The Latest from Iran (18 March): Uranium Distractions

2225 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. This could be interesting --- Hossein Marashi, cousin of Hashemi Rafsanjani's wife and a Vice Secretary-General of the Kargozaran Party. has been arrested.

2220 GMT: Edward Yeranian of the Voice of America offers an analysis, "Iranian Government Releases Prisoners for Persian New Year", with contributions from EA staff.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Mousavi's and Rahnavard's New Year Messages (18 March)
NEW Iran: Reading Mousavi & Karroubi “The Fight Will Continue” (Shahryar)
NEW Iran & the US: The Missed Nuclear Deal (Slavin)
Iran Labour Front: Minimum Wage, “Unprecedent Poverty and Hunger”, and Strikes
Iran Analysis: What Does the Fire Festival Mean?
Latest Iran Video: Two Views of the Fire Festival (16 March)
UPDATED Iran Document: Mousavi Speech on “Patience and Perseverance” (15 March)
The Latest from Iran (18 March): Uranium Distractions

2215 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Women's rights activist Somaiyeh Farid was arrested on Wednesday. Farid was at Evin Prison enquiring about her husband, Hojat (Siavash) Montazeri, who was arrested on 5 March.


2145 GMT: A Ray of Light. Amidst some poor analyses today of the Iranian political situation and the Green Movement, Melody Moezzi comes to the rescue with this piece in The Huffington Post:

The arrests before Revolution Day last month (11 February) surely dissuaded many opposition protesters not already in jail from pouring into the streets and risking beatings and unlawful detentions. I personally know of several opposition activists who stayed home as a result of the intimidation, and I can't say that I blame them. Still, no matter how few or many pro-democracy demonstrators show up in the streets for Nowruz the Iranian opposition has far from died. Rather, it has merely been pushed underground, but it is germinating like a stubborn hyacinth, taking on a course and a life of its own, teeming with the sweet smell of a freedom to come.

2100 GMT: A slow evening. Only significant news that we've noted is the release of Abolhasan Darolshafaei from detention. He is the last member of the family to be freed, following the releases of daughters Banafsheh and Jamileh and nephew Yashar.

No members of the Darolshafaei family are any longer in custody, just in time for New Year festivities.

1625 GMT: We have posted the New Year's video greetings of Mir Hossein Mousavi and his wife, Zahra Rahnavard, to the Iranian people.

1440 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Bahman Amoui, who has been detained since 20 June (read the letter to him from his wife, Zhila Baniyaghoub), has reportedly been released.

1415 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch: Journalist Akbar Montajabi has been released on bail. So have journalist Keyvan Samimi and Hojatoleslam Mir Ahmadizadeh.

1410 GMT: The Case for Change. Hassan Rowhani, a member of the Expediency Council and ally of Hashemi Rafsanjani, has used a long interview to discuss nuclear issues and to make the case for electoral reforms.

1355 GMT: Escape. The BBC is now reporting the story, which we carried last week, of student activist Ali Kantouri, who has fled Iran after being given a 15-year prison sentence for abduction and extortion.

1340 GMT: We have posted a special analysis by Mr Verde of the political significance of this week's Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Festival).

1220 GMT: On the Economic Front. Following up on our Wednesday special on the minimum wage and "unprecedented poverty and hunger"....

Six independent labor organizations have argued that the poverty line is $900 per month and asked for that to be new minimum wage. (The Government has authorised $303.) Economists at Mehr News Agency” have set the poverty line in the coming year at above $1000.

(Persian readers may also be interested in Faribors Raisdana's detailed analysis of minimum wages and labourer's poverty.)

1000 GMT: We have two specials for you this morning (and there's a third on the way). We've posted an excellent account by Barbara Slavin of the US-Iran deal on uranium enrichment that almost came off but then collapsed last autumn, and we have Josh Shahryar's analysis of the latest moves by Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

0855 GMT: We're Taking Our Subsidy Bill and Going Home. The ongoing fight between the President and Parliament for control of the budget and expenditure is highlighted by a bad-tempered interview of Ahmadinejad supporter Ruhollah Hosseinian in Khabar Online.

Hosseinian declares that, since the Majlis only gave the President $20 billion of the $40 billion he wanted from subsidy reductions, Ahmadinejad should withdraw the proposal: "It's not clear which portion of the government's revenue will be channeled to other sectors by the Parliament, so I believe implementing subsidy reform bill is against our interests."

