Iran Document: Tehran's Official Proposals in the Nuclear Talks in Moscow

Moscow Nuclear Talks, 18-19 JuneInitially posted by Laura Rozen and Barbara Slavin in Al-Monitor and now posted by Iranian outlets such as Tehran Times and Fars:

The file consists of three major sections:

1. Iran's Package of Proposals to the world Powers
2. Evidence and documents proving that uranium enrichment is Iran's inalienable right despite the western allegations
3. And Iran's response to the proposals offered by the world powers

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In the Name of ALLAH, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

A framework for comprehensive and targeted dialogue for long term cooperation among 7 countries

A. Guiding Principles:

Parties agree and assert:

Good will,
The spirit of cooperation,
Mutual respect,
Avoiding measures which violate good will, spirit of cooperation and mutual respect, giving priority to the issues of mutual interest,
Considering NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] as the cornerstone of talks,
Commitment to the rights and obligations specified in the NPT, and avoiding preconditions.

And agree to continue their talks in a new process which is:

Comprehensive,
Long term,
Sustainable,
Mutually agreed,
Constructive,
Of tangible measures,
On the basis of step by step approach, and
Based on reciprocity.

B. Objectives

To normalize Iran's nuclear file in the UN Security Council and in the Board of Governors by total termination of the UNSC [United Nations Security Council, unilateral, and multilateral sanctions against Iran.
To assure and guarantee the Islamic Republic of Iran of practically enjoying all its nuclear rights within the framework of the NPT and regulations of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], in exchange for implementing its safeguard obligations.
To achieve a sustainable nuclear cooperation for transferring advanced technologies.
To conclude a comprehensive agreement on collective commitments in the areas of economic, political, security and international cooperation.

C. Issues

Nuclear issues

Non-nuclear issues

D. Structure of the Process

1. Timing:

Meeting(s) between Dr. Saeed Jalili and Lady Ashton and the representatives of other 6 countries: every 3 months.

Expert Meeting(s) of the 7 countries chaired by deputies of Dr. Jalili and Lady Ashton: prior to each main meeting.

2. Agenda:

Combination of a set of nuclear and non-nuclear issues based on priorities suggested by the deputies meetings.

3. Agenda for the Moscow Meeting: the Islamic Republic of Iran's proposals and 5+1 proposal which were raised during Baghdad meeting.

E. Reciprocal Steps

To materialize the above mentioned objectives, and in order to:

First, legally and technically pave the way for guaranteeing the success of the talks in a short period of time in a way that it respects the legitimate and legal rights and obligations;
Second, define and agree on reciprocal steps in a way that it clearly sets the ultimate outcome of the process of the talks (namely, normalization of Iran's nuclear file in the UN Security Council and in the Board of Governors along with cancellation of all UNSC and other types of sanctions);
Third, facilitate and accelerate the definition of "confidence building reciprocal steps" and "desirable options for cooperation" in nuclear and non - nuclear areas;

Parties will commit themselves;

1. To define and implement the confidence building reciprocal steps in a "simultaneous", "equipollent" and "balanced" manner, and
2. to obligate to the rights and obligations envisaged in the NPT.

Therefore, no agreement shall and can undermine NPT's rights and obligation, or interpreted in a way that it either restricts or spoils them.

a. Nuclear Issues

Step One: Guidelines

Commencement of cooperation and reciprocal steps requires an appropriate context and a clear vision of the process. Within such context, attestation of parties to each other side's demand indicates the required commitment to conclude the process of talks.

The Islamic Republic of Iran emphasizes once again on its commitments under the NPT and its opposition to nuclear weapons based on the Supreme Leader's Fatwa against such weapons. 5+1 officially recognizes the nuclear rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran based on Article 4 of the NPT, particularly its enrichment activities, and will openly announce it.

Step Two: Transparency Measures

The Islamic Republic of Iran will continue its broad cooperation with the IAEA within the framework of its legal and Safeguard obligations as before. Since baseless accusations and ambiguities have been raised regarding Iran's past nuclear activities, Iran is asked to answer such allegations beyond its legal obligations.

