Iran's Uranium: Why Can't the US Take Yes for an Answer? (Parsi)

Trita Parsi writes for ABC News:

A noticeable irritation can be sensed in Washington. After months of investing in a new UN Security Council resolution and an escalation of the conflict and apparently winning agreement among the permanent members of the council for such a measure two emerging powers had the audacity to intervene and find a solution. Brazil and Turkey should keep their expectations low, however, because there will not be any thank you party for them in Washington anytime soon.

Iran’s Uranium: Washington “Can’t Afford to Look Ridiculous”, Makes Ridiculous Move (Emery)
Iran’s Uranium: US Shows a Middle Finger to Tehran…and Turkey and Brazil and… (Gary Sick)

Only two days after the announcement of the Brazilian-Turkish brokered deal with Iran that would see 1,200 kg of Iran's low enriched uranium shipped out of the country, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told a Senate panel that the United States and its partners seeking new sanctions against Iran have come up with a draft proposal for a new round of penalties. UN Ambassador Susan Rice held a press conference at the UN today unveiling the new resolution.



A day earlier, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley spoke dismissively about the Brazilian-Turkish deal. "The United States continues to have concerns about the arrangement. The joint declaration does not address core concerns of the international community," Crowley said, "Iran remains in defiance of five U.N. Security Council resolutions, including its unwillingness to suspend enrichment operations." Crowley then went on to link the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) deal with the Security Council demand for a suspension of Iran's enrichment activities. "Public statements today suggest that the TRR deal is unrelated to its ongoing enrichment activity. In fact they are integrally linked," he said.

These developments have taken many observers by surprise. Linking the TRR deal to suspension of enrichment is a new component it was the White House itself that decided last year to go forward with a deal to swap Iran's LEU for fuel rods without a suspension in order to throw back Iran's break out capability.

Furthermore, the earlier justification for the sanctions push was a reaction to Iran's failure to accept the swap proposal presented to it in October 2009. Administration officials stated on numerous occasions that sanctions would only be pursued if the diplomatic track failed to produce results. Sanctions would be needed to get Iran back to the table and to convince them to accept the deal.

Analysis: Washington Had Sudden Change of Heart

The sudden change of heart in Washington is particularly surprising mindful of the fact that the three objections Iran lodged against the 2009 TRR deal that the LEU needed to be shipped out in one shipment, that the swap would take place outside of Iran, and that the fuel rods would be delivered to Iran nine to twelve months have now all been withdrawn. Iran has agreed to the terms the US insisted on.

This may explain the comments of  Namik Tan, the Turkish Ambassador to the US, to the Associated Press, "We have delivered what they were asking for&If we fail to get a positive reaction it would be a real frustration."

But there are several factors that can shed light on Washington's apparent reluctance to take yes for an answer.

First, the Senate and the House are in the final phase of sending a broad sanctions bill to the President. The bill has several problems from the White House's perspective, including its limitations of Presidential waivers as well as the impact it will have on US allies who will be subjected to these sanctions.

Progress on the UN Security Council track has in the past few months been an important instrument to hold back Congress's own sanctions push. With Congress eager to sanction Iran, particularly now when the Brazilian-Turkish deal conceivably could derail or delay the UN sanctions track, the Obama administration feels the need to pacify the Congressional sanctions track by accelerating the UN sanctions track.

Second, the Brazilian-Turkish deal explicitly recognizes Iran's right to enrichment and would, as a result, eliminate the option of pursuing the zero-enrichment objective. While most analysts agree that the zero-enrichment objective simply isn't feasible, the White House has kept its options open on this issue. It has neither publicly confirmed it as a goal, nor rejected it. This, it has been argued, would provide the US with leverage. Even if it no longer is America's red line, it can still be America's opening position in a negotiation, the argument reads.

Does Washington's Reservations Hurt Obama's Attempt to Assert DC Diplomacy?

Third, there is a sense in the Obama administration that after the events of last year, a nuclear deal with Iran could only be sold domestically if Iran is first punished through a new round of sanctions. Only after a new round of sanctions would there be receptivity in Washington for a nuclear agreement with Iran. Hence, any nuclear deal that comes before a new round of sanctions would complicate the Obama administration's domestic challenges. A deal without punishment even a good deal simply wouldn't be enough.

Understandably, Washington's reaction to the Brazilian-Turkish deal has created some apprehension in the international community. The Obama administration has worked diligently to overcome the credibility gap America developed with the international community under President George W. Bush. One element of this effort was to utilize diplomacy as a premier tool of US foreign policy.

Punitive measures such as war or sanctions would no longer be the instruments of first resort. But the reaction to the Brazilian-Turkish deal may undo some of the progress the Obama administration has achieved with the international community. Washington's lack of appreciation for the breakthrough may fuel suspicions of whether sanctions are pursued to achieve success in diplomacy, or whether diplomacy was pursued to pave the way for sanctions and beyond.