Asked how the Administration could avoid implementing a plan which has been passed by Parliament, Hosseinian replied:

Although the bill has become a law, a way must be explored to halt its execution, since enforcing this law in its current form will simply add to the problems. As the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei coordinates the interactions between state branches of the country, a method must be found to annul implementing subsidy reform bill.

0830 GMT: The Uranium Issue. An EA reader asks for clarification on the claim that Iran may be facing a crisis over uranium stock for its medical research reactor.

I am strongly influenced by the knowledge that Iran's approach to the International Atomic Energy Agency last June, which set off this round of talks over uranium enrichment, was prompted by the specific issue of isotopes for medical treatment. I have my suspicions, though no firm evidence, that the renewal of a Tehran push for a deal may also be prompted by this immediate need for 20 percent enriched uranium.

We will soon be posting an excellent investigative piece by Barbara Slavin highlighting this issue.

0605 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Amnesty International is featuring the case of student activist Milad Asadi, detained without charge since 1 December.

0555 GMT: We might have been concerned with the Fire Festival and the renewed protest through the statements of prominent opposition figures (Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami), parties (Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution), and activist groups (Committee of Human Rights Reporters).

Looks like the Ahmadinejad Government wants to talk uranium, however. Iran's atomic energy agency chief, Ali Akhbar Salehi, put out the line that it was time to agree a uranium swap inside Iran. First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi insisted, "During the new year, new nuclear plants will be built and the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue with its path without allowing the arrogant powers to meddle."

But, with the US threatening more sanctions and no sign that the "West" will accept a deal where the swap occurs inside Iran, where is the hope for Tehran? No problem: "Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin has called for stronger ties...and urged closer cooperation between Iran and Russia to confront existing regional and international threats."

Better hope so. I get the sense that not only is Iran concerned about economic restrictions, primarily through the withdrawal of foreign companies and investment, but also that there may be a crisis looming over uranium for the medical research reactor.

Iran: Fire Festival 1, Khamenei 0 (Verde)

Mr Verde reflects on the triumph of Tuesday's Chahrshanbeh Suri celebrations over the Supreme Leader:

You get the feeling that some people (including a few journalists) who look into Iran from the outside seem to think they are watching a Hollywood movie: they are always looking for the next adrenaline rush of something “dramatic”. If no one is hurt or killed in the streets, then it is assumed that nothing of interest is happening in Iran. While the terrible footage of people being shot in the streets of Tehran or the sickening details of the torture and rape of detainees are important (very important) and relevant (very relevant), we have to understand that the struggle in Iran is not limited to being shot in the streets or raped in prisons. These sickening events are part of the regime’s mechanisms for trying to control and kill off the opposition (although it is obvious that it failed to do so), but they are surely not what we want to see happening in Iran on a daily basis.

Iran Analysis: What Does the Fire Festival Mean?
Latest Iran Video: Two Views of the Fire Festival (16 March)
The Latest from Iran (18 March): Uranium Distractions

On one level this year’s Chaharshanbeh Suri was what it should really be: despite the annual attempt of authorities to crack down on the occasion, people celebrated an ancient tradition and enjoyed themselves.


On another level, this year’s Chaharshanbeh Suri was different from the previous years. It came nine months after June’s disputed elections, nine months of relentless oppression by the regime, nine months of indescribable brutality by the security forces.

It also came one month after the regime’s attempts to demonstrate its popularity on 22 Bahman (11 February) in Azadi Square. On that day the regime turned Tehran into a military camp and was forced to use tear gas against a 72-year-old cleric. But it seems that Ali Khamenei may have been fooled by the few close-angle shots that the official media provided from the half empty Azadi Square. Alternatively, he too was well aware of his regime’s inability to demonstrate real popular support on that day.

Whatever his reason --- pride or dejection or fear --- Khamenei gave a fatwa ruling Chaharshanbeh Suri outside religion and declaring that it made no sense. Even if, with his limited religious credentials, Khamenei has the right to issue religious fatwas, his views about Chaharshanbeh Suri say more about Khamenei than about the Fire Festival. Khamenei is in his 70s. He has lived in Iran all his life and has been exposed to Chaharshanbeh Suri for many years. If Khamenei cannot make sense of our culture, it is HIS problem not ours.

Ali Khamenei had no business sticking his nose into something that he himself admitted that he does not understand. And he got a bloody nose out of it. Just as in the case of his message of “condolence” for Montazeri’s death, Khamenei took on something that was much bigger than him and he was humiliated. Imagine telling people no barbeques or fireworks for the Fourth of July. Imagine ordering all bars and pubs to close for St Patrick’s Day. This is what Khamenei did with his fatwa about Chaharshanbeh Suri and he discredited himself further.

