The Latest from Israel-Gaza-Palestine (31 January)

Latest Post:The Turkey-Israel Clash on Gaza -The American Jewish Committee Joins In

11:20 p.m. Intriguing manoeuvres in Cairo. Earlier it was reported that Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas would be in Egypt on Sunday, at the same time that a Hamas delegation was in Egypt. Abbas' staff are now saying he will make an "unscheduled" stop in Cairo on Monday.

9:45 p.m. A potentially key development in the Middle East. I had heard, while in Dublin, of the high hopes of Obama officials for a breakthrough in relations with Syria. (You may recall that Damascus was an associate member of the Axis of Evil during the Dubya years, and the US pulled its ambassador after the 2005 killing of Lebanese leader Rafik Hariri by a car bomb.)

Well, today Syrian President Bashir al-Assad met a US Congressional delegation and called for a "positive" dialogue with Washington based on, echoing President Obama's Inaugural phrase, "common interests and mutual respect".

However, before getting too effusive about the "excellent beginning", as one Congressman called the meeting, US officials may want to note that part of Assad's manoeuvring is to get (and to take credit for) recognition of Hamas. So holding out the prospect of warmer relations with Washington, while it has many uses for Syria, is also being used as a lever in the Israel-Palestine process.

9:30 p.m. Egypt says it has installed cameras and motion sensors along the border with Gaza to stop smuggling through tunnels.



6:30 p.m. Palestinian Authorian leader Mahmoud Abbas, predictably, has rejected Hamas' calls for a dissolution of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its replacement by a new umbrella Palestinian group: "[Hamas political director Khaled Meshaal's statements regarding the establishment of a new authority to replace the Palestine Liberation Organisation is an exercise in time-wasting. While he talks about establishing an organisation, he really wants to destroy what has been the voice (of the Palestinian people) for 44 years."

The PLO, founded in 1964, including Abbas' Fatah Party and other Palestinian political movements but not Hamas. Both Abbas and Hamas representatives are due in Cairo on Sunday for talks.

3:20 p.m. According to a Sydney reporter, the Israeli Ambassador to Australia has said,"The country's recent military offensives [in Gaza] were a preintroduction to the challenge Israel expects from a nuclear-equipped Iran within a year." Israel expects Tehran to "be at the point of no return" within 14 months.

3 p.m. Propaganda Story of the Day 2 (see 9:30 a.m.): Israeli military and officers are putting about the story that "an Iranian aid ship is now serving as a communications headquarters for Hamas".

The DEBKAfile, closely linked to Israeli services, added, "Iran has sent intelligence and Revolutionary Guards officers to Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, to help create a support system for the Iran Shahed's new communications purpose."

1:30 p.m. CNN's website has an update on the ongoing student demonstrations in Britain protesting the situation in Gaza. It's an article heavily tilted against the demos, focusing on the request of the National Union of Students call for an end to occupations and a supposed increase in hostility towards Jewish students.

10:25 a.m. Some good news. Despite the refusal of the BBC to air the Disaster Emergencies Committee appeal for aid to Gaza, the campaign has raised £3 million (more than $4 million) in its first week.

Morning Update (9:30 a.m.): Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is continuing his high-profile attack, which we've covered extensively, on Israel's policies in Gaza with an interview in The Washington Post: "Palestine today is an open-air prison."

Propaganda Story of the Day: The winner is in Israel's YNet News, "Thousands of al-Qaeda supporters active in Gaza". The sensationalist tale is based on information from two unnamed Palestinian sources.

A rocket from Gaza has landed near Ashkelon. There were no casualties.

And on the Eighth Day: Hopes and Fears over The Obama Foreign Policy

Whatever else is said about Barack Obama, you cannot accuse him of being slow off the mark. A day after the Inauguration, he issued the order closing the Guantanamo Bay detention camp and CIA “black sites” and ending torture by American agencies. Two days later, he revoked the Reagan directive banning funding for any organisation carrying out abortions overseas. On 26 January, he ordered a new approach to emissions and global warming, as the State Department appointed Todd Stern to oversee policy on climate change.



Last Monday, Obama launched his “reach-out” to the Islamic world with a televised interview, his first with any channel, with Al Arabiya. Two envoys, George Mitchell for the Middle East and Richard Holbrooke for Afghanistan and Pakistan, have been appointed; Mitchell is already in the region searching for diplomatic settlements. All of this has occurred even as the Administration was pushing for approval of its economic stimulus package and engaging in fierce inter-agency debates over Iraq and Afghanistan.

