Analysis: Provincial Elections in Iraq

The pressure of following President Obama's first days in office and events such as Gaza has pushed Iraq to the background. It shouldn't, as the country is entering a critical phase with Sunday's provincial elections. For all the vaunted success of the "surge" and the nominal US handover to Iraqi sovereignty, the country is still in "violent semi-peace". There are still bombings and killings on a daily basis, albeit much reduced below the levels of the last three years, and certain areas such as Mosul and Kirkuk are especially tense.

Robert Dreyfuss, one of the most provocative observers of Iraq, offers this analysis of the elections: "If [the process doesn't] go smoothly, and if the elections don't result in gains for parties that were shut out of the political process in 2005 -- especially among Iraq's disenfranchised Sunni bloc -- then it's very likely that violence will increase once again. It's even possible that many Sunnis will return to armed resistance, and some of them will rejoin Al Qaeda in Iraq.



Iraq's Election: What to Watch For

On Saturday, January 31, Iraq will conduct its first elections since 2005, when Iraqis went to the polls to select both their national parliament and provincial councils. This time, the election will decide only the provincial councils in 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces. Still, the election is likely to be a turning point for Iraq. Which way it turns -- toward greater democracy, or toward further instability and a return of violent resistance -- depends on what happens on Saturday.

It's not a pretty picture. The elections promise to be marred by violence, fraud, intimidation, vote-buying and bribery, bloc voting by tribes and ethnic constituencies, and undue influence by Shiite clerics.

If things don't go smoothly, and if the elections don't result in gains for parties that were shut out of the political process in 2005 -- especially among Iraq's disenfranchised Sunni bloc -- then it's very likely that violence will increase once again. It's even possible that many Sunnis will return to armed resistance, and some of them will rejoin Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Viewed most broadly, the election is a test of the ability of Iraq's ruling coalition to cling to power despite having presided over a catastrophic collapse of Iraq's economy, social services, and utilities, and despite widespread public perceptions that the ruling parties are guilty of vast corruption, mismanagement, and rule by paramilitary force through party militias. The four ruling parties are the two Shiite fundamentalist religious parties, the Islamic Dawa party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and the two Kurdish separatist parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). According to many sources I've interviewed, including Iraqis involved in the elections, large numbers of Iraqis view all four ruling parties with disdain. They are blamed for their inability to provide basic services such as electricity, health care, fuel, water, and trash collection, all of which are intermittent at best and nonexistent at worst. They are blamed for their mismanagement of the economy, and especially Iraq's oil, and for the unemployment rate that is estimated at 50 percent. Under ordinary circumstances, all four parties would suffer massive repudiation at the polls. But these are not ordinary circumstances.

The election is also seen as a referendum of sorts on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose Dawa party is a powerful player in Saturday's vote. Although Maliki's Dawa has split and split again -- it is down to a miniscule six seats in the 275-member parliament, after schisms -- it benefits from Maliki's heavyhanded use of political power as prime minister. Despite Dawa's history as a secretive, cell-based and cult-like religious movement with obscurantist Shiite views, Maliki is drawing electoral support from Iraqis who view him as a strongman, sort of a Saddam-lite ruler, and he has recast himself as a nationalist. He's built a fiefdom in the Iraqi army, shifting and reappointing generals who support him, in a naked effort to turn the army into Dawa's private militia. He's used a pair of security organizations that report directly to the prime minister's office to carry out arrests and intimidation of rival politicians and parties, especially against Muqtada al-Sadr's allies. He's constructed paramilitary "tribal councils" in provinces all over Iraq, lavishing tens of millions of dollars in government funding on these organizations, which are in fact nothing more than outright arms of Maliki's office. And he's using the Iraqi government's state-owned media openly on his behalf.

Here's what to watch for on Saturday:

First, can the religious parties hold on? According to many accounts, liberal, nationalist, and secular Iraqis believe that the population at large is disenchanted with Dawa, ISCI and the Sadrists. Will that result in gains for parties of a distinctly secular approach, especially the party led by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, a secular Shiite who has broad appeal to many nationalists and Sunnis? Or will the built-in advantages of Dawa and ISCI, who control the media and the government, allow them to continue as dominant forces?

