Torture: More on the CIA-Military, Guantanamo-Iraq Link

Last week, when we wrote about testimony by Philip Zelikow and Ali Soufan to a Senate hearing on torture, reader John Birch wrote perceptively, "Zelikow was testifying about the organized use of toture as an interrogation method by the CIA....The photos [Obama] held back are of the abuse and even torture of prisoners by the U.S. military." This prompted my response, "The connection is that the authorisation of torture by the CIA and US military, sanctioned from spring 2002 by Bush officials, made its way to Guantanamo Bay and then to Iraq, including Abu Ghraib," notably via General Geoffrey Miller.

Writing for Salon, Mark Benjamin adds an interesting dimension: Gitmo general told Iraq WMD search team to torture

[Even] before Miller met with the Abu Ghraib officials, he first made a little-known visit to the Iraq Survey Group, which was in charge of the hunt for WMDs in Iraq after the invasion. Miller told the ISG they were “running a country club” by not getting tough on detainees....Miller recommended temperature manipulation and sleep deprivation.

Gitmo general told Iraq WMD search team to torture

It’s one thing if, as former Vice President Dick Cheney keeps saying, the United States brutally interrogated people to keep our kids safe from another strike by Osama bin Laden. If folks got tortured to provide a rationale for going to war with Iraq, though, that's a whole different story.

Recent news reports have suggested the possibility that the Bush administration might have endorsed torture to prove an Iraq-al Qaida link. And a recent report from the Senate Armed Services Committee shows that months after then-President Bush had declared Mission Accomplished in Iraq, an Army general working hand in glove with top administration officials tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to convince a unit charged with finding weapons of mass destruction to get tough on its prisoners.

In August and early September of 2003, Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, the man in charge of the Pentagon’s torture laboratory at Guantanamo Bay, was dispatched to Iraq, allegedly to Gitmoize operations there.

It seems to have worked, at least in one place. Soon after Miller visited with officials in charge of Abu Ghraib, guards there began to use working dogs, stress positions, extremely lengthy interrogations, isolation, yelling and nudity in order to try to wring information from prisoners -- all techniques that had been used at Guantanamo and that the world would later see in photos released from an investigation in to what had gone on at the prison.

But according to the Senate committee's report, before Miller met with the Abu Ghraib officials, he first made a little-known visit to the Iraq Survey Group, which was in charge of the hunt for WMDs in Iraq after the invasion.

Miller told the ISG they were “running a country club” by not getting tough on detainees, Chief Warrant Officer Brian Searcy, the ISG interrogation chief, told the Senate committee. Searcy said Miller suggested shackling detainees and forcing them to walk on gravel. Mike Kamin, another ISG official, told committee investigators that Miller recommended temperature manipulation and sleep deprivation.

Miller also told the ISG’s Maj. Gen. Keith Dayton that Dayton’s unit was “not getting much out of these people,” and complained that the ISG had not “broken” their detainees psychologically. Miller offered to send along suggested techniques, Dayton recalled, that would “actually break” the prisoners.

Dayton demurred, saying his unit wasn’t changing anything and that lawyers would have to carefully vet anything Miller suggested. The ISG generally balked. One of its debriefers threatened to resign if Miller got his way. After the cool reception, Miller appears to have dropped the effort with respect to the ISG.

On his return from Iraq, Miller was sent directly to the Pentagon to personally brief then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Steven Cambone.

When interviewed by the committee, Miller couldn’t remember much about that visit. But in retrospect, it is pretty clear why the ISG wasn’t “getting much” out of their detainees on WMDs in Iraq: There weren’t any. Though with enough abuse, the detainees probably would have claimed otherwise.

Transcript: FBI Agent Ali Soufan Testifies on Torture

Related Post: Bush Official Zelikow Condemns Illegal Programmes

Testifying behind a screen, former FBI agent Ali Soufan told a Senate hearing yesterday about the damage caused by the Bush Administration's "enhanced interrogations". Soufan was one of the first agents to question Al Qa'eda operative Abu Zubaydah, and by "connecting" with the detainee, he learned the identity of 9/11 planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Shortly afterwards, CIA operatives took over the question, applying techniques including waterboarding. Abu Zubaydah, mentally and physically broken, offered little from that point.

Soufan's testimony can be read next to his opinion piece, published last month, in The New York Times.

Mr. Chairman, Committee members, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I know that each one of you cares deeply about our nation's security. It was always a comfort to me during the most dangerous of situations that I faced, from going undercover as an al Qaeda operative, to unraveling terrorist cells, to tracking down the killers of the 17 U.S. sailors murdered in the USS Cole bombing, that those of us on the frontline had your support and the backing of the American people. So I thank you.

The issue that I am here to discuss today – interrogation methods used to question terrorists – is not, and should not be, a partisan matter. We all share a commitment to using the best interrogation method possible that serves our national security interests and fits squarely within the framework of our nation's principles.

From my experience – and I speak as someone who has personally interrogated many terrorists and elicited important actionable intelligence– I strongly believe that it is a mistake to use what has become known as the "enhanced interrogation techniques," a position shared by many professional operatives, including the CIA officers who were present at the initial phases of the Abu Zubaydah interrogation.

These techniques, from an operational perspective, are ineffective, slow and unreliable, and as a result harmful to our efforts to defeat al Qaeda. (This is aside from the important additional considerations that they are un-American and harmful to our reputation and cause.)

My interest in speaking about this issue is not to advocate the prosecution of anyone. People were given misinformation, half-truths, and false claims of successes; and reluctant intelligence officers were given instructions and assurances from higher authorities. Examining a past we cannot change is only worthwhile when it helps guide us towards claiming a better future that is yet within our reach.

And my focus is on the future. I wish to do my part to ensure that we never again use these harmful, slow, ineffective, and unreliable techniques instead of the tried, tested, and successful ones – the ones that are also in sync with our values and moral character. Only by doing this will we defeat the terrorists as effectively and quickly as possible.

Most of my professional career has been spent investigating, studying, and interrogating terrorists. I have had the privilege of working alongside, and learning from, some of the most dedicated and talented men and women our nation has– individuals from the FBI, and other law enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies.

In my capacity as a FBI Agent, I investigated and supervised highly sensitive and complex international terrorism cases, including the East Africa bombings, the USS Cole bombing, and the events surrounding the attacks of 9/11. I also coordinated both domestic and international counter-terrorism operations on the Joint Terrorist Task Force, FBI New York Office.

I personally interrogated many terrorists we have in our custody and elsewhere, and gained confessions, identified terror operatives, their funding, details of potential plots, and information on how al Qaeda operates, along with other actionable intelligence. Because of these successes, I was the government's main witness in both of the trials we have had so far in Guantanamo Bay – the trial of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a driver and bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden, and Ali Hamza Al Bahlul, Bin Laden's propagandist. In addition I am currently helping the prosecution prepare for upcoming trials of other detainees held in Guantanamo Bay.

There are many examples of successful interrogations of terrorists that have taken place before and after 9/11. Many of them are classified, but one that is already public and mirrors the other cases, is the interrogation of al Qaeda terrorist Nasser Ahmad Nasser al-Bahri, known as Abu Jandal. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, together with my partner Special Agent Robert McFadden, a first-class intelligence operative from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), (which, from my experience, is one of the classiest agencies I encountered in the intelligence community), I interrogated Abu Jandal.
Through our interrogation, which was done completely by the book (including advising him of his rights), we obtained a treasure trove of highly significant actionable intelligence. For example, Abu Jandal gave us extensive information on Osama Bin Laden's terror network, structure, leadership, membership, security details, facilities, family, communication methods, travels, training, ammunitions, and weaponry, including a breakdown of what machine guns, rifles, rocket launchers, and anti-tank missiles they used. He also provided explicit details of the 9/11plot operatives, and identified many terrorists who we later successfully apprehended.

The information was important for the preparation of the war in Afghanistan in 2001. It also provided an important background to the 9/11 Commission report; it provided a foundation for the trials so far held in Guantanamo Bay; and it also has been invaluable in helping to capture and identify top al Qaeda operatives and thus disrupt plots.
The approach used in these successful interrogations can be called the Informed Interrogation Approach. Until the introduction of the "enhanced" technique, it was the sole approach used by our military, intelligence, and law enforcement community.