The media, rightly but ritually, hailed Obama's symbolic renunciation of his predecessor George W. Bush. Much more substantial was this Administration's attention to methods. The American global image would not be projected and its position assured, as in the Dubya years, through military strength; instead, the US would lsucceed through a recognition of and adherence to international cooperation, a projection of tolerance, and a desire to listen. While the term “smart power”, developed over the last two years in anticipation of this Administration, is already in danger of overuse, it is the right expression for the Obama approach.

Yet, even in Obama's more than symbolic announcement, there were seeds of trouble for that “smart power”. The President had hoped to order the immediate, or at least the near-future, shutdown of Camp X-Ray, but he was stymied by political opposition as well as legal complications. The interview with Al Arabiya was a substitute for Obama's hope of a major foreign policy speech in an Arab capital in the first weeks of his Administrat. The Holbrooke appointment was modified when New Delhi made clear it would not receive a “Pakistan-India” envoy; Mitchell's scope for success has already been constrained by the background of Gaza.

Little of this was within Obama's power to rectify; it would have been Messianic indeed if he could have prevailed immediately, given the domestic and international context. The President may have received a quick lesson, however, in the bureaucratic challenges that face even the most determined and persuasive leader.

Already some officials in the Pentagon have tried to block Obama initiatives. They tried to spun against the plan to close Guantanamo Bay, before and after the Inauguration, with the claims that released detainees had returned to Al Qa'eda and terrorism. That attempt was undermined by the shallowness of the claims, which were only substantiated in two cases, and the unexpected offense that it caused Saudi Arabia, who felt that its programme for rehabilitation of former insurgents had been insulted. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates finally and firmed quashed the mini-coup by declaring on Wednesday that he fully supported Obama's plans.

On other key issues, however, the President faces tougher, higher-ranking, and more persistent opposition. Within a day of Obama's first meeting on Iraq, Pentagon sources were letting the media know their doubts on a 16-month timetable for withdrawal. And, after this Wednesday's meeting, General Raymond Odierno, in charge of US forces in Iraq, publicly warned against a quick transition to the Iraqi military and security forces. This not-too-subtle rebuke of the President has been backed by the outgoing US Ambassador in Iraq, Ryan Crocker, and I suspect by the key military figure, head of US Central Command General David Petraeus.

The future US strategy in Afghanistan also appears to be caught up in a battle within the Administration, with a lack of resolution on the increase in the American military presence (much,much more on that in a moment). And even on Iran, where Obama appears to be making a overture on engagement with Tehran, it's not clear that he will get backing for a near-future initiatives. White House officials leaked Obama's draft letter to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a British newspaper, but State Department officials added that such a letter would not be sent until a “full review” of the US strategy with Iran had been completed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Still, all of these might be minor irritants, given the impact both of Obama's symbolic steps and of other quieter but important steps. For example, after the outright Bush Administration hostility to any Latin American Government that did not have the proper economic or political stance, Obama's State Department immediately recognised the victory of President Evo Morales in a referendum on the Bolivian constitution, and there are signs that the President will soon be engaging with Havana's leaders with a view to opening up a US-Cuban relationship. In Europe, Obama's phone call with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was quickly followed by Moscow's announcement that, in return for a more productive US stance on missile defence (i.e., Washington wasn't going to roll out the system in Eastern Europe), Russia would not deploy missiles on the Polish border. There are even signals of an advance in the Middle East through a new US-Syrian relationship, although this is probably contingent on some recogntion or acceptance of Hamas by Washington.

So why am I even more concerned about the Obama foreign-policy path than I was a week ago, when I wrote of my conflicted reaction to the Inauguration? Let me introduce to the two elephants in this room, one which he inherited and one which he seems to have purchased.

Unless there is an unexpected outcome from George Mitchell's tour of the Middle East, Obama's goodwill toward the Arab and Islamic worlds could quickly dissipate over Gaza. The military conflict may be over, but the bitterness over the deaths of more than 1300 Gazans, most of them civilians, is not going away. And because President-elect Obama said next-to-nothing while the Israeli attack was ongoing, the burden of expectation upon President Obama to do something beyond an Al Arabiya interview is even greater.

Whether the Bush Administration directly supported Israel's attempt to overthrow Hamas and put the Palestinian Authority in Gaza or whether it was drawn along by Tel Aviv's initiative, the cold political reality is that this failed. Indeed, the operation --- again in political, not military, terms --- backfired. Hamas' position has been strengthened, while the Palestinian Authority now looks weak and may even be in trouble in its base of the West Bank.

