Iran Analysis: Dead End for Reform --- and Which Way Forward? (Rasoulpour)

Saman Rasoulpour writes in Rooz Online:

How have the events of the past year affected the future of reforms and movements for reform in Iran? This is a question worth asking these days. The protests of the past year, while challenging every aspect of the regime, had one unintended consequence: It exposed significant challenges to the future of reform in Iran. These challenges can be grouped in several categories.

1) Aside from structural constraints facing reforms in Iran, new constraints were born. The most important such constraint was that a vast group of social and political activists were accused of instigating a velvet revolution. They were jailed and imprisoned on that basis. The most avid reformists received the harshest punishments. The prominent leaders of reform efforts were labeled “leaders of the conspiracy”. Reformist groups and parties were banned one after another, either formally or informally. Almost every figure that symbolized reform was shunned and confronted by the regime.

In sum, the regime attempted to suffocate the forces of reform and change. Throughout the past 30 years, rarely have figures who have been shunned by the regime been able to return to the political structure as critics of the ruling factions. 

2) Throughout all these years, the reform movement in Iran faced two general obstacles: on the one hand, the mass disqualification of its candidates running for office and, on the other hand, structural resistance and unlawful interference from various institutions.

One of the main concerns of the reformists has always been about passing through the Guardian Council’s qualification filter. Passing this filter has consistently consumed a portion of the reformists’ energy. But the situation is changed now. Essentially, how can the reformists enter the political structure now? Undoubtedly, the events of the past year and the regime’s oppressive treatment of its opponents have left the Guardian Council free to disqualify candidates en masse. This is the most probable situation. Any other situation would signal a change by the Guardian Council and the regime as a whole. 

3) One of the reform movement’s fundamental weaknesses was that it relied on negotiation at the top without the requisite pressure from the bottom. There was no organized force to put pressure on the system from below, which weakened the reformists and their power to negotiate. But now the situation is reversed. A social force that can put pressure on the regime for change exists. The Green Movement has been born. But no one is there at the top to negotiate and represent the people. The previous weakness is now a strength, while the previous strength is now a weakness. 

4) Reform is a process that, perhaps from the point of view of its supporters, is continuous and will never lose its relevance. But the question is: in the absence of access to the power structure and political power, how can reforms be advanced? Given the current situation, the reformists do not have much of a chance of entering the power structure. But this does not mean that they should suspend their efforts. The reformists must continue to exert their pressure from the outside, in the form of social pressure, in order to remove the barriers to their entry into the power structure. 

Conclusion

Throughout the past thirty years, rarely have figures shunned by the regime been able to return to the power structure. This is true of the reformists as well. Last year’s electoral coup was the beginning of a new era; an era in which people’s desire for change is not be tolerated, as viewed by the regime. This constraint has now been added to the list of prior constraints facing the reformists. The coup regime will hardly be able to return to its pre-coup state.