Monday
Nov092009
Iran's Nuclear Programme: Washington's Unhelpful Misperceptions
Monday, November 9, 2009 at 7:54
The Latest from Iran (9 November): Assessing the Government
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In The New York Times this morning, David Sanger publishes an article, "Iran Is Said to Ignore Effort to Salvage a Nuclear Deal", which gives half the story on the current tangled state of the negotiations over uranium enrichment.
Half the story because Sanger's story is effectively a US Government press release. Here is the narrative of unnamed officials:
This version of events intersects not only with developments around El Baradei's latest proposal --- Turkey takes Iran's reprocessed uranium from Russia and reshapes it into metal plates --- but also the reports that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was in Tehran pushing a deal. The article is also notable for revealing the Kish proposal, which had not surfaced before.
The downside of the article, however, is that it misses the other half of the narrative. Yesterday Tehran's officials put out a counter-proposal for reprocessing outside Iran, in a two-stage delivery to Russia. Each shipment of uranium would be 400 kilogrammes; the total of 800 kilogrammes is about half of Iran's stock. That proposal, which could be a response to Ryabkov's intervention, may just be a case of the Iranian Government spinning out the discussions, but it is a far cry from an outright rejection.
Indeed, it is troubling that Sanger's article is riddled with distorting exaggerations. His claim that US officials "had now all but lost hope that Iran would follow through with an agreement reached in Geneva on Oct. 1 to send its fuel out of the country temporarily" overstates the situation --- Tehran's officials did not accept a plan but agreed to further technical talks in Vienna. Thus his follow-up, "Iranian officials told the energy agency on Oct. 29 that they could not agree to the deal that their own negotiators had reached", is an unhelpful simplification.
That would not be a major problem if this was just loose reporting. The worry is that this is also the perception of US officials:
Even the most casual of EA readers would have picked up by now that there is not a single Iranian view on the negotiations. Instead, there is a heated debate within the regime on how to conduct the talks with the US. The Washington narrative in Sanger's article misses this, ignoring for example that President Ahmadinejad is pressing for a continuation of discussions despite hostility from within the Iranian Parliament and possibly from the Supreme Leader's office.
If true, this misperception carries the consequence that it may be the Obama Administration rather than Tehran which breaks off the talks. This does not mean that it is giving up a likely agreement --- again, Ahmadinejad's primary objective may be to stay at the table rather than signing a deal --- but it will lead to Iran blaming Washington for the collapse (and there will be supporters for this view, such as Erdogan in Turkey) and undercut the possibility of China and Russia supporting the harsh sanctions that the US Congress will demand.
Yet even this is secondary to the wider significance of the Administration's fuzzy view. Simply put, if the statements in Sanger's piece are accurate, Obama officials have a poor understanding of the internal dynamics in Iran after 12 June, with little comprehension of the fault-lines within the Establishment. In the end, they fail to understand that the nuclear issue is, first and foremost, a pawn in a much bigger chess match inside Iran.
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
In The New York Times this morning, David Sanger publishes an article, "Iran Is Said to Ignore Effort to Salvage a Nuclear Deal", which gives half the story on the current tangled state of the negotiations over uranium enrichment.Half the story because Sanger's story is effectively a US Government press release. Here is the narrative of unnamed officials:
The Obama Administration...has told Iran’s leaders in back-channel messages that it is willing to allow the country to send its stockpile of enriched uranium to any of several nations, including Turkey, for temporary safekeeping....But the overtures, made through the International Atomic Energy Agency over the past two weeks, have all been ignored....Instead....the Iranians have revived an old counterproposal: that international arms inspectors take custody of much of Iran’s fuel, but keep it on Kish, a Persian Gulf resort island that is part of Iran....
That proposal had been rejected because leaving the nuclear material on Iranian territory would allow for the possibility that the Iranians could evict the international inspectors at any moment. That happened in North Korea in 2003, and within months the country had converted its fuel into the material for several nuclear weapons.
This version of events intersects not only with developments around El Baradei's latest proposal --- Turkey takes Iran's reprocessed uranium from Russia and reshapes it into metal plates --- but also the reports that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov was in Tehran pushing a deal. The article is also notable for revealing the Kish proposal, which had not surfaced before.
The downside of the article, however, is that it misses the other half of the narrative. Yesterday Tehran's officials put out a counter-proposal for reprocessing outside Iran, in a two-stage delivery to Russia. Each shipment of uranium would be 400 kilogrammes; the total of 800 kilogrammes is about half of Iran's stock. That proposal, which could be a response to Ryabkov's intervention, may just be a case of the Iranian Government spinning out the discussions, but it is a far cry from an outright rejection.
Indeed, it is troubling that Sanger's article is riddled with distorting exaggerations. His claim that US officials "had now all but lost hope that Iran would follow through with an agreement reached in Geneva on Oct. 1 to send its fuel out of the country temporarily" overstates the situation --- Tehran's officials did not accept a plan but agreed to further technical talks in Vienna. Thus his follow-up, "Iranian officials told the energy agency on Oct. 29 that they could not agree to the deal that their own negotiators had reached", is an unhelpful simplification.
That would not be a major problem if this was just loose reporting. The worry is that this is also the perception of US officials:
“If you listen to what the Iranians have said publicly and privately over the past week,” one senior administration official said Sunday, “it’s evident that they simply cannot bring themselves to do the deal.”
Even the most casual of EA readers would have picked up by now that there is not a single Iranian view on the negotiations. Instead, there is a heated debate within the regime on how to conduct the talks with the US. The Washington narrative in Sanger's article misses this, ignoring for example that President Ahmadinejad is pressing for a continuation of discussions despite hostility from within the Iranian Parliament and possibly from the Supreme Leader's office.
