UPDATED Iran's Nukes: The Dangerous News of The New York Times

UPDATE 1500 GMT: More signals that the Sanger-Broad "news" of undeclared Iranian enrichment facilities as an imminent threat, either to security or to political strategy, is not supported by most Obama Administration officials . Senior adviser Valerie Jarrett told ABC News this morning:
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Here we go again.

We are going to continue to put pressure on Iran,” she said. “We’re going to have a coalition that will really put pressure on Iran and will stop them from doing what they are trying to do. Over the last year, what we’ve seen when the President came into office, there was a unified Iran. Now we’re seeing a lot of divisions within the country. And we’re seeing steady progress in terms of a world coalition that will put that pressure on Iran.

 
Iran's Nukes: False Alarm Journalism (Sick)

The declared line by both Jarrett and senior advisor David Axelrod is that the US is on the way to "a strong regime of sanctions" against Iran --- today's spin is that Russia is on board --- the more successful undeclared strategy is getting individual companies, both from pressure from the US Government and from Washington's allies, to leave Iran.

There had been a few weeks of silence from the Iran Nuclear Beat of The New York Times --- reporters David Sanger and William Broad --- since the last meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency at the end of February.



On that occasion, their reporting, fed by a set of IAEA and "Western" officials who want a tougher line on Tehran, had declared that the IAEA would issue a much tougher report over Iran's approach to a militarised nuclear programme. In the end, the statement of the IAEA's Secretary-General, Yukiya Amano, offered little new, even if Amano's rhetoric was a bit more strident than that of his predecessor, Mohammad el-Baradei.

Well, the boys are back this morning with a double-barrelled picture of showdown and possible war: the two declare, "Agencies Suspect Iran is Planning New Nuclear Sites", and Sanger adds the speculative piece, "Imagining an Israeli Strike on Iran".

As usual, the Sanger/Broad article is constructed on a patchwork of "Western officials" using the pair as a channel for their line on Iran, some twisting of words, and a disregard for context. The very first sentence is a guide: "Six months after the revelation of a secret nuclear enrichment site in Iran...." ignores the fact that Tehran declared the "secret" site to the IAEA. (There is a justifiable argument that Iran was forced into the declaration because Western officials, based on intelligence, were about to "out" the Fordoo plant near Qom, but that's a complexity beyond the New York Times piece.)

In this case, Sanger and Broad's entire declaration of drama rests on the standard process of IAEA inspectors looking for any sign of undeclared Iranian uranium enrichment sites. This is not earth-shaking: a series of IAEA reports have declared that, while there is no sign that Iran has diverted uranium to enrichment for military purposes, the Agency is looking for full disclosure from Tehran.

So what's new? Here, beyond the breathless invocation that "this article is based on interviews with officials of several governments and international agencies", is the total of Sanger and Broad's research: 1) the head of Iran's nuclear energy agency, Ali Akhbar Salehi, said that Tehran would build more enrichment plants (which indicates that Iran's intentions are not exactly covert and, despite Sanger and Broad's claim, was noted by news sites like EA); 2) some "recently manufactured uranium enrichment equipment" is not yet in the Natanz or Fordoo plants (which leaves the far from ominous possibility that it might be awaiting shipment to those plants or may be put on a 3rd site if Iran backs up Salehi's claim).

And that's it. There is no evidence here --- none, nothing, nada --- that Iran has or is anywhere close to an undeclared operational enrichment site. There is nothing here which indicates that, even if the site existed, it is being set up for a military programme rather than as a plant for enrichment of uranium to the 20 percent allowed by international regulations.

(In fact, a sharp-eyed reader will note that Sanger and Broad weaken the shaky foundations of their analysis with this paragraph slipped into the middle of the article: "American officials say they share the I.A.E.A.’s suspicions and are examining satellite evidence about a number of suspected sites. But they have found no solid clues yet that Iran intends to use them to produce nuclear fuel, and they are less certain about the number of sites Iran may be planning.")

And there is nothing here which indicates that Sanger and Broad have even glanced at their series of articles over recent months which have breathlessly implied Iran's march to a covert military programme for its uranium, articles which have evaporated without support for their claims , propped up by IAEA officials upset with the Agency's leadership or by US Government officials seeking an outlet for political moves rather than by any substantial investigation.

So what's the big deal? If indeed this is poor journalism, it should dissipate just like its predecessors.

Well, even poor journalism can have consequences, especially when it is buttressed by ominous speculation. On the surface, Sanger's "Imagining an Israeli Strike" is an introduction to a simulation played out at the Saban Center of the Brookings Institution in December, one which considered US and Iranian responses to an Iranian attack.

