Iran's Election: Six Indications That The Results Were Altered

From Juan Cole:

1. It is claimed that Ahmadinejad won the city of Tabriz with 57%. His main opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, is an Azeri from Azerbaijan province, of which Tabriz is the capital. Mousavi, according to such polls as exist in Iran and widespread anecdotal evidence, did better in cities and is popular in Azerbaijan. Certainly, his rallies there were very well attended.

So for an Azeri urban center to go so heavily for Ahmadinejad just makes no sense. In past elections, Azeris voted disproportionately for even minor presidential candidates who hailed from that province.

2. Ahmadinejad is claimed to have taken Tehran by over 50%. Again, he is not popular in the cities, even, as he claims, in the poor neighborhoods, in part because his policies have produced high inflation and high unemployment. That he should have won Tehran is so unlikely as to raise real questions about these numbers.

3. It is claimed that cleric Mehdi Karoubi, the other reformist candidate, received 320,000 votes, and that he did poorly in Iran's western provinces, even losing in Luristan. He is a Lur and is popular in the west, including in Kurdistan. Karoubi received 17 percent of the vote in the first round of presidential elections in 2005. While it is possible that his support has substantially declined since then, it is hard to believe that he would get less than one percent of the vote. Moreover, he should have at least done well in the west, which he did not.

4. Mohsen Rezaie, who polled very badly and seems not to have been at all popular, is alleged to have received 670,000 votes, twice as much as Karoubi.

5. Ahmadinejad's numbers were fairly standard across Iran's provinces. In past elections there have been substantial ethnic and provincial variations.

6. The Electoral Commission is supposed to wait three days before certifying the results of the election, at which point they are to inform Khamenei of the results, and he signs off on the process. The three-day delay is intended to allow charges of irregularities to be adjudicated. In this case, Khamenei immediately approved the alleged results.

I am aware of the difficulties of catching history on the run. Some explanation may emerge for Ahmadinejad's upset that does not involve fraud. For instance, it is possible that he has gotten the credit for spreading around a lot of oil money in the form of favors to his constituencies, but somehow managed to escape the blame for the resultant high inflation.

But just as a first reaction, this post-election situation looks to me like a crime scene. And here is how I would reconstruct the crime.

As the real numbers started coming into the Interior Ministry late on Friday, it became clear that Mousavi was winning. Mousavi's spokesman abroad, filmmaker Mohsen Makhbalbaf, alleges that the ministry even contacted Mousavi's camp and said it would begin preparing the population for this victory.

The ministry must have informed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has had a feud with Mousavi for over 30 years, who found this outcome unsupportable. And, apparently, he and other top leaders had been so confident of an Ahmadinejad win that they had made no contingency plans for what to do if he looked as though he would lose.

They therefore sent blanket instructions to the Electoral Commission to falsify the vote counts.

This clumsy cover-up then produced the incredible result of an Ahmadinejad landlside in Tabriz and Isfahan and Tehran.

The reason for which Rezaie and Karoubi had to be assigned such implausibly low totals was to make sure Ahmadinejad got over 51% of the vote and thus avoid a run-off between him and Mousavi next Friday, which would have given the Mousavi camp a chance to attempt to rally the public and forestall further tampering with the election.

This scenario accounts for all known anomalies and is consistent with what we know of the major players.

More in my column, just out, in Salon.com: "Ahmadinejad reelected under cloud of fraud," where I argue that the outcome of the presidential elections does not and should not affect Obama's policies toward that country-- they are the right policies and should be followed through on regardless.

The public demonstrations against the result don't appear to be that big. In the past decade, reformers have always backed down in Iran when challenged by hardliners, in part because no one wants to relive the horrible Great Terror of the 1980s after the revolution, when faction-fighting produced blood in the streets. Mousavi is still from that generation.

My own guess is that you have to get a leadership born after the revolution, who does not remember it and its sanguinary aftermath, before you get people willing to push back hard against the rightwingers.

So, there are protests against an allegedly stolen election. The Basij paramilitary thugs and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards will break some heads. Unless there has been a sea change in Iran, the theocrats may well get away with this soft coup for the moment. But the regime's legitimacy will take a critical hit, and its ultimate demise may have been hastened, over the next decade or two.

What I've said is full of speculation and informed guesses. I'd be glad to be proved wrong on several of these points. Maybe I will be.

PS: Here's the data:

So here is what Interior Minister Sadeq Mahsouli said Saturday about the outcome of the Iranian presidential elections:

"Of 39,165,191 votes counted (85 percent), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the election with 24,527,516 (62.63 percent)."

He announced that Mir-Hossein Mousavi came in second with 13,216,411 votes (33.75 percent).

Mohsen Rezaei got 678,240 votes (1.73 percent)

Mehdi Karroubi with 333,635 votes (0.85 percent).

He put the void ballots at 409,389 (1.04 percent).

Iran's Elections: Surprise and Uncertainty

The least that could be said this morning is that the overnight outcome of Iran's Presidential election was unexpected, to observers outside the country and I suspect many inside it. It is the more that might be said --- and done --- that now occupies attention.

