Monday
Nov172008
Iraq: Not So Fast....
Monday, November 17, 2008 at 11:07
There is a waving of banner headlines in the American and British press today that "Troops leave by end of 2011, US and Iraq agree". It appears that "after months of tense negotiations and public protests, the Iraqi cabinet on Sunday approved a bilateral agreement allowing U.S. troops to remain in this country for three more years."
Well, that's that, then. Americans can prepare for all their boys coming home by the end of 2011. Iraqis can bask in their freedom. Richard Beeston in The Times can even celebrate this great achievement of Bushian foreign policy: "This is a triumph in that it is precisely what the Bush Administration wanted in Iraq – a viable, democratic and independent government capable of making its own decisions and taking on greater responsibility for security."
Hmmm....Why am I a bit hesitant about such a triumph?
Well, a beginning might be to ask why, after so many months of negotiation, the al-Maliki Government has come off the fence and backed the Status of Forces Agreement. Of the reports I read this morning, only The Guardian of London --- drawing on an Associated Press account --- picked up on the catalyst:
On Saturday the leading Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani dropped his opposition to the deal, in a shift that some observers believe paved the way for a Shia bloc in the cabinet to vote in its favour.
Al-Jazeera adds that al-Malaki "dispatched Khalid al-Attiyah and Ali al-Adeeb, two senior Shia legislators to Najaf to secure the support" of Sistani.
As late as Friday, it was reported that the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq --- the largest party in the al-Maliki coalition --- was holding back on approval. Meanwhile, Moqtada al-Sadr at Friday prayers was telling supporters to prepare for resistance against US troops.
Could al-Sadr's open call have pushed Sistani into public acceptance of the deal? Did the Islamic Supreme Council move first, or did they follow Sistani? And what of the nine ministers of the 37-member Cabinet who absented themselves from Sunday's meeting rather than give approval: are they from Sunni factions who now worry about a renewed US-Shi'a alliance against their interests?
I can't answer any of these questions yet. I do know, however, that there's an even bigger one that no one has broached today.
Is the United States really going to abandon more than dozen permanent bases, representing billions of dollars of investment, by the end of 2011? Or will there be interpretations and re-interpretations of the agreement to allow US units --- "trainers", "advisors", "mobile forces" --- to remain in Iraq?
Let's re-visit that headline: "Troops Leave by End of 2011". Here's the exact transcript of President-elect Obama on CBS television last night:
Kroft: Can you give us some sense of when you might start redeployments out of Iraq?
Mr. Obama: Well, I've said during the campaign, and I've stuck to this commitment, that as soon as I take office, I will call in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my national security apparatus, and we will start executing a plan that draws down our troops.
Once more, drawdown is not full withdrawal. As far as I am concerned, the best statement of near-future US policy in Iraq is the report of December 2006 by the Iraq Study Group (member Robert Gates, the current and likely near-future Secretary of Defense), which proposed the retention of 50,000 troops in various guises in the country.
Well, that's that, then. Americans can prepare for all their boys coming home by the end of 2011. Iraqis can bask in their freedom. Richard Beeston in The Times can even celebrate this great achievement of Bushian foreign policy: "This is a triumph in that it is precisely what the Bush Administration wanted in Iraq – a viable, democratic and independent government capable of making its own decisions and taking on greater responsibility for security."
Hmmm....Why am I a bit hesitant about such a triumph?
Well, a beginning might be to ask why, after so many months of negotiation, the al-Maliki Government has come off the fence and backed the Status of Forces Agreement. Of the reports I read this morning, only The Guardian of London --- drawing on an Associated Press account --- picked up on the catalyst:
On Saturday the leading Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani dropped his opposition to the deal, in a shift that some observers believe paved the way for a Shia bloc in the cabinet to vote in its favour.
Al-Jazeera adds that al-Malaki "dispatched Khalid al-Attiyah and Ali al-Adeeb, two senior Shia legislators to Najaf to secure the support" of Sistani.
As late as Friday, it was reported that the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq --- the largest party in the al-Maliki coalition --- was holding back on approval. Meanwhile, Moqtada al-Sadr at Friday prayers was telling supporters to prepare for resistance against US troops.
Could al-Sadr's open call have pushed Sistani into public acceptance of the deal? Did the Islamic Supreme Council move first, or did they follow Sistani? And what of the nine ministers of the 37-member Cabinet who absented themselves from Sunday's meeting rather than give approval: are they from Sunni factions who now worry about a renewed US-Shi'a alliance against their interests?
I can't answer any of these questions yet. I do know, however, that there's an even bigger one that no one has broached today.
Is the United States really going to abandon more than dozen permanent bases, representing billions of dollars of investment, by the end of 2011? Or will there be interpretations and re-interpretations of the agreement to allow US units --- "trainers", "advisors", "mobile forces" --- to remain in Iraq?
Let's re-visit that headline: "Troops Leave by End of 2011". Here's the exact transcript of President-elect Obama on CBS television last night:
Kroft: Can you give us some sense of when you might start redeployments out of Iraq?
Mr. Obama: Well, I've said during the campaign, and I've stuck to this commitment, that as soon as I take office, I will call in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my national security apparatus, and we will start executing a plan that draws down our troops.
Once more, drawdown is not full withdrawal. As far as I am concerned, the best statement of near-future US policy in Iraq is the report of December 2006 by the Iraq Study Group (member Robert Gates, the current and likely near-future Secretary of Defense), which proposed the retention of 50,000 troops in various guises in the country.