The Power Politics Surrounding Iran

Shirvin Zeinalzadeh, who writes on Iranian affairs for Enduring America, evaluates the significance of Tehran's firing of a solid-fuel missile last week:

Iran last week successfully test-fired the controversial solid fuel ‘Sejjil 2’ missile, ahead of the upcoming Iranian Presidential elections and with prominent publicity and international attention.

The immediate reaction from Israeli and US outlets went farther, speculating that Iran would use this as a platform for nuclear weapons. Israeli foreign minister Avidgor Lieberman said, "Israel and the US share an understanding on strategic goals, first and foremost dismantling Iran from the ability to attain non-conventional arms."

The reality, however, is that the nuclear issue is peripheral to both the symbolic and military importance of the test-firing. This is once a statement by Iran , both to its own people and to the world, that a nationalist rallying around the flag will lead to self-sufficient military power.

Iran has no power whatsoever in its arsenal to reach the US mainland. Instead, Tehran's initiaitive is in the context of the creation of NATO and US strategic bases in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Diego Garcia.

Iran's justification, therefore, is that it is balancing the power in the region with its missile development A range of 2000 kilometres ensure that Iran can deter the US or Israel from attacking it through with the possibility of a counterstrike against any forces based in the area within the Sejjil’s range.

This notion was put forth in President Ahmadinejad's statement, "Today Iran has the power to turn any base that fires a bullet at Iran into hell." He added, "Today we declare that no country has the power to threaten Iran."

The power politics are in play, as Iran seeks to defend its sovereignty and territorial rights by boosting its defence system. As Ahmadinejad said, "Unfortunately today there are some people who think that compromise with enemies will remove threats, but experience has shown that whenever Iran softens its stance the enemies are emboldened."

Iran's Elections: Ahmadinejad Plays His Israel-US Cards

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been working flat-out to maximize his vote before the Iranian Presidential election on June 12. His ‘hard-line’ stand against the West was subtly elaborated when he referred to Israel with the words of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Revolution: , when on Friday. Referring to Israel, he quoted Khomeini’s words: "They are like dogs. If you attack them, they retreat; if you retreat they attack."

Ahmadinejad’s verbal salvos against the West are part of an effort to criticise his opponents, linking them to the "concessionary" policies of the previous reformist government, led by Mohammad Khatami. According to Ahmadinejad, Khatami "could not show resistance against pressures", whereas the current government succeeded in "deflecting" pressures and “burying the sanctions in the cemetery of history".

However, if Ahmadinejad’s rhetorical attacks are primarily in a domestic arena, they are bolstered by external foes. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s National Security Adviser, Uzi Arad, said last Thursday: “Israel maintains its liberty to operate against Iran.” He added that on past occasions, Israel had not updated the US on military options.

Arad may have been shaky in his historical references, comparing Ahmadinejad to Egypt's President Nasser in 1956 and 1967, but this did not deter the United States from dropping its own hints. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, stated on Friday that President Obama had asked him to update the plans for the use of military force against Iran, prepared during former President George W. Bush’s terms in office.

It is irrelevant whether Gates and Obama are opposing the use of military force against Iran at this point; what matters is what Iranians perceive on the eve of the elections. Indeed, Amadinejad is countering on such perceptions in the next three weeks. That is what does matter in determining the ‘retreat-attack’ game…

Text: The EastWest Institute (US-Russian) Report on "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential"

For more than a year, US and Russian scientists and other experts supported by The EastWest Institute have been studying US-Russian relations and Iran's weapons programmes. Their report, released this week, recommends the suspension of plans for missile defence and pursuit of a diplomatic route, both in the United Nations and directly with Iran, on the nuclear issue.

