Two Tunisia Analyses: What Has Caused the Current Protests? (Khreeji and Alexander)
Tuesday, January 4, 2011 at 6:46
As the protests in Tunisia, which started almost three weeks begin to capture some attention outside the country, we post two analyses offering an introduction to the issues.
See also our earlier coverage:
29 December: "Escalating Protests over Unemployment"
30 December: "Is This the Fall of the Government?"
31 December: "The Rise of an Economic and Political Crisis"
1 January: "An Inspiring Revolt"
3 January: "WikiLeaks and Tunisia 2008: President Ben Ali's Extended Family --- The Nexus of Corruption"
Intissar Khreeji in Al Jazeera English: "Trouble in Paradise"
Corruption, authoritarianism, repression. Not words that many would associate with the beautiful North African republic of Tunisia, a popular summer holiday destination for many Brits.
But the recent attempted suicide of a 24 year-old graduate, whose desperation at being mistreated by police led him to set himself on fire publicly outside the local police station, has sparked interest in this small, quiet country, long considered by the West to be a haven of stability and moderation and a rare "success story" in the region.
In nearly every field, Tunisia has been a model student of the West, embracing the hallmarks of modernity with zeal. Bourguiba, the country’s first president after its independence, sought to refashion Tunisian society along the French mould, from the aggressive secularisation of all public space and banning of the headscarf to introducing Enlightenment philosophy into high school curricula.
This modernisation process, it was assumed, would lead to a more advanced, prosperous and stable society freed of the chains of despotism and religion holding back the Arab world.
On the surface, the wave of protests that has swept Tunisia for the past two weeks were provoked by the dire situation of unemployed youth in the country, which has one of the highest literacy rates in the Arab world yet suffers from 30% youth unemployment. At least, this is how most international media have portrayed the situation.
However, any discerning journalist who digs a little further can see that these protests are, like similar outbursts across the Arab world, the product of deep dissatisfaction at decades of sustained political repression, rampant corruption and routine silencing of all forms of political dissent.
Tunisia today exhibits all the symptoms of political decay that can be seen in surrounding Arab countries, with rising unemployment figures, widespread dissatisfaction and political unrest in the face of repeated extensions of so-called democratic mandates (President Ben Ali recently attempted to amend the Constitution to allow him a sixth term in office).
Any criticism of the President can lead to persecution and imprisonment, torture is routine and opposition parties are almost nonexistent. Not a single human rights monitoring group is allowed to operate legally and freely in the country.
Despite being a small country of just over 10 million, it has imprisoned more journalists than any other Arab country since 2000.
The plight of Tunisia demonstrates the fallacy of the US mantra of "stability over democracy". A guiding principle of US and European policies in the region, this equation has turned out to be a false choice and an extremely dangerous assumption.
US and European governments have consistently privileged one limb of the "stability-democracy" equation, on the grounds that the repression of entire populations in the Arab world is but a small price to pay for the stable conditions necessary for us to benefit from the vast economic opportunities in the region and the counter-terrorism assistance they can give us.
However, the frequent outbreaks of political turmoil across the region demonstrate that stability and democracy are not part of a zero-sum game but two sides of the same coin. The US government has itself come to this conclusion, noting on the White House website in 2007 that "on 9/11, we realized that years of pursuing stability to promote peace left us with neither… The pre-9/11 status quo was dangerous and unacceptable".
Yet, despite full knowledge of the extent of despotism in the country (as revealed in the US cables from the US ambassador to the country), the US continues to ply the regime with financial, political and military support.
Christopher Alexander in Foreign Policy: The Protest Wave
January traditionally has been Tunisia's month for political drama -- a general strike in January, 1978; a Libyan-supported insurrection in January, 1980; bread riots in January, 1984. This year, however, January will be hard pressed to top the previous December. The last two weeks of 2010 witnessed the most dramatic wave of social unrest in Tunisia since the 1980s. What began with one young man's desperate protest against unemployment in Sidi Bouzid, in Tunisia's center-west, spread quickly to other regions and other issues. Within days of Mohamed Bouazizi's attempted suicide in front of the local government office, students, teachers, lawyers, journalists, human rights activists, trade unionists, and opposition politicians took to the streets in several cities, including Tunis, to condemn the government's economic policies, its repression of all critics, and a mafia-style corruption that enriches members of the president's family.
In a country known for authoritarian stability, it is easy to see this unrest as a harbinger of dramatic change. In fact, the protests have been building for at least two years. The frustration is rooted in a deep history of unbalanced economic growth. Several organizations have helped to convert this frustration into collective protest. To date, the December protests have produced a cabinet reshuffle, a governor's sacking, and a renewed commitment to job creation in disadvantaged regions. Whether they lead to more dramatic change remains to be seen. If Ben Ali's rule is not in immediate danger, the protests at least suggest that his governing strategy is in serious trouble.
Ben Ali's rule has relied on a skillful combination of cooptation and repression. By pledging his fidelity to democracy and human rights early in his tenure, he deftly hijacked the core of the liberal opposition's message. At the same time, he used electoral manipulation, intimidation, and favors to co-opt leaders of ruling party organs and civil society organizations. Those who remained beyond the reach of these tools felt the force of an internal security apparatus that grew dramatically in the 1990s. Most Tunisians grudgingly accepted Ben Ali's heavy-handedness through the 1990s. Authoritarian rule was the price they paid for stability that could attract tourists and investors. Ben Ali was an effective, if uncharismatic, technocratic who beat back the Islamists, generated growth, and saved the country from the unrest that plagued Algeria.
Over the last five years, however, the fabric of Ben Ali's authoritarianism has frayed. Once it became clear that the Islamists no longer posed a serious threat, many Tunisians became less willing to accept the government's heavy-handedness. The regime also lost some of its earlier deftness. Its methods became less creative and more transparently brutal. The government seemed less willing to at least play at any dialogue with critics or opposition parties. Arbitrary arrests, control of the print media and Internet access, and physical attacks on journalists, human rights and opposition party activists became more common. So, too, did stories of corruption -- not the usual kickbacks and favoritism that one might expect, but truly Mafia-grade criminality that lined the pockets of Ben Ali's wife and her family. The growth of Facebook, Twitter, and a Tunisian blogosphere -- much of it based outside the country -- made it increasingly easy for Tunisians to learn about the latest arrest, beating, or illicit business deal involving the president's family.
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