Second, will the Sunnis gain power in the provinces where they are either dominant or strong? In 2005, the Sunnis boycotted the vote, and only about 2 percent of Sunni Arabs voted at all. That led to a victory for the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), a fundamentalist religious party of Sunnis tied to the Muslim Brotherhood. In 2009, many analysts expect that the IIP will be decimated. Since 2003, the IIP has cooperated with the United States and with the Kurdish-Shiite ruling alliance, so if the IIP is knocked out, expect a more militant, more nationalist force to take its place. Many of the former resistance groups, the Awakening movement, and Sunni tribal parties have formed parties for the Jan. 31 election.

Key battles will be in Mosul, capital of Nineveh province in the north; in Baghdad, the capital and a province of its own, with nearly one-fourth of Iraq's population; and Diyala province, a mixed area northeast of Baghdad.

In Nineveh province, because the Sunnis boycotted the last vote, the provincial council is controlled overwhelmingly by Kurds, who are a small minority in Nineveh, confined to eastern Mosul city. The Kurds are angling to suppress the Sunni vote, and they've even armed a Christian militia. By all accounts, though, the Sunnis ought to seize control of Nineveh. If they don't, an angry and violent resistance movement is likely to emerge in the north.

In Baghdad province, now controlled by ISCI and Dawa, there's a chance that nationalist parties, Sunnis, and secular parties can win a large number seats on Baghdad's 57-seat council, and if they make the right alliances -- say, with Sadrists -- they could oust ISCI and Dawa in the heart of the country. But Baghdad has been ethnically cleansed, and many Sunnis have been displaced. It's not clear if displaced Iraqis will be allowed to vote, or if so, for whom. If the Shiite religious parties maintain control of Baghdad, again it's possible that there will be a violent reaction from former insurgents and elements of the Awakening movement.

In Diyala province, where Sunnis and Shiites are more balanced, the outcome up for grabs. Sunni and Shiite enclaves are walled off, violence is endemic, candidates can't easily campaign or promote their parties, and the results will make no one happy. It's a tinderbox.

There is also the question of outside support. Iran is undoubtedly pouring money into support for its allies, including ISCI. To a lesser degree, Saudi Arabia is probably supporting some Sunni parties and possibly some secular parties as well. Turkey is suspected of backing the IIP. And it's hard to believe that the CIA isn't giving cash to back favored candidates.

Meanwhile, the election will be incomplete because there is no vote in disputed Tamim province, whose capital of KIrkuk is claimed by expansionist Kurds. The problem in Kirkuk is so explosive that the Iraqi government decided to put off elections there altogether. And there are no provincial elections in the three Kurdish provinces in the north, which are increasingly seen as part of a separatist, independence-minded zone -- something that both Sunni and Shiite Arabs reject.

Obama on Top of the World: The Latest in US Foreign Policy (28 January)

Earlier Updates: Obama on Top of the World (27 January)
Latest Post: The Other Shoe Drops: Obama Prepares for War in Afghanistan

6 p.m. The Guardian of London: "President Barack Obama's administration is considering sending a letter to Iran aimed at unfreezing US-Iranian relations and opening the way for face-to-face talks." The letter would be in response to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's letter of congratulations to Obama on 6 November.

2:20 p.m. We've updated this morning's story on the Obama strategy for Afghanistan.

2:02 p.m. Reports that President Obama will visit Canada on 19 February.

2 p.m. The Dennis Ross saga, which has given us nightmares, continues. He still has not been officially named as the State Department envoy on Iranian matters but "United Against Nuclear Iran", the pressure group which includes as members Ross and State's envoy to Afghanistan/Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, either has outdated info or gives the game away:

United Against Nuclear Iran thanks Ambassadors Holbrooke and Ross for their commitment, service, and leadership and we congratulate them on their recent appointments to the Department of State.

1 p.m. Pick a Number, Any Number. A NATO spokesman claims that less than 100 Afghan civilians were killed in the organisation's military operations in 2008. That compares with an estimate in The New York Times of up to 4000 and by an Afghan human rights group, based on UN numbers, of almost 700.

