Iran Analysis: The Hardliners Take on Ahmadinejad

The dominant front-line story on EA from Iran these days is the tension within the establishment: the growing conservative/principlist movement against the Government, the fight over Islamic Azad University, the disputes over the budget and the (still far from implemented) subsidy cuts, the criticisms over corruption, intimidation of senior clerics, and even pressure on the Supreme Leader.

This, however, may be the most dramatic illustration of the divisions.

Recently, the President's Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai claimed publicly that he had been told by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "You are being attacked because of me. They cannot attack me so they have a go at you."

Ahmadinejad then said to his principal aide, "In one year’s time [you] will become a kafar (infidel)" in these criticisms." Rahim-Mashai added his view: "Ahmadinejad’s turn will also come, and this prediction will come true in one and a half year’s time."

And who is behind this plot? Rahim-Mashai pointed at the prominent "hard-line" newspaper Keyhan: "In the opinion of [Keyhan editor Hossein] Shariatmadari I am not even Muslim. In his view I am a spy and a monafegh (heretic) and a part of a velvet coup."

And there's more. Last Thursday, Mehdi Mohammadi, Keyhan's political editor, told supporters of the"hard-line" movement Ansar Hezbollah:

In Iran, a new movement is appearing which wants to say that it’s more revolutionary than the Supreme Leader. This new movement wants to pit the supporters of Hezbollah in the society against the Supreme Leader, and to make this movement problematic for him. This new movement doesn’t want to see the country in peace and tranquility. It even wants to vacate the surroundings of the Supreme Leader from others and only keep itself in his proximity. And when this happens, it will want to say that we are the only ones who stayed, therefore all authority should be surrendered to me because I won 25 million votes.

That "I won 25 million votes" makes clear that Mohammadi is targeting the President. And here's a twist: Ansar Hezbollah is considered close to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who has often been identified as Ahmadinejad's religious mentor.

Then there is the curious affair of Mohammad Nasser Saghaie Biriya, Ahmadinejad's religious affairs advisor, who tried to resign last week. The supposed source was Ahmadinejad's criticism last month of the excesses of "morality police", for example, over the enforcement of hijab.

So what is going on here? There are two immediate possibilities: 1. the "hardliners" see the President going soft in his social policies, even as he tries to parade Iran's leading position abroad (note, for example, the smile-raising moment of Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami warning Ahmadinejad of the folly of his statement that men might be allowed to wear ties and not commit religious error); 2. the "hardliners" are making their own grab for power.

Yet while part of the tension lies in these all-too-obvious dynamics, the wider cause is still the one that has besieged the President since June 2009: his legitimacy is not assured.

If Ahmadinejad had truly established a grip on the economy, if he had demonstrated capability in political as well as economic management, if he had backed up his "25 million" chant with the clear support of Iran's people, then the hard-line concerns would not have turned into open opposition.

He didn't. And perhaps more importantly, he's not even a secure firewall, anyone. By that, I mean that one of Ahmadinejad's role has always been to serve as protection for the Supreme Leader and the Iranian system. Governments always get criticised and, in Iran's case, such criticism has the benefit of taking possible heat away from other institutions and Ayatollah Khamenei.

(If I was being provocative, I would suggest that this is not unique to the Islamic Republic. Many monarchs and indeed the Shah of Iran have tried to use Prime Ministers as firewalls against opposition. History shows when they have succeeded and when they have failed.)

The disputed election, however, damaged Ahmadinejad as a firewall. Indeed, when the Supreme Leader tried to shore up the President with his Friday Prayer sermon a week after the vote, telling everyone to shut up and sit down, the declaration had the opposite effect.

By the summer, it was not just a question of whether the President could survive but whether Ayatollah Khamenei was stable in his authority. In August, the tension broke into the open with the vehement opposition to the selection of Rahim-Mashai --- yes, the same person who is claiming that he is now the hard-liners' primary target --- as 1st Vice President and with battles for control of key Ministries. It took a letter from the Supreme Leader to Ahmadinejad and the uneasy "compromise" of Rahim-Mashai resigning the Vice Presidency but then becoming Chief of Staff to ease the prospect of an internal coup.

The claim that this crisis passed because the "Green" opposition to Ahmadinejad's election has disappeared or been muted always missed the wider point. Even if Government repression could take people off the streets and break up their communications, many within the Iranian establishment were not satisfied that the President had established authority. Indeed, many see him as counter-productive, sapping any strength that the Iranian system can claim.

That, of course, is not the sole reason for Keyhan's assault. There are personal factors and egos in play here. It does mean, however, that some in the establishment who might knock back Keyhan and other "hard-liners" will now try to use this conflict for their own manoeuvres.

If Ahmadinejad is no longer a suitable firewall for the Supreme Leader and thus the current Iranian system, then he must go, sooner or later.

But then the irony: the person who will step in to make this "later" rather than "sooner" is Ayatollah Khamenei. The President may be damaged goods but there is no assurance that a replacement will provide better cover for the Supreme Leader. To the contrary, the drama of toppling Ahmadinejad may expose weakness rather than establish strength.

So, in addition to putting out --- in confusing fashion, itself testimony to the tensions within --- his "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa last week, the Supreme Leader also appears to have worked with Mesbah Yazdi to persuade the President's religious advisor, Biriya, to withdraw his resignation. Keyhan's campaign against Rahim-Masahi, for now, has now picked up the endorsement of officials. A lid has been maintained on the Kahrizak prison abuse scandal, protecting other Ahmadinejad aides like Saeed Mortazavi.

The President is still in place. But whether Rahim-Mashai proves to be a prophet with his 18-month prediction --- "Ahmadinejad's time will come" --- reamins to be seen.

Comments

[News vom 28. Juli « Arsh]

[...] Die Attacken der Hardliner gegen Ahmadinedjad [...]

[Catherine]

Who needs soap operas when you can follow Iranian politics? :-)

Seriously, though - I think the 'Ahmadinejad = Khamenei's compromised firewall' analogy is a very good description of the way things stand.

[Verde_e]

Thank you for a very interesting read and good summary of the events.

Re. “The disputed election, however, damaged Ahmadinejad as a firewall.”

Maybe the firewall ducked and let the flames through, or maybe it was not strong enough to withstand the flames.
It’s worth remembering that soon after the original fires were started, the firewall started spraying gasoline over the flames. To make matters worse, the master of the house came out well beyond the firewall, but instead of dousing the flames with water, poured accelerant on them.
Anyway, it seems that these days small but potentially dangerous fires are spontaneously starting in some unexpected places well beyond the firewall, places which until recently were thought to be safe. Some of these fires are not being fully extinguished. They are just being covered with a thin layer of ash.

Re. “The President may be damaged goods but there is no assurance that a replacement will provide better cover for the Supreme Leader. To the contrary, the drama of toppling Ahmadinejad may expose weakness rather than establish strength.”

Indeed. To use the fire analogy, the damage beyond the firewall may be to an extent that the firewall has to be relied upon to help prop things up.

[Bozorg]

I'm so sick of reading all this bs about infighting between equally brutish bullies while the country continues to fall into the shitter.

Where the hell is the opposition? Where the hell are the people?