Sunday
Jul252010
Iran Analysis: Re-Defining the Green Movement (Verde)
Sunday, July 25, 2010 at 7:27 
Recently Ataollah Mohajerani, the former Minister of Culture in the Khatami Government, provoked much discussion and some criticism when he tried to set out his view of the groups within the Green Movement.This week, writing in Rah-e-Sabz, Mohajerani tried to clarify his assessment.
The former Minister, claiming that his speech at Imperial College London had been taken out of context, writes that he sees three types of Greens:
A) Revolutionary: People who are against the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Imam Khomeini, and Islam. They want to overthrow the Islamic Republic and have been of this opinion for 30 years.
B) Revolutionary-Reformist: people who want to change the Constitution and remove velayat-e faghih (ultimate clerical supremacy).
C) Reformist: people who want to implement parts of the Constitution which have not been implemented, bringing out its full potential and following up on the post-election protest of "Where is My Vote?". Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, Mohammad Khatami, and most of the political prisoners are in this category
Warning that the opposition "have all become like Keyhan", the hard-line newspaper, with its lies against the Greens, Mohajerani says that those in his first category are after the overthrow of the Islamic Republic; they sympathize with and are comrades of the neocons, applauding American activists like John Bolton and Senator John McCain in Washington. This, according to Mohajerani, has been the style of overseas-based Iranian opposition for 30 years.
My observations
*It is a good sign that Mohajerani has tried to address the criticism of his views and of the “filtering” of the Green Movement.
*In the description of his first group "Revolutionaries", it sounds as if Mohajerani is saying that anyone who is against the revolution and Khoemini is also against Islam. Is he equating Khomeini and the 1979 Revolution with Islam? In that case, what is the difference between his view of the world and that of the current Supreme Leader, who equates himself with the Prophet?
*I am not sure where his descriptions of the Green Movement leave people like Neda Agha Soltan --- who, according to her mother, did not vote in the 2009 elections --- who were murdered during the street protests and have arguably become the potent symbol of both the Green Movement and the regime’s brutality.
*Mohajerani talks about the setting of conditions by some people for when they get to power (i.e., after the failure of the current regime leadership which, like many others, he takes to be inevitable). Setting such conditions is a bad thing to do, but it looks like Mohajerani is doing exactly the same thing. With his own description of the Green Movement, which is setting categories and conditions, where does this leave him?
*Mohajerani seems to say that everyone who is against the revolution and Khomeini is by definition a supporter of US neoconservatives. This appears to paint a lot of not very similar people with the same brush.
[An aside: I think, (with his mention of “these people have been the same for 30 years” and his definition of the first “revolutionary” category of Greens, Mohajerani is mainly having a go at the supporters of the previous regime of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.]
*Most importantly in my view:
The three sections of the Green Movement that Mohajerani describes are actually a sign of the opposition's strength. This indicates that the movement includes a range of people from the Islamic Republic’s former (and maybe even current) high-ranking officials to those who have been against the Islamic Republic even before its creation. This view of the Green Movement is of a loose coalition of almost all political groups and ideas, with the exception of Ayatollah Khamenei and a few people around him).
My conclusion....
Mohajerani and many other reformists, a lot of whom are paying a very heavy price, should be commended for their stand against Khamenei and his gang. With that stand, they have helped and are still helping the Green Movement.
When he was Minister for Culture, Mohajerani tried to open up the cultural environment --- within regime limits, it has to be said --- and was eventually forced from office. After the elections last summer, he did a series of interviews with Persian language media, in which he managed to prove (importantly, within the context of the Islamic Republic) that Ayatollah Khamenei, by his actions, no longer met the conditions to remain in the post of Supreme Leader. This should not be forgotten when arguing about different interpretations about the Green Movement.
By the same token, Mohajerani and other former high-ranking regime officials need to look and see what has gone wrong in the regime, in which they served not long ago, for it to have become the disaster it is today. The outcome of such an investigation could be very useful for all Iranians and the future of Iran.
This does not mean that we should blindly follow anyone who makes pronouncements, an allegation which has been made by many of the current young generation of Iranians against our parents’ generation. While we should remember and be thankful for the stand that people like Mohajerani are taking against Khamenei, we need more critical dialogue within the Green Movement. As Zahra Rahnavard said in a recent interview, “Those who are not criticized become stagnant like a marsh”.