Iran Analysis: Assessing the Tehran Nuclear Deal (Gary Sick)

Gary Sick, a former official in the Carter and Reagan Administrations and one of the top US-based analysts on Iran, offers an evaluation of today's agreement between Iran, Brazil, and Turkey on a procedure for the enrichment of Tehran's uranium stock:

What to make of the new nuclear agreement by Turkey and Brazil with Iran?

Perhaps the main point is to be reminded of the moral from the old folk tale: Be careful of what you wish for, since you just might get it. The United States took a rather righteous position that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the West had made Iran a remarkably generous offer, and when it was rejected they had no choice but to go all out for sanctions.

Iran Document: Text of Iran-Brazil-Turkey Agreement on Uranium Enrichment
Iran Urgent: The Deal on Uranium Enrichment

There are those in Washington (but also in Paris and London) who were fully committed to passing a strong sanctions resolution in the United Nations Security Council next month, and this is a blow to them and all the intense diplomatic work they have done in the past five or six months. Clearly, it will be immensely more difficult, if not impossible, to get a sanctions resolution if this deal is on the table.


According to preliminary information, the agreement provides that Iran will, within a month, ship 1240 kg of roughly 5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey where it will be held in escrow for up to a year until Iran is provided with 120 kg of fuel cells (uranium enriched to near 20 percent) to replace the nearly exhausted fuel of the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) that makes medical isotopes. This represents more than half of the 2065 kg of LEU that Iran had produced as of February according to the IAEA, and it greatly reduces Iran’s capability to produce enough fissile material for a bomb.

We should all be reminded of the original purpose of the agreement. It was intended as a confidence-building measure that would open the way to more substantive discussions of other issues. The original offer that Iran provisionally accepted in October tacitly accepted Iran’s right to enrich uranium; in return Iran would give up control over a significant portion of its existing stash of LEU. Even low enriched uranium can be further enriched to create bomb-grade (roughly 90+ percent) highly enriched uranium (HEU) that is required for a bomb. The October agreement would have created an environment conducive to at least minimal mutual trust and the beginning of serious negotiations.

Note to negotiators: In the past six months, Iran has not used its LEU to build a bomb, even without an agreement.

Iran has set up a special line to enrich uranium to the 20 percent required for the TRR, but that line is small, separated from its other enrichment facilities, and under inspection of the IAEA. The move to enrich some uranium to 20 percent was obviously intended as a pressure tactic to drive the West back into negotiations, since Iran does not have the capability to manufacture fuel cells for the TRR.

We should also be reminded that Iran did not reject the original deal: they proposed amending it. Basically, when the Iranian negotiators came home with the proposed deal, they were attacked from all sides –-- including members of the Green Movement –-- for being suckers. Their opponents pointed out that they were going to rely on the word and goodwill of Russia (where the LEU would be enriched to 20 percent) and France (where the fuel cells would be fabricated). Iranians from left to right argued that both of these countries had repeatedly cheated Iran on nuclear issues: Russia by delaying endlessly the completion of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr, and France by refusing to grant Iran rights to the Eurodif enrichment facility partially owned by Iran since the days of the shah. Why, they asked, should we believe that this agreement will be any different?

Instead, they proposed that the swap of LEU for the fuel cells should happen on Iranian soil, probably in stages and within a fixed period of time. That idea was rejected by the United States and its negotiating partners.

The new bargain appears to be a compromise in which the LEU would physically be removed from Iran and held in escrow in Turkey for up to a year, in which time the fuel cells would be manufactured and delivered to Iran. The new bargain also appears to go much further in formally recognizing the legitimacy of Iran’s independent enrichment program. That should not be a surprise given the fact that Brazil, one of the parties to the bargain, has its own enrichment facility similar to Iran’s and in fact concealed its details for some time.

So where does that leave us?

Essentially, it takes us back to last October. The one big difference is that Iran has more LEU now than it did then. But the reality is that Iran will keep producing LEU unless a new agreement is reached to persuade them to stop. If we wait another six months for negotiations, Iran will have still more LEU.

In short, this agreement is largely symbolic and limited in its practical effects. If the West accepts the deal as worked out by Brazil and Turkey, and if a new round of negotiations begins – on both the nuclear and other major issues – then this could be a breakthrough. If the West turns it down, or if the two sides do not use it to negotiate some of the major issues that separate them, then nothing much will have been accomplished.

The next step is up to the United States and its negotiating partners.

Although angst is high among the sanctions-at-all-costs crowd, this path to a nuclear swap deal was fully endorsed by the United States and was the centerpiece of the justification for sanctions. One way to respond at this point may just be to declare that our threat of sanctions worked: Iran has capitulated and we accept yes as an answer.

Hmmm…are we that smart?