Turkey Special: A Tangled Situation --- Ankara, The Kurds, and US Messages

Recep Tayyip ErdoganLooking for an example of how the intertwining of conflicts within Syria and Turkey has led to complications and delicate manoeuvres? Consider Washington's latest step after clashes between Turkish soldiers and the Kurdish insurgency PKK.

Following the deaths of three troops and 20 PKK members two weeks ago in the southeastern province of Hakkari, US Ambassador to Turkey Francis Ricciardone said that Washington had offered Ankara the same tactics and methods used to find and kill Osama bin Laden, but that this had been rejected.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reassured the public: 

There are so many differences [between the fight against al-Qaeda and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq]. Osama bin Laden was captured in his house, our fight against PKK is continuing in the caves of mountainous places. 

Why did the US put Erdogan in a difficult position with its Ambassador's revelation?

There are two reasons. The first is Ankara’s deaf ear to the Kurdish reality along its southern border, as the insurgent PKK emerges with organic ties to Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government and its brigades. The second is the gradually-increasing pressure from Turkey’s Kurds, who do not want to miss the opportunities in the current regional developments to achieve their long-awaited democratic autonomy.

Iran is allowing the PKK to use the Shehidan camp. Syria's Kurds are effectively enjoying an autonomous region. Iraq's Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, at odds with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, is more than holding his own. When Maliki tried to improve his posoition with a military deal with Moscow, this only raised Barazani's importance in the eyes of Washington. All the while, the PKK enjoys more room for manoeuvre amid the inflexible Syrian policy of Ankara.

Reports that the PKK was in alliance with the Assad regime were misleading, even before Syria's Kurds started displaying their autonomy in cities such as Afrin, Kobane, Qamishlo and Amuda. The Hawler Agreement between the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), brokered by Barzani in July, moved towards Kurdish unity under one flag with an organized and central military force supplied by the PYD in the West Kurdistan region.   

Barzani sees an opportunity to put his mark on contemporary Kurdish history as the nation’s father, supporting unity with economically-booming Mosul and Kirkuk. He has admitted the training of Syrian peshmergas in case of a need to intervene in Kurdish towns in Syria.

Meanwhile, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, has called on Syrian Kurdish forces to maintain their neutral position until Assad is gone, while the PKK's fighters try to control territory southeast Turkey, despite the Turkish Armed Forces’ operations this summer.

The Erdogan Government tried to exploit a possible rift between Barzani and Ocalan over this strategy, using an MP of  the opposition Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)). Leyla Zana, to float the idea of a negotiation of the Kurdish issue; however, Turkey's Kurdish bloc was well-prepared and Barzani had to step back. The PKK maintained the strategy of an active presence in the southeast, while boosting Syrian Kurds as a possible counter to Ankara’s intervention.  

PKK deputy leader Murat Karayilan, has denied accusations that the movement is fighting for Damascus --- "the Assad regime will collapse sooner or later" --- and said that there are no PKK members inside Syria. That position, however, is far from an alliance with the forces trying to overthrow Assad. While the international community tries to agree its next move, Syrian Kurds will do their best to avoid any friction --- even as this approach was tested on Friday by a deadly clash with the Free Syrian Army in Aleppo --- while the PKK and pro-Kurdish BDP seem to increase the pressure on the government until talks between Ocalan and the government kicks off. 

Eight days ago, at the second extraordinary congress of the BDP, co-chairwoman Gultan Kisanak called for freedom for Ocalan and for Syrian Kurds. Kisanak’s partner, Selahattin Demirtas, said that Turkey couldn’t be ruled from a single centre and said that they wanted democratic autonomy for Kurds as well as 15 to 20 regions of the country.

Demirtas also stressed the importance of Ocalan’s political role: "The only person who can stop deaths is Ocalan. If the government has put him in a 12-metre hole, there is a mistake here." Barzani echoed to Kurds in Syria and to the Erdogan government: “Turkey should talk to Ocalan.”

Then, after Washington's reaction, Erdogan said that the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) could have talks with the PKK. President Abdullah Gul gave support and said that dialogue was vital to avoid a deadlock. However, there were other challenges, after six weeks of hunger strike by more than 500 PKK and PJAK prisoners; yet, the Government has taken no steps othen than sending Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin to talk to the detainees. 

Is the Government talking to Ocalan now? The BDP says there are no negotiations going on and Ankara is silent. Pressure is being exerted on Erdogan from his own party: the AKP's deputy and the head of the Constitutional Committee at the Parliament, Burhan Kuzu, said that education in Kurdish language would divide the country. 

And Washington’s next moves? On 25 October, US Army Europe Commander Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling --- in contrast to the Turkish military's denials --- said American troops were deployed in Turkey. The head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, adjusted this message --- the “teams” were sent not just for the Syrian crisis but also for humanitarian reasons. At the same time, Dempsey offered an important revelation:

We’ve been having an intelligence-sharing regime with Turkey for about the last five years. And one of the things we're looking to do now is learn lessons from the last five years, recognize a different situation on Turkey's southeastern border, and see if there's other things we could do to -- to assist them, as well as to reduce the threat of ballistic missile attack inside Turkey. 

Well, you know, what --- what Prime Minister Erdogan said, that's his country, and I wouldn't question his approach to this. He's been doing quite well, actually. But we --- we offer partners, and Turkey is not only a close bilateral partner, they're part of our NATO alliance --- we offer them to share our expertise and also to learn from their experiences. And sometimes they take our offer and sometimes they don't. 

Dempsey’s message was clear to the Prime Minister: "His country needs to take lessons from a different situation on Turkey's southeastern border."

An intervention from the US Ambassador, a challenge from Washington's top military commander --- what is “Erdogan’s country” to do now? Facing the Americans, Iraq's Barzani, and the PKK --- all in the context of the evolving Syrian crisis --- will Ankara change its tough-on-Kurds inside Turkey? Will it make a move regarding Syria's Kurds? Or will it try to gain time until Ankara can see a clearer message from Washington following the US elections?