Lebanon's Elections: From Global "Showdown" to Local Reality

Related Post: Lebanon and Iran Elections - It’s All About (The) US



UPDATE --- IT'S ABOUT (THE) US: For Michael Slackman of The New York Times, it's not a question of Washington shaping the Lebanese outcome: "Political analysts...attribute it in part to President Obama’s campaign of outreach to the Arab and Muslim world." You can slap the Obama model on top of any election to get the right result: "Lebanon’s election could be a harbinger of Friday’s presidential race in Iran, where a hard-line anti-American president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, may be losing ground to his main moderate challenger, Mir Hussein Moussavi."

Simon Tisdall, normally a shrewd observer of international affairs, trots out the same simplicities in The Guardian of London: "It's possible that watching Iranians will be encouraged in their turn to go out and vote for reformist, west-friendly candidates in Friday's presidential election. Lebanon may be just the beginning of the 'Obama effect'."

Juan Cole has posted a more thoughtful assessment, even as he opens with the reductionist and sensationalist declaration, "President Obama's hopes for progress on the Arab-Israeli peace process would have been sunk if Hezbollah had won the Lebanese elections.")

My immediate reaction to the results of Lebanon's elections, in which a "March 14" coalition of largely Sunni Muslim and Christian groups including Saad Hariri, the son of the slain former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, maintained a Parliamentary majority (71 of 128 seats) over a "March 8" coalition of largely Shia Muslim and Christian groups including Hezbollah?

Surprise.

Not surprise at the result, even though many observers expected the Hezbollah coalition, which also included the Shia party Amal and the Christian party led by former President Michel Aoun, to take a narrow majority of seats. The balance of the result came in a handful of seat in largely Christian areas, and those groups in March 14 were able to mobilise their supporters more effectively than their counterparts in March 8.

The surprise instead came as I read, in American and British media, the sometimes vapid, often reductionist, possibly counter-productive framing of the outcome: "Pro-Western bloc defeats Hezbollah in crucial poll", "a Western-backed coalition...thwart[ed] a bid by the Islamist Hezbollah party to increase its influence". "a hotly contested election that had been billed as a showdown between Tehran and Washington for influence in the Middle East". Even one of the best "Western" analyses of the result, Robert Fisk's assessment in The Independent, was converted through an editor's headline to "Lebanese voters prevent Hizbollah takeover".

Anyone reading these headlines could be forgiven for concluding that the March 8 group consisted solely of "Islamist" Hezbollah, even though it fielded only 11 candidates (all of whom won) put forth by the coalition. Conversely, the March 14 bloc needed no further identification beyond "US-backed". The New York Times account did not even bother, apart from one phrase buried deep in the article, to explain what "March 14" was. It was enough to depict in the opening paragraphs "a significant and unexpected defeat for Hezbollah and its allies, Iran and Syria" and "Hezbollah itself — a Shiite political, social and military organization that is officially regarded by the United States and Israel as a terrorist group".

The post-election reality is likely to be far more mundane though important, not for US and British interpretations of "Hezbollah v. US (and Israel), but for the Lebanese people. Since the assassination of Rafik Hariri in June 2005 and Syria's withdrawal from the country, Lebanon --- with a fascinating but often frustrating political system trying to hold together Sunnis, Shi'a, and Christians --- has struggled to maintain a working national government. After months of effective suspension, a "National Unity" Cabinet with former General Suleiman as President was finally agreed in 2008. Members of the March 8 bloc held 1/3 of the Cabinet seats and a veto on proposed legislation.

The nominal March 14 majority does not resolve that situation. As Robert Fisk observes, "The electoral system – a crazed mixture of sectarianism, proportional representation and 'list' fixing – means that no one ever really "wins" elections in Lebanon, and yesterday was no different." So today Lebanon returns to the issue of whether that system will be maintained. While not making an explicit commitment, Saad Hariri said all parties must "give a hand to each other and have the will to go back to work". Hezbollah leader Sheikh Nasrallah, conceding defeat, offered conciliation: "We accept the official results in a sporting spirit. I would like to congratulate all those who won, those in the majority and those in the opposition."