Reader Comments (19)
Mr Verde
"Is he equating Khomeini and the 1979 Revolution with Islam? "
To me, the answer to this is very obvious.
The revolution of 1979 has always been referred to ( by Regime and its supporters) as "THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION" - not the Iranian Revolution or even the Iranian Islamic Revolution. It is obvious to me that the Revolution has always aimed at speaking for all Islam - and continues to do so. That is why Khamenei's recent Fatwa is no surprise to me - in his eyes, he is the ISLAMIC SUPREME LEADER.
Barry
Arshama,
Re. “Thank you very much for your excellent defense of Islamic reformists against Iranian democrats.”
I think you are mistaken about what I am saying here. I suggest you read it again. A few points to help you along:
Re. “First, your analysis is exclusive, because it excludes automatically 5 million Iranian expats, who are simply defined from a reformist, i.e. anti-western and anti-democrat perspective.”
All the things before “Some observations:” is a translation of what Mohajerani has written in his article not from me. I am not condoning the categorization or the special treatment that Mohajerani wants to reserve for the reformist. I am just reporting them for the benefit of those who do not speak Persian. Also since I had criticized him previously, I thought it is useful to provide his response (not to me, but to other people who criticised his filtering attempts). In his clarification Mohajerani is reaffirming his previous filtering views; he is just using different words.
My main points are the ones which are denoted with a “*”. Instead of sticking to general declarations like “… your excellent defense of Islamic reformists against Iranian democrats” you might wish to address those points to prove your case that I am defending the reformists against democrats.
There is a little typo in the post above:
The text including the following paragraph to the end is not part of “my main point” or the “*” points. That should have been made clear by something like “conclusion” or “way to look at it” (it was in the draft but not in the main post). That paragraph is:
“Mohajerani and many other reformists, a lot of whom are paying a very heavy price, should be commended for their stand against Khamenei and his gang. With that stand, they have helped and are still helping the Green Movement.”
Also with regard to your first point, I am not disregarding anyone. To the contrary I am questioning the attempt by Mohajerani to do so. But instead of just saying “he is being exclusive” I am pointing to problems with his assertions (denoted with “*”).
Re. “Second, your analysis is ahistorical at best and deceitful at worst. By concealing Iran's political developments during the past 100 years you manage to pretend that the Islamic Revolution has been the first effort in our history to achieve democracy.”
This is not attempt at writing the history of 100 years in Iran. It is to address the Mohajerani categorization and filtering of the Green Movement in favour of the reformist. I am not concealing anything here. I am trying to report and raise issues I find with the Mohajerani view of the Greens Movement.
Re. “My third point is that you continue to defend Mr Mohajerani, who banned the dailies Toos and Jame'e and ordered to imprison their editors during his era as Islamic Guidance Minister”
If by “defend” you mean that I am saying that the Ministry of Culture was relatively more open then than it is now, then you are correct (hence the caveat: “importantly, within the context of the Islamic Republic”). If you are however saying that I agree with Mohajerani’s categorization and think that the reformists should have a reserved place, then you are misunderstanding me.
If you think that the status of the Culture Ministry is better now than it was then, you have every right to think so and by using your logic (which I would not use BTW) you’d have to accuse yourself of defending the Culture Minister of Ahamadinejad’s government.
In any case, if you are talking about the closure of newspapers during the time the Khatami presidency, why are you only mentioning only two newspapers? Tens (around 100) newspapers were banned during that period.
As for Mohajerani’s criticism of Khamenei after the elections, I think it was very useful because it was from the context of within the regime. It was useful that a regime insider was criticising Khamenei not in general terms, but about specific issues.
As for me saying that the reformists’ stand against Khamenei has been useful for the Green Movement: I’d argue that most of this stand is the result of what we generally call the “Green Movement” and not the cause of it. But it is still useful. It is creating a – at times seeming fatal – divisions within the regime and that could be beneficial to the movement.
This is not the first time you are accusing me of deceit and blind support of the reformists while claiming that I am not a reformists stooge. As I recall in the last instance you concluded: “I take back all my allegations immediately”. None of this is personal, but the problem is that when we start accusing each other with broad, incorrect and misleading statements such as “Thank you very much for your excellent defense of Islamic reformists against Iranian democrats” little room will be left for talking about the actual issues.
