UPDATED Death, Confusion, and Clerics in Iran: The Case of Mohammad Amin Valian

UPDATE 6 MARCH: Iranian Students News Agency has confirmed the "mohareb" death sentence handed down to Mohammad Amin Valian. Valian's attorney says the case has not yet gone to appeal.

The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran claims, from a source, that "[Valian's] family is under immense pressure to withhold interviews with the media and human rights organizations....Ministry of Information authorities have promised his family that if they don’t get the media involved, they would somehow secure a clemency for him from the Supreme Leader."

We still do not have confirmation of the "mohareb" (war against God) death sentence allegedly handed to Mohammad Amin Valian. What we do have, however, are some high-profile politics and religious moves which may point to deeper issues for the Islamic Republic. Mr Verde analyses:

Ayatollah Sane'i, in response to the question: “What are the criteria for identifying mohareb and what are the punishments for it?” has issued a fatwa (decree) on his site.

The Latest from Iran (4 March): A Death Penalty Mystery

The fatwa describes what is mohareb (which, from my reading, clearly does not include the actions of protesters, even on Ashura --- 27 December). More significantly, it says that in certain conditions when people are protesting for their rights, their defence of those rights is not only permitted, but is obligatory. [Sane'i uses the word “vajeb”, which is a strong word when it is used in fatwas --- for example, "vajeb" is used in relations to namaz (daily prayers), roozeh (fasting in Ramadan), and Hajj (the once in the lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca).]


In addition to Sane'i's fatwas, there are rumors that Ayatollah Mostafa Mohaghegh-Damad is lobbying the Qom Grand Ayatollahs to give fatwas to stop the execution of Valian. As EA has reported, Grand Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi has denied that he ever issued a fatwa calling for the execution of protesters, even those who demonstrated on Ashura.

(A side note: both the Sane'i fatwa and Makarem-Shirazi denial were issued on the eve of the Prophet’s birthday. That may also be an indication of how important they think the issue is.)

We know that the Sane'i fatwa and Marakem-Shirazi's denial of fatwa are authentic: they are published on their own websites.  We are not sure of the authenticity of the Mohaghegh-Damad move. However, I am thinking that it might be true. The reason: his name has always been mentioned in an alleged protest to Sadegh Larijani, the head of Iran's judiciary, about the two executions in January.

Usually the clergy do not talk much about their behind-the-scene moves (they don’t like to publicize what they do). But if an untruth is told about what they are saying or doing, they usually issue a very strong denial. as Makarem-Shirazi has now done. Makarem has left no doubt that he not only does not want people executed, but he also wants them released).

If all of the above is true, we may be witnessing a new front (or better put, a new crack) appearing within the regime:

Sane'i supports the reformist camp. His fatwas are usually a slap down for Ayatollah Khamenei, who has --- far from incidentally --- lesser religious credentials.

Neither Mohaghegh-Damad or Makarem-Shirazi are reformists, however. They are conservative clerics who have good religious credentials. So we might be witnessing the conservative clerics trying to distance themselves from the actions of the regime and also from the Supreme Leader.

If this process continues, either the regime (and more significantly, Khamenei) will have to give in, or the regime will have to rely even more on the military and less on its religious legitimacy. (Its public legimimtacy no longer exists.)
These moves would be the first time that the reformists and conservative clerics have allied publicly.  It may also give more meaning and significance to Hashemi Rafsanjani’s speech on Wednesday.

This cannot be good for Khamenei.

Latest from Iraq: Party Descriptions, Najaf Bomb, Sadr Defiance

Juan Cole has the latest news and analysis, 24 hours before Iraq's national election.

In an apparent bid to divide Shiites and Sunnis on the eve of Sunday's parliamentary election, guerrillas on Saturday morning set off a bomb only 900 feet from the shrine of Imam Ali (which has the sort of place in the hearts of Shiite Muslims that the Basilica of St. Peter in Rome has for Catholics).

Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sadr Movement within the National Iraqi Alliance, issued a fatwa or religious legal ruling on Friday insisting that believers must vote in Sunday's election and terming going to vote "political resistance," which produces success when a group is united, and ordering his adherents to unite. The WSJ says that the Sadrists are using very canny electoral techniques in a quest to ensure they win as many seats as possible in Sunday's election.

If the Sadrists succeed in rallying the Shiite masses to vote as an act of defiance toward the US military presence and the complaisance of the al-Maliki government, it could change the political landcape.

The USG Open Source Center translates a guide to the main party coalitions in the March 7 elections in Iraq:


Iraqi National Alliance

The [Iraqi National Alliance] was announced on 24 August 2009 and includes 11 political entities, among them the most important Shiite parties which are the "...Islamic Supreme Council [of Iraq]" [ISCI}, "Badr Organization" [paramilitary of ISCI, organized to contest for vote], "Al-Sadr Trend", "[Islamic Virtue] Al-Fadilah Party", "Al-Da'wah Party-Iraq Organization", "National Reform Trend" (Ibrahim al-Ja'fari), "Iraqi National Congress" (Ahmad Chalabi), Ibrahim Bahr-al-Ulum, and "Al-Wasat Trend" led by Muwaffaq al-Rubay'i in addition to Sunni forces, among them the "Muslim Ulema Group", "Al-Anbar Salvation Council", and liberal, secular and independent figures.

The [INA] is considered the main rival to the [State of Law] "SOL" which is led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The [ISCI] and "Al-Sadr Trend" are hoping to regain some of the Shiite votes they had lost to Al-Maliki in the governorates councils' elections last year. There are also speculations that the [INA] might forge an alliance with Al-Maliki's alliance after the elections in case none of them obtains enough seats that allow it to form a government on its own.

The "State of Law Coalition"

The "SOL" whose establishment was announced by Al-Maliki in October 2009 includes 50 political entities and a number of political and tribal figures, the most prominent of which are "Al-Da'wah Party General Headquarters" led by Al-Maliki, the "Islamic Turkoman Union" led by Deputy Abbas al-Bayyati, the "Mustaqillun [Independents'] Bloc" led by Oil Minister Husayn al-Shahrastani, and other groups which include some leaders of Sunni tribes, Christians, and independents. "SOL" was the biggest winner in the governorates councils' elections in January 2009 after raising the slogan of imposing security, providing services, and establishing a strong central government. Al- Maliki considers his victory in the legislative elections "a certainty" with more votes than his rivals but he announced that he would be compelled to conclude alliances with other forces if he did not win a majority (163 seats) to form a government.

Iraqi National Movement

This list includes the "National Accord Movement" which was announced on 31 October 2009 under Iyad Allawi, the "Iraqi Front for National Dialogue" led by Salih al-Mutlak (the two movement's merger), Deputy Adnan Pachachi who is the former leader of the "Independent Democrats Grouping", and Salam al-Zawba'i, the deputy prime minister who had resigned. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister (title as published) Tariq al-Hashimi announced on 28 October 2009 that his "Tajdid" movement joined the "INM" which is seeking to contest the elections on the basis of a nationalist program.

The "INM" came under heavy pressures. The "Accountability and Justice Commission" banned some of its symbolic figures, most notably Salih al-Mutlak and Zafir al-Ani, from participating in the elections and the movement considered this an act of revenge and unconstitutional. Al-Mutlak announced his party would not contest the elections to protest his exclusion but later rescinded the decision and announced it would participate. The "Iraqi Unity Movement"

It was announced on 21 November 2009 and includes around 26 political entities and various secular and Islamic forces and technocrats. The most prominent of them is Interior Minister Jawad al-Bulani, "Iraqi Al-Sahwah Council" leader Ahmad Abu-Rishah, the "Charter Grouping" led by Sunni Emoluments Council Chairman Shaykh Ahmad Abd-al-Ghafur al-Samarra'i, former Defense Minister Sa'dun al-Dulaymi, and "Iraqi Republican Grouping" led by Sa'd Asim al-Janabi.