And there are wider re-configurations. Egypt, which supported the Israeli attempt, is now having to recover some modicum of authority in the Arab world while Syria, which openly supported Hamas, has been bolstered. (Those getting into detail may note not only the emerging alliance between Damascus, Turkey, and Iran but also that Syria has sent an Ambassador to Beirut, effectively signalling a new Syrian-Lebanese relationship.)

Put bluntly, the Obama Administration --- with its belated approach to Gaza and its consequences --- is entering a situation which it does not control and, indeed, which it cannot lead. The US Government may pretend that it can pursue a political and diplomatic resolution by talking to only two of the three central actors, working with Israel and the Palestinian Authority but not Hamas, but that is no longer an approach recognised by most in the region and beyond. (In a separate post later today, I'll note a signal that even Washington's European allies are bowing to the existence of Hamas.)

The Israel-Palestine-Gaza situation is not my foremost concern, however. As significant, in symbolic and political terms, as that conflict might be for Washington's position in the Middle East and beyond, it will be a sideshow if the President and his advisors march towards disaster in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

On Wednesday, the New York Times had the red-flag story. White House staffers leaked the essence of the Obama plan: increase US troop levels in Afghanistan, leave nation-building to “the Europeans”, and drop Afghan President Hamid Karzai if he had any objections. On the same day, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told Congressional committees that the US would continue its bombing of targets in northwest Pakistan. (Not a surprise, since the first strikes of the Obama era had already taken place , killing 19 people, most of them civilians.)

So much for “smart power”. Leave aside, for the moment, that the rationale for the approach to Afghanistan --- Gates saying that the US had to defeat “Al Qa'eda” --- is either a diversion or a flight for reality, since the major challenge in the country (and indeed in Pakistan) is from local insurgents. Consider the consequences.

What happens to Obama's symbolic goodwill in not only the Islamic world but worlds beyond when an increase in US forces and US operations leads to an increase in civilian deaths, when America walks away from economic and social projects as it concentrates on the projection of force, when there are more detainees pushed into Camp Bagram (which already has more than twice as many “residents” and worse conditions than Guantanamo Bay)? What happens to “smart power” when Obama's pledge to listen and grasp the unclenched fist is replaced with a far more forceful, clenched American fist? And what has happened to supposed US respect for freedom and democracy when Washington not only carries out unilateral operations in Pakistan but threatens to topple an Afghan leader who it put into power in 2001/2?

This approach towards Afghanistan/Pakistan will crack even the bedrock of US-European relations. In Britain, America's closest ally in this venture, politicians, diplomats, and military commanders are close-to-openly horrified at the US takeover and direction of this Afghan strategy and at the consequences in Pakistan of the US bombings and missile strikes. Put bluntly, “Europe” isn't going to step up to nation-build throughout Afghanistan as a mere support for American's military-first strategy. And when it doesn't, Obama and advisors will have a choice: will they then criticise European allies to the point of risking NATO --- at least in “out-of-area” operations --- or will it accept a limit to their actions?

Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe the lack of agreement in the Obama Administration so far on a defined number of US troops means the President might not be in accord with the approach unveiled in the New York Times. Maybe the Administration will pursue an integrated political strategy, talking to groups inside Afghanistan (and, yes, that includes “moderate Taliban”) and to other countries with influence, such as Iran. Or maybe it won't do any of this, but Afghanistan won't be a disaster, or at least a symbolic disaster --- as with Iraq from 2003 --- spilling over into all areas of US foreign policy.

Sitting here amidst the grey rain of Dublin and the morning-after recognition that “expert thought” in the US, whatever that means, doesn't see the dangers in Afghanistan and Pakistan that I've laid out, I desperately hope to be wrong.

Because, if the world was made in six days, parts of it can be unmade in the next six months.

The Latest on Israel-Gaza-Palestine (30 January)

10 p.m. Hamas has started paying out compensation in cheques, rather than cash, to families whose houses were destroyed in Israeli attacks. About 2700 families have received 4000 euros ($5000).

Because of the shortage of banknotes in the area, it is unclear if the cheques can be cased.



5:05 p.m. Hamas Makes Its Move. The game for the moment is not "reconcilation", at least not with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. Several thousand Gazans turned out Friday in support of Hamas' call for the abolition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its replacement by a new umbrella group.

5 p.m. The French Foreign Ministry says that Israel has blocked its attempt to get a water purification station into Gaza. The equipment is being brought back to France.

3:45 p.m. A senior Hamas leader, Khalil Al-Hayya, has appeared for the first time in public since the Israeli attacks on 27 December. He told a rally, "We promised to come out to you either as martyrs or as victors," Hayya told supporters. "Today I come out to you and you are victors."

Al-Hayya urged Hamas fighters to maintain their resistance and promised that the organisation would lead the reconstruction of Gaza.

