Damascus Matters: Syria, the US, and the New Middle East

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Much has changed in US foreign policy since the Bush Administration pulled its ambassador from Damascus in 2005 to protest Syria's suspected involvement in the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Since the advent of the Obama Administration, not only the hopes of change in US-Syrian relations but the quest to unblock the Palestinian-Israeli peace process has brought the prospect of dialogue.

The latest signal came on Thursday when two Democratic Congressmen, Senator Edward E. Kaufman of Delaware and Representative Tim Waltz of Minnesota visited Syrian President Assad. According to Syria's official Arab News Agency, talks focused on "the necessity to remove obstacles that hinder relations and to promote stability in the Middle East". Specifically, the exchange points to a visit to Damascus by President Obama's envoy George Mitchell in June.

The Kaufman-Waltz visit is the fourth by US officials or legislators since January. Three days after the hard-line statement of the new Israeli Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, “Peace will only be in exchange for peace.”, Democratic Representative Stephen Lynch of Massachusetts and Republican Bob Inglis of South Carolina, met Assad.

Assad's comment after this meeting that he wanted to meet Obama personally was matched by the US Embassy's statement that the talks were constructive on Syrian-Lebanese relations, security on the Syria-Iraq border, and the situation in Gaza. On 5 May, two senior US officials, Jeffrey Feltman and Daniel Shapiro, made their second journey to Damascus in two months and found some “common ground” with the Syrians.

The 2nd Feltman-Shapiro visit was particularly significant as it came on the
same day that Assad and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad met to re-confirm their ‘strategic alliance.’ Contrary to the claim of many that this was a declaration of Syria's "strategic needs" being met by Tehran; Assad's manoevure was more a temporary alignment with no advance on the "road map" of the Palestinian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli peace processes. In the absence of tangible steps, Damascus is covering itself against any unilateral concessions.

Hence, the second visit of Feltman and Shapiro was needed to maintain close contact between Washington and Damascus until the peace process could be restarted. Other regional leaders have also contributed. On May 11, the Jordanian King Abdullah visited Damascus, as he and Assad affirmed the need for a comprehensive solution on the basis of Israeli and Palestinian states in a regional context. The newly-appointed Syrian ambassador to Ankara said on 12 May that Damascus was ready to resume Turkish-mediated indirect talks with Israel, despite Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement that he would not cede the Golan Heights.

In contrast to the Bush Administration's attempt to get the "right" Middle East through exclusion of those whom it did not like or trust, the Obama Administration in four months has rebuilt relationships with key leaders. Still, the outcome of those initial breakthroughs awaits an even bigger signal: the US President's speech in Cairo next Thursday.

May Plan C on the Israeli-Arab Peace Process Work?

My colleague Scott Lucas wondered for weeks whether the Obama Administration has a Plan A for the Middle East before, last Friday, he finally wrote of an American "grand design".

With respect, I differ. The President and his advisors not only have a Plan A. They are ready with a Plan B and a Plan C.

Obama put Plan A for a two-state Israel-Palestine outcome and general Arab-Islamic agreements to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israelis made clear, and let the press know they had made clear, that this was not acceptable. So Plan B is working groups with the Israelis while encouraging regional leaders, such as Jordan's King Abdullah, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to maintain the call for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Then there is Plan C. The Associated Press reported last week that the Obama Administration may set a deadline of the end of 2009 on talks with Iran if they are not producing result.

The immediate reading was that Washington might be siding with Tel Aviv on the need for an eventual showdown with Iran. The reality could be more nuanced: the Obama Administration may use Tehran’s uncompromising position to pull Arabs and Israelis together for a regional process including Israel-Palestine.

Although some claim that this Plan C will never work, since Arabs and Israelis have different fears with regards to Iran’s policies, others argue that it is the best path. "The administration has to find the best path," says Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Is this the best path? Given the opportunities, yes. They may not produce success but they offer the best alternative available."

The key to full Arab participation may be Syria, which has recently been in talks with Iran on a possible common approach. Here George Mitchell, Obama's Middle East envoy and a legendary negotiator, comes into play. Washington's ploy may be for Mitchell talks in Damascus to open the doors both to a diminishing of Iran’s influence and Israeli-Syrian talks.

Because Israel wants to see the Iranian threat "dealt with" before any peace deals with the Arabs, this subtle move by the Obama Administration could bring success. Instead of Israel’s insistence on clearing Tehran's nuclear facilities, Washington can change the context of the Tehran issue by adding the more political yet still forthright policies of Arab states into a broad-based coalition against Tehran. This approach may be enough to allay Tel Aviv’s concerns.

Assessing Netanyahu-Obama: Israel, Iran, and Palestine

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Enduring America, 16 May: "Of course, the two leaders may fudge the outcome, claiming success in an ongoing discussion without making any specific commitments on the next step in the Israeli-Palestinian process."