The Islamic Republic of Iran will transparently cooperate with the IAEA on the issue of "possible military dimensions" of Iran's nuclear program (PMD).

5+1 will terminate all unilateral and multilateral sanctions (out of the UNSC framework) in order to make transparency on their intentions.

Step Three: Confidence building steps

The Islamic Republic of Iran's enrichment activities providing enriched fuel needed for TRR [Tehran Research Reactor] are under the supervision of the IAEA's inspectors and cameras continuously. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been asked for taking some additional confidence building measures in this respect, although it has no more obligations in this regard;

The Islamic Republic of Iran will cooperate with 5+1 to provide enriched fuel needed for TRR.

In order to build confidence on their intentions, 5+1 will terminate the sanctions and will remove Iran's nuclear file from UNSC agenda.

Step Four: Strengthening cooperation on mutual interests

In order to enhance assurance and confidence and to fulfill parties interests, parties will agree to start and boost their cooperation on the following issues:

The Islamic Republic of Iran's priorities: Designing and building nuclear power plants, and research reactors.

5+1 priorities: light water research reactors, nuclear safety and security, nuclear fusion

b. Non- nuclear Issues

Step Five: Strengthening joint cooperation

For the purpose of broadening the dimensions of trust and confidence and working on the common grounds of interest in non-nuclear areas, parties agree to start their cooperation on the following issues;

The Islamic Republic of Iran's priorities: Regional issues especially Syria and Bahrain 5+1 priorities: combating Piracy and counter narcotic activities.

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Part 2

In the Name of ALLAH, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Why Enrichment is an Inalienable and Chartered Right under the NPT?

The right to enrichment in the NPT Article 4 of the NPT draws no limitation on the kind of technology or the level of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including the full fuel-cycle (enrichment).

4.1: Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this treaty.

4.2: All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

The right to enrichment in the NPT

2. In the records of the negotiations led to the codification of the NPT [and] in the texts, records, and documents of the negotiations which led to the codification, adoption and ratification of the NPT, there is no suggestion or reference to the possibility to limit the kind of technology or the level of peaceful applications of nuclear technology .

The right to enrichment in the NPT

3. In the documents of the NPT review conferences (which are adopted by consensus), with reference to Article 4, respect for choices and the fuel cycle policies of the NPT members is underlined. See:

1975 conference: NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, p. 6
First UNGA Conference on Disarmament 1978: SSOD I
1985 conference: NPT/CONF.III/64/I, Annex I, par. 7
2000 conference: NPT/CONF.2000/28, Parts I, II
2010 conference: NPT/CONF.2010/50, Vol. I

The right to enrichment in the NPT

The Conference of 1975 recognizes that regional or multilateral nuclear fuel cycle centers may be an advantageous way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many States. (NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, p. 6)

The right to enrichment in SSOD I

The First UNGA special session on Disarmament in 1978 final document was adopted by consensus. In para 68, it explicitly says that "non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the rights of the NPT members for full use of their peaceful nuclear energy program. In this document the priorities and interests of the member states is underlined. In para 69 the right to have fuel cycle and respect for the choices and policies are re-emphasized.

68. Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International cooperation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

69. Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international cooperation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy provided that the agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

Source: UNGA Official Records, Supplement No. 4, A/S-10/2, p.9

The Conference of 1985 confirms that each country's choice and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies. (NPT/CONF.III/64/I, Annex I, par. 7).

The U.S Official View on Nuclear Enrichment as a Right in 1960s

William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Testimony at Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 1968

It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards

The right to enrichment in the NPT/CONF 2010

Emphasis on need to respect 'choices', 'policies' and 'decisions' of the NPT member states. Reiterate the right to have fuel cycle.