Nothing more here, in other words, than analysts testing out a scenario. Except that the timing of this article, placing it alongside the Sanger/Broad exaggeration of news, is far from subtle: if Iran is hiding uranium enrichment plants, couldn't that bring the bombers in from Tel Aviv?

All too predictably, Sanger and Broad's piece is being splashed across websites who support tougher Israeli and US action, possibly even a military strike, and are looking for "evidence" for their position: Fox News and The Jerusalem Post have circulated the piece. (To be fair, neither has added editorial comment elevating the language of fear and threat; I anticipate, however, that columnists will soon be jumping in.)

It's one thing for a series of commentators to bang the drum for an Israeli or even US strike on Iranian facilities --- almost all of those opinions are marginal in policy discussions in Washington. It's another for two reporters at the leading newspaper in America, under the guise of "news" rather than speculation or editorial comment, to offer support for that action.

That's not just poor journalism. That's dangerous journalism.

Israel, Iran, and "Existential Threat" (Halpern)

Orly Halpern writes for Foreign Policy:

In February 2005 I sat in an intelligence briefing for Israeli Middle East and diplomatic affairs correspondents at the headquarters of the Israel Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem. There were probably 15 of us around a long table. At the head, various researchers took turns speaking about the threat levels coming from different parts of the Muslim world.

When it came to Iran, the intelligence researcher told us in the most foreboding tone that Iran was very close to building a nuclear weapon. It was the same "and-that-will-be-the-end-of-us" tone that numerous Israeli politicians had been using in the media to warn Israelis following the Iranian announcement to develop nuclear energy.

At the time, I was serving as the Middle East correspondent for The Jerusalem Post and was a member of the Gulf2000 Project, a group led by former National Security Council member and presidential advisor Gary Sick and made up mainly of academics, journalists, diplomats and intelligence people from East and West with a professional interest in the Persian Gulf.  It exposed me to a wealth of information about Iran, including the problems it faces, its own security fears and the question of the nuclear threat. And it became clear to me that the Iranian regime was not crazy enough to push a would-be red button on Israel.



But I wanted to know how the Israeli intelligence people would answer the question: "So do you think that if the Iranian regime were to develop nuclear weapons some crazy mullah would press the red button?" So, I asked.

Before they could respond, Ayala Hasson, Israeli Channel One's diplomatic affairs correspondent, shouted across the table, "But of course they'll press the button!"

Harry Kney-Tal, director of the Foreign Ministry's Center for Diplomatic Research, paused before answering: "No, we don't think there is some crazy Iranian who is going to press the button." Nuclear weapons were a form of "insurance" against being attacked, he said.

For years now, official Israel has been scaring its people into believing Iran is near the ‘point of no return' and the day it reaches it will be doomsday for Israel (of course, Israel's estimated "point of no return" dates continuously pass, prompting it to make new ones). But the Israeli establishment knows that there is no existential threat, that the Iranian regime is radical, but not suicidal; that if it is building weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it is in self-defense.

So why all the hype?  Why the deception?  The reasons are many, but they come down to money, politics, and security.

After the briefing Kney-Tal shared with me that if Iran were to have nuclear weapons Israel would lose its role as the regional superpower. "We are afraid that it will give Iran more leverage to empower its clients, "he said, referring to Hizbullah and Syria.

In other words, Iranian nukes would prevent Israel from acting as the neighborhood bully and Israel would have to think twice before it attacked its neighbors.

Yet it wasn't until last month that a senior Israeli official, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, acknowledged that Israel did not fear an Iranian attack. The Iranian regime was "radical", he said in a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, but not "meshugeneh" (the Yiddish word for crazy).

As retired Brigadier General Uzi Eilam describes in his recently published book, Eilam's Arc, money and politics--not security--are the key reasons for the scare.  The "defense establishment is sending out false alarms in order to grab a bigger budget," said the former Director-General of Israel's Atomic Energy Commission.

Moreover, some Israeli politicians are using Iran to divert attention away from problems at home. Not only does it make them more popular among the population--Israelis understandably feel more at home in the role of victims--but it also focuses the attention away from the country's internal problems which are not being solved: poverty, racial strife, and lack of peace with its neighbors. Finally, the ‘Holocaust-is-around-the-corner' doomsday prophecy, putting Israel in the traditional Jewish role of the oppressed, gives Israeli leaders more clout when pushing for gestures from friendly countries abroad.

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