Recommendations

5.10 This report has concluded that there is at present no IRBM/ICBM [intermediate-range/inter-continental ballistic missile] threat from Iran and that such a threat, even if it were to emerge, is not imminent. Moreover, if such a threat were forthcoming, the proposed European missile defenses would not provide a dependable defense against it. It does not make sense, therefore, to proceed with deployment of the European missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

5.11 The more immediate danger comes from the military and political consequences that would follow if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them against targets in the Middle East. The urgent task, therefore, is for Russia and the United States (and other states) to work closely together to seek, by diplomatic and political means, a resolution of the crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear program. Such cooperation could be helped if the issue of European
missile defense were set aside.

5.12 If deployment of the European missile defense system were suspended, the United States and Russia could
explore in a serious fashion the possibility of cooperation in ballistic missile defense, an issue also mentioned in
the joint statement of the two presidents. A wide range of options could be explored, including the possibility
of boost-phase missile defense. (See the Technical Addendum for a detailed discussion.)

5.13 There is scope for U.S.-Russian cooperation in thefollowing areas:

a. Ensuring that the sanctions the Security Council has imposed on Iran are implemented strictly;
b. Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and in particular the IAEA’s capacity to implement safeguards and enhance its verification procedures;
c. Strengthening the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] in order to restrict further the export of sensitive missile technologies;
d. Persuading Iran, by diplomatic means, to adopt measures that will reassure its neighbors (and the international community more generally) that its nuclear program is directed solely toward peaceful purposes.
e. Exploring the responses the two countries could take if Iran should expel the IAEA inspectors; and studying other paths by which Iran might seek to “break out” as a nuclear power and devising appropriate responses.
f. Investigating seriously the possibility of cooperation in missile defense.

5.14 The issues dealt with in this report — the potential nuclear-missile challenge from Iran and the role of missile defense in meeting that challenge — have in the past served to worsen U.S.-Russian relations. The analysis given in this paper points to a diff erent possibility: that cooperation between the two countries could help to resolve these important and urgent issues and could play a role in changing the U.S.-Russian relationship for the better.

Text: The Latest CIA Report on Iran's Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programmes

Every year, the US Director of National Intelligence is required by law to submit to Congress a report on "the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions".

This is the section of the full report, submitted earlier this month, concerning Iran:

I. Acquisition by Country

As required by Section 721 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 31 December 2008. This report focuses on key countries that we assess are seeking WMD capabilities.

Iran

Nuclear

We assess that Iran had been working to develop nuclear weapons through at least fall 2003, but that in fall 2003 Iran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities, and its covert uranium conversion- and enrichment-related activities. We judge that the halt lasted at least several years, and that Tehran had not resumed these activities as of at least mid-2007. We do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, although we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons by continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.

During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure and continued uranium enrichment and activities related to its heavy water research reactor, despite multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions since late 2006 calling for the suspension of those activities.

• In 2008, Iran continued to make progress enriching uranium at the underground cascade halls at Natanz with first-generation centrifuges, and in testing and operating second-generation centrifuges at the pilot plant there.

• In November 2008, Iran announced it had about 5,000 centrifuges operating at Natanz. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that between mid-December 2007 and November 2008, Iran fed about 8,080 kilograms of uranium
feed gas into its cascades, and produced about 555 kilograms of low enriched uranium (LEU) gas (uranium hexafluoride) at an enrichment level appropriate for reactor fuel, a significant improvement from the 75 kilograms of LEU gas it had produced in 2007.

• Iran has also fed small amounts of uranium feed gas to its second generationcentrifuges—the IR-2, since January 2008, and the IR-3, since April 2008.

• Iran in January 2008 received the final delivery of the initial batch of uranium fuel purchased from Russia required to operate the nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Delays in the project pushed the reactor's startup time into 2009.

• Iran in 2008 continued construction of the reactor buildings at the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor, including installing a dome on the reactor containment building by mid-November.

• The IAEA in 2008 continued to investigate the "alleged studies" documentation — information indicating Iran conducted military-led, covert uranium conversion and nuclear weaponization work prior to 2003. According to the November 2008 Director General's Report to the Board of Governors, the "alleged studies" issue remains unresolved and the IAEA continues to call on Iran to provide further clarification.

