weapons, human rights), in order to develop our diplomatic dialogue for the past several years." Iraq was regarded as a potential force for regional stability, especially if it accepted the diplomatic initiatives for resolution in the Gulf War, then initiated by Japan.

By the time Secretary of State George Shultz wrote Reagan about the proposed meeting with Aziz, qualms had disappeared in favour of four advantages. The renewed diplomatic relations, frozen for seventeen years, would offset perceptions that the Soviets were "making inroads" in the region at the expense of the US. Second, a renewed Cairo-Amman-Baghdad alignment would strengthen Jordan against the Syrian and radical Palestinian "threat" that Jordan would face if it moved to negotiate with Israel. Third, the State Department assessed "it is significant that Iraq is willing to be seen as moving toward the U.S. even when our ties with Israel are stronger than ever". Finally, the meeting would signal an increased US regional influence just as Iran was trying to portray the "US as powerless to shape regional events".

All of this was covered with the insistence that the US remained neutral over the Iran-Iraq War, even though the renewed contacts with Baghdad facilitated further export of biological and chemical agents. A State Department official summarised, "We should make clear, as a matter of pertinent fact rather than as a challenge or warning, that U.S. foreign policy will remain firmly based on such principles as: concern for human rights; support for the security of all states in the region, including Israel; opposition to the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons; and international cooperation in combating terrorism."

Some concessions were already visible. On November 20, Shultz told Reagan that US ‘vigorous diplomacy’ with Iraq and "Iraq’s wartime need for international support" had led it to expel or suppress terrorist groups. Other concerns were not mentioned, as "diplomatic relations will expand our contacts with an influential Gulf country that shares our antipathy for the spread of radical Islamic violence and that claims to share our interest in regional stability".

National Security AdvisorMcFarlane characterised the meeting as a "historic event" that would strengthen US friends in the region and provide opportunities for the regional peace process. He continued, "Although this step comes at Iraqi initiative, I believe we will be criticized in some quarters for dealing with a ruthless regime that uses brutal methods against its own people and adversaries (e.g. chemical weapons). Nonetheless, we have carefully laid the groundwork for this development and are convinced that the increased influence...that will accrue from normal relations clearly outweighs the potential disadvantages."

So Tariq Aziz met Ronald Reagan on 27 November 1984 in the Oval Office between 11.40 a.m. and 12.05 p.m. The memoranda of conversation is an anodyne transcript of the diplomatic language that covered strategic considerations, tactical concern over diplomatic opportunity and potential public relations disaster, and anxiety on regional resources and Iraq’s oil supplies. Reagan declared the basis for the relationship based on "equality, mutual respect and reciprocity in all areas", a hope ‘that commercial, cultural and educational ties will be strengthened", and the wish that the Gulf War could be resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, leaving both countries intact. Aziz expressed his appreciation for the US assistance toward that end.

"National interest" had prevailed. Baghdad and Washington would work together, amidst Iraq's war and US neutrality, to achieve their goals.

Twenty-six years later, I bet both the White House and Tariq Aziz wish they could rewind the clock.