Middle East Analysis: Syria, Thomas Friedman, & "Why We Fail" (Narwani)

Sharmine Narwani writes in The Huffingon Post:

Nothing annoys me more about New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman than his tendency to scuttle his occasionally insightful commentary with fabricated assumptions to fit his narrative.

This makes it really hard for me to like him.

You know that irritation that grows under your skin when somebody is making a lot of sense and then suddenly -- wham -- they hit you with a doozy so ridiculous you feel disproportionately deflated?

Well, that is my Friedman experience time and time again. Not always though -- sometimes I am irritated from the get-go.



In his latest column on Tuesday, Friedman shines a light on a very true Middle East reality -- one that quite deliberately gets downplayed in Washington's power centers: The Mideast is now, for the first time since the Cold War ended, largely defined by two blocs of influence and their respective worldviews.

The first, is the US-led bloc consisting of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan -- the latter three often ignominiously referred to as the "moderate" Arab states. The second, is the grouping sometimes referred to as the "resistance" bloc that consists of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas.

Friedman's column posits that there are five key actors in the Israeli-Palestinian equation today: Israel, America, the "moderate" Arabs, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and the resistance bloc.

Look, I can give him that -- I don't have a fundamental problem with the fact that he only includes one key individual from the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority to represent the entire Palestinian side. Fatah, on its own, is rather irrelevant these days, except in the minds of the US bloc. And kudos to Tom for recognizing this nuance.

Friedman then makes his main thrust, which is that only two of these actors actually have clear strategies for a Palestinian-Israeli solution:  Fayyad, the former World Bank economist who, peace or no peace, wants to create a de facto Palestinian state on the ground within two years -- and the resistance bloc. That's true enough. Friedman goes on to press the other three players to forge a clear, unified strategy -- preferably backing Fayyad's plan -- which can foil the agenda of the resistance bloc.

And then I did my double take. Iran... Hezbollah... Hamas... Where was Syria?

Ah, Thomas. You did that doozy-thing.

The Alliance of Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas

It is more than abundantly clear that in Washington, Tel Aviv, Riyadh and Cairo, all efforts are being made to wrest the reluctant Syria from this "resistance" bloc. It is equally obvious for those who live in the real world, that Syria has no intention of parting ways with its longtime friends.

When US President Barack Obama moved ahead with plans to reinstate an American ambassador in Damascus in 2009, the gleeful thinking in Washington was that Syria would prostrate itself in gratitude, jump at bilateral peace talks with Israel and walk into the US bloc's fold. Increasingly, however, even US analysts are grumpily acknowledging that the chances of this now happening are akin to Sarah Palin embracing a vegetarian diet.

But not our Thomas. He decided that this is how he wanted things to be, and so -- voila -- it just was.

As an opinion writer, Friedman still has the responsibility to convey the facts as they are - he can always spin his analysis around them or not include them in his deliberations if he wants to produce substandard commentary. But to just unilaterally change the facts? That isn't just wishful thinking -Friedman is trying to create the facts. And here is why his exclusion of Syria from this bloc is so completely disingenuous:

Syria Makes Its Position Clear

Renewed Syrian-US relations, rapprochement between Damascus and Riyadh, and Syria's disengagement from Lebanon brought hopes last year that the government of Bashar Al-Assad would take a more independent regional stance. When speculation reached a fevered pitch, Assad decided to nip it in the bud by staging a photo op worth a thousand words.

Last month, he convened a high-profile meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejadand Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah just to underline the cohesiveness of this bloc and quash all speculation of potential rifts.

The message, according to savvy, Damascus-based political analyst, journalist and author Sami Moubayed, was two-fold. Firstly, it was a warning for Israel to abandon all thoughts of launching another war in the region -- as in Gaza in 2008/9 and Lebanon in 2006: "The meeting de-escalated tension in the region and served as a deterrent by reminding all parties that the amount of destruction that would result from any war would be too much to bear."

Secondly, the meeting represented a clear signal to the US that this alliance will stand firm and cannot be ruptured because of the will of external players. Moubayed explains:

You don't sever relations just because another party wants you to -- you only do so when you have been wronged or there is a state of war, and those conditions don't apply at all to Syrian-Iranian relations.

In fact, throughout the 1990s Syria enjoyed relationships with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the US -- relationships with one party never precluded relations with another. That is not the way of diplomacy.

London-based Syrian diplomat Jihad Makdissi concurs: "We have always enjoyed good relations with both Iran and the West, so why is there suddenly a necessity to break links? This Iranian-Syrian relationship is devoted to the stability and security of the region, and the West should take advantage of this friendship instead of antagonizing both countries."

Invest, Not Divide

What does this mean? In the world of realpolitik, far, far away from Friedman's Mideast musings, this means that the US and others can "use the leverage that Syria has within this group to moderate them", says Moubayed.

He believes that after over a year of active engagement with Syria, the US bloc has in effect tacitly surrendered to the notion that "if they can't break this alliance, the best possible alternative is to invest in it instead."

