Iran Nuke Talks Follow-Up: So Why Did the Istanbul Discussions Collapse?

Yesterday I posted an analysis, "How the US Media Missed the Important Story", which sought to highlight a key reason for the failure of this weekend's talks on uranium enrichment between Iran and the 5+1 Powers (US, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany) --- the 5+1's proposal for "third-party enrichment", with more than 90% of Tehran's uranium stock leaving the country, was much tougher than what it put on the table in the discussions of October-November 2009. 

Scott Peterson of The Christian Science Monitor, whom I mentioned in the analysis, has offered us an important follow-up:

European diplomats gave rough details of the updated fuel swap proposal they put to the Iranians. They said it would require Iran to remove the bulk of Iran's LEU (presumably including that enriched to 19.75%), to leave behind the same amount of LEU that would have been left if the original Oct. 2009 deal had been agreed; ie, less than the amount that could technically be enriched further and turned into a single bomb.

Diplomats said the Iranian side listened intently, but had nothing to say about it except to steer talks back to the preconditions. It appears that the Iranians did not offer a counter-proposal. And it was not clear if the European proposal I describe above was just one of several options put on the table. Also not clear are what, precisely, [the head of the 5+1 delegation Catherine Ashton meant when she spoke about "ways to improve transparency through IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] monitoring measures".

Peterson, who is also the author of the study of Iran, Let the Swords Encircle Me, adds, "Those actual details didn't make it into many stories because they appeared not to be the determining factor in the talks on the day."

In other words, for many observers, the key to the talks was that the Iranians had opened the talks by setting two pre-conditions: acknowledgement of Iran's right to enrich uranium and the removal of sanctions. Any proposal by the 5+1 was irrelevant until those pre-conditions were put aside.

Peterson's point is important, although it still does not quite meet my original objection: even if the 5+1 proposal was not as significant for journalists as the Iranian position, failing to mention it gives the misleading impression in their stories that the collapse of the talks was one-sided.

Which leads me to the substantial argument: 

Accepting that the Iranians had put forward a difficult barrier with their two preconditions, isn't this proposal a non-starter as well? Tehran is being asked to give up 90% of its low-enriched stock and almost all/all of its 19.75% stock. Given that President Ahmadinejad was unable to get domestic support for a deal for 60% of LEU in Nov. 2009 (and then there was no issue of 19.75% uranium), I can't see how anyone could believe this is a viable deal.

Put more concisely: "There does not seem to have been any point in either side showing up, given these entrenched positions."

And now to the real follow-up: how will each side portray the Istanbul talks to bolster their positions, both at home and at abroad? And is Istanbul the end of the line for negotiations or --- given the mild line taken by President Ahmadinejad yesterday looking for more talks --- was this merely a mis-step in a continuing dance?