I am sure based on the above article others can accuse me of being a monarchist stooge, neocon supporter, Green hater and/or many other things!
I agree with your point about labelling people being cheap and wrong.
I believe that despite the appearance of things, change is coming to Iran much faster than many people might think. I’d argue that in many respects change has already happened and we’re witnessing the aftershocks now and it is a matter of time until the changes become obvious. This is why I have started writing more about the Green Movement recently. Talking about Khamenei and his views these days look like beating a dead horse (it is looking like the same can be argued about talking about Mohajerani’s filtering attempts).
Regards,
Verde
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Mr Verde,
I really appreciate your efforts to give non Persian speakers a look behnd the scenes at insider discussions, but I must admit I found this post was rather confusing before your clarification above.
Although it was clear for me that the beginning was a translation of what Mohajerani wrote this week in Rah-e-Sabz, I actually thought the points marked by an asterisk might be translations of observations made by the readers who left comments on the website! :-) Then I thought at some point you had switched over to your own views towards the end, but wasn't sure where.
All's well that ends well.
Catherine,
I see what you mean. In that case, here are some explanations:
1.
The first section, including the A), B) and C) points and until “Some observations” is a translation of points that Mohajerani is making. They are not my interpretation or arguments.
2.
The section, “Some observations”, including the “*” points are MY observations, i.e. my arguments against Mohajerani’s re-statement of his categorization and filtering attempts of the Green Movement.
3.
Beginning with the paragraph “Mohajerani and many other reformists...” to the end is not my argument but a background about Mohajerani and reformists (trying to give a perspective to point out that I am not all out to condemn them just for the hell of it).
4.
One additional point I am making now (to emphasize a point I made in the article):
I think the point I make in “*Most importantly in my view” (in the “*” points section) should be taken seriously. The reason: because while Mohajerani is trying to say that only one of his categories of Greens are actually real Greens (category C, the reformists in HIS view, not mine!), he is actually inadvertently highlighting the diversity of the Green Movement. The total of his A), B) and C) categories means that, although he doesn’t like it and tries to dismiss others, the Green Movement is a large coalition of groups that spans almost the entire Iranian society and political thought (with the exception of Khamenei and a very few number of people around him, whose stand at the present time can hardly be considered political thought; it is more like holding onto power at any cost). The point I am making is that the Green Movement is so vast and powerful that even when people like Mohajerani try to” scale it down” to only include them, they will inadvertently have highlighted its immensity. How many other movements are there currently in the world, about which the same can be argued?
5.
New point, but still relevant:
I have said it before, but I think it is worth remembering that the reformists are facing serious ideological challenges. One of their options would be to stick their heads in the sand and try to “filter” others. The other would be to try to engage in constructive arguments. If they carry on the way they are acting now, I guess we might start seeing the beginnings of split amongst the reformists. By this split I don’t mean that any of it will help Khamenei, but a split about how to address issues in Iran beyond the stand against Khamenei (which has united almost political groups in this matter at least). I think it is becoming more apparent that the Khamenei is not able to control the current crisis. As a result some reformists (at least) may be feeling that they might be getting to a position where they’d be able to take control of things in Iran. And they might want to make sure that it is only them who’d be in power and not anyone else. Such a way of thinking is not different to that of Khamenei or Ahmadinejad, just the words and the people are different. The end result would be more or less the same.
6.
I could get all upset and start complaining about being “attacked” by people for posting my views, but I see the points in your post about the structure of the text and Arashama’s arguments. Besides the whole point of offering “analysis” is to have a debate about it, otherwise I should apply for the job of the Supreme Leader!
7.
I hope the numbering system helps clarify things a little.
Regards,
Verde
Magan,
Re. “I could not expect more than this from the likes of Mohajerani but why do you find Mohajerani’s nonsense appealing? Why is it even worth an analysis? I am beginning to wonder….”
Please refer to point 5 in my reply to Catherine. Also bear in mind that this whole thing started with the article on Rah-e Sabz which in trying to defend Mohajerani and Kadivar attacked EA without giving any proper reasons.
Reagrds,
Verde
My apologies for some confusion over Mr Verde's analysis because of my editing this morning. Thanks to Mr Verde and to readers for clarifying points in discussion.