Previous leaks pointed to understandings between Al-Bulani, Abu-Rishah, and Samarra'i with "INM" leaders Iyad Allawi, Tariq al-Hashimi, and Salih al-Mutlak in addition to former parliament Speaker Mahmud al-Mashhadani to form a large political front. But the widening of the front and disagreements over its leadership apparently aborted the idea in its cradle.

Kurdish Lists

Four main Kurdish lists are competing in the elections. The two main Kurdish parties which control the Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq dominate the "Kurdish Alliance." These are the "Kurdistan Democratic Party" led by Kurdish Prime Minister Mas'ud Barzani and the "Patriotic Union of Kurdistan" led by President Jalal Talabani. The two parties underline the Kurdish nationality and have strong relations with the West.

The two parties' grip on the Kurdistan Region weakened before the "Change Bloc" led by Nushiran Mustafa who had split from Talabani and which called for reforms. It scored good results in last year's Kurdish parliamentary elections and will contest this one alone. There is a fourth list, which is the "Islamic Kurdish Union" in addition to the "Islamic Group."

Others

Less important forces are contesting the elections, such as the Communist Party and the "National Unity Alliance" which includes a group of entities, most notably the "National Dialogue Council" led by Khalaf al-Alayan, "Asla" led by Fadil al-Maliki, "Ansar al-Risalah" led by Mazin Makkiyah, and the liberal "Al-Ahrar" led by Deputy Iyad Jamal-al-Din. The Tribal Chiefs

Tribal chiefs play an important role in the elections and the main parties are seeking to curry their favor. Some leaders of Sunni tribes became prominent when the US forces started to back the "Awakening Councils" against "Al-Qa'ida" gunmen in 2006. Though the prominent tribal figures were eager to engage in political activity, they did not however establish a united front but joined existing blocs. The minorities

Iraq's smaller minorities in Iraq include the Turkoman, Christians, Yazidis, Sabians, and Al-Shabak. They are allied to larger electoral lists in areas they do not dominate.

Israel-Palestine: Clashes on Temple Mount

At the end of Friday Prayers in Jerusalem, 15 police officers and dozens of Palestinians were hurt in Temple Mount clashes and three stone throwers were arrested.

Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas said in a statement that Israel has crossed every red line and made prospects for peace even dimmer in ther confrontations with Muslim worshipers on the Temple Mount.

Israel-Syria: The War of Words Continues…
Middle East Inside Line: US Warns Palestine, New Israel Proposal on Iran, Turkey’s Reaction to US “Genocide” Resolution

Abbas also said that the “occupation army” was “provoking” members of other faiths in a way that could “set off a religious war in the region”. He warned that “Israeli escapades” in east Jerusalem would have repercussions not just in the city and the Middle East, but also in the Muslim world. He urged the US and the international community to intervene and stop tensions from escalating further.


Syria also condemned Israel's "desecration of Arab and Islamic sanctities". A statement released by the Syrian Foreign Ministry said:

The desecration ... comes at a time when the majority of the Arab League Council's memebers adopted the indirect Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. The clashes serve as extra evidence on Israel's non-seriousness about peace ... and a proof of the Israeli anti-peace policy that aims at liquidating the Palestinian cause.

An Open Letter to the Editors of Iran's "Principled" Newspapers

TO: The Editors of Alef, Farda, Hamshahri Online, Jahan, Khabar Online, and Tabnak

FROM: A Journalist in the "West"

Dear Sirs:

I note that on 2 March you published an open letter to 21 American and British newspapers and magazines "to propound some questions within the framework of the standards of our common profession at the same time reminding you of several main points concerning the way of covering Iran news in the West".


Let me say at the outset that I welcome such questions --- the journalist should never rest content that he or she has mastered this craft and has perfect skills of observation, reporting, and analysis. Let me say also that I welcome your advice as "news websites which act independently". I acknowledge, as you are at great pains to point out, that your publications have criticised the current Government; indeed, I have passed on your articles and commentary on Enduring America. (Although I must add, in the interest of our dialogue, that this critique does not cover certain important individuals in the Iranian system, such as Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his closest advisors.)

So, as I have read your advice, I do hope you will spare the time to consider my response.