11:30 a.m. On the Other Hand....Only two hours after we updated on Russia's cancellation of a deployment of missiles on the Polish border, thanks to the Obama Factor, another problem crops up:

NATO countries expressed concern on Wednesday about reports that Russia plans to set up bases in Russian-backed breakaway territories in Georgia, a NATO spokesman said.

The specific issue is Russia's announcement on Monday that it intends to build a naval base in Abkhazia, which was part of Georgia but which Russia recognised as "independent" after last August's Russian-Georgian war.

10:35 a.m. It's not all bad news in Afghanistan. The Taliban have praised, "Obama's move to close Guantanamo detention center is a positive step for peace and stability in the region and the world."

Unfortunately, the feel-good moment may be short-lived. The Taliban also insisted that, if the President wants "mutual respect" with Muslim communities, "He must completely withdraw all his forces from the two occupied Islamic countries (Afghanistan and Iraq), and to stop defending Israel against Islamic interests in the Middle East and the entire world." And, as for Afghanistan, Obama should not send additional US forces as "the use of force against the independent peoples of the world, has lost its effectiveness".

9:45 a.m. Score one diplomatic/victory for the Obama Factor.

An official from the Russian General Staff has told the Interfax news agency that Moscow will suspend deployment of missiles on the Polish border: "These plans have been suspended because the new US administration is not pushing ahead with the plans to deploy...the US missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic." The news follows a conversation between President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on Monday.

There are other US-Russian exchanges to watch. The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister has told Iran that Moscow wants to broaden "political, trade, and economic cooperation". For the moment, however, the apparent rapprochement raises the question....

What exactly was the value of the Missile Defence pursued by the Bush Administration so relentlessly over the last eight years?

7:30 a.m. Is this for show for real? Pakistan's Foreign Ministry, contradicting the testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates yesterday,  say they have no agreement with the Obama Administration allowing US missile strikes on Pakistani territory: ""There is no understanding between Pakistan and the United States on Predator attacks."

Of course, it could be the case that the American arrangement is with the Pakistani military and intelligence services, bypassing the Foreign Ministry. Alternatively, the Pakistani Government is trying to hold to the public line of "independence" while private accepting US operations.

6 a.m. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has given a challenging but cautious response to President Obama's suggestion of engagement. Speaking at an election rally in western Iran, Ahmadinejad said:

We welcome change but on condition that change is fundamental and on the right track. When they say "we want to make changes', change can happen in two ways. First is a fundamental and effective change ... The second ... is a change of tactics."

Ahmadinejad, clearly picking up on Obama's campaign slogan of "change", added, "[The US] should apologise to the Iranian nation and try to make up for their dark background and the crimes they have committed against the Iranian nation."

This is a significant rhetorical position that has been taken up by Iranian leaders in the past. Indeed, I suspect US policymakers will immediately think that at the end of the Clinton Administration, they made such an apology, albeit belatedly, for the 1953 US-backed coup. It should also be noted that this is a campaign speech, with Ahmadinejad staking out his foreign-policy position to the Iranian electorate.

This said, Ahmadinejad gave an important signal in a reference to Washington stifling Iran's economic development since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Decoded, this may be indicating to Obama: if you want to engage, the US has to make a commitment --- possibly even in advance of negotiations --- to ease existing sanctions on Tehran.

3:50 a.m. Glimpse the Future. Just to highlight our top post this morning on Afghanistan and the problems of the Obama strategy: "American officers distributed $40,000 on Tuesday to relatives of 15 people killed Jan. 19 in a United States raid."

The US military wasn't exactly generous in its apology, holding to the claim that a "militant commander" died along with 14 civilians. While a colonel told villages, "If there was collateral damage, I’m very sorry about that,” a US military lawyers made clear that "he payments were not an admission that innocents had been killed".

3:30 a.m. We've just posted a separate entry highlighting the apparent White House strategy in Afghanistan: ramp up the military effort, leave nation-building to others, and ditch Afghan President Hamid Karzai if necessary.

Morning Update (1:45 a.m. Washington time): It looks the campaign, pursued by some in the Pentagon, to undermine the Obama plan to close Guantanamo Bay within a year has been checked. The New York Times and CNN began running a "backlash" story yesterday that the Saudi programme for rehabilitation of terrorists was actually very, very good with only nine participants, out of hundreds, returning to their evil ways. The significance? The original spin was that two ex-Gitmo detainees who had rejoined Yemeni terrorist cells may have gone through the Saudi programme.

Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, testifying to Congressional committees, gave full support to the closure plan: ""I believe that if we did not have a deadline, we could kick that can down the road endlessly."

The Other Shoe Drops: Obama Prepares for War in Afghanistan

Update: In a sign of division in the Obama White House, officials are back-pedaling away from this morning's story. A White House official, dropping the Karzai-must-accept line and the military-only approach, said, "President Barack Obama will press Afghan President Hamid Karzai to extend government control beyond the capital and fight corruption under a new U.S. policy with a "significant non-military component." He added, with respect to the Times article, "There is no purely military solution to the challenge in Afghanistan so there will be a significant non-military component to anything that we seek to undertake." A Pentagon spokesman added, ""That story, to me, seemed to suggest that we had some sort of view on the specific outcome of the election in Afghanistan. I don't believe that to be true."

Regular readers know that our primary concern with the Obama Administration is the foreign-policy priority of a military-first approach to Afghanistan.



Well, the White House spinners have now used The New York Times to set out the plans, and it's worse than we thought. Not only will there be war, but the US Government is prepared to push aside Afghan President Hamid Karzai if he has anything to say about it:

President Obama intends to adopt a tougher line toward Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, as part of a new American approach to Afghanistan that will put more emphasis on waging war than on development, senior administration officials said Tuesday.

Mr. Karzai is now seen as a potential impediment to American goals in Afghanistan, the officials said, because corruption has become rampant in his government, contributing to a flourishing drug trade and the resurgence of the Taliban.

Among those pressing for Mr. Karzai to do more, the officials said, are Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. and Richard C. Holbrooke, Mr. Obama’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Indeed, the approach appears to be a replication of General David Petraeus's model for Iraq, "with provincial leaders as an alternative to the central government". And, in case you thought Obama was going to at least complement the military strategy with a political and social approach to the turmoil in much of Afghanistan, the White House aides emphasised:

[We will] leave economic development and nation-building increasingly to European allies, so that American forces [can] focus on the fight against insurgents.

Obama advisors appear to be so clueless --- sorry, but that seems to be the appropriate word --- that they are replacing all local considerations with a sweeping portrayal of "us v. Bin Laden" as the central issue: “What we’re trying to do is to focus on the Al Qaeda problem. That has to be our first priority.”

Beyond the military question --- can you really defeat the Taliban and other insurgents head-on, rather than trying to build up a base of support in the villages through development of infrastructure and social programmes? --- Obama may be shattering a fragmented country. The "ditch Karzai" approach may have merit in light of the corruption and inefficiency allegations, but if it effectively sets aside a national government --- which the US threatened but never did in Iraq --- then what hope of a unified long-term campaign against insurgency?

And no amount of extra US soldiers --- 20,000 or 30,000 or 100,000 --- is going to offer a magic answer to that question.

The Latest on Israel-Gaza-Palestine (28 January)

Earlier Updates and Links to Posts: The Latest on Israel-Gaza-Palestine (27 January)
Latest Post: Keeping the Gaza-Iran Link Alive

12:40 a.m. The Egyptian newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat reports, from Palestinian sources, that Hamas delegates will present their response tomorrow to Egypt's proposals. This will include an 18-month cease-fire to begin on 5 February; however, Hamas will not commit to the Palestinian unity talks proposed by Egypt on 22 February.

If --- and this is a big if --- this is true, Hamas is making a bold, challenging move. It is putting recognition of its legitimacy before other issues such as the opening of the crossings, although of course it may pursue these issues once the cease-fire is agreed. Israel would have to acknowledge Hamas as the de facto leadership of Gaza, the Palestinian Authority would be sidelined, and other Palestinian factions would have to either follow the Hamas lead or risk undermining the cease-fire.

Next move: Egypt's. Will it accept the Hamas proposal with the PR victory of a cease-fire or hold out for the "unity" talks?



11:45 p.m. Israeli military reports that a rocket has landed in southern Israel. It is the first fired since the unilateral cease-fires of 18 January.

