Text: The Latest CIA Report on Iran's Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programmes

Every year, the US Director of National Intelligence is required by law to submit to Congress a report on "the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions".

This is the section of the full report, submitted earlier this month, concerning Iran:

I. Acquisition by Country

As required by Section 721 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 31 December 2008. This report focuses on key countries that we assess are seeking WMD capabilities.

Iran

Nuclear

We assess that Iran had been working to develop nuclear weapons through at least fall 2003, but that in fall 2003 Iran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities, and its covert uranium conversion- and enrichment-related activities. We judge that the halt lasted at least several years, and that Tehran had not resumed these activities as of at least mid-2007. We do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, although we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons by continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.

During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure and continued uranium enrichment and activities related to its heavy water research reactor, despite multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions since late 2006 calling for the suspension of those activities.

• In 2008, Iran continued to make progress enriching uranium at the underground cascade halls at Natanz with first-generation centrifuges, and in testing and operating second-generation centrifuges at the pilot plant there.

• In November 2008, Iran announced it had about 5,000 centrifuges operating at Natanz. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that between mid-December 2007 and November 2008, Iran fed about 8,080 kilograms of uranium
feed gas into its cascades, and produced about 555 kilograms of low enriched uranium (LEU) gas (uranium hexafluoride) at an enrichment level appropriate for reactor fuel, a significant improvement from the 75 kilograms of LEU gas it had produced in 2007.

• Iran has also fed small amounts of uranium feed gas to its second generationcentrifuges—the IR-2, since January 2008, and the IR-3, since April 2008.

• Iran in January 2008 received the final delivery of the initial batch of uranium fuel purchased from Russia required to operate the nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Delays in the project pushed the reactor's startup time into 2009.

• Iran in 2008 continued construction of the reactor buildings at the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor, including installing a dome on the reactor containment building by mid-November.

• The IAEA in 2008 continued to investigate the "alleged studies" documentation — information indicating Iran conducted military-led, covert uranium conversion and nuclear weaponization work prior to 2003. According to the November 2008 Director General's Report to the Board of Governors, the "alleged studies" issue remains unresolved and the IAEA continues to call on Iran to provide further clarification.

Ballistic Missiles

Iran has continued to develop its ballistic missile program, which it views as its primary deterrent. Iran is fielding increased numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs) and we judge that Iran currently is focusing on producing more capable MRBMs. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is one of the largest in the Middle East.

The Shahab-3 MRBM, capable of striking Israel, was formally handed over to the Iranian military in July 2003. During a military parade in September 2007, Iran displayed a missile, referred to as the Ghadr-1, which Iranian officials claimed had a range of 1,800-km.

Iran's defense ministry in 2005 stated that it had successfully tested an engine for a 2,000km ballistic missile and implied it would have two-stages~a key technology in the development of longer-range ballistic missiles. In late November 2007, Iran's defense minister claimed Iran had developed a new 2000 km-range missile called the Ashura. Iranian officials on 12 November 2008 claimed to have launched a two stage, solid propellant missile called the Sejil with a range of 2,000 km.

As early as 2005, Iran has stated its intentions to send its own satellites into orbit. In 2005, Iran's first satellite with an imagery payload, Sina-1, was launched on a Russian rocket, and Iran signed a $132 million deal with a Russian firm to build and launch a communications satellite. As of January 2008, Tehran reportedly had allocated $250 million to build and purchase satellites. Iran announced it would launch four more satellites by 2010 to improve land and mobile telephone communications.

Iranian officials, including President Ahmadi-Nejad, claimed that Tehran in February 2008 launched a probe called the Kavoshgar ("towards orbit") and that this device is transmitting information back to Earth. Based on Iranian press footage of the launch, however, the vehicle—which looked similar to the Shahab-3 MRBM, a system that by itself probably does not have the capability to place an object into orbit—appeared to suffer an in-flight failure. Iran's President also announced Tehran would conduct two more rocket tests prior to launching a "home-produced" satellite into orbit later in 2008, and several Iranian news websites released photos of a new rocket called "Safir" that appears larger than Tehran's existing ballistic missiles. Iranian officials stated on 27 August 2008 that they had launched a smaller research rocket called the Kavosh-2.

