Terrorism Weekly: The Problems of Informers --- From Iraq to the London Bombing

Mohammed Junaid BabarTwo stories in the news week point to the importance of human sources in supplying intelligence but also the risks involved.

The first is the well-known story of “Curveball”, an Iraqi named Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi. Under the control of German intelligence, he supplied information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs.His "information" was an important part of the American case for invading Iraq, used by George Bush in his 2003 State of the Union speech and by Secretary of State Colin Powell in a February 2003 speech to the United Nations’ Security Council. Although some already had questions about the reliability of the source, it was only after the WMDs didn’t turn up that the inaccuracy was confirmed.

This week the Guardian interviewed “Curveball” who confirmed he made up his WMD information with the goal of encouraging the invasion of Iraq.

Then there is the less-known case of Mohammed Junaid Babar, displaying the very different approach to counter-terrorism on both sides of the Atlantic but also the crucial importance that informers play in counter-terrorism investigations.

By its nature, terrorism frequently involves small groups of tightly-connected individuals who are well aware of state efforts at electronic surveillance. They avoid using telephones and e-mails, if used, are sent using encryption and in code. That reality, combined with a frequent lack of familiarity on the part of counter-terrorism forces about those groups, makes it even more useful to recruit someone with inside knowledge or even to infiltrate someone into the targeted group. Either approach is problematic, but it is the first option that is the more difficult, since the individual recruited as an informer may literally already have blood on his/her hands.

Both the UK and the US use informers in combatting terrorism. In the US, however, the informers play a much more public role, particularly as crucial witnesses at terrorism trials. Britain at one time employed a similar approach in Northern Ireland's terrorism trials, using so-called “supergrasses” to help obtain convictions. However, controversy over the reliability of witnesses (a long-time allegation against informers who testify) led to a scrapping of the system. Informers are still used in the UK in counter-terrorism operations, but their roles and identities remain hidden from public view.

This different approach and its implications was on display this past week in the case of Babar, who had helped establish and fund a terrorism training camp in northwest Pakistan at which two of the eventual London bombers of July 2005, including ringleader Mohammed Siddique Khan, would train. In a story broken by the Guardian, it was revealed that Babar had quietly been released from prison after serving only 4 1/2 years of what could have been a 70-year sentence. The justification for doing so was the help that he had provided in a number of counter-terrorism cases, including in the US, Canada, and the UK. His reward was a reduced prison sentence, a common tactic in the US to gain the cooperation of terrorism suspects or even convicted terrorists.

A similar approach was attempted with Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian al-Qaeda member, charged with bombing Los Angeles International Airport as part of the so-called Millennium Bomb plot. In Ressam’s case, the deal that would have allowed a reduced prison sentence fell through after he stopped cooperating with the US government.)

When the news of Babar‘s release broke in the Guardian, outrage ensued. Very quickly a comparison was made with the early of the release of the Lockerbie bomber by the Scottish government, a move that had outraged the United States. Further, there was a suggestion that Babar may have been an American informer at the time that he set up the camp. This appears to have been based on a comment by the trial judge who said that the cooperation had begun “before his arrest.”.

However, this appears not to have been the case for one obvious reason: if Baba had been an informer prior to his arrest then he would not have been tried and convicted and serving a prison sentence in the first place. This is almost unheard of in the treatment of informers; to do so would damage future recruitment efforts. If Babar was a long-term informer, instead of becoming an informer once he was caught, he would have been well-paid, received a new identity and been resettled by the US Government as a reward.

The Babar case points to the complexities around the use of informers. Issues of law, ethics, and transparency are not easily resolved by governments who prefer to sweep the entire subject under the carpet of secrecy. And --- whatever one's moral viewpoint --- informers are undeniably useful in situations involving life and death.

Steve Hewitt is Senior Lecturer in American and Canadian Studies at the University of Birmingham and author of Snitch: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer and The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the Home Front since 9/11

Human Sources = Human Problems

Two stories in the news week point to the importance of human sources in supplying intelligence but also the inherent risks involved with this type of intelligence.