There is evidence of this "investment" already: in the past two years, Syrian backdoor diplomacy has gained the release of high-profile Western captives in both Iran and Gaza. And recognition of Syria's role has come from the highest quarters in European capitals.

As Moubayed notes, the departure of US troops in 2012 will leave a vacuum in Iraq, which Iran and Saudi Arabia will compete to fill. Secular Syria is in the enviable position of enjoying a "cross-confessional network of allies (read Shiites and Sunnis) which it can use to stablilize and normalize Iraq - to the collective benefit of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States".

Even if the Syrians and Israelis struck a deal to swap the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights for peace -- highly unlikely given the make-up of the current, right-wing Israeli government -- Jihad Makdissi insists that nothing would fundamentally change in relation to an alliance with Iran:

In Syria's view, for normality to prevail in the Middle East, Israel needs to withdraw from all occupied Arab land. The occupation is the problem in the region, not Iran.

So, Tom -- peace talks or not, nuke talks or not -- Syria is an active adherent of the increasingly popular regional worldview that includes Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. All the wishful thinking in the world won't alter a relationship that has outlasted five US presidents, and provides vital strategic value to its participants.

In all fairness, Friedman is just doing something that has been a hallmark of US policy in the Middle East for decades. Denying inconvenient facts that have left us deaf, dumb and blind to the realities we face in the region. It is no wonder we cannot claim any lasting victories.

Blind spots everywhere, and then we wonder why we fail.

Iraq: We're Staying --- US Military Challenges Obama's Withdrawal Plan

Within days of President Obama's inauguration last January, I began writing of a military attempt to "bump him" on three fronts: preventing the closure of Guantanamo Bay, getting more troops in Afghanistan, and delaying the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.

Well, the commanders, backed by key individuals in the Executive and the complications of Congress, succeeded on the first two matters. And, days before Iraq's national elections, they are pressing again on the third. General Raymond Odierno, the commander of US forces in Iraq and a man who (a la General David Petraeus) has learned how to work the press, started telling favoured reporters that Obama's August date for removal of most combat troops might not be tenable. Prominent columnists like Thomas Friedman and Thomas Ricks soon rolled out the arguments for sticking around.



In contrast to last year, this is not yet a head-on clash with the President; Odierno and his allies, possibly including Petraeus, now head of the US Central Command for the region, are working around him through media channels. But it does set up a challenge for Obama, especially if expected political complications with the elections occur: does he again give way on policy to his military brass?

Ranj Alaaldin writes for The Guardian of London:

Yesterday came the first signs of the inevitable in Iraq: a prolonged
presence of US troops beyond the status of forces agreement deadline of 2011.


President Obama has promised to get all combat troops (ie most of those still in the country) out of Iraq by August this year. But Thomas Ricks of Foreign Policy magazine has revealed that the top US military commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, has asked Obama to keep a combat force in the north for longer than that.

Odierno's request suggests that a somewhat flexible approach will be taken towards the remaining 40,000 to 50,000 troops. The general has asked for a combat brigade to remain in Kirkuk, the ethnically mixed, oil-rich and volatile disputed territory. But the problem of Kirkuk will not be
resolved by the end of 2011 and it may never be peacefully resolved at all (see the Falklands, the other oil-rich disputed territory that has had
historic battles fought over it, where disputes exist over the rights to
its oil and also where the UN, as with Kirkuk, has been called to look
into).

If Obama does indeed give his approval then it is likely to be a reflection of the US troop presence in Iraq over the next five, possibly
10, years. Yet, we may well be seeing the South Korea-style permanent military presence taking root here, both as a counter-measure against the impenetrable Iranian influence in the country as well as a measure to keep the peace; since Kirkuk could decide whether Iraq collapses or survives, a prolonged military presence in Iraq focused around the province, as well as other northern areas like Mosul and Diyala – where joint US-Kurd-Arab military patrols have been initiated – can be justified.

How will this be sold to the American and Iraqi public? As I explained to
the LSE Ideas Middle East programme, the remaining 35,000 to 50,000 troops are expected to carry on in "advisory" capacities, code for "on standby" if things get really bad and a status more acceptable to a public largely critical of any "combative", and therefore seemingly aggressive, military mandate. Iraqis may welcome this so long as the US keeps out of everyday Iraqi life, stays in the background as the Iraqi security forces become more assertive and generally improve, and so long as it leads to improved security.

Politically speaking, there will be some, especially among the Sunnis who deride Iran's influence and the Shia hold on power, that deem a strong US presence a necessary and imperative counter-measure against other domestic and external forces that have a degree of power far superior than their own.

It is election time in Iraq and the nation is gripped with the campaigning
process as they prepare to cast their vote in less than 10 days. For this reason, the US administration is doing well to wait before coming out officially to extend the deadline – lest it hurt any allies, potential or
otherwise – and it is likely to wait up to two months after the election
as the political framework settles. For these reasons, it is unlikely that
the revelation will have any bearing on the elections.