"Israel" prompts more spin and speculation than perhaps any other current issue --- even Afghanistan and Pakistan --- in US foreign policy. So, on the eve of and even during yesterday's meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Obama, there were the differing, even contradictory revelations: Obama would force Netanyahu to accept a two-state solution with Palestine. Obama would set a deadline on "engagement" with Iran. Netanyahu would concede to "two-state" talks. Netanyahu would not shift his position.

None of this actually happened (except maybe that last one).

None of this happened because each leader knew he would not get the other to adopt his chief demand: Netanyahu would not get an American suspension of discussions with Tehran, and Obama would not get the Israelis to move beyond a limited Palestine agenda consisting of economic development and security. So the aim for each was to ensure he maintained flexibility, while giving the appearance of a friendly and productive meeting.

Let's start with the Iranian spectre. In the press briefing, Obama had the huge advantage of speaking first. With Netanyahu's publicity machine in overdrive on the "existential threat" of Tehran, the US President set out this apparent shared ground:

Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon would not only be a threat to Israel and a threat to the United States, but would be profoundly destabilizing in the international community as a whole and could set off a nuclear arms race in the Middle East that would be extraordinarily dangerous for all concerned, including for Iran.

Let's call this "The Bogeyman Tactic", as in I can tell my kid that I will protect him from the Bogeyman because I know he doesn't exist. As yet another CIA assessment concluded this month, the US has no evidence that Iran has an active programme for the development of nuclear weapons. So Obama could put out the bold statement which was hypothetical, rather than real.

Much more important was Obama's position on future talks with Iran. Once again he began with a diversion:

We are engaged in a process to reach out to Iran and persuade them that it is not in their interest to pursue a nuclear weapon and that they should change course. But I assured the prime minister that we are not foreclosing a range of steps, including much stronger international sanctions, in assuring that Iran understands that we are serious.

The agenda in the still-private US-Iran talks, at this point, is well beyond The Bomb. Tehran wants an easing of economic sanctions; Washington wants cooperation on regional issues, with Iran offering some assistance on Afghanistan and --- in its relations with countries and parties like Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah --- giving the US some diplomatic space on the Israel-Palestine and regional issues.

The misleading headline this morning is that Obama left "all options", including military action, "on the table" (Netanyahu's words, not the US President's). Just as inaccurate is the claim that Washington has set an end-of-year deadline on the Iran talks. What Obama actually said was, "It is important for us, I think, without having set an artificial deadline, to be mindful of the fact that we’re not going to have talk forever." Later in the briefing, he added:

We should have a fairly good sense by the end of the year as to whether they are moving in the right direction and whether the parties involved are making progress and that there’s a good-faith effort to resolve differences.

From this, the press added 2 and 2 and got 5. It's wrong (although there is at least one Obama official, working against the Administration's current position, muttering about a deadline), but it's convenient for Washington. It keeps gentle pressure on Tehran while offering the President diplomatic cover. Without making any policy chance, he can let the Israelis claim that Washington recognises its concerns.

What then of Obama's priority issue, Israeli-Palestinian talks? The US President could not have been clearer on the central demand:

I have said before and I will repeat again that it is, I believe, in the interests not only of the Palestinians but also the Israelis and the United States and the international community to achieve a two-state solution in which Israelis and Palestinians are living side by side in peace and security.

The ball was in his court, but Netanyahu simply ignored it. He offered, "We want to live in peace with [the Palestinians]." More substantially, he said, "We want them to govern themselves absent a handful of powers that could endanger the state of Israel." But instead of uttering the word "state", he put Israel's core demands:

If...conditions are met — Israel’s security conditions are met, and there’s recognition of Israel’s legitimacy — its permanent legitimacy, then I think we can envision an arrangement where Palestinians and Israelis live side by side in dignity, security and in peace.

And, with that, Netanyahu --- who said far less than Obama to make his points --- drew his line. Obama's pointed statement that "[Jewish] settlements have to be stopped in order for us to move forward". No response. Obama's call for action on the "humanitarian situation in Gaza"? Netanyahu sidestepped it with, "The president described to you those rockets falling out of Gaza."

On the day-to-day scorecard of statesmanship, the President and Prime Minister each got a Win. Obama blocked the Israeli insistence of Iran First:

If there is a linkage between Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, I personally believe it actually runs the other way. To the extent that we can make peace with the Palestinians — between the Palestinians and the Israelis, then I actually think it strengthens our hand in the international community in dealing with the potential Iranian threat.

Netanyahu, however, ensured that Palestine First would be a far from quick and complete process. His agenda --- Israel gets recognition and guarantees on its security --- trumped any specific item put by Obama, let alone the concept of a Palestinian state.

Which, beyond any issue of the political and economic future for Palestinians, leaves only the problem that will overtake these talks --- a problem for Obama, not Netanyahu.

Read on: "Obama Wins Battle, Loses War"