Action 47: Respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies. (NPT/CONF.2010/50, Vol. I)

The right to enrichment in NAM Documents

120 NAM [Non-Aligned Movement] countries in their highest political level repeatedly underlined the inalienable right of the NPT members to have peaceful nuclear energy and the need to respect their policies, choices and decisions with regard to fuel cycle. NAM Summit XV (July 2009) --- Egypt:

132. The Heads of State and Government of the States Parties to the NPT emphasized once more that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Article I, II and III of the Treaty. They stressed that this right constitute one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. In this connection, they confirmed that each country's choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

NAM FM May 2012 --- Egypt:

187. The Ministers of the States Parties to the NPT emphasized once more that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Article I, II and III and IV of the Treaty. They stressed that this right constitute one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. In this connection, they confirmed that each country's choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

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Part 3

In the Name of ALLAH, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Reviewing and Assessing the Proposal of 5+1

Introduction

According to the agreement made in Istanbul II talks and Baghdad, there is a need for adopting a "road map" or "framework" or "process" for the talks.

There [sic] roadmap should include: "guiding principles", "objectives", "structure of the process", "issues" (nuclear and non-nuclear) and "steps".

Features of reciprocal steps: they should be equipollent, compatible and simultaneous.

But the proposal of 5+1 has some shortcomings both in context and in the essence.

Some of the requests made from Iran are not clear.
The reciprocal steps of 5+1 are too general and vague.
5+1 proposal lacks a time frame.
The 2nd and 3rd phases of 5+1 proposal are back to the past, and therefore they are illogic [sic] and unrealistic.

Shortcomings of 5+1 proposal

Request for "stopping 20 percent enrichment" means depriving Iran from its rights in contradiction to international documents such as the following:

Article IV of NPT
NPT review conferences documents
The final documents of the Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament
NAM documents
G77 documents
Organization of Islamic Cooperation documents

Request for "stopping 20 percent enrichment" is contrary to international practices/ procedures including the following:

Practices on implementation of NPT during the last decades< /br>
No objection to the nuclear fuel cycle of countries such as Brazil, Japan, Argentina etc. even by 5+1

em>The right to enrichment in the NPT

Why 20 percent enrichment is being done?

Islamic Republic of Iran's right to develop peaceful nuclear activities within the framework of the NPT and the IAEA regulations.
Supply the fuel needed for research reactors such as TRR.
Avoiding selling fuel needed for TRR by those countries that have the technology.
Rejecting the framework proposed by one member of 5+1 to swap the fuel (Tehran Declaration) by this group.

Some of the propositions in the proposal of 5+1 are incorrect, some are ambiguous, some are in contradiction to international documents and some are not in conformity with the realities:

A. "Stopping all activity at Fordow , including both 5% enrichment and 20% enrichment and the installation of additional centrifuges and centrifuge components"

Points:

5 percent enrichment activities and installing more centrifuges and their components do not correlate with 20 percent enrichment.
In Fordo there are other activities which are not related to 20% enrichment.

B. "Transferring 20% enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA custody"

Points:

There is no correlation between transferring 20 percent materials out of the country with 20 percent enrichment. All materials are under the "supervision" and "seal" and "unannounced inspections" of the IAEA.
There is no correlation between transferring 20 percent materials out of the country with 20 percent enrichment as in the third country materials would be under the supervision of the IAEA, as this the case in Iran.

C. "Shutting down the Fordow facility will address concerns that the facility is intended for military use"

Points:

This facility is not a military base and there is no reason to consider it so.
None of the equipments and items used, especially the one used to collect enriched material, neither the design nor the system can be used to collect highly enriched materials.
IAEA director has explicitly confirmed that all the equipment and activities in Fordo are for peaceful purposes and under the supervision of IAEA.

D. "Fordow facilities...concerns...since it is located on a military base"

Points:

These facilities are not located on a military base.
There is no limitation to international authorized access (IAEA access) to this facility.

E. "Fordow facilities...concerns...since it is heavily fortified"

Points:

Protection of sensitive nuclear facilities is not only permissible but necessary
Established international mechanisms for nuclear security highlight the need for strong protection of nuclear facilities.
The sustained threats against nuclear facilities and enrichment activities, as well as ongoing threats against nuclear scientists, which are in contradiction to the UN charter and resolutions, necessitate more security from such facilities.
Facing constant threats, we need a back up facility to safeguard our enrichment activities.