The first case is the well-know case of “Curveball”, an Iraqi named Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, who while under the control of German intelligence supplied information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. His intelligence was an important part of the American case for invading Iraq, including by George Bush in his 2003 State of the Union speech and by Secretary of State Colin Powell in a February 2003 speech to the United Nations’ Security Council. Although some already had questions about the reliability of the source, it was only after the WMDs didn’t turn up that the inaccuracy was confirmed. This week the Guardian interviewed “Curveball” who confirmed he had made up his WMD information with the goal of encouraging the invasion of Iraq.

The second case is the less well-known example of Mohammed Junaid Babar. His case displays the very different approach to counter-terrorism on both sides of the Atlantic but also the crucial importance that informers play in counter-terrorism investigations. As I point out in my book, Snitch, informers are particularly crucial when dealing with terrorism. Because of its very nature, terrorism frequently involves small groups of tightly connected individuals who are well aware of state efforts at electronic surveillance, thus they avoid using telephones and emails, if used, are sent using encryption and in code. That reality, combined with a frequent lack of familiarity on the part of counter-terrorism forces towards those groups involved in In such activities, makes it even more useful to recruit someone with inside knowledge or even to infiltrate an insider into the targeted group. Either approach is problematic, but it is the first option that is the most problematic of all since the individual recruited as an informer may literally already have blood on their hands.

Both the UK and the US use informers in combatting terrorism. In the US, however, the informers play a much more public role, particularly as crucial witnesses at terrorism trials. The United Kingdom at one time employed a similar approach in Northern Ireland terrorism trials, using so called “supergrasses” to help obtain convictions. However, controversy over the reliability of witnesses (a long-time allegation against informers who testify) led to a scrapping of the system. Informers are still used in the UK in counter-terrorism operations but their roles and identities remain hidden from public view.

This different approach and its implications was on display this past week in the case of Babar. In a story broken by the Guardian, it was revealed that Babar, who had helped establish and fund a terrorism training camp in north-west Pakistan at which two of the eventual 7 July 2005 bombers, including ringleader Mohammed Siddique Khan, would train at, had quietly been released from prison after serving only a sentence of four-and-a-half years in prison of what could have been a 70-year sentence. The justification for doing so was the help that he had provided in a number of counter-terrorism cases, including in the US, Canada and the UK. His reward was a reduced prison sentence, a common tactic in the US to gain the cooperation of terrorism suspects or even convicted terrorists. A similar approach was attempted with Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian al-Qaeda member, charged with bombing Los Angeles International Airport as part of the so-called millennium bomb plot. In Ressam’s case, the deal that would have allowed a reduced prison sentence partially fell through after he stopped cooperating with the US government.

When the news of Babar‘s release broke in the Guardian, outrage ensued. Very quickly a comparison was made with the early of the release of the Lockerbie bomber by the Scottish government, a move that had outraged the United States. Further, there was a suggestion that Babar may have been an American informer at the time that he set up the camp. This appears to have been based on a comment by the trial judge who said that the cooperation of had begun “before his arrest.” However, this clearly appears not to have been the case for one obvious reason: if he had been an informer prior to his arrest then he would not have been tried and convicted and serving a prison sentence in the first place. This is almost unheard of tradecraft in the treatment of informers of this type for the simple reason that to do so would damage future recruitment efforts. If Babar was a long-term informer instead of becoming an informer once he was caught, based on practice elsewhere, he would have been well paid, received a new identity and been resettled by the US government as a reward for his help.

The Babar case points to the complexities around the use of informers. The use of informers, particularly in counter-terrorism cases, raise legal, transparency, and ethical issues that are not easily answered by governments who prefer to sweep the entire subject under the carpet of secrecy. In turn, there is the undeniable utility of informers in cases that may literally involve life and death.

Steve Hewitt is Senior Lecturer in American and Canadian Studies at the University of Birmingham and author of Snitch: A History of the Modern Intelligence Informer and The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism on the Home Front since 9/11.)