The first post-election issue is likely to be whether the March 8 groups will retain their Cabinet veto. Withdrawing it risks a breakdown of "unity" and a return to the pre-2008 suspension of Government; maintaining it limits the scope for legislation and precludes the demand, put forth by Israel and the United States, for the disarming of Hezbollah's militias. And even before that, there is the question of who becomes Prime Minister: according to Al Jazeera, US officials prefer current PM Fouad Siniora to Hariri.

No doubt the veneer of Lebanon's result as a critical step in the Middle East peace process will continue for a few days, as. The Wall Street Journal declared, "The push back of Hezbollah is seen as providing President Barack Obama more diplomatic space to pursue his high-profile Arab-Israeli peace initiative." The reality, however, is that this image of Lebanon --- and beyond that, the Hezbollah v. US-Israel-peace-loving countries narrative --- is more pretext than substance, especially with the post-2005 Syrian pullback. I suspect that the issues that preoccupy most Lebanese are internal rather than external, and the space to deal with those political and economic matters would be welcomed.

So the danger is not that a Lebanon led by Hezbollah, and behind Hezbollah its "masters" in Iran, will emerge to challenge Israel and the US. Instead, the political knife cuts the other way: external rhetoric of the Hezbollah danger, a rhetoric which can always be escalated not to advance the regional peace process but to block it, would simply add to the internal tensions as Lebanon tries to find a stable political leadership in a time of great economic and social change.

So, as the Middle Eastern road show returns to more established venues --- George Mitchell in Israel and possibly Syria this week, a Hamas delegation including Khaled Meshaal going to Cairo, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promising a major foreign policy speech --- here's a proposed follow-up for the headline writers on Lebanon.

Leave It Be.

Obama's Cairo Speech: A View from Tehran

Iran Review has posted this reaction to last Thursday's speech by President Obama in Cairo from Dr. Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh of the Tehran International Studies and Research Institute. The analysis expands on Golshanpazhooh's "window of hope" article that we posted last month: "The Obama speech is an undeniable turning point. But the most important part of the story is to put these words into action.

Obama's Address: A Point of View

As US President Barack Obama was preparing to deliver his address to the Muslim world in Cairo this week, the IRI [Islamic Republic of Iran] Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei was almost simultaneously addressing a ceremony on the occasion of the late Imam Khomeini’s demise anniversary in Tehran.

"I say firmly that introducing change and transforming a new image would not be realized through speech and slogans. It rather requires action and making up for the numerous violations of rights of the Iranian nation and the regional nations,” said Ayatollah Khamenei in his address.

Referring to the not-too-distant experience of the people of the region, the Supreme Leader added: “The former US administration has drawn an ugly, violent and hated image from the US government because of its violent acts, military interventions, discriminations and forceful interventions and the Muslim nations hate the United States from the bottom of their hearts."

The same outlook was adopted by many regional media and studies centers in recent days with a different literature. It somehow showed the deeply rooted enthusiasm and expectation of the Muslim people of the region about change in the US policies. It also revealed how high the wall of mistrust between them and the US statesmen was.

Nonetheless, it cannot be claimed that Obama’s Cairo address was only a nice speech devoid of substance and goodwill. After I read the full text of his speech I had a feeling that these remarks could be motivational to every Muslim not because the address praised Islam but because it showed that after long years the US government has at least tried to remove its glasses of pessimism and unilateralism and look at the Muslim community and the Islamic faith “as they are”.

I personally enjoyed the text and applauded Obama for his points of view and manners when he says: “…America does not presume to know what is best for everyone…”; or when he takes a position against opposition of the Western societies with the kind of clothes a Muslim woman should wear: “We cannot disguise hostility towards any religion behind the pretence of liberalism.”; or when he tries to recognize the right of my homeland to use peaceful nuclear energy: “And any nation – including Iran – should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty…”; or when he says: “In our times, Muslim communities have been at the forefront of innovation and education.”; or when he admits: “And while America in the past has focused on oil and gas in this part of the world, we now seek a broader engagement.”; or when he cites words from the three Divine books (Quran, Talmud and Bible) and nicely repeats the message of peace.

In the meantime, there are also points in Obama’s address which are ambiguous and open to question by Muslims, particularly the people of the Middle East. The people of the Middle East hardly believe Obama’s words about their claim of goodwill in Iraq. No one can forget the history of 100 years of Western colonialism and oil plundering in the region as well as their support for monarchial, despotic and undemocratic rules by just hearing a few nice words.