S.
Mr Verde,
Yes, thanks, it's all much clearer now. Megan's post makes me wonder too, btw. Is this discussion of "Who's Halal and Who's Not" more prevalent inside or outside Iran? I mean Mohajerani is an exile giving speeches in London that "filter" some GM types from others and pronounce judgement on them, if I understand the situation correctly. What effect does this have, if any, on debates inside Iran on the way forward for the GM? Who listens to Mohajerani and where? What influence do his followers have?
Mr Verde,
Your reply was clarifying, but only to a certain degree. My main objection is that your criticism is limited within the narrow boundaries of this IR. But I will try to point out the instances first:
Re: *Mohajerani seems to say that everyone who is against the revolution and Khomeini is by definition a supporter of US neoconservatives. This appears to paint a lot of not very similar people with the same brush.
This does not "appear to paint lot of not very similar people with the same brush", this IS a denunciation of all other Iranians, who are fed up with the "doroughe maslahati" (emergency lies) of this system's supporters.
Re: "This does not mean that we should blindly follow anyone who makes pronouncements, an allegation which has been made by many of the current young generation of Iranians against our parents’ generation. While we should remember and be thankful for the stand that people like Mohajerani are taking against Khamenei, we need more critical dialogue within the Green Movement."
This sounds like a general accusation of the current young generation, critisising their parent's generation. Either the parent's generation is responsible for its deeds and failures, which have led to the actual mess, or it is not. In the second case there is no need for a debate, and we can switch to the usual IR "all is well" mantra.
I am certainly NOT "thankful for the stand that people like Mohajerani are taking against Khamenei", because they did not take it, when they were in power and had the opportunity to do it, but capitulated in front of him. Only now that they are not in power anymore, they start to criticise him in order to get it back. People like Mohajerani are not interested in defending civil rights, they defend their claim to power.
As far as I am informed central demands of this chided "young generation" are their civil rights, which they expressed by asking "Where is my vote?"
The novelty of this demand lies in its emphasis on individual rights, while parts of the reformists continue to demand equal rights for their faction. Honestly speaking I prefer to discuss with staunch regime supporters, who leave no doubt about their factional and exclusive claims, instead of reformists, who blur the debate by claiming a so-called "democracy" mainly for their faction and their supporters within this Islamic Constitution.
I am not accusing you of blind support of the reformists, but of limiting your criticism to the narrow borders, set by this Islamic Republic. Mr Mohajerani may have tried to open the cultural environment, but he and his reformist fellows backed down to Khamenei, instead of defending their voters demands. I did not find my list of ca. 200 banned dailies during the reformists era, but at least some of them: Asr-e Azadegan, Sobh-e Emrooz, Hamshahri, Hammihan, Mosharekat, Iran-e Farda, Akhbar-e Eqtesad, Aftab-e Emrooz, Gozaresh-e Rouz, Ava, Arya, Fath, Toos, Jame'e, etc.
The Green Movement will bog down, if its supporters are not honest about historical failures of the reformists. Reformists did a lot to open up the public space for critical discussions about equality and human rights, but if they are not willing to defend them against all odds, they should leave the struggle for a genuine democracy in Iran to the young generation.
Regards,
Arshama
You want Iran to be sanctioned, you want foreign involvement, and you probably wouldnt mind Iran government being removed by force, how are you so different than a neo-conservative?
Arshama and Mr Verde,
With every new (and always fascinating) exchange between you, it becomes clearer to me why Arshama reacts to Mr Verde's posts sometimes quite vehemently. I am also *finally* learning more about the failures of the Khatami era as well as its much touted achievements.
1) Would either of you say in all honesty that when the reformists "were in power and had the opportunity to do it [take a stand against Khameini], but capitulated in front of him", that they really "had the power" (ie control over all the military, especially the IRGC & Co.) to take a stand? I'm thinking now of - just as one example - the threats made to Khatami by a group of high-ranking IRGC officials during the 1999 student uprising - basically shut them down or we'll shut you down. I'm citing from memory right now, so maybe I've got some details wrong, but I think you know which incident I mean.
2) RE: "Only now that they are not in power anymore, they start to criticise him in order to get it back. People like Mohajerani are not interested in defending civil rights, they defend their claim to power." (Arshama)
I would imagine it's even more a question of whitewashing their past and creating a more respectable legacy - all from an extremely safe distance! That's also why I asked Mr Verde (somewhere above) about the current importance for the GM inside Iran of statements by exiled figures like Mohajerani. Are statements by people like him viewed as attempts by those who "had their chance" to remain relevant despite their previous failures and long after their shelf life has expired? Or does the GM inside Iran welcome the criticism of the current regime by former reformists - despite their complicity in the continuation of the regime - as a morale-boosting shot in the arm and as arguments they can use to convince broader sectors of the population to join or at least not work against the GM?
These questions are addressed to both of you - if you have the time to answer. If not, I understand.
Catherine,
Your point 1:
==========
Re. >when the reformists "were in power and had the opportunity to do it [take a stand against Khameini], but capitulated in front of him", that they really "had the power" (ie control over all the military, especially the IRGC & Co.) to take a stand?<
The short answer is probably not. But this does not let them off the hook. They bear a lot of responsibility for what is happening in Iran today.
Respectfully, I think by asking the question the way you have asked it, you’re looking for a simple answer (i.e. yes or no), but you may not be getting FULL answer or even the correct answer. Your question is very similar to the way some of the reformists ask such questions (rhetorically) in order to be able to prove that they’re the good guys [I am NOT accusing you of pushing their agenda! I am merely trying to articulate my point of view]. Their argument is something like: look we did the best we could; they had all the muscle and we had nothing.
I know this may be frustrating because you want a straight answer to your question, but please bear with me:
IMHO by asking the question the way you ask it, you are making some assumptions that may not be correct. Before asking that question you’ll perhaps need to have answered the following questions:
What were the reformists’ intentions?
Did they do the correct things?
Did they do enough?
I believe these are more relevant than whether they had enough muscle. I’ll explain why:
[First off, I’ll ignore here the questions about the background of the reformists, which may also be relevant to the issue. The reason for this is, if I were to talk about that too, this post would become a book]
Back in the 1990s the reformists promised reforms. They were saying that they were able to use the internal institutions of the Islamic Republic to reform it in order for the system of governance to become more responsive to the people’s will and fairer (they were vague about the level of responsiveness that they were pushing for). Based on what the reformists were saying I would respectfully argue that your question is not very valid. The reason: they were saying that they were able to reform the system from within. You don’t need military muscle if you are aiming to reform something from within.
Early on in Khamtami’s presidency the reformists were faced with four major challenges from within the regime: the Karbaschi trial, the chain murders, the 1999 student dorm attacks and the closure of newspapers. In all four cases they gave in to the opposite side. On top of that, while giving in to the opposite side, they were still saying to the people: don’t worry we’ll reform the regime.
[Explanation: although people from outside of the regime were hurt and killed in them, all four of the above were challenges from WITHIN the regime:
- Karbaschi: he was a regime official who was put on trail and convicted on laughable charges. I am not saying that Karbaschi is a saint. I am saying that the charges brought against him during that trial were ridiculous.
- Chain murders: although the victims were from outside of the regime, the murders were carried out by regime’s active intelligence officers on orders from their superiors within the regime. Besides, only a few of the suspected regime assassinations were ever talked about by the reformists in the chain murders case; there were many more that the regime has not yet owned up to.
- 1999 student revolt: although many students were killed, injured and jailed as a result, the actual events that led to the revolt and regime brutality were intra-regime issues: it all started as protest by regime affiliated student organizations against the closure of Salam newspaper (which belonged to a regime insider).
- Closure of newspapers: the newspapers had permits from the regime’s Culture Ministry. I am not saying that they deserved to be closed down or that it was a good thing they were shut. I am saying that one part of the regime (the press court) was acting against newspapers which had permits from another part of the regime.]
In order not to right too much, I’ll leave out the closure of the papers and the Karbaschi case out for the following part of my argument (as my argument below will also cover these two cases).
Look at the case of the chain murders and the student dorm attacks. In both cases extreme (unthinkable) brutality was used by regime operatives against innocent people. The details of the chain murders are sickening. The evidence of the aftermath of the attacks on the dorms is truely disturbing. Any government which is faced with such serious transgressions will make sure that every single person responsible is made to account for their decisions and actions and if it is not able to do that, it would resign.