It is an approach rooted in experiences and lessons learned during World War II and from our Counter-insurgency experience in Vietnam – experiences and lessons that generated the Army Field Manual. This was then refined over the decades to include how to interrogate terrorism suspects specifically, as experience was gained from interrogations following the first World Trade Center bombing, the East Africa Embassy bombings, and the USS Cole bombing. To sum up, it is an approach derived from the cumulative experiences, wisdom, and successes of the most effective operational people our country has produced.

Before I joined the Bureau, for example, traditional investigative strategies along with intelligence derived from human sources successfully thwarted the 1993 New York City Landmark Bomb Plot (TERRSTOP), a plot by the Blind Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, to attack the UN Headquarters, the FBI's New York office, and tunnels and bridges across New York City, -- as a follow-up to the 1993 World Trade Center bombings. That remains to this day the largest thwarted attack on our homeland. I had the privilege of working with, and learning from, those who conducted this successful operation.

The Informed Interrogation Approach is based on leveraging our knowledge of the detainee's culture and mindset, together with using information we already know about him.

The interrogator knows that there are three primary points of influence on the detainee:

First, there is the fear that the detainee feels as a result of his capture and isolation from his support base. People crave human contact, and this is especially true in some cultures more than others. The interrogator turns this knowledge into an advantage by becoming the one person the detainee can talk to and who listens to what he has to say, and uses this to encourage the detainee to open up.

In addition, acting in a non-threatening way isn't how the detainee is trained to expect a U.S. interrogator to act. This adds to the detainee's confusion and makes him more likely to cooperate.

Second, and connected, there is the need the detainee feels to sustain a position of respect and value to interrogator. As the interrogator is the one person speaking to and listening to the detainee, a relationship is built – and the detainee doesn't want to jeopardize it. The interrogator capitalizes on this and compels the detainee to give up more information.

And third, there is the impression the detainee has of the evidence against him. The interrogator has to do his or her homework and become an expert in every detail known to the intelligence community about the detainee. The interrogator then uses that knowledge to impress upon the detainee that everything about him is known and that any lie will be easily caught.

For example, in my first interrogation of the terrorist Abu Zubaydah, who had strong links to al Qaeda's leaders and who knew the details of the 9/11 plot before it happened, I asked him his name. He replied with his alias. I then asked him, "how about if I call you Hani?" That was the name his mother nicknamed him as a child. He looked at me in shock, said "ok," and we started talking.

The Army Field Manual is not about being nice or soft. It is a knowledge-based approach. It is about outwitting the detainee by using a combination of interpersonal, cognitive, and emotional strategies to get the information needed. If done correctly it's an approach that works quickly and effectively because it outwits the detainee using a method that he is not trained, or able, to resist.

This Informed Interrogation Approach is in sharp contrast with the harsh interrogation approach introduced by outside contractors and forced upon CIA officials to use.

The harsh technique method doesn't use the knowledge we have of the detainee's history, mindset, vulnerabilities, or culture, and instead tries to subjugate the detainee into submission through humiliation and cruelty. The approach applies a force continuum, each time using harsher and harsher techniques until the detainee submits.

The idea behind the technique is to force the detainee to see the interrogator as the master who controls his pain. It is an exercise in trying to gain compliance rather than eliciting cooperation. A theoretical application of this technique is a situation where the detainee is stripped naked and told: "Tell us what you know."

If the detainee doesn't immediately respond by giving information, for example he asks: "what do you want to know?" the interviewer will reply: "you know," and walk out of the interrogation room. Then the next step on the force continuum is introduced, for example sleep deprivation, and the process will continue until the detainee's will is broken and he automatically gives up all information he is presumed to know.

There are many problems with this technique.

A major problem is that it is ineffective. Al Qaeda terrorists are trained to resist torture. As shocking as these techniques are to us, the al Qaeda training prepares them for much worse – the torture they would expect to receive if caught by dictatorships for example.

This is why, as we see from the recently released Department of Justice memos on interrogation, the contractors had to keep getting authorization to use harsher and harsher methods, until they reached waterboarding and then there was nothing they could do but use that technique again and again. Abu Zubaydah had to be waterboarded 83 times and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed 183 times. In a democracy there is a glass ceiling of harsh techniques the interrogator cannot breach, and a detainee can eventually call the interrogator's bluff.

In addition the harsh techniques only serves to reinforce what the detainee has been prepared to expect if captured. This gives him a greater sense of control and predictability about his experience, and strengthens his will to resist.

A second major problem with this technique is that evidence gained from it is unreliable. There is no way to know whether the detainee is being truthful, or just speaking to either mitigate his discomfort or to deliberately provide false information. As the interrogator isn't an expert on the detainee or the subject matter, nor has he spent time going over the details of the case, the interrogator cannot easily know if the detainee is telling the truth. This unfortunately has happened and we have had problems ranging from agents chasing false leads to the disastrous case of Ibn Sheikh al-Libby who gave false information on Iraq, al Qaeda, and WMD.

A third major problem with this technique is that it is slow. It takes place over a long period of time, for example preventing the detainee from sleeping for 180 hours as the memos detail, or waterboarding 183 times in the case of KSM. When we have an alleged "ticking timebomb" scenario and need to get information quickly, we can't afford to wait that long.

A fourth problem with this technique is that ignores the end game. In our country we have due process, which requires evidence to be collected in a certain way. The CIA, because of the sensitivity of its operations, by necessity, operates secretly. These two factors mean that by putting the CIA in charge of interrogations, either secrecy is sacrificed for justice and the CIA's operations are hampered, or justice is not served. Neither is a desirable outcome.

Another disastrous consequence of the use of the harsh techniques was that it reintroduced the "Chinese Wall" between the CIA and FBI – similar to the wall that prevented us from working together to stop 9/11. In addition, the FBI and the CIA officers on the ground during the Abu Zubaydah interrogation were working together closely and effectively, until the contractors' interferences. Because we in the FBI would not be a part of the harsh techniques, the agents who knew the most about the terrorists could have no part in the investigation. An FBI colleague of mine, for example, who had tracked KSM and knew more about him than anyone in the government, was not allowed to speak to him.

Furthermore, the CIA specializes in collecting, analyzing, and interpreting intelligence. The FBI, on the other hand, has a trained investigative branch. Until that point, we were complimenting each other's expertise, until the imposition of the "enhanced methods." As a result people ended doing what they were not trained to do.

It is also important to realize that those behind this technique are outside contractors with no expertise in intelligence operations, investigations, terrorism, or al Qaeda. Nor did the contractors have any experience in the art of interview and interrogation. One of the contractors told me this at the time, and this lack of experience has also now been recently reported on by sources familiar with their backgrounds.

The case of the terrorist Abu Zubaydah is a good example of where the success of the Informed Interrogation Approach can be contrasted with the failure of the harsh technique approach. I have to restrict my remarks to what has been unclassified. (I will note that there is documented evidence supporting everything I will tell you today.)

Immediately after Abu Zubaydah was captured, a fellow FBI agent and I were flown to meet him at an undisclosed location. We were both very familiar with Abu Zubaydah and have successfully interrogated al-Qaeda terrorists. We started interrogating him, supported by CIA officials who were stationed at the location, and within the first hour of the interrogation, using the Informed Interrogation Approach, we gained important actionable intelligence.

The information was so important that, as I later learned from open sources, it went to CIA Director George Tenet who was so impressed that he initially ordered us to be congratulated. That was apparently quickly withdrawn as soon as Mr. Tenet was told that it was FBI agents, who were responsible. He then immediately ordered a CIA CTC interrogation team to leave DC and head to the location to take over from us.

During his capture Abu Zubaydah had been injured. After seeing the extent of his injuries, the CIA medical team supporting us decided they were not equipped to treat him and we had to take him to a hospital or he would die. At the hospital, we continued our questioning as much as possible, while taking into account his medical condition and the need to know all information he might have on existing threats.

We were once again very successful and elicited information regarding the role of KSM as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and lots of other information that remains classified. (It is important to remember that before this we had no idea of KSM's role in 9/11 or his importance in the al Qaeda leadership structure.) All this happened before the CTC team arrived.

A few days after we started questioning Abu Zubaydah, the CTC interrogation team finally arrived from DC with a contractor who was instructing them on how they should conduct the interrogations, and we were removed. Immediately, on the instructions of the contractor, harsh techniques were introduced, starting with nudity. (The harsher techniques mentioned in the memos were not introduced or even discussed at this point.)

The new techniques did not produce results as Abu Zubaydah shut down and stopped talking. At that time nudity and low-level sleep deprivation (between 24 and 48 hours) was being used. After a few days of getting no information, and after repeated inquiries from DC asking why all of sudden no information was being transmitted (when before there had been a steady stream), we again were given control of the interrogation.

We then returned to using the Informed Interrogation Approach. Within a few hours, Abu Zubaydah again started talking and gave us important actionable intelligence.

This included the details of Jose Padilla, the so-called "dirty bomber." To remind you of how important this information was viewed at the time, the then-Attorney General, John Ashcroft, held a press conference from Moscow to discuss the news. Other important actionable intelligence was also gained that remains classified.

After a few days, the contractor attempted to once again try his untested theory and he started to re-implementing the harsh techniques. He moved this time further along the force continuum, introducing loud noise and then temperature manipulation.

Throughout this time, my fellow FBI agent and I, along with a top CIA interrogator who was working with us, protested, but we were overruled. I should also note that another colleague, an operational psychologist for the CIA, had left the location because he objected to what was being done.

Again, however, the technique wasn't working and Abu Zubaydah wasn't revealing any information, so we were once again brought back in to interrogate him. We found it harder to reengage him this time, because of how the techniques had affected him, but eventually, we succeeded, and he re-engaged again.

Once again the contractor insisted on stepping up the notches of his experiment, and this time he requested the authorization to place Abu Zubaydah in a confinement box, as the next stage in the force continuum. While everything I saw to this point were nowhere near the severity later listed in the memos, the evolution of the contractor's theory, along with what I had seen till then, struck me as "borderline torture."

As the Department of Justice IG report released last year states, I protested to my superiors in the FBI and refused to be a part of what was happening. The Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, a man I deeply respect, agreed passing the message that "we don't do that," and I was pulled out.

As you can see from this timeline, many of the claims made in the memos about the success of the enhanced techniques are inaccurate. For example, it is untrue to claim Abu Zubaydah wasn't cooperating before August 1, 2002. The truth is that we got actionable intelligence from him in the first hour of interrogating him.

In addition, simply by putting together dates cited in the memos with claims made, falsehoods are obvious. For example, it has been claimed that waterboarding got Abu Zubaydah to give up information leading to the capture of Jose Padilla. But that doesn't add up: Waterboarding wasn't approved until 1 August 2002 (verbally it was authorized around mid July 2002), and Padilla was arrested in May 2002.

The same goes for KSM's involvement in 9/11: That was discovered in April 2002, while waterboarding was not introduced until almost three months later. It speaks volumes that the quoted instances of harsh interrogation methods being a success are false.

Nor can it be said that the harsh techniques were effective, which is why we had to be called back in repeatedly. As we know from the memos, the techniques that were apparently introduced after I left did not appear to work either, which is why the memos granted authorization for harsher techniques. That continued for several months right till waterboarding was introduced, which had to be used 83 times – an indication that Abu Zubaydah had called the interrogator's bluff knowing the glass ceiling that existed.

Authoritative CIA, FBI, and military sources have also questioned the claims made by the advocates of the techniques. For example, in one of the recently released Justice Department memos, the author, Stephen Bradbury, acknowledged a (still classified) internal CIA Inspector General report that had found it "difficult to determine conclusively whether interrogations have provided information critical to interdicting specific imminent attacks."

In summary, the Informed Interrogation Approach outlined in the Army Field Manual is the most effective, reliable, and speedy approach we have for interrogating terrorists. It is legal and has worked time and again.

It was a mistake to abandon it in favor of harsh interrogation methods that are harmful, shameful, slower, unreliable, ineffective, and play directly into the enemy's handbook. It was a mistake to abandon an approach that was working and naively replace it with an untested method. It was a mistake to abandon an approach that is based on the cumulative wisdom and successful tradition of our military, intelligence, and law enforcement community, in favor of techniques advocated by contractors with no relevant experience.

The mistake was so costly precisely because the situation was, and remains, too risky to allow someone to experiment with amateurish, Hollywood style interrogation methods- that in reality- taints sources, risks outcomes, ignores the end game, and diminishes our moral high ground in a battle that is impossible to win without first capturing the hearts and minds around the world. It was one of the worst and most harmful decisions made in our efforts against al Qaeda.

For the last seven years, it was not easy objecting to these methods when they had powerful backers. I stood up then for the same reason I'm willing to take on critics now, because I took an oath swearing to protect this great nation. I could not stand by quietly while our country's safety was endangered and our moral standing damaged.

I know you are motivated by the same considerations, and I hope you help ensure that these grave mistakes are never made again.

Thank you.

Video and Transcript: David Petraeus on "Fox News Sunday"

Related Post: David Petraeus on CNN’s “State of the Union”

The centrepiece of the Obama Administration's Afghanistan-Pakistan sales pitch this weekend is not one but two appearances by General David Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, who showed up on "Fox News Sunday" before moving to CNN for "State of the Union".

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pYnfhaYTFK8[/youtube]

CHRIS WALLACE: Joining us from U.S. Central Command in Florida is General David Petraeus, who oversees American military operations in the Middle East and Central Asia.

And, General, welcome back to “FOX News Sunday.”

PETRAEUS: Good to be with you, Chris. Thanks.

WALLACE: General, let’s start with Pakistan. The military there has launched a new offensive against the Taliban in the Swat Valley. Is there any sign that this is different from earlier Pakistani military campaigns, which have not been effective?

PETRAEUS: There are a number of signs of difference, actually, Chris.

First of all, the actions of the Pakistani Taliban pushing below the Swat Valley into Dir and Buner seem to have galvanized all of Pakistan, not just the president and the prime minister, but also even the opposition leaders, virtually all the elements of the political spectrum and the people, in addition to, of course, the -- the military.

So there is a degree of unanimity that there must be swift and effective action taken against the Taliban in Pakistan.

And this is reflected also, as has been announced by the Pakistani leaders, the shift of forces from the eastern part of their country faced off against India to the North-West Frontier Province areas where the fighting is already ongoing and where more presumably will be conducted.

WALLACE: But the fact is that -- and I know you have been critical of this. A lot of military experts in the past -- the Pakistani army tends to fight the war that they would fight against the Indians, with heavy artillery, with air ships -- you know, with war planes fighting.

Do -- do you have the sense that they have the counterinsurgency strategy that makes you confident that they can beat the Taliban in the Swat Valley?

PETRAEUS: Well, we did have some good conversations this past week in Washington as part of the trilateral process that you’ve reported.

And during that, it was very clear in discussions with everyone, from President Zardari through the other members of the delegation that there’s an understanding that this does have to be a whole-of- government approach -- in other words, not just the military but all the rest of the elements of government supporting the military -- so that they can reestablish basic services, repair the damage that is inevitably done by the bombardment of these areas in which the Taliban are located, and to take care of the internally displaced persons.

And there’s an enormous effort ongoing in that regard, our State Department, other countries, all trying to help the U.N., which is the agency on the front lines there, trying to take care of these refugees that are streaming out of the Swat Valley.

WALLACE: General, you reportedly told top U.S. officials recently that the next two weeks were critical to determine the survival of the Pakistani government.

If we’re talking about something as existential as that, what are the chances that the Islamic radicals could get their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal?

PETRAEUS: Well, first of all, the reports of what I said were a little bit more than what I actually said behind closed doors several weeks ago, at which time I said that, in fact, the next few weeks would be very important and, to a degree, pivotal in the future for Pakistan.

And I think that that has been proven accurate. Indeed, now the Pakistani government, military, people have all responded, and certainly the next few weeks will be very important in this effort to roll back, if you will, this existential threat, a true threat to Pakistan’s very existence that has been posed by the Pakistani Taliban.

With respect to the -- the nuclear weapons and -- and sites that are controlled by Pakistan, as President Obama mentioned the other day, we have confidence in their security procedures and elements and believe that the security of those sites is adequate.

WALLACE: But -- but to press the point, if I may, because, as you say, you are talking about an existential threat from Islamic radicals, can you assure the American people and the rest of the world that the U.S. will not allow those Pakistani nuclear weapons to get into the hands of Islamic radicals?

PETRAEUS: Well, this is not a U.S. assurance that matters. This is a Pakistani assurance. And also, by the way, I should point out, Chris, this is not a U.S. fight that Pakistan is carrying out at this point in -- in this effort.

This is a Pakistani fight, a Pakistani battle, with elements that, as we’ve mentioned, threaten the very existence of the Pakistani state.

WALLACE: You also said this week that Al Qaida has reemerged in northwestern Pakistan as a centrally organized operation capable of planning attacks in other countries.

Is Al Qaida back in business, sir?

PETRAEUS: Well, Al Qaida has been back in business for years, Chris. There is not an enormous revelation here. What I was merely saying was that the location of Al Qaida’s senior leadership is, indeed, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of that very rugged border region of western Pakistan just east of Afghanistan.

There’s no question that Al Qaida’s senior leadership has been there and has been in operation for years. We had to contend with its reach as it sought to facilitate the flow of foreign fighters, resources, explosives, leaders and expertise into Iraq, as you’ll recall, through Syria.

We see tentacles of Al Qaida that connect to Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, the elements Al-Shabab in Somalia, elements in north central Africa, and that strive to reach all the way, of course, into Europe and into the United States.

And of course, there were attacks a couple of years ago in the U.K. that reflected the reach of the transnational extremist elements of Al Qaida and the other movements in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

WALLACE: And -- and, General, do you believe that bin Laden and Zawahiri are still in charge of Al Qaida?

PETRAEUS: We do. Again, I don’t think anyone can give you any kind of accurate location for bin Laden or, frankly, for Zawahiri other than a general description of where that might be, but certainly, they surface periodically.

We see communications that they send out. And of course, they periodically send out videos in which they try to exhort people and to inspire individuals to carry out extremist activities.

WALLACE: General, let’s...

PETRAEUS: It’s important to note, by the way, Chris, that -- that these organizations, by the way, in the FATA have sustained some pretty significant losses over the course of the last six, eight, 10 months or so.

And there is a good deal of disruption that has taken place but, of course, that’s transitory in nature, and we’ll have to see how the security operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas -- different from, of course, the fight in the -- in the Swat and North- West Frontier Province areas go.

WALLACE: General, let’s turn to Afghanistan. It has been widely reported that as many as 147 civilians, Afghan civilians, were killed after U.S. air strikes in western Afghanistan. I know you’ve been investigating the circumstances and the responsibility for that. At this point, what do you know?

PETRAEUS: Well, in fact, I should note, first of all, that I had a very good conversation with President Karzai about this, about some statements, of course, that he’s made in recent days, and we’re going to have to work our way through this.

I would point everyone to -- and we sent you a copy, of course, of the joint press release -- again, put out by the Afghan and U.S. elements in Kabul yesterday after their initial investigating team came back, which clearly described the sequence of events that took place, with the Taliban moving into these villages, seeking to extort money from them, eventually killing three of the citizens in that area, then engaging the Afghan police who responded, which led to the governor of that province, Farah province, requesting help from the Afghan national army and coalition forces.

It was in that response that, of course, this very significant firefight broke out, battle, that ultimately resulted in the dropping of bombs which clearly killed Taliban and some civilians that it appears the Taliban forced to remain in houses from which the Taliban was engaging our forces.

Now, we are going to do a very thorough investigation of this. I’ve appointed a brigadier general with extensive experience in conventional and special operations who will go out to Afghanistan and look at it more broadly as well, to ensure that our forces are very well acquainted with in -- in carrying out the directives that General McKiernan has put out so that our tactical actions don’t undermine our strategic goals and objectives.

And that’s essentially the conversation that President Karzai and I had yesterday on this particular topic.

WALLACE: General, you also say that the Taliban is mounting a surge of its own to protect its safe havens in eastern Afghanistan. President Obama has announced that he’s going to send another 21,000 troops to the country.

Are you getting all the troops you need? And what kind of assurances are you getting from the president about his willingness to send more troops if necessary, his commitment to win in Afghanistan?

PETRAEUS: Well, I’d just state that every request for forces that -- that I’ve sent to the secretary of defense and that has gone to the president has been approved, and that carries all the requests through the course of this calendar year.

There are requests beyond that for which decisions don’t need to be made for a number of months, and I’m confident those decisions will be made at that point in time.

We have gone so far as to shift some forces that just -- we don’t have enough of in the inventory -- which, by the way, is why Secretary Gates’ budget addresses these kind of so-called enablers, the low- density, high-demand units -- to shift some of these from Iraq to Afghanistan, in fact, to ensure that -- that the infrastructure is established and that the kinds of forces that they need to enable this significant augmentation of our forces is made possible.

WALLACE: There is also growing violence in Iraq, amid signs that the Iraqi government is dropping some of the counterinsurgency tactics that you introduced into Iraq. Jobs programs in Sunni areas are -- are being ended. The Sunni “Awakening” -- these are Sunni forces that are fighting Sunni insurgents -- some of those units have not been paid for most of this year.

Are we giving back -- is the Iraqi government giving back some of the gains that we worked so hard to establish on the ground in Iraq?

PETRAEUS: Well, first of all, I don’t think it’s accurate to say that the “Sons of Iraq,” these Sunni “Awakening” forces, have not been paid this year. There is drama and emotion with every single payday, but the vast majority of these “Sons of Iraq” have been paid during the pay periods.

There’s another one ongoing right now. Inevitably, names are lost, mixed up, or what have you. But over time, we feel quite comfortable with what the Iraqi government has done in taking care of these “Sons of Iraq” and on taking them all now onto their payroll rather than being on ours.

The level of violence, actually, has been roughly about the same for the last five or six months, which is quite significant. It has averaged between 10 and 15 attacks per day for that period, which equates to a level of violence not seen since the late summer of 2003 before the insurgency and well before the militia activities accumulated that led to, at one time, 160 attacks per day in Iraq in June of 2007. What we have seen and what is troubling, certainly, has been the incidence of sensational attacks, if you will, high-casualty-causing attacks. Particularly, we saw these in Baghdad a few weeks ago.

That did prompt a number of attacks with Iraqi conventional and special operations forces, together with our forces, to go after the reemerging networks of Al Qaida.

We should expect that Al Qaida will continue to try to reestablish itself in Iraq, even as the focus of Al Qaida’s senior leadership appears to have shifted away somewhat from support of the activities in Iraq.

WALLACE: I’ve got a couple of...

PETRAEUS: But we will see this periodically. There will be periodic upticks in that regard.

WALLACE: If I may, sir, we’ve got a couple of more questions I want to ask you, and we’re beginning to run out of time.

I want to follow up on this last point, because all U.S. combat troops are supposed to be out of Iraqi cities by the end of June of this year.

But General Odierno, the head of U.S. forces in Iraq, now says that 20 percent of our combat forces are going to stay behind in Baghdad and Mosul past that deadline. Why is that, sir?

PETRAEUS: Well, what we are in the process of doing and have been doing is withdrawing the bases of our combat forces from Iraq cities and large towns. That process has been ongoing. It’s gone smoothly. We still do have some of those bases in Baghdad and Mosul, but we think that they will be out.

What General Odierno was talking about were liaison elements, adviser elements, organizations that partner with Iraqi forces in the support of them, not in the conduct of our combat operations.

So certainly, there will be a presence, but there will not be the combat forces based in those cities as we have had in the past, and that is in accordance with the security agreement.

WALLACE: Finally, General, and we have about a minute left, let’s turn, finally, to Iran.

President Obama has made several efforts to reach out to the Iranian regime. Whether it’s its nuclear program or arming our enemies in Iraq, do you see any signs on the ground that the Iranian regime is moderating its behavior?

PETRAEUS: Well, I think there’s probably been some small reduction in the assistance provided to Shia extremists in Iraq, although that continues, and again, it’s very difficult to measure because sometimes you have to have some event that precipitates something to be able to determine how much is ongoing. Beyond that, we’ll have to see as the weeks and months proceed. My deputy just accompanied Ambassador Ross in a swing through the region. There clearly -- enormous concern out there about Iranian rhetoric and actions, but we need to see how these diplomatic initiatives might be able to moderate and produce some openness and transparency in Iran, particularly with respect, of course, to its nuclear programs.

WALLACE: General Petraeus, we want to thank you for giving us a tour of all your responsibilities in that part of the world. Thank you for joining us, and please come back, sir.

PETRAEUS: Thank you, Chris.

Video and Transcript: Pakistan's Zardari and Afghanistan's Karzai on "Meet the Press" (10 May)

Days after their meetings with US officials, including President Obama, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai went through individual examinations on NBC's Meet the Press, hosted by David Gregory. We'll have analysis on Monday.

Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy

DAVID GREGORY: First, the presidents of Pakistan and Afghanistan.  I sat down with both leaders earlier this week after their White House meetings.  Pakistan's President Zardari, in office for the last eight months, is the widower of slain Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.  I began by asking about the Taliban and whether he agrees with the Obama administration that the group represents an existential threat to his country.

MR. ASIF ALI ZARDARI:  No, I consider the philosophy of Taliban as threat to the world, not just to Pakistan and your country, but I feel it's a larger threat.

MR. GREGORY:  Existential threat to Pakistan?

MR. ZARDARI:  Pakistan, the whole world.  They start from the Horn of Africa and come down all the way to Pakistan.  They don't evolve from Pakistan and go up, they come down.

MR. GREGORY:  Do you consider the Taliban to be a bigger threat today than India?

MR. ZARDARI:  I consider it a different--they're--India's a country and Pakistan is a, a...(unintelligible)...we're, we're two states which in fact Pakistan stemmed out of the subcontinent out of India.  So it's a different relationship, it's a different context.

MR. GREGORY:  Is there a war with the Taliban inside Pakistan?

MR. ZARDARI:  There is a war, sir.

MR. GREGORY:  And is it America's war or Pakistan's war?

MR. ZARDARI:  It's a war of our existence.  We've been fighting this war much before they attacked 9/11.  They're kind of a cancer created by both of us, Pakistan and America and the world.  We got together, we created this cancer to fight the superpower and then we went away--rather, you went away without finding a cure for it.  And now we've both come together to find a cure for it, and we're looking for one.

MR. GREGORY:  When you speak like that, it doesn't sound as if you consider it Pakistan's war, you consider it America's responsibility.

MR. ZARDARI:  No, I think it's a joint responsibility.  I think it's the joint responsibilities of all the democracies of the world.  That's why we made this Friends of Democratic Pakistan, so we can bring most strength to the situation.  You've got to admit that you all have been trying to battle it for the last eight years.  The--all the...(unintelligible)...world powers have been trying to battle it for the last eight years in Afghanistan and nobody's come out of victorious yet.

MR. GREGORY:  And so you say there is a commitment on the part of Pakistan to fight the Taliban now.  How many troops, how many Pakistani troops do you now have in the western part of your country battling the Taliban?

MR. ZARDARI:  Three times the amount of troops you have battling them in Afghanistan.  That's 125,000 we have on ground.

MR. GREGORY:  And yet the administration--you have a military force of roughly 660--650,000 men.

MR. ZARDARI:  Oh.

MR. GREGORY:  Has the administration said to you there should be more fighting men in the west?

MR. ZARDARI:  There is a point of view that more men might improve the situation, but that's something that's still disputed by our military analysts.  We don't think that more--presence of more troops there--you must remember, 650-personnel strong army doesn't mean they're all infantry.  That's the fighting brigade of the infantry, that's the teeth of the army.  So they're not all infantry.  They're tank drivers, they're truck drivers, they're other--gunners, etc., etc.  So we have an infantry of 250,000, out of which 125,000 happens to be in those mountains.

MR. GREGORY:  So you have a sufficient number of troops fighting the Taliban.

MR. ZARDARI:  We think, we think they're sufficient.

MR. GREGORY:  You appeared on Capitol Hill this week, and the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Howard Berman, said this, speaking of you.  He said, "He did not present a coherent strategy for the defeat of this insurgency.  I had a sense of what they're doing today," he said, "I did not have a sense of what they plan to do tomorrow." What's the strategy?

MR. ZARDARI:  So, well, he didn't even ask me, so that's OK.  But I'll tell you what I've got planned to do.  We, we've been loving...(unintelligible)...in, in America, my wife was loving, and we were of the view and always have been of the view that democracy is the answer to the problem.  Like somebody said, it may be--not be the best form of government, but it's the only form of government.  Now we've got democracy.  Democracy needs help.  It needs a little more help than we've been getting in the past. What the American public and people at large do not understand is for 10 years you have given $10 billion to a dictator, but you've given them for the war in these mountains.  So it's actually reimbursement for the money spent; after all, 125,000 troops moving in logistically, otherwise do cost.  So you've been paying back...(unintelligible)...into Pakistan for the expenses occurred as such.  But we need to support democracy.

MR. GREGORY:  Mm-hmm.

MR. ZARDARI:  We need to support the country, we need support--we need to support the systems.  And we've been involved for the last 30 years.  It's not 10 years.

MR. GREGORY:  But is that a strategy for cracking down on the Taliban insurgency?

MR. ZARDARI:  Sure it is.  Sure it is.  The stronger my institutions are, the more the youth I employ, the less fodder they have.  The more poverty goes down, the less fodder they have to recruit from.  That's the strategy.  What else can--what--there is no scientific theorem to that.  And if there was one, if you had a strategy, you would've done it in a, in 10 years.

MR. GREGORY:  But there's a military question, which is, is Pakistan capable of dealing with an insurgency, capable of mounting an effective counterinsurgency when the orientation of your military's primarily been to fight a big enemy to the east in India, predicated on the idea of some kind of deterrence?  Are you able to mount a counterinsurgency strategy at this point?

MR. ZARDARI:  Sir, we've been in this war for the last seven years.  But if you see the record of the one year that the democratic government of Pakistan, the PPP government and its allies has been there, we've done more to damage the infrastructure of the Talibans or the--or these miscreants, whatever you need to call them, than ever before.

MR. GREGORY:  And yet there are some who say that the strategy has not borne fruit.  You went in--so people understand, you went into an area north of Islamabad, the Swat Valley, and you essentially made a deal with the Taliban, which is they would put down their arms if Islamic law could be applied, could be implemented there.

MR. ZARDARI:  Incorrect.

MR. GREGORY:  Incorrect.  Tell me what's correct.

MR. ZARDARI:  The correct position is that we came up with the formula which was that there would be speedy justice there known as...(foreign language spoken).  Nothing to do with Sharia law.  It's been interpreted by--as Sharia law by them.  And then that didn't work.  But we had to get the population to be with us.  The population was fed up with them and was fed up with the fighting.  Some--the provincial government came up with this idea that let's go for a peace deal and let's get the people involved.  They tried it.  It hasn't worked.

MR. GREGORY:  But when you made this deal, when you actually signed this deal...

MR. ZARDARI:  The parliament signed on this deal.  The parliament recommended me--to me to sign.

MR. GREGORY:  Were you against it?

MR. ZARDARI:  I was--yes, I had a position against it.

MR. GREGORY:  Right.  Why?  Why did you think it was misguided?

MR. ZARDARI:  I thought that it won't work.

MR. GREGORY:  You think it was abdication to the Taliban?

MR. ZARDARI:  No, it's not abdication.  I thought that the Talibans are not rational people.  I don't think there's any good Talibans.  The world does, so that's a defensive opinion.

MR. GREGORY:  But so you think there's no negotiating with them.

MR. ZARDARI:  I don't think there should be a negotiating with them at the moment.  Maybe one day when there is enough, we've done enough.

MR. GREGORY:  Mm-hmm.