So why did he intervene so clumsily? Maybe the thinking was this:

The protests are over after 22 Bahman (obviously wrong). People are scared of the “power” of the regime (wrong --- if shooting people on the streets had not scared people, how could filling less than half of Azadi Square?). The authorities have warned people not to celebrate Chaharshanbeh Suri (people had ignored such threats before). There is going to be a heavy security presence everywhere (this has been the case for nine months).

So Khamenei and his advisors probably thought that people won’t celebrate Chaharshanbeh Suri and they tried to turn it into political capital. Khamenei would give the fatwa, no one would show up, and the conclusion would be that people accept whatever Khamenei says, even when it is the dismissal of of a millennia-old tradition.

Didn't turn out that way. The result is Chaharshanbeh Suri 1 (Khamenei own goal), Supreme Leader 0.

A non-Iranian friend asked me about Khamenei’s fatwa and why Iranians seemed to be upset about it. I replied:

“Why Chaharshanbeh Suri matters to me?"

Because it is part of my cultural heritage, as is has been part of the cultural heritage of my ancestors for a very long time.

I have no doubt that the way we celebrate Chaharshanbeh Suri today is different from its original form. I also have no doubt that denying Chaharshanbeh Suri as part of our culture is the folly of people who have either a limited understanding of being who we are, or of people who want to wipe the slate clean and make our lives all about them.

The onslaught we are witnessing on our culture is nothing to new. Our culture has withstood many a fierce attack in the past.

To borrow a phrase from a gentleman who himself is trying to deny this part of our culture, the efforts of the sect-like group is not even a “caricature” of the onslaughts that our culture has withstood in the past.

Iran Analysis: What Does the Fire Festival Mean?

Sometimes a celebration should be considered first as a celebration.

After months of reporting on tension and conflict, it was a pleasure to watch the joy of Iranians on Chahrshanbeh Suri, the eve of Iranian New Year celebration of the renewal of fire. Although there was a heavy security presence in main streets and squares, this did not --- as The Washington Post reported --- "block traditional celebrations".

Latest Iran Video: Two Views of the Fire Festival (16 March)

Instead, on side streets and outside residences across Iran, people gathered to set off firecrackers, sing, dance, and jump over the small fires which hark back to Zoroastrian tradition. An EA reader eagerly wrote us, "Our family live in a provincial town. It was rocking tonight with the sound of fireworks! Cud be heard in every part of the town :-)" Even in Press TV's state-sanitised video of events, there is the pleasure of an elderly woman gingerly skipping in her long dress over a few inches of flame.



I never had the sense, despite some eager chatter, that this was going to be an occasion for bring-down-the-Government marches. Some in the Western media, coming late to the party, had the misleading impression that this was going to be an attempted recovery of the blunted rally of 22 Bahman (11 February) --- The Guardian, which set up emergency LiveBlog coverage, seemed particularly disappointed --- but this was not a make-or-break Green Movement moment.

Instead, this was an occasion to celebrate Iranian identity and to have some fun. For me, that seems to be more than enough to observe and praise.

Sometimes a celebration should then be considered political.

But even if the videos coming out of Iran were limited and of basic quality --- the regime is still waging a cyber-war against communication --- and even if the direct protests of "Death to the Dictator" were scattered, don't be mistaken: even having fun and "being Iranian" can be a political act.

Ironically, we have the Supreme Leader to thank for making this clear. His clumsy intervention that Chahrshanbeh Suri “has no religious basis and is harmful and must be avoided” turned an appearance at the Fire Festival into a gesture of disregard or even defiance.

He may be Supreme Leader, but this was how far Ayatollah Khamenei's legitimacy extends. This morning, after thousands (how many thousands?) celebrated in his or her way, the Supreme Leader's "fatwa" has reportedly been removed from his website.

To show authority, security forces closed stores and shopping malls in Tehran during the afternoon and banned motorcycles in the city. Municipal garbage containers were collected to prevent their being used to make bonfires. Thousands of officers were placed at the capital's main gathering points. Neighborhood police officers went door to door warning residents that large celebrations were banned.

As thousands (how many thousands?) still sang and danced and set off their firecrackers, was this a sign of regime legitimacy or a sign of forced authority? As thousands (how many thousands?) shared the festivities with friends and family, was this a sign of confidence or a sign of fear?