What happened in the case of the chain murders? The regime said that its intelligence officials (judging by what they had been prepared to do for the regime, perhaps its most loyal intelligence agents) were foreign agents. One of then conveniently “committed suicide” and the others supposedly “confessed” to being foreign spies and given “jail sentences”. Nothing was said officially about the chain of command and the people who had ordered the murders.
And what happened in the case of the 1999 student demos? The student dorms were trashed by regime operatives and students were beaten and murdered, but no one was made to account. And Khamami later thanked the students for their patience!
Whatever the stated intentions of the reformists, the above would suggests that they were not after real reforms. They were after gaining power within the constructs of the Islamic Republic. They wanted to keep the main structures of the regime intact at all costs and instead of Khamenei and his gang up there, they wanted to be the top dogs. The people’s vote was used as a tool in the internal fight for power (similarly to the way Khamenei’s talks about the 42 million votes cast in the 09 elections and Ahmadinejad’s “24 million” votes). The reformists were saying they were powerless in the face of Khamenei (the same thing your question is referring to I guess). If that were the case, then Khatami should have resigned. In my view he did not resign because that would have placed the regime squarely against the people and that could not have been good for the regime (as example, look at the 2009 protests). At the time the reformists kept on talking about some actions not being in “interests” (maslahat), it appears they were talking about the interests of the regime rather than the interests of the country and the people. After 8 year of reformist presidency we ended up with Ahmadinejad which eventually led to the brutality of last year (which is still going on but reported less). You may say, well this argument is with the benefit of hindsight. Fair enough, but my argument is consider that you are witnessing the following (at the time they happened): regime intelligence officials are murdering people in the most gruesome fashion in their home in Tehran and riot police and IRGC personnel attack students sleeping in their dorms and throw them out of windows and kill them. Now you just allow them to get away with it. What do you expect happens next? I am sure you’ll agree this is what happens next: the shooting of people in the streets; he running over of people by police; raping of prisoners by regime operative in prison; etc.
So unless the reformists were very very very naive , they must have known not standing up in cases like chain murders or student dorm attacks would only mean one thing: worse things happening in the future, and on a much larger scale.
So answers to the three questions I asked above:
Q: What were the reformists’ intentions?
A: To gain power for themselves within the Islamic Republic, at the price of the basic rights of Iranians being trampled upon.
Q: Did they do the correct things?
A: Not for the people or the country. Not as it turns out for themselves
Q: Did they do enough?
A: Clearly not.
I would argue that the mess you have in Iran today is as much the fault of the reformist as it is the fault of Khamenei and co.
Your point 2:
==========
I think Mohajerani is not just speaking for himself. He is speaking for parts of the reformists. At this stage it is very difficult to say what portion or even who within the reformists.
I think the Mohajerani categorization of the Green Movement is in the same spirit as statements from other reformists who insist on sticking to the IR constitution. Maybe Mohajerani is taking it further than some of them mean or want, but in reality both the categorization and sticking to IR constitution will lead to exclusion of most Iranians from participating fully in having a say in the way the country is run. The Mohajerani categorization is a good demonstration of what the IR constitution means. Many GM leaders in Iran, like say Mousavi, may not like the fact that Mohajerani is speaking with such excluding terminologies, but what they are saying about sticking to the IR constitution means the same thing: it was the same thing when they were in power in the 1980s, it is the same thing now (Khamenei/Ahmadinajd rule), and even if they were to “reform” things within IR, it has a good chance of becoming another excluding system.
I am sure you have noticed that over the past year, the reformist leaders inside and outside Iran have at times said contradictory things. I think the problem is not that they are stupid or don’t know what they are saying. The problem is that they on the one hand want to stick to the IR constitution but at the same time are stating aims that will only be possible if the IR constitution were to be changed beyond recognition.
I think the reformists are no longer able to get away with broad statements about the constitution and people’s rights. This is forcing them into revealing the paradoxes within the stance. It must be difficult to cope with such paradoxes. As a result some of them are starting to re-evaluate what they believed to be solid foundations for their beliefs. Others are saying, let’s leave these until later. Others are just repeating their statements without even bothering to addresses the paradoxes. And others are lashing out at everyone else, for example calming that they are hoping for military strike on Iran. (Or a combination of these).
-
I think the following should be considered:
If IR were not to exist, then the reformists dialog and ideology would lose most of its relevance. At the moment the reformists have a lot to say, because they are speaking within the confines of the IR, and are facing an adversary which seems to have checked out its power of logical deduction. Of course, in this context, the reformists smell of roses.
But what if they were to have to compete with people and groups with other political and social views?
-
Originally the aim of the reformists was to provide an alternative to the Khamenei rule within the Islamic Republic. For a very long time now, it has been apparent that Khamenei’s policies and actions would lead to him losing face and legitimacy (I am guessing most people, me included, could not guess he would manage to do this at such speed, with such efficiency and so spectacularly!). The hope of the reformists was/is to then be able to step in and take control of the levers of power. As it turned out Khamenei was more stubborn (and foolish in my view) than they first thought. More importantly the public reaction was much stronger than anyone could have predicted (and certainly stronger than the reformists were hoping for: they wanted public outcry, but not so widespread and persistant). The combination of these two factors and the failures of the reformists (as mentioned in answer to your first q) have led to not just to damage to Khamenei’s reputation, but to serious questions about IR’s ability to govern the country in a fair and proper manner. As a result, it is not enough for the reformists to stick to broad statements or just dismiss others. They need to change their stance substantially.
So now we have the reformists getting what they wanted: Lost of legitimacy of Khamenei
We also have Khamenei in a way getting what he wanted: the reformists not having an easy ride to power.
The problem for both of them is that there is a third issue here too: exposure of the IR as a dangerous system of governance.
---
An example of one of the problems with the IR constitution (because reformists inside and outside Iran keep talking about it, and it is relevant to your point):
I will not talk about the position of Supreme Leader, as it has been talked about a lot, but consider this serious flaw with the constitution:
We have a Majles which passes legislation, which is the vetted by the Council of Guardians to ensure that it does not negate the constitution and Sharia law (which is a very vague thing anyway. If the CG thinks that a piece of legislation is against the constitution and/or Sharia, it is sent back to Majles in order for it to make the required changes. If the Majles insists on its original version of the legislation, then it is sent to the Expediency Council. The EC has the power to change the legislation or keep it as it is. The EC’s version of the legislation will become law. The EC is there to arbiter between the Majles and CG and it is allowed to ignore worries about legislation being against the constitution or Sharia. So the IR constitution has a framework within it which will allow it to negate the constitution!
If the IR constitution were to be implemented, you’d either have what we have now, or just plain and simple chaos.
You might say, well this is just one example, which can be amended. The problem is that there are many such problems within the constitution. And on top of it we have the VF and other institutions whose major responsibility seems to be to resist and overrule the public.
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Having said all this I think the reformists stand against is creating space for people from within the regime to voice their disquiet too. Example: IRGC commander Jafari was forced to admit a couple of days ago that some members of the IRGC have sided with the Green Movement.
I think the best way to characterize the GM is to say that it is united in trying to stop Khamenei/Ahmadinejad, and beyond that there are many difference. The movement is very large and very broad (even by Mohajerani’s definition). It is too large and too broad for it to be viewed as a single political force. Despite the internal differences and the brutal assault by Khamenei’s forces, the GM has managed to (mostly thanks to the resilience of its footsoldiers) retain its cohesion and focus on its initial aim. Beyond that, there needs to be proper dialog amongst all sections of Iranian political thought and society. We don’t need Mohajerani’s disqualification of people. We’ve had that for over 30 years and look where it has got us.
Regards,
Verde
M.Ali,
Re. “You want Iran to be sanctioned..”
http://www.khabaronline.ir/news-78486.aspx" rel="nofollow">http://www.khabaronline.ir/news-78486.aspx
Since it was only yesterday that Ahmadinejad said, “One of my wishes is that gasoline is sanctioned”, I can only assume your post is directed at him. I doubt if Ahmadinejad would be reading EA. I’m even doubtfully he thinks much of the internet. You may have better luck communicating with him in chah-e jamkaran.
Good Luck!
[...] to be answered regarding the implications of this phenomenon. Meanwhile, in his blog, Scott Lucas describes the assessment of the Green Movement offered by Ayatollah Mohajerani, former Minister of Culture [...]