2:20 p.m. A Gaza Twist from the Past. A Spanish court has named seven Israelis, including Infrastructure Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, in a war crimes lawsuit brought by relatives of 15 Gazans killed in a 2002 bombing.

2:15 p.m. I don't think there is a very good sign. George Mitchell has said, after talks in Jerusalem, ""The tragic violence in Gaza and in southern Israel offers a sobering reminder of the very serious and difficlt challenges and unfortunately the setbacks that will come."

Mitchell could be just damping down expectations, but it may be that talks with Israelis and the Palestinian Authority have confirmed the gaps between the positions of those two actors, let alone the position of Hamas. At the very least, Mitchell's statement indicates Washington will not be putting forth any dramatic proposals during and immediately after his trip.

1:45 p.m. (Israel/Gaza time): US envoy George Mitchell's tour continues today with meetings with Israeli Housing Minister Isaac Herzog and the leader of the opposition Likud party and Prime Ministerial candidate Benjamin Netanyahu. Mitchell then goes to Jordan.

There is no shift in Mitchell's general line, which we have noted in the last 48 hours, of an end to arms shipments to Gaza and a re-opening of border crossings in line with a 2005 agreement brokered by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Battles within Obama-land: The Foreign Policy Disputes on Iraq and Iran

Two major stories on US foreign policy, highlighting two critical policy choices on Iraq and Iran:

The New York Times features "On Iraq, Obama Faces Hard Choices".  (Since I wrote that, the Times has gotten to the point: "Obama Seeks Accord With Military on Iraq.) That rather obvious headline is followed by a detailed description of the tension within the White House, a tension we have been highlighting for a week.



Obama's campaign promise for a 16-month withdrawal of all combat troops from Iraq is now being confronted --- publicly and blatantly --- by military commanders. General Raymond Odierno, the US commander in Iraq, indicated yesterday that "it may take a year to determine exactly" when US forces can be withdrawn. Although he said there would be a reduction this year, he pointedly used the word "slowly" when describing the transition from counter-insurgency to stability operations.

Describing last week's National Security Council-military meeting as "a very elevated conversation" does nothing to reduce the suspicion of a battle between the President and the military. Nor does sniping from the sidelines by former Dubya advisors like J.D. Crouch III, who was instrumental in pushing General David Petraeus and Odierno to their current command positions.

Meanwhile The Guardian splashes a Page 1 exclusive on a draft Obama letter to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, replying to Ahmadinejad's congratulations to Obama in November on his election. The letter could signal the opening of US engagement with Iran, but if you read further, it seems that this too may be the start of a battle within the Administration:

The letter is being considered by the new secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, as part of a sweeping review of US policy on Iran. A decision on sending it is not expected until the review is complete.

Obama may be saved in this case, however, from an immediate conflict because of timing. Ahmadinejad faces re-election this spring, and the US decision may be to hold off on an approach until then. Then again (and this has not been noted by the media), if the US is planning to "surge" in Afghanistan, it would seem prudent to open some discussion with Tehran, which has significant influence in the west of the country.

Morning update ( 12:05 a.m. Washington): The significant overnight news is what was not said by President Obama.

A week after his National Security Council first sat down with military commanders, Obama had a two-hour meeting with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the generals yesterday. His statement afterwards was leading but vague, ""We are going to have some difficult decisions that we are going to have to make, surrounding Iraq and Afghanistan most immediately."

As far as that can be read, it's an indication that there will be troop increases in Afghanistan in the next few months and there will be some decrease in Iraq. The numbers in each case, however, are still up for grabs, as is the strategic approach --- military-first? with or without Afghan President Hamid Karzai? with or without US efforts at nation-building? --- in Afghanistan. Put bluntly, the battles at the moment are not overseas, but within the Administration.

For a clue as to the next development, look for "spin" in The New York Times and The Washington Post in forthcoming days.

Meanwhile, Obama envoy George Mitchell moves to the West Bank today to talk with Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas.

The Latest on Israel-Gaza-Palestine (29 January)

12:45 p.m. Al Jazeera reports: "At least eight people, six of them children, have been injured by an Israeli air attack in the southern Gaza Strip."



Morning update (7:15 a.m. Israel/Gaza time): The diplomatic spotlight today moves to the West Bank, where US envoy George Mitchell meets Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas. The key development may come, however, in Cairo if Hamas delegates --- as we reported yesterday --- propose an 18-month cease-fire beginning on 5 February.

Meanwhile, Israel carried out its retaliation for the rocket fired across the border yesterday, bombing a metal foundry in southern Gaza.