Iran Snapshot: Supreme Leader v. Ahmadinejad in 3 Paragraphs

I was prompted to write this by a question on another website, trying to come to grips with the political conflict inside Iran: "At least several high officials appear to believe Khamenei could simply have 'ordered' Ahmadinejad to retain [Minister of Intelligence Heydar] Moslehi whether Ahmadinejad wanted to or not. If push comes to shove and the President simply stands his ground, the Supreme Leader may simply overrule his decision on a matter that’s plainly within the President’s authority under the constitution?"

Re: “Khamenei could simply have ‘ordered’ Ahmadinejad to retain Moslehi whether Ahmadinejad wanted to or not."

Effectively, that is what the Supreme Leader’s office did, through the letter to Moslehi and through Khamenei’s public statements. The Supreme Leader was supported by the leadership of the Revolutionary Guards (see snap analysis opening today's LiveBlog), by clerics from Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi to Tehran Friday Prayer leader Kazem Seddiqi, by prominent legislators such as Deputy Speaker of Parliament Bahonar and the 90 MPs who called for questioning of Ahmadinejad, and by the judiciary with the arrests of some in Ahmadinejad’s office (including provocative claims such as “sorcery” and “exorcism”).

This power play by the Supreme Leader’s office might have been countered if some of those groups had given support to Ahmadinejad. None of them did, pointing to his narrow (and arguably shrinking) base for power within the establishment.

Three “red lines” have been set down for the President: 1) no more moves over the Ministry of Intelligence; 2) no manipulation of 2012 Parliamentary elections; 3) no anointing of his right-hand man Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as a successor