Ballistic Missiles

Iran has continued to develop its ballistic missile program, which it views as its primary deterrent. Iran is fielding increased numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs) and we judge that Iran currently is focusing on producing more capable MRBMs. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is one of the largest in the Middle East.

The Shahab-3 MRBM, capable of striking Israel, was formally handed over to the Iranian military in July 2003. During a military parade in September 2007, Iran displayed a missile, referred to as the Ghadr-1, which Iranian officials claimed had a range of 1,800-km.

Iran's defense ministry in 2005 stated that it had successfully tested an engine for a 2,000km ballistic missile and implied it would have two-stages~a key technology in the development of longer-range ballistic missiles. In late November 2007, Iran's defense minister claimed Iran had developed a new 2000 km-range missile called the Ashura. Iranian officials on 12 November 2008 claimed to have launched a two stage, solid propellant missile called the Sejil with a range of 2,000 km.

As early as 2005, Iran has stated its intentions to send its own satellites into orbit. In 2005, Iran's first satellite with an imagery payload, Sina-1, was launched on a Russian rocket, and Iran signed a $132 million deal with a Russian firm to build and launch a communications satellite. As of January 2008, Tehran reportedly had allocated $250 million to build and purchase satellites. Iran announced it would launch four more satellites by 2010 to improve land and mobile telephone communications.

Iranian officials, including President Ahmadi-Nejad, claimed that Tehran in February 2008 launched a probe called the Kavoshgar ("towards orbit") and that this device is transmitting information back to Earth. Based on Iranian press footage of the launch, however, the vehicle—which looked similar to the Shahab-3 MRBM, a system that by itself probably does not have the capability to place an object into orbit—appeared to suffer an in-flight failure. Iran's President also announced Tehran would conduct two more rocket tests prior to launching a "home-produced" satellite into orbit later in 2008, and several Iranian news websites released photos of a new rocket called "Safir" that appears larger than Tehran's existing ballistic missiles. Iranian officials stated on 27 August 2008 that they had launched a smaller research rocket called the Kavosh-2.

Technologies used to build an SLV are directly applicable to the development of longer range ballistic missiles. Assistance from entities in China and North Korea, as well as assistance from Russian entities at least in the past, has helped Iran move toward self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. Iran still remains dependent on foreign suppliers for
some key missile components, however. Iran also has marketed for export at trade shows guidance components suitable for ballistic missiles.

Chemical and Biological

We assess that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications. Tehran continues to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could advance its capability to produce CW agents. We judge that Iran is capable of weaponizing CW agents in a variety of delivery systems.

Iran probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. We assess that Iran has previously conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies that could be used for BW.

The Netanyahu Meeting: Obama Wins Battle, Loses War

Latest Post: Israel-Palestine - Obama's Two-Week Window
Assessing Netanyahu-Obama: Israel, Iran, and Palestine
Video and Transcript : Obama-Netanyahu News Conference

Enduring America, 16 May: "What President Obama needs now is not an Iranian concession but an Israeli one. If Netanyahu holds fast and does not open up the possibility of “genuine” talks with the Palestinian Authority, including discussions of political status as well as economic development and security, then Obama’s message — launched on Inauguration Day — of a new day in the Middle East is looking shaky."

Obama didn't get it. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made his high-profile visit and engaged in two hours of discussions with the President. And after those talks, there was no sign that Netanyahu had given any ground on the US showpiece demand: two-state negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

And Obama, or at least his advisors, may not get it. That very public refusal of the Israeli Prime Minister is likely to damage, if not sink, far more than the American position on Israel-Palestine. The bigger casualty may be Obama's strategy towards the Middle East and the Islamic world.

The outcome is the result both of flaws in the Administration's Palestine approach, which has never been comprehensive but rests on the narrower illusion that peace rests on an agreement between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority and --- more importantly in the short term --- the tactical error of announcing an Obama talk from Cairo on 4 June.