The latest announced vote count, as I write, is about 18 million votes for President Ahmadinejad and 9 million for former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, with about 250.,000 each for Mohsen Rezaei and Mehdi Karroubi. With Iranian official saying that 32 million ballots were cast, the total already allow Ahmadinejad to claim a majority victory.

The President's advisors are already doing so eagerly. Meanwhile, Mousavi is considering his next step. His campaign's immediate response was there had been widespread irregularities in the campaign, although their initial statements focused on those prevented from voting before polls counted.

The bigger question is whether the totals were "massaged" to ensure Ahmadinejad did not have to face a widely-expected second-round contest with Mousavi. The challenger was reportedly meeting with the other candidates, Rezaei and Karroubi, to consider next steps.

It appears many in Iran are holding their breaths waiting for developments. Ahmadinejad supporters have been celebrating in the streets, but there are no reports on conflicts beyond the break-up of one gathering of Mousavi enthusiasts. Mehr newspaper is reporting, however, that authorities have warned rallies are prohibited.

Iran's Election: "Ahmadinejad Victory!"

Shirvin Zeinalzadeh, interviewing Iranian voters in London, offers his viewpoint on the Iranian election:

The Interior Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran has just officially announced that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is to serve a second term. This news has come as a shock to some, but no surprise to others as he seals an overwhelming landslide victory.

The celebrations and tension will of course continue into the night and for the rest of the week as Mir Hussein Moussavi declares false results and unfair issues within the voting booths, however, the sheer difference in the vote percentage, and support for Ahmadinejad has shown that once again Iran’s high voting turnout has stunned the West with its ever growing strength and belief in the Islamic Republic.

I was fortunate enough to visit two polling stations in London, one in the Consulate Section of the Iranian Embassy, and the other in the Islamic Republic of Iran School, also in London.

As I witnessed the many protestors and press outside the consulate section, the support was clearly balanced between the two main candidates, (although it is worth a mention I could not find a single voter who claimed to be voting for the other two candidates). The school had a very different electoral populous however. Away from the media glitz, and protestors who threw paint over an official, the school was surprisingly just as busy, and from my personal view and self conducted exit poll, Ahmadinejad clearly took the majority of votes.

It really comes as no surprise that his victory was so big. Many fail to realise the supporters of Moussavi were the young elite rich of Northern Tehran, who already possess dual nationality to Western countries, and are merely trying to adapt their Western life styles to suit them in a selfish was in Tehran. (By selfish I mean allowing them more freedom to behave in the way that they enjoy). But one must not forget that Iran is not solely made up of this 1% ultra rich North Tehran populous, and Ahmadinejad’s supporters can be found in the majority of rural towns, countryside and cities, as well as the remaining massive population of Tehran.

The dust will soon settle both in Iran and the West, once this happens, we will begin to see the consequences of this election.

I will be looking closely at the reaction of Barack Obama, will he be returning the letter of congratulations Ahmadinejad sent, and will this send a message of finally cracking on with the bi-lateral diplomacy needed between the two states, safe in the knowledge that the terms have now be set, and that there are four solid years for the two leaders to find mutual interests.

Or will this lead to the more probable result of Ahmadinejad gaining more confidence in his second tenure as President of the Islamic Republic, leading to more national achievements and more defiance of ‘enemies’ in Iran’s next four years of foreign policy.

Recent EU and council elections in the UK showed a 30% turnout, Iran’s Presidential election was over 80%, therefore this strong voice is truly the opinion of the majority, which is more than can be said in the precedent case. There is no doubt that the scale and importance of the elections were not in the same league, but this kind of turnout is fairly common in Iran, and should be congratulated.

My final point brings me back to the Iranian School, this small and tucked away polling station seemed to have given a good indication of the election results. As a teacher there myself, I have followed this election closely with my students and their parents, and it has been a long accepted notion that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was going to serve his second term as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Now is the time to reach out to Iran and use this occasion to build up relations with the continuing government of Ahmadinejad, and to work on bi-lateral relations, regional security and more importantly the support and trust that Iran and the West need to build with each other to develop the nation into a serious contributor of peace and example setting in the region and international arena.

Iran Elections: Will the Results Be Accepted by All?

Yesterday's analysis of Iran's Presidential elections sparked a lively debate on whether the results will be honoured. An initial note is that today is only the first round, with the likely outcome of President Ahmadinejad and former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi as the top two candidates; the crunch question over an "acceptable" vote would come in the following week's second-round decider.

That said, an article by Robert Dreyfuss of The Nation, one of the better "Western" reporters in Tehran, offered these observations:

There's worry and anger about cheating and unfair campaigning. Yesterday, the state-run Iranian TV gave Ahmadinejad twenty minutes of free air time for a speech, while offering one minute each to his three rivals. (They turned it down contemptuously.)