In the opinion of Iranians, the successful US coup d’etat of 1953 in Iran cannot be compared to the hostage taking of the US diplomats in the early revolution, as implicitly stated by Obama. The latter was in fact the natural outcome of 26 years of tolerating a regime which came to power with the US backing while the former was a spontaneous event inspired by revolutionary sentiments.

Obama’s words regarding US financial and logistical support for Pakistan and Afghanistan were nice. But the people of the region cannot but ponder why the US has voiced support for despotic and unelected governments in Pakistan whenever its interests required and potentially produced hatred among those who have grounds for extremism? They also wonder why poppy cultivation and opium export have increased several folds and security has not improved that much in Afghanistan following the US occupation?

The second part of Obama’s remarks is devoted to the question of peace between Palestinians and Israel. As President Obama has admitted himself settlement of this problem will not be an easy task. However, it seems that the biggest hurdle in the way of accepting Washington’s goodwill and resolve in this respect is the presumption that is seen throughout his remarks in this section: the only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two states, where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace and security. But according to the literature of the region, we must go back a little bit to see whether it was basically the rights of the Israelis to settle in the lands we now call “occupied” and build more settlements there every day and make life difficult for the main Palestinian owners? If Obama in part of his statement explicitly says that the agony of the Palestinians cannot be ignored and admits that “they endure the daily humiliations – large and small – that come with occupation”, would it be possible to overlook the term “occupation” in finding a solution for peace and simply bypass it?

Everyone knows it is very difficult to find a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli dispute but now that there is a will in the US administration to understand the positions of the two sides, it would be better to lay its foundations properly. I wish Obama could help Muslims what to do when some fail to recognize the power of a group coming to power in a democratic election? Have we really understood why Hamas was forced after victory in the January 2006 parliamentary elections in Palestine to shift its policy to that of a liberation struggle?

In the third part of his address, President Obama talked about the right of countries to access nuclear technology and about their responsibilities. Obama has tried in a fair way to understand “those who protest that some countries have weapons that others do not…” And for the same reason he “strongly reaffirms America's commitment to seek a world in which no nations hold nuclear weapons.”

Will the people of the region witness a day not too far when Israel’s nuclear sites and armaments go under IAEA supervision and when Israel joined the NPT under US pressure? Wouldn’t it be more rational then to exert pressures on other countries to come clean in their nuclear programs?

In any event, the Obama speech is an undeniable turning point. But the most important part of the story is to put these words into action. If Obama fails to put these words into action he would be unable to create a change in the outlook and more importantly the “mentality” and “perception” of the people of the region towards the US. If this happens it would be a big disaster; a tragedy equal to disappointment and repeating the past feeling and bitter thought in the mind of most of the people of the region that “it is the same America and there is no difference between Bush and Obama; that their policy is the same policy of hegemony and unilateralism with the only difference that the new one has a more attractive look.”

An Alliance of Interests? Russia and Israel in Obama's New World

As the advent of the Obama Administration brings back the "multipolar" in international relations, some of its most enthusiastic backers are in Moscow. During the Bush years, President Vladimir Putin publicly criticized Washington's unilateralism. Sometimes the challenge was rhetorical to the "new bombs" of the US. Sometimes it was much more:  when the Bush Administration tried to isolate Russia from NATO’s "impact zone" in Eastern Europe by proposing a missile umbrella in the Czech Republic and Poland, Putin raised the threat of a nuclear attack if Poland accepted a US missile interceptor base on its soil.

The intensity of attention to the "change" in Barack Obama’s rhetoric, especially toward the Israeli-Palestine/Arab problem, has contributed to this transformation. While Washington disowns the policies of the Bush era and puts pressure on Israel for sufficient concessions to start negotiations with Arab states, France has opened its first military base in the gulf region since the 1960s. And Russia becomes one of the first beneficiaries of the "soft power" of the US.

After Russia agreed last year not to sell S-300 missiles to Iran in 2008 and halted the sale of advanced MIG-31 fighter jets to Syria last month, Israel expedited the production of unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia. This was more than a bit of military equipment: as Israel manoeuvres agianst the Arab Peace Initiative, Tel Aviv is seeking a new relationship with Moscow. The Foreign Minister of Israel, Avigdor Lieberman, visited with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin and declared that he would expand and deepen the strategic ties between two countries, albeit without any intention of replacing the US. "We are expanding in additional directions, including Russia, South America, central Asia and India, but our ties to America come first," asserted a senior official in Lieberman's office.