This is another one I'll sit out, because I have nothing to add of much worth. Nevertheless I would but say thank you to Mr Verde and our wonderful community whom I always learn so much from. :-)
A pretty lame question from a non-Persian speaker, but was Mrs. Rahnavard making an allusion to a proverb regarding the stagnant marsh and change?
Catherine,
For 31 years this regime is insulting expats as traitors, attempting to destroy Iran, obviously by equating our country with itself. I am accustomed to such insults on regime sites, but I will not accept them nearly unchallenged on EA. It deeply hurted me to read them here, hence my harsh reaction.
Mr Verde has already answered your questions in admirable detail, nevertheless I will try to answer them too.
Re: 1) The reformists had promised more freedoms to the people than they could keep, proved their weakness in front of that radical current within the IR, which is now in power, and were not ready to bear the political consequences of their failure, i.e. to resign. During their rule they subsequently caved in to these so-called "pressure groups" in order to remain in power and lost their initial credibility, which caused their voters' alienation and final defeat.
Re: 2) I have no insight into the recent political mood, but imho Mohajerani's attacks are a boost to those parts of the reformists, who still believe in an (impossible) reconciliation of democratic demands with the IR's constitution. Strategically spoken everything which weakens the political opponent (regime) is useful, but Mr Mohajerani and his likes are already outdistanced by a majority of the Greens. The regime's constant oppression has led to radicalisation of demands, aiming now at the very core of the system, i.e. system change.
Last week Mehrdad Mashahyekhi (Iranian republican and political expert in the US) offered an interesting analysis of the actual situation in Iran on VoA, pointing to the reformist camp split into a pro-Mousavi and an anti-Mousavi group. The former welcomes his attempts to reach out for the seculars, the latter is obviously angered by these moves. Mr Mohajerani certainly belongs to the second group, which sees its hopes to regain power dashed.
A final notice: Mohajerani's labels for the three types of Greens (A-C) are fraudulent in themselves. By defining the opponents of this regime (A) as "revolutionary", he turns upside down the whole history of this system, always boasting of its Islamic Revolution. As Mashayekhi noted in the VoA discussion, one of the most apparent signs of the regime's crumbling is the breakdown of former political labels like reformist, hardliner etc. Last week Khabar Online quoted a hardliner, announcing the establishment of a group of "reformist hardliners" ;-)
Arshama
Arshama
"By defining the opponents of this regime (A) as "revolutionary", he turns upside down the whole history of this system,"
Perhaps there is a good side to this? Remember Samuel?- he used to say that he wanted to perpetuate the Islamic Revolution ( or was it the Iranian Revolution??) - some words like that anyway. Well - perhaps the Revolution IS being continued and perpetuated - but NOT in the direction that he wants!! :) Or , is there not a delicious irony in that the Iranian Revolution has become the conservative "Status Quo" - and another Revolution is now stalking it??? :)
Barry
Barry,
Sorry, I should have elaborated my note. To be honest Iranians are fed up with revolution and related mantras, this regime is trying to hammer into their heads for 31 years.
A revolution is perhaps necessary for regime change, but when it gets institutionalised for political propaganda, it looses all its meaning. This is also one of the main reasons why this regime has failed to bring up a "revolutionary" generation. As far as I gather from all the slogans, news, blogs etc. Iranians are fed up with this propaganda and simply want to have freedom, peace and personal security.
The big problem of Iran's society is that it currently lacks powerful moderate and pragmatic politicians, who are ready for compromise to the benefit of society. After 31 years of deliberate regime subversion (divide et impera) we are confronted with a society, heavily divided on all possible levels: politics, gender, ethnicity and religion, and a political caste mainly interested in ensuring factional power.
Mousavi and Karroubi are to be praised for insisting on non-violent resistance against this regime, a concept which clearly opposes the former agenda of Muslim and communist radicals, preaching violence as a means of politics.
A revolution can topple a regime, but it is no concept for politics in the long term. An Iranian Revolution as you call it is not the answer to the country's manifold problems, we need sober pragmatic politicians, who are able to reunite this deeply split society in order to reconstruct the country on the base of majoritarian consent.
Arshama
Mr Verde and Arshama,
Thanks so much for your replies! I'll get back to you when I've read them thoroughly. As Kurt says, this is a wonderful place to exchange viewpoints, knowledge and learn from each other.