1. You begin: "Western journalists travel to Iran and mostly stay at hotels located in the northern part of Tehran, the capital, where the wealthy lives. Then [they] convey their observations based on what is called 'wants of Iranian people'."

I think it's a fair point to ask if we have had a full picture of Iranian politics before and after the 12 June election. I agree that most coverage has come out of Tehran, just as most coverage of my country comes out of London and most coverage of France comes out of Paris.

I think it's important for journalists to break the initial bureaus of their residences, bureaus, and contacts. So why then, in this search for objectivity, did Iranian authorities confine all "Western" journalists to Tehran from June? Indeed, why did they restrict them to the residences and hotels that you deplore? Why is a Western journalist unable to go beyond his/her bus route from an Iranian press centre to Azadi Square on a day such as 22 Bahman (11 February)?

Why, when it is important to learn about all of Iran and its people are my Internet connections and those of the people who could inform me restricted?

2. "On June 28, 2009 it an unknown blog announced that a young Iranian woman, Taraneh Mousavi, had died after being sexually abused while in custody after being arrested for protesting the 2009 election results by Iran security forces....Shortly after that the blog post published, the news broke in all western media without the source being verified."

I would be grateful, sirs, if you could point me to "all western media" who published this news. Apart from a reference in The Huffington Post, taken from The New York Review of Books, I don't recall the name of Taraneh Mousavi in the "mainstream" press.

We knew of the claim here at Enduring America, and we did not print it as "news". We did not do so because we could not verify the story, even when it was mentioned in Mehdi Karroubi's open letter asking the Iranian Government to deal with the issues of detainee abuse.

But, sirs, if I may ask in the interest of journalism, why do you confine yourself to Taraneh Mousavi? Why do you not mention the other numerous cases of detainee abuse that have been verified, despite the restrictions on our eyes and ears? Why do you only mention deaths in Kahrizak Prison after the Supreme Leader decides that they can be acknowledged? Why do you not refer to solitary confinements, extended interrogations without charge, imprisonment without trial?

Why do you not even mention your fellow journalists who sit in those prisons?

Why?

3. On 20 June, 2009, a real girl with known identity and family was questionably shot to death around- not among- the protestors. About 2 hours later different videos captured of her death were broadcast on internet. The young doctor in the film, identified as Arash Hejazi, had entered Iran 5 days before the incident and appeared in BBC 48 hours later explaining the weird details of the story and how the nearby members of the crowd caught the shooter. Consequently the international media reflected the story accordingly.

Sirs, a real girl --- whose full name you do not even mention --- was unquestionably shot to death. Neda Agha Soltan became one of many whose lives have been taken in this conflict.

The details are not "weird". A young woman, on the margins of a demonstration, was killed by a gunman. Some people dared to film the incident so it would not be lost; some very brave people, including the doctor you mention, tried to save her life; some very brave people tried to catch the assailant.

Sirs, why do you not simply acknowledge the death? Why must you substitute insinuations and vilifications to insist that she must have died to serve "Western" beneficiaries?

Did each of the dozens of people who have been killed since June --- whose faces we did not see because there was no video, whose stories we did not know because there was no Dr Hejazi or music teacher to bring them to us, in some cases whose names have not been revealed ---- die merely as pawns in a foreign plot?

Is that all, as journalists who claim to observe, you can offer?

4. During unrest in Iran, BBC Persian and The Voice of America, the Britain and USA's governments affiliated Televisions, encouraged the protesters to continue their protests on the basis of their unilateral stands. The voice of America taught their audiences the way of setting litter bins on fire and how to throw the country into chaos.

I believe that the first rule of journalism when a reporter makes an accusation --- even when that accusation is against a fellow journalist --- is to have evidence. So, sirs, where is this footage, this training of protesters, this call to insurrection?

Do I do you the discourtesy of claiming that you train your audience to suppress protest, to quell dissent, to refuse thought? Do I accuse you of serving a political master? Do I allege without information, besmirch without fact?

So, since you ask about "the professional behavior of an 'informative' and 'impartial' media, why do you do so?