As we closed coverage last night, the message came in from a Tehran resident, via another EA reader, who had been told of "Western" reports that nothing political had occurred during Chahrshanbeh Suri. The resident, after an evening of joy and celebration, simply responded:

"In Iran everything is political."

Iran Breaking: Ban on Reformist Political Party

We're watching carefully the reported ban on the activities of Iran's leading reformist political party, Islamic Iran Participation Party (Mosharekat).

Deputy Interior Ministry Solat Mortazavi told the Iranian Students News Agency that all activities of IIPF have been banned and its headquarters have been locked.

The Latest from Iran (15 March): Breaking Human Rights

Mortazavi implied that the ban was in place before the IIPF announcement that its congress had been called off because of pressure from security forces. (IIPF's position is that there is no ban, since this would have to come from a judicial decision, only the postponement of the congress.)



Speaking to BBC Persian, a leading member of the IIPF, Ali Shakouri, disputed the claim that the party was banned but confirmed that its headquarters are locked and inaccessible. He added that the party continued publishing communiques and other activity (which in practice amounted to little more than keeping Norooz News up and running) despite the lack of headquarters and the imprisonment of several leading party figures.

Shakouri said that the party has no idea who was behind the locking of the headquarters and reiterated that no judicial source has yet ordered the suspension of party activities.

The IIPF has also put out a statement declaring that the ban is a sign of Government weakness and calling on activists to maintain their campaign against the "empire of lies".

An EA correspondent comments:

This is potentially a very destabilising move that would be impossible without the direct consent of the Supreme Leader.

Whether the judiciary confirms the Interior ministry announcement will be the next big development. If the head of the judiciary, Sadegh Larijani agrees with Mortazavi, Ahmadinejad's political deputy, this would be a major setback for those hoping for a conservative alignment against the President.

Iran: The Opposition's Campaign in the US --- Sequel With Revelations and A Lesson

First, the update on the story of "a senior aide" to Mehdi Karroubi giving a press conference in Washington and the subsequent focus on his comments about a split between the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad, rather than the Green Movement's strategy, objectives, and views of US policy on Iran.

Iran: The Opposition’s New PR Campaign in the US
The Latest from Iran (14 March): False Strategies, Real Conflicts

Having been told that the aide was not Ataollah Mohajerani, the former Minister whose appearance in Washington last October brought tension rather than American support for the Greens, we put together the identity of the aide last night. Tehran Bureau, which to our knowledge has published the only significant report of the press conference, has now withdrawn the cloak of anonymity, so we can confirm that the speaker was Mojtaba Vahedi, "chief of staff" to Mehdi Karroubi since 1982 and editor-in-chief of reformist newspaper Aftab Yazd until January 2010.



The issue was not necessarily Vahedi's emphasis, as tangential as it might be, that "over the past nine months, we've seen Mr. Khamenei go from praise and support to silence to refusal to back the president". (An example of Vahedi's analysis can be found in an interview in Radio Zamaneh.) Rather it was the media's treatment of him as a spokesman for Karroubi.

A knowledgeable EA correspondent summarises:

The Khamenei-Ahmadinejad split is at best a rumor with no substantial elements to back it up. But then again, these people's claim to fame is the ability to produce "insider" information from within Iran and use their former proximity to ruling circles and people within Iran....I am sure Vahedi has proven links and solid contact with the people inside Iran, however he is not necessarily (and my gut feeling is that he isn't at all) a spokesperson or representative for Karroubi. In the same way that [Mohsen] Makhmalbaf doesn't necessarily represent Mir Hossein Mousavi.

The revised Tehran Bureau article backs up this point with the single line, "Vahedi asked that his comments not be attributed to Karroubi."

The problem actually stems from good intentions. Reporters in Washington want to get a picture of events inside Iran but face the challenges of getting around regime restrictions and gaps in communication. So they seize upon individuals --- who may have had significant inside Iran but are now outside the country --- as "spokesmen" when, in fact, they are expressing personal opinions.

In this case, the outcome was a fizzle. Vahedi offered little for "mainstream" journalists to grasp, so apart from Tehran Bureau, the effort disappeared. Yet, if his comments had been reported, they were likely to be misleading and counter-productive: the lead would have been his speculation over Khamenei and Ahmadinejad rather than any sense of the state of the opposition and its ambitions.

Put bluntly, this is a case where older visions of leaders handing down their insights through "senior aides" continue to overshadow the reality of a disparate Green Movement which, battling the regime's suppressions, can struggle to provide a focus for observers. Mir Hossein Mousavi's "We are the Media" still needs fulfilment.