Technologies used to build an SLV are directly applicable to the development of longer range ballistic missiles. Assistance from entities in China and North Korea, as well as assistance from Russian entities at least in the past, has helped Iran move toward self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. Iran still remains dependent on foreign suppliers for
some key missile components, however. Iran also has marketed for export at trade shows guidance components suitable for ballistic missiles.

Chemical and Biological

We assess that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications. Tehran continues to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could advance its capability to produce CW agents. We judge that Iran is capable of weaponizing CW agents in a variety of delivery systems.

Iran probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. We assess that Iran has previously conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies that could be used for BW.

Torture: More on the CIA-Military, Guantanamo-Iraq Link

Last week, when we wrote about testimony by Philip Zelikow and Ali Soufan to a Senate hearing on torture, reader John Birch wrote perceptively, "Zelikow was testifying about the organized use of toture as an interrogation method by the CIA....The photos [Obama] held back are of the abuse and even torture of prisoners by the U.S. military." This prompted my response, "The connection is that the authorisation of torture by the CIA and US military, sanctioned from spring 2002 by Bush officials, made its way to Guantanamo Bay and then to Iraq, including Abu Ghraib," notably via General Geoffrey Miller.

Writing for Salon, Mark Benjamin adds an interesting dimension: Gitmo general told Iraq WMD search team to torture

[Even] before Miller met with the Abu Ghraib officials, he first made a little-known visit to the Iraq Survey Group, which was in charge of the hunt for WMDs in Iraq after the invasion. Miller told the ISG they were “running a country club” by not getting tough on detainees....Miller recommended temperature manipulation and sleep deprivation.

Gitmo general told Iraq WMD search team to torture

It’s one thing if, as former Vice President Dick Cheney keeps saying, the United States brutally interrogated people to keep our kids safe from another strike by Osama bin Laden. If folks got tortured to provide a rationale for going to war with Iraq, though, that's a whole different story.

Recent news reports have suggested the possibility that the Bush administration might have endorsed torture to prove an Iraq-al Qaida link. And a recent report from the Senate Armed Services Committee shows that months after then-President Bush had declared Mission Accomplished in Iraq, an Army general working hand in glove with top administration officials tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to convince a unit charged with finding weapons of mass destruction to get tough on its prisoners.

In August and early September of 2003, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, the man in charge of the Pentagon’s torture laboratory at Guantanamo Bay, was dispatched to Iraq, allegedly to Gitmoize operations there.

It seems to have worked, at least in one place. Soon after Miller visited with officials in charge of Abu Ghraib, guards there began to use working dogs, stress positions, extremely lengthy interrogations, isolation, yelling and nudity in order to try to wring information from prisoners -- all techniques that had been used at Guantanamo and that the world would later see in photos released from an investigation in to what had gone on at the prison.

But according to the Senate committee's report, before Miller met with the Abu Ghraib officials, he first made a little-known visit to the Iraq Survey Group, which was in charge of the hunt for WMDs in Iraq after the invasion.

Miller told the ISG they were “running a country club” by not getting tough on detainees, Chief Warrant Officer Brian Searcy, the ISG interrogation chief, told the Senate committee. Searcy said Miller suggested shackling detainees and forcing them to walk on gravel. Mike Kamin, another ISG official, told committee investigators that Miller recommended temperature manipulation and sleep deprivation.

Miller also told the ISG’s Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton that Dayton’s unit was “not getting much out of these people,” and complained that the ISG had not “broken” their detainees psychologically. Miller offered to send along suggested techniques, Dayton recalled, that would “actually break” the prisoners.

Dayton demurred, saying his unit wasn’t changing anything and that lawyers would have to carefully vet anything Miller suggested. The ISG generally balked. One of its debriefers threatened to resign if Miller got his way. After the cool reception, Miller appears to have dropped the effort with respect to the ISG.

On his return from Iraq, Miller was sent directly to the Pentagon to personally brief then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Steven Cambone.

When interviewed by the committee, Miller couldn’t remember much about that visit. But in retrospect, it is pretty clear why the ISG wasn’t “getting much” out of their detainees on WMDs in Iraq: There weren’t any. Though with enough abuse, the detainees probably would have claimed otherwise.