At a Mousavi rally, people chant: "Iranian TV has become Ahmadinejad's PlayStation!" A man says that if there is evidence of cheating, people won't stand for it. Later, the crowd chants: "If there is any cheating, we are going to make hell in Iran!" Rumors that people would storm the offices of Iranian TV if Ahmadinejad were given the free time proved unfounded, and the speech was aired without incident.

But there's an uneasy feeling that, especially if the vote is close, one side or the other won't accept the results. Perhaps the greatest danger comes from the angry, inflamed supporters of Ahmadinejad, though a highly informed analyst says that Iran's Leader, Ali Khamenei, will be able to control the backers of Ahmadinejad in the event of a Mousavi victory. But there's no question that Iran is highly divided, and when the results are announced--probably Saturday morning--there will be a few days of tension before it's clear how the voters on the losing side react.

"I hope the gap is wide enough that the losing side accepts it," says a well-known professor at Tehran University. If Ahmadinejad loses, if the gap is wide, Khamenei will put a lot of pressure on him not to make trouble."

The reality is that Khamenei and his all-powerful Council of Guardians has approved all four candidates, and virtually everyone I've spoken with says that the Leader will be happy if either Ahmadinejad or Mousavi wins. It's even likely that Khamenei may have decided that Ahmadinejad has served his purpose, and that a more acceptable, more moderate president would better serve Iran's broader interests.

How Not to Cover Iran's Elections: The Awards Ceremony

On Tuesday, we profiled our first entry in the competition to write the worst story about Iran's Presidential election: Colin Freeman's effort, for The Daily Telegraph of London to turn the campaign into a "a rock gig moshpit" and "a World Wrestling Federation grudge match" and to make over President Ahmadinejad as a member of The Sex Pistols.

We could not have anticipated the flood of entries that would follow. Each time, we thought the bottom had been reached, an intrepid reporter or commentator would take the bar lower. So, without further ado, the ultimate in Bad Election Journalism:


HONOURABLE MENTION

The Washington Post: Any Label Will Do

Friday's piece by Thomas Erdbrink is OK in its profile of the campaigns of President Ahmadinejad and Mir Hossein Mousavi. That is, until he and his headline writers try to put the voters and their candidates into easy-to-open boxes: "[This] is a confrontation not just between Iran's haves and have-nots, but between the old revolutionaries who seized power from the shah and a new cadre of radicals seeking to dislodge them."

All right, who are "the old revolutionaries" here? Mousavi? Former President Rafsanjani? And who is the "new radical"? Ahmadinejad? But wait --- Ahmadinejad is already in power. So is he seeking to dislodge himself?

And the people on the streets? If they support Ahmadinejad, are they automatically "have-nots"? A student wearing green for Mousavi becomes a "have"?

Hours later, we can't decide if this entry is Zen-like or just Lost in Confusion.

BRONZE MEDAL

Assorted Newspapers: Iran's Michelle Obama

Apparently it's not enough to put Tehran under the spell of "The Obama Effect". You have to carry out a metaphormosis into the Great Man, or at least his nearest and dearest.

So in the last 72 hours Zahra Rahnavard suddenly became, in The Boston Globe, Der Spiegel, The Huffington Post,  "a no-nonsense university dean who has been compared to Michelle Obama".

So who in Iran had anointed Professor Rahnavard as the American First Lady of the country? Well, no one actually. That is, apart from Reza Sayah of CNN, who topped a profile of Rahnavard "Iran's Michelle Obama".

Unfortunately for "the Obama effect/transformation", Rahnavard refused to play along at a press conference on Sunday: ""I am not Iran's Michelle Obama...I am a follower of Zahra (the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad)."

Which makes us wonder: if Mousavi becomes President of Iran, will someone be bold enough to call Michelle Obama's "America's Zahra Rahnavard"?

SILVER MEDAL

The New York Times: Release the Bush Hounds

It is one thing for the editors of The Wall Street Journal, seeking the Mother of all Counter-Revolutions, to feature John Bolton's call for the Israeli bomb to replace the ballot. It's another for the flagship of US newspapers to wheel out Elliott Abrams, years after he tried and failed as a George W. Bush Administration official to knock off the Iranian Government:

The Lebanese had a chance to vote against Hezbollah, and took the opportunity. Iranians, unfortunately, are being given no similar chance to decide who they really want to govern them.

GOLD MEDAL

The Daily Telegraph's Colin Freeman: It's All Rubbish Anyway

Still, at the end of the day, you can't keep a bad journalist down, or rather raise him up. The World's Worst Tehran Correspondent followed his initial entry with this content-free "profile" of the campaign:

Instead of being seen as a respected statesman and upholder of the Islamic regime, the man rubbing shoulders with the Supreme Leader may be known popularly as either "Ahmadinejad the Liar", "Karoubi the Corrupt", or "Mousavi the Illiterate US Stooge" – epithets endorsed by their own colleagues. Those, surely, are not the kind of people a regime that brooks no real opposition would ideally want as figureheads.

Which I guess means that, at least, we won't be calling the eventual winner of this contest --- be he "old revolutionary" or "new radical" --- "Iran's Barack Obama".