MR. ZARDARI:  Then always--there cannot only, only be war.  There has to be a--the parliament has come up with a strategy where there's the three D's: dialogue, deterrence and development.  So we have to go into dialogue by the will of the people, which we did.  It didn't work.  Now we've got to do the, the deterrence phase where we are fighting.  And then once we've calmed the situation down in--then we'll go to the development stage to give them the ownership, give them schools.

MR. GREGORY:  You have the fighting that's going on in Swat.  You have the Taliban insurgency there.  That insurgency has also spread into Punjab, to the state of Punjab.  I don't have to tell you, that's where half of Pakistan's population is.  And it has lead to some dire assessments by analysts who look at your country with a critical eye, including a former adviser to General David Petraeus who helped him with the insurgency in Iraq, and he said this: "We're now reaching the point where within one to six months we could see the collapse of the Pakistani state," because the Taliban insurgency has so destabilized Pakistan.  Does he have that right?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think you--he's had other positions wrong before, so--and having said that, we have a threat, yes.  Is the state of Pakistan going to collapse?  No.  We are 180 million people.  The population is much, much more than the, the insurgents are.  But we do have a problem.  We have a problem because it's been there.  It was like I said, it was a monster created by all, all of us.  We got together and we didn't--we forgot to make a cure for it.

MR. GREGORY:  Can you survive politically?

MR. ZARDARI:  Of course.

MR. GREGORY:  Is it possible to defeat this insurgency without U.S. soldiers fighting by your side or at least training your soldiers in Pakistan?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think we need to find a strategy where the world gets together against this threat, because it's not Pakistan specific, it's not Afghanistan specific.  Like I said, it's all the way from the Horn of Africa. You've had attacks in Spain, you've had attacks in Britain, you've had attacks in America, you've had attacks in Africa, Saudi Arabia.  So I think the world needs to understand that this is the new challenge of the 21st century and this is the new war, and we've all got together.

MR. GREGORY:  The question a lot of people ask is are you--is Pakistan really committed to that war?  In The New York Times Dexter Filkins, who, who's reported from Afghanistan and Pakistan, writes this:  "Whose side is Pakistan really on?  ...  Little in Pakistan is what it appears.  For years, the survival of Pakistan's military and civilian leaders has depended on a double game:  assuring the United States that they were vigorously repressing Islamic militants--and in some cases actually doing so--while simultaneously tolerating and assisting the same militants.  From the anti-Soviet fighters of the 1980s and the Taliban of the 1990s to the homegrown militants of today, Pakistan's leaders have been both public enemies and private friends.  When the game works, it reaps great rewards:  billions in aid to boost the Pakistani economy and military and Islamist proxies to extend the government's reach into Afghanistan and India."

MR. ZARDARI:  I think it's an old concept, an old theory that he's talking about.  And what billions are you talking about?  Like I said, a billion dollar a year?  That's not even--altogether, this aid package is not even one tenth of what you gave AIG.  So let's face it; we need, in fact, much more help.  We are responsible, a responsible state.  We've brought democracy back, it's a young democracy.  Accept it, it was not me who was aiding the dictators of the past.

MR. GREGORY:  Is there a view, however, in Pakistan that the Taliban should be kept around for a rainy day, as it's been said, as a bulwark against Indian influence in neighboring Afghanistan?

MR. ZARDARI:  I don't think so.  I don't think so.

MR. GREGORY:  You don't think that was part of the past at all?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think in--it was part of your past and our past, and the ISI and the CIA created them together.  And I can find you 10 books and 10 philosophers and 10 write-ups on that, of what all you didn't do.

MR. GREGORY:  Fair argument, certainly, a lot of people would agree with you. But did the game change after 9/11 to a point where the U.S. decided to root out this threat and Pakistan was straddling both sides?

MR. ZARDARI:  You tell me.  I was imprisoned by the same dictator you were supporting.  You were supporting a dictator who...

MR. GREGORY:  You're speaking of General Musharraf.

MR. ZARDARI:  I'm speaking of General Musharraf.  In fact, I lost my wife on his watch and I has--I spent five years in his prison.

MR. GREGORY:  But, Mr. President, you know well that there is a widespread belief that your military and your intelligence services still have these same sympathies for the Taliban.

MR. ZARDARI:  I wouldn't agree with you.  I think General Musharraf may have had a mind-set that I--to run with the head and hunt with the hound.  But certainly not on our watch.  We don't have that thought process at all.

MR. GREGORY:  Let me ask you about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.  There's been a question about the security of that arsenal.  You've assured the world that those nuclear weapons are secure.  But I wonder why you're continuing to add to your stockpile, add to your arsenal at what is described as a pretty fast rate when there's so much instability in the country?

MR. ZARDARI:  That's, that's, that's not a fact.  It's a, it's a position that some people have taken.  We, we're not adding to our stockpile as such. Why do we need more?

MR. GREGORY:  So you're not adding to your nuclear arsenal at all?

MR. ZARDARI:  I don't think so, no.

MR. GREGORY:  You don't--do you know?

MR. ZARDARI:  Even if I did, I wasn't going to tell you.

MR. GREGORY:  There is a view that--in the intelligence community in this country that it does not know where all the nuclear weapons are within Pakistan.  Why not share that information so there could be a joint strategy to keep those weapons secure?

MR. ZARDARI:  Why don't you do the same with other countries yourself?  I think it's a sovereignty issue and we have a right to our own sovereignty. It's a sovereign country.

MR. GREGORY:  Who's in control of Pakistan, you or the military?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think the military is in control of their hemisphere and I'm in control of the whole country.

MR. GREGORY:  Can they overrule you?

MR. ZARDARI:  No.  I can overrule them.

MR. GREGORY:  Haven't they overruled you in the past?

MR. ZARDARI:  No.  We've gone to their position and they've come to our positions.

MR. GREGORY:  But you still have final say?

MR. ZARDARI:  The parliament has final say.  It's the parliament that forms government, and I am a product of the parliament.

MR. GREGORY:  But why is it when you wanted your intelligence chief to go to Mumbai you were overruled by your military?

MR. ZARDARI:  No, it was not overruled by the military.  They thought it was too, too soon.  And eventually we've offered for the intelligence chief to meet.

MR. GREGORY:  There's a lot of discussion about additional aid, as you've been talking about throughout our conversation, for Pakistan, $1.5 billion for five years, a total of $7.5 billion.  But as you know, there's discussion about putting some strings, some limits on that aid based on performance by Pakistan.  Do you disagree with that policy?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think it's doubting an ally before you go into action together.  If we are allies--and we, and we understand, it's an accepted position that you--we cannot work this problem out unless Pakistan, Afghanistan and America are on the same page.  How do you go and take an ally along by saying, "OK, I don't trust you," from the first day?  It's not a, a good position to be in.  So I feel that we shouldn't have any, any kind of conditionalities.  We should have a result, a result-oriented relationship where I should be given a time line and I'll give you all a time line so we can both give each other time lines and meet the time lines on, on the, on, on the positive.

MR. GREGORY:  In terms of U.S.-Pakikstani cooperation, there are drones that fire missiles and target Taliban and other extremists, al-Qaeda figures, within Pakistan.  Do you consider those to be effective?

MR. ZARDARI:  I would consider them to be very effective if they were part of my arsenal.  I've been asking for them, but I haven't got a positive answer as yet.  But I'm not giving up.

MR. GREGORY:  Where is Osama bin Laden?

MR. ZARDARI:  You all have been there for eight years, you tell me.  You lost him in Tora Bora, I didn't.  I was in prison.  In fact, my wife warned America about Osama bin Laden in '89.  She rung up senior Bush and asked, asked of him, "Are you destabilizing my government?" Because he paid the then opposition $10 million to do--overthrow the first woman elected in Islamic country.  So we knew that he was your operator.  And...

MR. GREGORY:  But you're not actively looking for him?

MR. ZARDARI:  I think the world is looking for him, and we are part of the world's lookout brigade.

MR. GREGORY:  Do you think he's alive or dead?

MR. ZARDARI:  I've said before that he--I don't think he's alive.

MR. GREGORY:  And you believe that.

MR. ZARDARI:  I have a strong feeling and I have sole reason to believe that, because I've asked my counterparts in the American intelligence agencies and they haven't heard of him since seven years.

MR. GREGORY:  Mr. President, thank you very much for your views and good luck with your work.

MR. ZARDARI:  Thank you, sir.

MR. GREGORY:  Coming next, seven years after 9/11 and the war rages on with the insurgent Taliban still controlling parts of Afghanistan.  Can the government regain control?  And the tough issue of civilian casualties due to U.S. air strikes.  Some harsh words from President Hamid Karzai.  Our exclusive interview from earlier this week is next.

(Announcements)

MR. GREGORY:  Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai after this brief commercial break.

(Announcements)

MR. GREGORY:  Mr. President, welcome back to MEET THE PRESS.

MR. HAMID KARZAI:  Happy to be here.

MR. GREGORY:  President Obama talked about the deterioration in Afghanistan during a speech back in March.  This is what he said.

(Videotape, March 27, 2009)

PRES. OBAMA:  The situation is increasingly perilous.  It's been more than seven years since the Taliban was removed from power, yet war rages on. Insurgents control parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Attacks against our troops, our NATO allies and the Afghan government have ridden--risen steadily. And most painfully, 2008 was the deadliest year of the war for American forces.

(End videotape)

MR. GREGORY:  So here we are seven years after the attacks of September 11th, 2001.  Another American president is committing troops to Afghanistan, 21,000 additional troops.  By this summer there'll be 68,000 U.S. troops.  My question:  Is it too little, too late?

MR. KARZAI:  Well, a very important question, indeed.  When we began in 2001 with the arrival of the international community in Afghanistan and the two--the Afghan people and the international community joining hands, we together defeated the Taliban and the terrorists and al-Qaeda in less than a month and a half.  Subsequent to that the Afghan people would, as we established the interim government, would come in large numbers, hundreds of them, to my office and ask for more international forces in the country, in their villages, in their towns, in their districts.  That didn't happen at that time.  So in that sense, the arrival of more forces is late.  It should've happened then, six years ago, and we should've paid attention then, six years ago, to the sanctuaries, to the training grounds, to the--those financing the terrorists.  It's a bit late.  But as we all know, it's never too late for a good thing to do.

MR. GREGORY:  With 21,000 additional troops, there's a question of what can be gained.  But the issue of civilian casualties as a result of U.S. air strikes, how much damage does that do to the U.S. effort?

MR. KARZAI:  A lot of damage.  This is something that I've been engaged with with our allies for at least six years now.

MR. GREGORY:  And you talked to President Obama about it.

MR. KARZAI:  Oh, very, very much.  For as least six years now, in different ways and different forms.  The Afghan people are allies of the United States. The Afghan people want this effort together to succeed.  The Afghan people see that the presence of the international community in Afghanistan brings us plenty of good things.  But Afghan people also want to have their children safe.  The Afghan people say we are fighting together with you, shoulder to shoulder against terrorism, that we are part of the struggle; that we are not--our homes, our villages are not places for terrorism and that they should be safe.  It's an important thing that America recognize that civilian casualties are the biggest concern of Afghanistan and a damage to the effort against terrorists.

MR. GREGORY:  When President Obama addressed the American people and announced more troops going to your country, he raised a very important question, which is what is America's purpose...

MR. KARZAI:  Mm-hmm.

MR. GREGORY:  ...in Afghanistan?  Dexter Filkins, veteran war correspondent, has covered Afghanistan and Pakistan thoroughly for The New York Times, writes in the current edition of The New Republic this, and he starts with a question:  "What can be won in Afghanistan?  Driving around the country, as I did recently, one is constantly overwhelmed by how little has been accomplished there.  In December 2001, the country lay in ruins.  Today, it is still pretty much the same place.  ...  Today, Taliban fighters move freely across the countryside, and in some places they have set up a shadow government.  ...  After eight years of neglect, the Afghanistan state is a weak and pathetic thing." Pretty strong words.  Why is that the case?

MR. KARZAI:  Very wrong words.

MR. GREGORY:  Wrong.  You say it's wrong.

MR. KARZAI:  Very wrong words.  Pretty strong, wrong words.  It isn't like that.  In 2001, Afghanistan did not have a single kilometer of paved road. Today Afghanistan has its ring road completed, nearly 3,000 kilometers and above.  Today we have many of the roads in the cities paved.  Today we have health services, which were only to about 9 percent of the Afghan population in 2002, reaching nearly 85 percent and over of the Afghan population.  The rural developing program of Afghanistan goes to more than half of Afghanistan's 40,000 villages.  In 2002, we had 4,000 students in Afghanistan universities and only three or four universities.  Today we have 75,000 students in Afghan universities, 14 public universities and, and many private universities.  In 2002, the 4,000 students that we had were all boys, men. Today, nearly 40 percent are girls of the 75,000.  Today we have thousands of Afghans studying abroad, at least 1,000 each year in India and hundreds in Europe and America.  We have experts return to Afghanistan.  I met with them three months ago.  The country is a lot better.

MR. GREGORY:  Back in 2003, this is what you said about the Taliban.  They were the ones who provided safe haven to al-Qaeda, these are the people that threatened both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  This is what you said back in June of 2003:  "I am not worried about the resurgence of the Taliban.  The Taliban movement as a movement is finished and is gone." Were you wrong about that?

MR. KARZAI:  I was not wrong about that.

MR. GREGORY:  But they're back.

MR. KARZAI:  I was, I--no.  It's--there's a difference.  The Taliban as a movement is gone from ruling Afghanistan.  They were the government in Afghanistan.  In 2001 they were the government.  Today they are not the government.  In 2002 they were threatening you.  Today they are not, from Afghanistan.  Yes, they are a threat in the form of the terrorism that they bring upon us, in the form of the violence that they bring upon us; not as an organized political force holding the government in Afghanistan.  That's not there.

MR. GREGORY:  Are they an existential threat to your leadership?

MR. KARZAI:  They're not an existential threat to Afghanistan's government. They are a threat to our, to our efforts towards more security, more progress, more reconstruction and a more peaceful life.  That threat they definitely are, and especially in parts of the country.  That's strongly there, yes.

MR. GREGORY:  The new administration has a slightly different strategy for trying to deal with the Taliban, and it has to do with operations on a tactical level, similar to what was done in Iraq, to try to turn some of these what might be called irreconcilables and bring them into the American fold.

MR. KARZAI:  Mm-hmm.

MR. GREGORY:  This is how the president described it back in that March speech.

(Videotape, March 27, 2009)

PRES. OBAMA:  There is an uncompromising core of the Taliban.  They must be met with force and they must be defeated.  But there are also those who've taken up arms because of coercion or simply for a price.  These Afghans must have the option to choose a different course.  And that's why we will work with local leaders, the Afghan government and international partners to have a reconciliation process in every province.

(End videotape)

MR. GREGORY:  Now, you have called that reconciliation process...

MR. KARZAI:  Yes.

MR. GREGORY:  ...unworkable.  Why do you believe that?

MR. KARZAI:  No.  I, I didn't call the reconciliation process unworkable. And by the way, I agree with President Obama's description of the elements of peacemaking with the Taliban.  Those Taliban who have been driven out of the country by fear or coercion or intimidation by our forces or the international forces, or by whatever other circumstances that they've found themselves compelled to leave the country and take guns against us are the ones that we want to reconcile with.  They are the sons of the soil, they must return.  To be very precise, those of the Taliban who are part of al-Qaeda or other terrorist networks, or those who are in the grip of, you know, intelligence services must not and cannot come to Afghanistan because they will continue to bring violence and destruction and, and, and damage to Afghanistan.  But those who have been driven out of fear or the other circumstances that I described earlier are welcome.  They're the sons of our soil, they're from our country and we want to reconcile with them.  And that's what President Obama was referring to.  What I was objecting to was the international forces directly engaging at local level with the Taliban commanders for reconciliation.  That is the job of the Afghan government.

MR. GREGORY:  Speaking about the Taliban and the defeat of the Taliban and al-Qaeda generally, do you have more confidence today in Pakistan's commitment to fighting and defeating the Taliban than you did under General Musharraf?

MR. KARZAI:  Definitely more, yes.  Definitely there is a recognition the Pakistani leadership and the democratically-elected leadership.  They see very much the same way things that, that, that--as we see; therefore, we have a lot more confidence there.  We had a very good meeting in Washington.  I hope that this will be taken into further steps, meaning implementation on the ground. I'm a lot more confident and a lot more hopeful.

MR. GREGORY:  You are running for re-election, and as you campaign you've had some pretty pointed messages.  You're critical of the United States for civilian casualties as a result of U.S. air raids.  You also were at a rally recently during which you were very clear and you said, "Look, I have made certain demands of the Americans, and if they do not provide additional aircraft, for instance, I'll go somewhere else and I'll get it." You appeared to threaten the administration, and I wonder whether your core political message is an anti-American message.

MR. KARZAI:  It is not.  It is very much a pro-American message.  So the Afghans do want this relationship with America to continue, but of course Afghanistan has a character of its own and an interest of its own and a demand upon our allies as well.  We are, we are your front line in the war on terrorism.  The Afghan people have given everything on a daily basis in the war on terrorism.  We have our police dying every day, at least five, six of them.  Our security forces...(unintelligible)...people.  Our villages are not where the terrorists are.  And that's what we kept telling the U.S. administration, that the war on terrorism is not in the Afghan villages, not in the Afghan homes.  Respect that.  Civilian casualties are undermining support in the Afghan people for the war on terrorism and for the, the, the relations with America.  How can you expect a people who keep losing their children to remain friendly?

MR. GREGORY:  And yet...

MR. KARZAI:  And, and, and that's a moral question as well.  We have to be morally on a much higher platform in our force to win the war on terrorism.

MR. GREGORY:  And do you worry, do you worry that the U.S. has not met that standard?

MR. KARZAI:  The U.S. has...

MR. GREGORY:  Have they not met their own moral standard?

MR. KARZAI:  The U.S., the U.S., the U.S. has not met that standard in Afghanistan.  The United States must stand on a much higher moral platform in order for us together to win this war.

MR. GREGORY:  Let me be clear about what you are saying.  Are you suggesting that the United States is waging an immoral war in Afghanistan?

MR. KARZAI:  No.  No.  It's not immoral war, it's the standard of morality that we are seeking which is also one that is being desired and spoken about in America.  In other words, are we the same as the terrorists, are we the same as the bad guys, or are we standing on a much higher moral, moral platform?  Are we better human beings or not?  We must definitely be better human beings in order for us to tell the people that, "Look, those guys are wrong and we are better." And we must show that in our practice, and that practice should be extreme care for civilians and their children and their homes and, and, for the civilians to see us completely distinct and separate from the terrorists.  So we have to be better.  My moral, moral platform has to be a lot higher, a lot more distinct and likeable than the terrorists and the bad guys.  That's what separates us.  Otherwise there'll be no difference, so why should the people care about us or--and not care about them?  Do you get my point?

MR. GREGORY:  And yet Secretary of Defense Gates has made the point that there has to be sustained commitment on the part of the Afghan people and the Afghan government.

MR. KARZAI:  And there is.

MR. GREGORY:  He says this:  "It's absolutely critical that the Afghans believe that this is their war.  it is their war against people who are trying to overthrow their government that they democratically elected." Do you think that's the view of your people?

MR. KARZAI:  That is absolutely the view of our people.  And that's why our people, even when they are bombed, even when they suffer, they still come to us.  They receive me in their midst when I go to, to offer my condolences. They receive the American soldiers, they receive the American officers when a, when an incident like that.  In Farah there was an incident of massive civilian casualties, and the U.S. military officials and the Afghan government went together to the population.  That means the people are still with us.  Had they been against us, they would have not received us, they would have not come to us.  But then, there is a limit to all of that.  Any society will, will, will get fed up with, with, with continued violence and continued casualties.  That is something very, very serious.  And I, and I have conveyed this to my friends in America in all humility and friendship, on behalf of the Afghan people, that Afghans are a straightforward, honest allies, believing in the cause that we have undertaken, and that's why we were able to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in less than a month and a half.  And if you continue to behave the way we are, we will lose that.  And that's, and that's a correct thing to do.

MR. GREGORY:  Before you go, just a couple of other issues.  One of the big issues fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan is the poppy crop, opium.  This is what you said on this program back in 2004.

(Videotape, June 13, 2004)

MR. KARZAI:  This production of, of, of poppies supports terrorism.  It criminalizes the economy.  It undermines institution building in Afghanistan. Afghanistan will have to destroy it for the sake of the Afghan people and also because of...(unintelligible).  We will succeed because we have to succeed.

(End of videotape)

MR. GREGORY:  And yet today 60 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product is poppy, it is opium.  It accounts for 93 percent of the world's production of opium.  That's not a very strong record.

MR. KARZAI:  It isn't, it isn't like that today.  When I was speaking, was it 2004, we had only--well, in 2005 we had only three provinces free of poppies in Afghanistan.  Today we have 22 provinces free of poppies in Afghanistan, either completely or mostly, you know, to, to a bigger extent.  Only one province in the country is producing poppies to the quantity that it can make 60 percent of Afghanistan's exports.  So Afghanistan has made progress in, in, in, in reducing poppies in Afghanistan, in eradicating and removing it from, from our, our culture.  But the money that is spent to eradicate poppies and to provide it with alternative livelihoods is something that we have a question about with our allies.

MR. GREGORY:  Finally, this spring you signed a law that makes it legal for Afghan men to rape their wives.  Now, you have said in the past month that you were reviewing that law.  Are you going to repeal it?

MR. KARZAI:  It has been reviewed.  When--there's so much that I can talk about in response to what is there.  It is not exactly as, as is printed in the, in the, in parts of the world media.  But when I heard of this, I called the minister of justice and he told me that there were problems in this law and that it will be--then I instructed the review and amendment of the law.  I called in the clergy in the country, the senior most who, who had a hand in drafting this law, and they'd redo the...(unintelligible)...amend it and redraft it, and even parts of the law removed.  I've already done that.  The minister of justice was with me about 10 days ago to give me the amended law that will be sent to the parliament.  So it's something that we have to do.

MR. GREGORY:  Right.

MR. KARZAI:  And we have to correct it, regardless of whether it's...

MR. GREGORY:  So how--just to be clear then, how are you correcting it?  What is permissible behavior?

MR. KARZAI:  But it's, it's, it's, it's--well, it's, it's, it's the--it's not my choice.  It has to go through a legal process and consultation and back to the parliament.  We are a democratic country.  We have a parliament that, that passes laws like that, that debates them and then sends them back to the concerned lobbies.

MR. GREGORY:  But, but are basic human rights part of your democratic values?

MR. KARZAI:  Absolutely.  Oh, absolutely.  Absolutely.

MR. GREGORY:  So, so raping of women is a crime in Afghanistan and will be a crime?

MR. KARZAI:  Absolutely.  Absolutely.  A crime in Afghanistan, because our religion is extremely, extremely difficult on that.

MR. GREGORY:  So this particular area, the, the ability to rape your wife is something that will be repealed.

MR. KARZAI:  Rape has, rape has...

MR. GREGORY:  Is that--are you saying that unequivocally?

MR. KARZAI:  It is not, it is not in the law.  This--it's not in these very sharp words that are described in the Western media.  Even if it is milder than that, it is wrong and it will be repealed, it will be removed and the amendment will be made in this law.  So the Afghan people don't want that and the Afghan people are sensitive about it.  I assure you that has been done.

MR. GREGORY:  Right.

MR. KARZAI:  It's something that really embarrassed us when it came out.  We are a lot more aware a nation, a lot more culturally good nation than sometimes we are seen in, in, in the rest of the world.

MR. GREGORY:  So in democratic Afghanistan it is illegal for a man to rape his wife?

MR. KARZAI:  Absolutely.  Absolutely.  Like hell.  Sure.

MR. GREGORY:  All right, Mr. President, thank you very much.  Good luck with your important work.

MR. KARZAI:  Thank you.