Up to two weeks ago, the Administration was not suffering from an approach which was making little headway but still had the superficial gloss of "engagement". With little possibility of an Israel-Palestine breakthrough, Obama and Co. could do the minimum --- keep the Palestinian Authority's Mahmoud Abbas propped up and thus keep Hamas as arm's distance --- while maintaining the priority of the US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Indeed, Obama's success yesterday was connected with "Af-Pak". By blocking Netanyahu's demand that Washington break off talks with Tehran, the President ensured that Iran was kept in play as the US sought co-operation for its military campaign in Afghanistan. He could wave good-bye to Bibi and return to the central crisis for his Administration.

The only problem is that by yesterday, in symbolism if not substance, Obama had given himself another Presidential talk: Get an Israel-Palestine Settlement, Save the World.

When Obama takes the podium in Egypt in two weeks' time, it will be the fourth time that he has put out his unclenched fist to the Arab and Islamic worlds. The Inaugural Address, the interview on Al-Arabiya, and the speech from Ankara were generally received as the since words of a US President who wanted to rebuild America's relations --- not just political but cultural and ideological --- with countries and peoples in the Middle East and beyond.

Now, however, almost five months have elapsed since the Gaza War, two since a new Israeli Government took office. Inevitably, the question emerges --- especially since the US is putting Palestine First back at Netanyahu's Israel First --- so what, in substance rather than rhetoric, is going to be done?

This isn't to say that Palestine is everyone's political priority. However, in part because of history, in part because of the Gaza War, and in large part because it has become a touchstone for justice and legitimacy, other Governments have to pay heed to it.

So, for example, up to December 2008, Syria was looking towards direct talks with Israel on political and economic issues. Then Tel Aviv chose to launch the Gaza attack. Now, although the Obama Administration has tried to restart the process with Damascus, Palestine stands in the way. Netanyahu has effectively said, Iran First, Then Palestine, Then Maybe Syria. Meanwhile, Damascus concentrates on bolstering its regional position after its withdrawal from Lebanon, building links not only in the Middle East but with Turkey and Iran.

Saudi Arabia, whose 2002 plan for Israel-Palestine talks was loudly rebuffed by the Bush Administration, also hangs back. Why, given internal instability and its interest in other conflicts such as the Pakistani situation, expend political capital when Washington has committed itself to leading the way?

So instead the Arab point man for the Israeli-Palestinian, and indeed a supposed Arab-Israeli, detente is King Abdullah of Jordan. Whatever his altruism in serving this cause, it also repays the US for the aid necessary to prop up the Jordanian economy. Never mind that the grand notion of an Islamic agreement with Tel Aviv, especially the notion that Israel can be recognised while Palestine is not, is still in the realm of fantasy: someone has to go through the motions.

Meanwhile Hamas continues its slow entry from the cold. While its latest initiatives, such as Khalid Meshaal's restating of the offer of a 10-year truce and distancing from the 1988 Charter, are predictably being dismissed by many in the US, they are resonating in the Middle East. The organisation which, up to December 2008, was still being treated as a pariah by many other governments is now gaining acceptance. Grudging acceptance, but still an acceptance of political legitimacy.

The problem is that a lot of folks, maybe not in Middle Eastern Governments, but amongst populations in and beyond the region, are going to ask the Emperor if his clothes are real when Obama speaks in Cairo. And I can't see where the cloth is coming from. When Hosni Mubarak declares in Washington on 26 May that he is very happy with the Israel-Palestine process, most will recognise that the Egyptian leader --- now closer to Tel Aviv than to many Arab states --- is doing it for his position with Washington. And even if Palestinian Authority Abbas declares in Washington on 28 May that he's quite happy to sit down with Netanyahu, he will do so as a weak (if not illegitimate) leader.

Obama continues to impress with his day-to-day tactics, and he did so yesterday against another master tactician, but as strategists, he and his Administration have put themselve in a difficult position.

Where I come from, it's called a "hiding to nothing".