Obama's Public Diplomacy Corner: Big Symbols, Limited Interaction with Muslim World

Darrell Ezell writes for EA:

On 4 June 2009, President Barack Obama announced in Egypt that he had come to “Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world”. Fulfilling his Inauguration promise to extend a hand to the Muslim world, Obama stated his administration planned to seek a new way forward “based on mutual interest and mutual respect.”

With Obama proposing this progressive policy, Americans, as most of the Muslim world, were confident a broad strategy would follow. Instead, a piecemeal approach to engaging the Muslim world has taken place.


Indeed, to a degree, this administration’s approach to interaction with the Muslim world resembles outreach under the Bush administration. Most of the outreach strategy of Assistant Secretaries of State like Charlotte Beers and Karen P. Hughes strategy revolved around listening tours with elite audiences and a bold secular agenda on Education, Science/Technology, and Economic Development.

Mindful of the many setbacks under Beers and Hughes generated by an overreliance on symbols, one might imagine this administration would grasp the importance of assessing their strategy in order to avoid complications. Instead, It appears the Obama administration has lapsed into the same problem, with those symbols standing in for direct interaction with Muslim communities.

Those of us who take this process seriously comprehend that to effectively restore relations with Muslim communities, equal attention is required at two levels. The first level focuses on government-to-government interaction, which includes restoring executive relations with predominantly Muslim countries of interest. The second level emphasizes direct interaction with Muslim communities at a grassroots (or people-to-people) level.

While the Obama Administration has taken the correct steps to make engagement a top priority on its agenda, unfortunately, its approach is imbalanced. Since Cairo, this engagement has been primarily directed to restoring communication with elites rather than with Muslim communities. With this imbalance, PD symbols try to mollify Muslim communities until a broad strategy is developed::

*Reinstating existing cultural exchange and PD programs directed primarily at Muslim youth and women;
*Appointing Special Representative Farah A. Pandith and Special Envoy Rashad Hussain;
*Recurring visits by Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Muslim countries; and
*Promoting America’s secular vision to the Muslim world

While PD symbols are often effective in launching engagement, in recent years they have ineffective in communication with the Muslim world. Hence, a more sustained effort is required.

Regardless of how many PD symbols this administration decides to implement, recognizing and incorporating religious perspectives is vital to an enriched engagement. Real dialogue must occur at the grassroots level, incorporating the aspirations and perspectives of religious leadership and civic activists into the administration’s foreign policy vision. Integrating this important dimension will require Obama quelling political fears in Washington toward the religion of Islam. Rami Khouri reminds us:

The best and worst in American attitudes towards things religious and international [are] clearly visible. The negatives on display include: how serious the engrained negative perceptions and ignorance of Islam and Muslims are among the American population; how simplistic and blind the government can be when addressing the interplay between religion and foreign policy; and, how persistently resistant the American political and cultural elite are to acknowledging that US foreign policy -- and actions by its ally Israel and friendly Arab and Asian autocrats -- play a major role in triggering defiant and often violent responses from Arabs and Asians, who often have no means other than religion to express themselves.

A broad White House and State Department strategy is necessary. This means rethinking Washington’s current approach to interaction, which has yet to incorporate the dynamics of religion and communication into the process of engagement.

Some State Department officials will argue that a host of cultural exchange and PD programs exist that “reach out” to religious networks. Unfortunately, many of these programs are often limited to elite perspectives which overlook an engagement of religious leadership which may be opposed to America’s foreign policy. Finding common ground begins with U.S. officials recognizing communication and practicing social dialogue with allies and foes alike in the Muslim world.

Unless this administration takes the dynamic of communication and the impact of religion in foreign policy seriously, its lapse into reliance on PD symbols will soon be irreversible. Below are four reasons why those symbols will be a hard sell this time around:

First, the impact of emerging religious-based perspectives cuts against America’s secular PD symbols.

Second, the Muslim world is mindful of the damage caused by the 2005 Hughes agenda that exposed an administration less interested in listening and more concerned with projecting its world view within Muslim communities.

Third, reliance on symbols is less likely to aid in restoring what Hama Yusuf acknowledges as the U.S.-Muslim world trust deficit.

Last, an executive-to-grassroots approach is less effective in reaching a common ground with 1.3 billion Muslims. Ensuring a more sustained effort that begins at the grassroots and moves upward is more likely to assure President Obama’s vision on a new way forward.