So the Netanyahu Administration is trying to use Kremlin as leverage against the pressure of the Obama Administration, using Russia's manoeuvring vis-a-vis the US to its advantage. Still, Israeli officials might want to remember that the multipolar works in more than one direction: Moscow has just welcomed Palestinian Authority representatives as part of its interest in a Middle Eastern peace process. If Russia finds common ground with Washington on issues from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus to Central Asia, will Tel Aviv again find itself isolated in this Very New World?

UPDATED Cases of (Non)-Engagement: From Iran and Saberi to North Korea and Ling-Lee

UPDATE: Pointed illustrations already of the limited options, if any, that the US Government has. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's warning that the US could return North Korea to its list of states sponsoring terrorism, made only hours before the sentencing of Ling and Lee, is already looking irrelevant. Leaks to the New York Times that the US may "interdict, possibly with China’s help, North Korean sea and air shipments suspected of carrying weapons or nuclear technology" have been overtaken.


An opinion piece by The Christian Science Monitor by Allan Richarz sadly highlights the difficult situation. Richarz blusters with artificial linkages between the Saberi and Ling-Lee cases ("little more than manufactured crises designed to wrest concessions"), irrelevancies (his warning, "if the US reciprocates Tehran's gesture by releasing the three Iranian detainees held in Iraq, it will only be a matter of time before another hapless Westerner is put on trial" is a fantasy --- Iran never made
that connection in the Saberi case), and table-thumping ("the US and the West must adopt a hard line"). All of this is to cover the harsh lack of specific measures behind Richarz's general invocation, "The West must swiftly and effectively level retaliatory political and economic sanctions on the offending state."

The news that the Central Court of North Korea has jailed American journalists Laura Ling and Euna Lee for 12 years for illegal crossing of the Korean border prompts a "compare and contrast" with the case of Roxana Saberi, the Iranian-American journalist freed but then released earlier this year by Tehran.

The Saberi case, while tense, was ultimately easier to resolve because there were channels of communication between the US and Iran. The general Obama approach of "engagement" both bolstered and gave further impetus to the campaign first to mitigate Saberi's sentence and then to allow her to leave Iran. Had Tehran persisted with its detention, the wider possibility of a US-Iranian rapprochement might have collapsed.

Unfortunately, that foundation of engagement is not present in the Ling-Lee case. North Korea has already raised the ante of confrontation with its recent nuclear and missile tests. The jailing of the journalists now raises the price for discussion: which incentives have to be tabled to get both the release of the two women and Pyongyang's agreement to re-open talks on its nuclear future?

Of course, the case can be read as a red line drawn away from the nuclear dimension. Investigating the plight of North Koreans defecting or attempting to leave the country will not be tolerated; Pyongyang's internal affairs and treatment of its population is not subject to external scrutiny.

The point is that --- whatever North Korea's motives --- the possibilities for a humanitarian resolution are far more limited, if they exist at all, than they were in the case of Iran. That in turn is a far-from-incidental commentary on the reality as well as the rhetoric of Obama's unclenched fist.

Updates on the case can be followed via the Liberate Laura website.

Video: Iran-First or Palestine-First? A Turning Point Debate on CNN

Usually we don't feature panel discussions on political chat shows, especially when they have an "octo-wall" of speakers. Yesterday, however, there was a turn of debate on CNN's GPS which may be symbolic of the shift in US foreign policy.

This was a clash of "Iran-first" vs. "Palestine-first" in the US approach towards Israel. And Palestine-first won, 16 hands down.

The episode began when the Israeli historian and commentator Benny Morris put forth the case for focusing on a purported Iranian nuclear weapons programme. Then the twist: Morris' assertions were taken apart by Juan Cole, and with only one Israeli on the octo-wall of 7 different nationalities and perspectives, the notion that the issue of Palestine had to be set aside --- especially to threaten economic sanctions or even military action against Iran --- was roundly dismissed. Useful contributions from Hanan Ashrawi, Maziar Bahari, Saad Ibrahim, and Rami Khouri ensured that both the Palestine aspect and the wider aims of President Obama's Cairo speech replaced Tehran as the centre of attention: