Pot-Kettle-Black Moment of the Day: Karl Rove on "Credibility" and Torture

Karl Rove, The Washington Post, 21 May 2009: "The kerfluffle over House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's CIA briefing on enhanced interrogation matters a lot. First, there's the question of credibility."

The Question of Credibility: Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Link to 9-11. The Suspended Hunt for Osama bin Laden. Federal Budget Deficits. The Firing of Justice Department Prosecutors on Political Grounds. Katrina.

George W. Bush, 7 November 2005: "We do not torture."

Keeping Guantanamo Open: Will Obama Give Way?

A Gut Reaction to the Obama National Security Speech: Getting Stuck in A “Long War”
The Great Congressional Bailout: Guantanamo (Part 2 — Dan Froomkin)
Related Post: The Great Congressional Bailout - Guantanamo (Part 1 — The Daily Show)

President Obama will make an important, possibly defining, statement on the future of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility today. It will define not only whether Obama will stick to his January promise to close the prison within 12 months but also whether he will be politically caged --- not only on Gitmo but on other "national security" and foreign policy issues --- by Congress, the media, and the Bushttp://enduringamerica.com/wp-admin/post.php?action=edit&post=9804#edit_timestamphmen/Bushwomen and those who still support them.

Obama's plan was challenged from Day 1, when dissidents within the Pentagon leaked claims to the media that ex-Gitmo detainees had returned to terrorism. Those numbers were never established, but the seeds were planted. If the Administration could not offer a plan with cast-iron guarantees that no one released from Guantanmo would threaten "America", then the closure would be blocked.

The latest --- and most significant --- blow for Guantanamo's continued existence came this week, and it was thrown by Obama's own party. Democratic Congressional leaders withdrew the proposal for $80 milliino to begin implementation of closure, until the Administration offered more defined plans for the handling of ex-detainees. While those leaders kept the option of reinstating the funds open, the political signal --- accompanied by rhetoric, fed by Obama's own Attorney General, that no "terrorist" would ever be released on US soil --- was clear.

There are a lot of mundane realities behind the Administration's difficulties. It could not release many of the detainees to their home countries, who would not take them or could subject them to further abusive detention, and it was unable to get the commitment from "third countries" to take 60 of the most difficult cases. Most importantly, it could not come up with a legally and politically acceptable plan to process the detainees through the US criminal courts.

However, it is in dramatic headlines, rather than complex details, that Guantanamo --- and Obama's position --- will be framed. And today the propaganda campaign within the Executive Branch comes full circle. "Two Administration officials" have fed The New York Times, a reliable channel for such information and mis-information, "an unreleased Pentagon report [that] concludes that about one in seven of the 534 prisoners already transferred abroad...has returned to terrorism or militant activity".

This is the same Pentagon "study" that was first floated at the end of 2008, with the allegation of 61 recidivists, and then re-presented in January. That study was roundly thumped by analysts who noted the lack of supporting evidence, and the leaking officials went quiet while Obama held the upper hand in the publicity fight over Guantanamo and torture.

There is no further substance offered in today's article, just the assurance that "a copy of [the report] was made available to The New York Times". Reporter Elisabeth Bumiller, backtracking from the headline "1 in 7 Freed Detainees Rejoins Fight, Report Finds", puts the caveat 2/3 of the way down the article:

The Pentagon has provided no way of authenticating its 45 unnamed recidivists, and only a few of the 29 people identified by name can be independently verified as having engaged in terrorism since their release. Many of the 29 are simply described as associating with terrorists or training with terrorists, with almost no other details provided.

There is also the context, at the foot of the story, that "terrorism experts said a 14 percent recidivism rate was far lower than the rate for prisoners in the United States, which, they said, can run as high as 68 percent three years after release".

No matter. The leaking official cutely and cleverly tells Bumiller, "The report was made available...[because] the delay in releasing it was creating unnecessary 'conspiracy theories' about the holdup." It's cute and clever, because any Washington official with more than two weeks' experience knows how the report's unsupported but sensational "1 in 7" claim would be handled. So, with the pretence that he/she is only protecting the public from "conspiracy theories" about the pro-Guantanamo and anti-Obama propaganda, the official leaks that propaganda.

Beyond all the scheming is the significance of the political challenge. In January, when this battle began, it was a minor annoyance to Obama. Now it is a test of his ability to hold a declared position. The President has already flipped twice in recent days on the release of detainee photographs and on military tribunals; this would be a third-time denial both of legal rights and of his authority.

As George W. Bush might have phrased it, Obama's opponents have been chanting, "Bring it on." Today may indicate whether whether Obama will "bring it back" or give way, on this issue and those to come.

Text: The EastWest Institute (US-Russian) Report on "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential"

For more than a year, US and Russian scientists and other experts supported by The EastWest Institute have been studying US-Russian relations and Iran's weapons programmes. Their report, released this week, recommends the suspension of plans for missile defence and pursuit of a diplomatic route, both in the United Nations and directly with Iran, on the nuclear issue.

Recommendations

5.10 This report has concluded that there is at present no IRBM/ICBM [intermediate-range/inter-continental ballistic missile] threat from Iran and that such a threat, even if it were to emerge, is not imminent. Moreover, if such a threat were forthcoming, the proposed European missile defenses would not provide a dependable defense against it. It does not make sense, therefore, to proceed with deployment of the European missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

5.11 The more immediate danger comes from the military and political consequences that would follow if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them against targets in the Middle East. The urgent task, therefore, is for Russia and the United States (and other states) to work closely together to seek, by diplomatic and political means, a resolution of the crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear program. Such cooperation could be helped if the issue of European
missile defense were set aside.

5.12 If deployment of the European missile defense system were suspended, the United States and Russia could
explore in a serious fashion the possibility of cooperation in ballistic missile defense, an issue also mentioned in
the joint statement of the two presidents. A wide range of options could be explored, including the possibility
of boost-phase missile defense. (See the Technical Addendum for a detailed discussion.)

5.13 There is scope for U.S.-Russian cooperation in thefollowing areas:

a. Ensuring that the sanctions the Security Council has imposed on Iran are implemented strictly;
b. Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and in particular the IAEA’s capacity to implement safeguards and enhance its verification procedures;
c. Strengthening the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] in order to restrict further the export of sensitive missile technologies;
d. Persuading Iran, by diplomatic means, to adopt measures that will reassure its neighbors (and the international community more generally) that its nuclear program is directed solely toward peaceful purposes.
e. Exploring the responses the two countries could take if Iran should expel the IAEA inspectors; and studying other paths by which Iran might seek to “break out” as a nuclear power and devising appropriate responses.
f. Investigating seriously the possibility of cooperation in missile defense.

5.14 The issues dealt with in this report — the potential nuclear-missile challenge from Iran and the role of missile defense in meeting that challenge — have in the past served to worsen U.S.-Russian relations. The analysis given in this paper points to a diff erent possibility: that cooperation between the two countries could help to resolve these important and urgent issues and could play a role in changing the U.S.-Russian relationship for the better.

Text: The Latest CIA Report on Iran's Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programmes

Every year, the US Director of National Intelligence is required by law to submit to Congress a report on "the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions".

This is the section of the full report, submitted earlier this month, concerning Iran:

I. Acquisition by Country

As required by Section 721 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 31 December 2008. This report focuses on key countries that we assess are seeking WMD capabilities.

Iran

Nuclear

We assess that Iran had been working to develop nuclear weapons through at least fall 2003, but that in fall 2003 Iran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities, and its covert uranium conversion- and enrichment-related activities. We judge that the halt lasted at least several years, and that Tehran had not resumed these activities as of at least mid-2007. We do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, although we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons by continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.

During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure and continued uranium enrichment and activities related to its heavy water research reactor, despite multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions since late 2006 calling for the suspension of those activities.

• In 2008, Iran continued to make progress enriching uranium at the underground cascade halls at Natanz with first-generation centrifuges, and in testing and operating second-generation centrifuges at the pilot plant there.

• In November 2008, Iran announced it had about 5,000 centrifuges operating at Natanz. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that between mid-December 2007 and November 2008, Iran fed about 8,080 kilograms of uranium
feed gas into its cascades, and produced about 555 kilograms of low enriched uranium (LEU) gas (uranium hexafluoride) at an enrichment level appropriate for reactor fuel, a significant improvement from the 75 kilograms of LEU gas it had produced in 2007.

• Iran has also fed small amounts of uranium feed gas to its second generationcentrifuges—the IR-2, since January 2008, and the IR-3, since April 2008.

• Iran in January 2008 received the final delivery of the initial batch of uranium fuel purchased from Russia required to operate the nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Delays in the project pushed the reactor's startup time into 2009.

• Iran in 2008 continued construction of the reactor buildings at the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor, including installing a dome on the reactor containment building by mid-November.

• The IAEA in 2008 continued to investigate the "alleged studies" documentation — information indicating Iran conducted military-led, covert uranium conversion and nuclear weaponization work prior to 2003. According to the November 2008 Director General's Report to the Board of Governors, the "alleged studies" issue remains unresolved and the IAEA continues to call on Iran to provide further clarification.

Ballistic Missiles

Iran has continued to develop its ballistic missile program, which it views as its primary deterrent. Iran is fielding increased numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs) and we judge that Iran currently is focusing on producing more capable MRBMs. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is one of the largest in the Middle East.

The Shahab-3 MRBM, capable of striking Israel, was formally handed over to the Iranian military in July 2003. During a military parade in September 2007, Iran displayed a missile, referred to as the Ghadr-1, which Iranian officials claimed had a range of 1,800-km.

Iran's defense ministry in 2005 stated that it had successfully tested an engine for a 2,000km ballistic missile and implied it would have two-stages~a key technology in the development of longer-range ballistic missiles. In late November 2007, Iran's defense minister claimed Iran had developed a new 2000 km-range missile called the Ashura. Iranian officials on 12 November 2008 claimed to have launched a two stage, solid propellant missile called the Sejil with a range of 2,000 km.

As early as 2005, Iran has stated its intentions to send its own satellites into orbit. In 2005, Iran's first satellite with an imagery payload, Sina-1, was launched on a Russian rocket, and Iran signed a $132 million deal with a Russian firm to build and launch a communications satellite. As of January 2008, Tehran reportedly had allocated $250 million to build and purchase satellites. Iran announced it would launch four more satellites by 2010 to improve land and mobile telephone communications.

Iranian officials, including President Ahmadi-Nejad, claimed that Tehran in February 2008 launched a probe called the Kavoshgar ("towards orbit") and that this device is transmitting information back to Earth. Based on Iranian press footage of the launch, however, the vehicle—which looked similar to the Shahab-3 MRBM, a system that by itself probably does not have the capability to place an object into orbit—appeared to suffer an in-flight failure. Iran's President also announced Tehran would conduct two more rocket tests prior to launching a "home-produced" satellite into orbit later in 2008, and several Iranian news websites released photos of a new rocket called "Safir" that appears larger than Tehran's existing ballistic missiles. Iranian officials stated on 27 August 2008 that they had launched a smaller research rocket called the Kavosh-2.

Technologies used to build an SLV are directly applicable to the development of longer range ballistic missiles. Assistance from entities in China and North Korea, as well as assistance from Russian entities at least in the past, has helped Iran move toward self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. Iran still remains dependent on foreign suppliers for
some key missile components, however. Iran also has marketed for export at trade shows guidance components suitable for ballistic missiles.

Chemical and Biological

We assess that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications. Tehran continues to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could advance its capability to produce CW agents. We judge that Iran is capable of weaponizing CW agents in a variety of delivery systems.

Iran probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. We assess that Iran has previously conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies that could be used for BW.

Video Shocker: Obama is Hitler (And You're on His List)

Via Media Matters:

Our favourite delusional paranoid and/or talk-show shyster, Glenn Beck, reworks the poem about the Jews, leaping from the AIG financial services group to the auto industry, to prove that Obama/Hitler is "coming after you":