9 p.m. A shift on Hamas? As Egypt takes a harder line, the European Union moves --- slightly --- in the other direction. The EU's foreign policy head, Javier Solana, said "that a new Palestinian government that included Hamas should commit to pursuing a two-state solution".

This is a shift from the three conditions, set down by the Quarter of the US-EU-Russia-UN, that Hamas renounce violence, recognise Israel, and recognise interim peace agreements.

Solana's seems to be a recognition that a Palestinian Authority-only approach will no longer work, given the weakness of the organisation amongst Palestinians, and that negotiations with Israel must rest on a "reconciliation" of Hamas and Fatah, the leading party in the PA.  A diplomat said, "We have to give some room to [PA leader] Mahmoud Abbas."

6:05 p.m. And let's hope that this change in tone and direction from Egypt isn't linked to the Mitchell visit. Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit has invoked the grand axis of Hamas-Hezbollah-Tehran as the culprits in Gaza: "(They tried) to turn the region to confrontation in the interest of Iran, which is trying to use its cards to escape Western pressure ... on the nuclear file."

So much for Egypt trying to lead a united Arab settlement: look for more stories of an "Arab Cold War" with Cairo squaring up against Syria.

5:45 p.m. Let's hope that US envoy George Mitchell's initial trip to the Middle East is, as President Obama indicated on Monday night, one "for America to listen". Because, from what little is emerging, I'm not sure how the journey is matching up to Mitchell's declaration that the US is "committed to vigorously pursuing lasting peace and stability in the region".

After meeting Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Wednesday, Mitchell put forth a couple of general points for a settlement, notably an end to smuggling into the Gaza Strip and the reopening of border crossings linked to the 2005 agreement brokered by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The first point, of course, is aimed at Hamas and the second, while appearing on the surface to be a concession to Gaza, is specifically tied to re-introducing Palestinian Authority forces into the area.

4:30 p.m. Seven Israeli human-rights groups have filed a claim that Israeli Defense Forces kept Gaza detainees in "horrid conditions" and treated them "inhumanely". The lawsuit, based on detainee testimony, claims "many of the prisoners were held inside holes in the ground for long hours, while they were handcuffed, blindfolded and left exposed to the harsh weather".

4:20 p.m. An Israeli emergency clinic at the Erez crossing, opened on 19 January, has closed after treating only five wounded Palestinians.

12:30 p.m. The initial press statement of US envoy George Mitchell, held after his talks in Cairo, was distinctly and diplomatically vague. Mitchell said only, "It is of critical importance that the ceasefire be extended and consolidated, and we support Egypt's continuing efforts in that regard."

Mitchell is now in Israel for discussions.

9:45 a.m. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad el Baradei, is refusing to give any interviews to the BBC after its refusal to air the Disasters Emergency Committee appeal for Gaza.

8:45 a.m. False Alarm. I was very, very excited at the Ticker-flash from The New York Times: "Abdullah II: The Five-State Solution", thinking that the Saudi king had unveiled a new, grand initiative for a Middle Eastern settlement. Took me only a second to click on the link.

Unfortunately, it's just Thomas Friedman making stuff up.

Morning update (8 a.m. Israel/Gaza time): Three Israeli airstrikes on tunnels overnight, a day after the killing of an Israeli soldier and a Palestinian farmer.

US envoy George Mitchell is in talks in Cairo, including with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

Meanwhile the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen has kept the notion of a Gaza-Iran dispute simmering with the claim, "The United States did all it could to intercept a suspected arms shipment to Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip, but its hands were tied." Mullen was referring to the seizure of a Cypriot-flagged ship, which we noted at the time, which was intercepted by a US patrol at sea, taken to a port, and searched for two days. Reports at the time said "artillery", which Hamas does not use in Gaza, was found; Mullen referred to "small munitions".

Explanation? If US forces had found parts for rockets, their headline claim of Tehran support for Hamas, I don't think there would have been any hesitation to seize them and hold them up to world scrutiny --- it's not as if US "hands are tied" these days regarding international waters or even national sovereignty (for example, Pakistan). On the other hand, "small munitions" --- handguns and ammunition, for example --- isn't worth the fuss; better just to big up the incident (see the Sunday Times "story" by Uzi Mahnaimi that raised our eyebrows) to keep pressure on Iran.

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