F. "Fordow facilities...concerns...since it is too small for commercial purposes"

Points:

Fordow facility has never been constructed for commercial purposes
The main purpose of Fordow facility is to protect it against threats, but it is also being used for 20% enrichment, R&D activities, labs, storage places, etc.
Facing constant threats, we need a back up facility to safeguard our enrichment activities

G. "Agreement on these interrelated elements (stopping, shutting down, shipping) is necessary"

Points:

Shutting down Fordow facility has no relation to 20%, as various activities other than producing 20 percent materials are done at Fordow.
Transferring the materials out of the country is not related with 20 percent enrichment because all materials in Iran are under the supervision of the IAEA, sealed by the IAEA and inspectors of the agency do the unannounced inspections.

H. "5+1 will cooperate with Iran to provide fuel complexes for the Tehran Research Reactor"

Point:

A few months before, Iran put its home- made fuel complexes inside TRR. Therefore, cooperation of 5+1 to "provide fuel complexes for TRR" is far from the actual needs and real time requirements of Iran.

I. "With provision of fuel for the TRR, there is no rationale for further production of 20% material"

Points:

Continuation of 20 percent enrichment to supply needed fuel for TRR in the next few years,
Calculating the amount of 20 percent materials that due to technical issues, including relevant tests, get out of the cycle,
Supplying fuel needed for at least 4 other research reactors because of the territorial extent of Iran and the short lifetime of medical isotopes,
Right of the Islamic Republic of Iran to sell fuel complexes to other countries

J. "The E3+3 [5+1] would support IAEA Technical Cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR....The E3+3 could review the IAEA Technical Cooperation projects...and make a recommendation to the IAEA Board on restarting some of them"

Points:

Technical cooperation of the Agency with Iran for its peaceful nuclear activities is an obligation of the IAEA and one of the rights of IR [Islamic Republic].
Iran as a member state of the agency and the NPT.
Iran voices its readiness to share its software and hardware services in the area of research reactor safety if other countries need and at discretion of the IAEA

J. "The E3+3 would support IAEA Technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR....The E3+3 could review the IAEA Technical cooperation projects...and make a recommendation to the IAEA Board on restarting some of them"

Points:

Placing technical cooperation of the Agency in the shadow of political measures is contrary to the dignity and specialized status of the IAEA.
Under Article4:2 of the NPT, 5+1 are required for fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and information with Iran.

L. "E3+3 has put together a detailed package … to provide medical isotopes for cancer patients in Iran...."E3+3...to ensure no gap in treatment for your cancer patient....The United States is prepared to … permit safety- related inspection and repair in Iran for Iranian commercial aircraft"

Point:

Providing isotopes for patients, treating cancer patients as well as repairing and providing spare parts for commercial aircrafts are among basic human rights, and mixing them with political issues demonstrates non- constructive objectives of the other side.

M. "The E3+3 would cooperate with Iran to provide Iran fuel elements for the Tehran Research Reactor....The E3+3 would support IAEA Technical Cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR....Cooperation on the early stages of acquiring a modern light water isotope producing research reactor....The United States is prepared to...adjust its sanctions policy....The E3+3 could review the IAEA Technical Cooperation projects … and make a recommendation to the IAEA Board on restarting some of them"

Points:

Regardless of the substance of the above propositions as the reciprocal steps of 5+1, it should be said that:
First, using general terms such as "cooperation", "support", "adjustment", "review" and "recommendation" in these propositions are in contradiction with the basic goal of the very same proposal "which is creating confidence and trust in the first stage."
Second, the above-mentioned suggestions are not compatible with the requests such as "stopping enrichment", "transferring of materials" and "shutting down the Fordo".
Third, taking into consideration the record and history of the western countries attitudes regarding Iran's nuclear issue, it would increase and deepen the distrust and uncertainty on the Iranian side.