5. At the end of the protesters actions on 15 June 2009 in streets of Tehran, some people attacked to a Basij post, a place that kept weapons. They threw incendiary bombs and climbed up its wall in order to seize it. In your country what is the police reaction to such behavior?

Sirs, in the interest of a full exchange, why do you only mention this incident and remove the context of the hundreds of thousands who protested peacefully on 15 June? Why do you not mention the excitement and hope as well as the anger and frustration, the possibility that Iranian people could freely make their concerns known in the interest of democracy and the Islamic Republic?

Why do you not mention --- for I have seen the footage of the claimed "attack" on the Basiji building --- that a few protesters were throwing Molotov cocktails at a heavily-fortified base? Why do you make up the story --- for I have seen the footage --- that they were climbing its walls? Why do you fail to mention that Iranian security forces, safe on the roof of that building, were shooting down at demonstrators? Why do you not mention that at least eight people, none of them from the security forces, died that evening?

I note your claim, "On 30 December, 2009, some people set fire to the public and private properties, police cars and banks." (I think you mean "27 December", when there was a mass demonstration on Ashura protesting for rights and justice in the name of Islam, and when a police station in Tehran was set alight.) I see your reference to the group Mujahedin-e-Khalq and their violence against the Iranian regime. I note your allegation that "Abdolmalek Rigi, the ringleader of the Jundollah terrorist group, is interviewed and introduced as a hero by the Voice of America". (Again, sirs, where is your evidence?)

But why, sirs, do you stop there? Why do you give us a fragment of "some people [who] set fire", Mujahedin-e-Khalq, and Abdolmalek Rigi as the whole picture of the post-election opposition? Who do you, who claims to represent all of Iran's people in your reporting, erase the thousands, ten of thousands, hundreds of thousands who are not firestarters, MKO terrorists, or Jundullah members?

Why do you not acknowledge those who asked, peacefully, "Where is My Vote?" Why do you not give respect to those who asked that their officials be accountable for injustices, abuses, and denial of rights? Why do you claim to see but do not see?

6. Ask your work conscience to judge if your performance has been fair and impartial or not?

With respect, sirs, it is not a question of my conscience or my performance. I am but an interested observer, fortunate to have learned from many Iranian friends and colleagues.

Your question would be better directed, not to "Western" journalists", but to those who are at the centre of this story. What "conscience" has been present in the Iranian officials who, legitimately or illegitimately, hold power? What can you about their "performance"?

One of the invocations for a journalist is to "speak truth to power". Doing so, we do not try to deflect attention from our task by attacking the powerless, by setting up diversions so we ignore those who wield authority, by casting aspersions which are tangential rather than asking questions and finding answers which are essential.

I hope, sirs, that you will return to this task, and look forward to being a "Western" journalist who reports this when you do.

Scott Lucas

Israel-Syria: The War of Words Continues...

Responding to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's declaration that he was prepared to meet with Syrian President Bashar Assad immediately and without preconditions, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem told the pan-Arab newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat that Israel must first declare its intention to withdraw to the 1967 borders before any Syrian-Israeli talks can take place.

Israel-Syria Dialogues: Hopes vs. Realities

The Syrian foreign minister said that there is no point in "putting the cart before the horse" and that "Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories before Syria and Israel can meet".

Despite the exchange of threats between Damascus and West Jerusalem last month and the trilateral meeting of Hezbollah's Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Assad in Syria on 25 February, Israel's training exercise "Firestones 12", which took place in northern Israel last week, conspicuously omitted simulations of war with Syria. Instead, the Israel Defense Forces fought mock battles in preparation for clashes with Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The army also cancelled emergency call-up drills for large numbers of regular forces and reserves, fearing Syria might mistake such a move as mobilization for war.

But in line with Haaretz's Gideon Levy's article "Israel Does Not Want Peace," it can be said that Israel seeks no talks to resolve the problem; instead, it suspends this possibility while never missing any chance of upholding Damascus's hostility. At the end of the day, Syria is bound to play the "bad guy" for Israeli officials, isn't it?