If true, this misperception carries the consequence that it may be the Obama Administration rather than Tehran which breaks off the talks. This does not mean that it is giving up a likely agreement --- again, Ahmadinejad's primary objective may be to stay at the table rather than signing a deal --- but it will lead to Iran blaming Washington for the collapse (and there will be supporters for this view, such as Erdogan in Turkey) and undercut the possibility of China and Russia supporting the harsh sanctions that the US Congress will demand.
Yet even this is secondary to the wider significance of the Administration's fuzzy view. Simply put, if the statements in Sanger's piece are accurate, Obama officials have a poor understanding of the internal dynamics in Iran after 12 June, with little comprehension of the fault-lines within the Establishment. In the end, they fail to understand that the nuclear issue is, first and foremost, a pawn in a much bigger chess match inside Iran.
Reader Comments (15)
What if the US feels that a reasonable successful deal with Iran will lead to the appearance of success with a Potamkin village protocol of shipping the uranium around and getting plates back, BUT regardless, with Iran still able to have a secret enrichment project with enough material to make a bomb? The US would not want any agreement to be reached because it would make sanctions impossible and not allow for a strike against a nuclear plant. As an analogy: What if two countries came to an agreement on the number of surface ships a country could have, but it was known that the enemy country was building submarines. All the intricate paperwork, supervision and inspection of ship building equipment would be pretty but pointless.
Each country has a secret agenda. The object is to fool the other and plod ahead with the real agenda. This is why the negotiations look nonsensical. If the game is really about Iranian internal political-power maneuvers, then isn't the rest of the world irrelevant, because it's all about INTERNAL appearances --- the internal character players are posting their signs and placards of power, doing their thrusts and parries against each other, but with no real effect on the outside world except for the possibility of a misunderstood bluff or bravado that provokes an attack by the outside world?
Doug,
I appreciate this very much but, if this was the US Government's perception, why pursue the third-party enrichment deal so fervently from July?
S.
Wait a second. Are you saying that both the US and Iran want to ensure that an agreement is not reached, but don't want to be blamed for the stalemate?
Scott,
Sorry, I didn't see your response while I was typing a p.s.
You make a good point.
Thanks.
In every analysis on nuke, EA seems to be criticizing anybody who points finger to IR for the stalemate. Why EA blames 5+1, any diplomat, politician, journalist who believes IR is up to no good on nuke deal? Why EA is constantly explaining away, making excuses for a dysfunctional body of cheaters, liars, killers and rapists? Why does EA find a regime that jails and fabricate lies to eliminate its own former VP and ministers so trustworthy? Does everybody misunderstand IR?
There is not a single Iranian expert, whether currently in Iran or outside, who believes this regime, will not lie, cheat, and drag its feet until they get weaponries uranium. What is it that EA knows that others do not?
EA even has watered down Alaeddin Boroujerdi proposal. In Boroujerdi’s proposed deal, IR should get the 20 % EU before it surrenders its own 3.5% EU. In other word give them the ransom first before they release the hostage. This regime sees everybody and every nation in its own image, liars and cheaters.
IR will play this game until world run out of time or out of patience. And even if they get the deal with everything they want they will back down a few months after they have signed it. Mark my words.
"The Obama Administration…has told Iran’s leaders in back-channel messages that it is willing to allow the country to send its stockpile of enriched uranium to any of several nations, including Turkey, for temporary safekeeping"
But, for sure, the French administration will not ;-)
Megan,
Speaking personally, my priority is not to assign blame or to offer excuses for anyone. It is to recognise how the Ahmadinejad Government is probably devoted to continued talks primarily because they offer a bolstered "legitimacy" against internal opposition (rather than, for example, using the talks to cover a drive for a nuclear-weapons capability in the near-future). If that premise is true, then the issue becomes how Iran Government will keep putting revised proposals on the table without --- at least imminently --- reaching a final agreement (which differs in approach but not outcome from "stalemate").
My concern is that Obama Administration officials, missing the internal dimension behind Ahmadinejad Gov't strategy, are also missing the wider and more significant political picture.
S.
Scott,
Thanks for the analysis but it seems to me that having spent so much time analyzing what politicians's twisted language may actually mean, you are in danger of adopting that same style in your writings.
If you have a hypothesis, come out and say it instead of wrapping it up a half a dozen references and ending with a vague statement about "a pawn in a much bigger chess match inside Iran."
BTW, based on your last reply to Megan, I agree with you that IRI's first and foremost priority is suppressing the internal dissent by the opposition.
Further I believe that those Iranians who bravely participate in street demonstrations are clearly demanding the ouster of not only Ahmadinejad but also khamenei. But the vast majority of Iranians, especially outside of Tehran, are still sitting on the sidelines.
Setting aside the loyal regime supporters (I think 30% is a reasonable estimate of their proportion of the population), my belief is that those who are sitting on the sidelines are waiting to hear what the opposition's PLAN is for Iran's future.
They are "snake bitten", highly suspicious of any political leader, and based on the events of the last 30 years have come to believe that the Green Leaders are just out to take back the power & status that they have have lost during the past few years.
These Iranains don't want to risk their lives and properties only to replace this group with another group that for all they know can turn out to be another group of self-centered individuals only interetsed their own power and financial stakes.
Although this segment is not necessarily highly religious, the traditional Shia belief which views political power as inherently corrupt (until the 12th Imam returns and establishes the first "just" power in the world) very much reinforces the views of these Iranians.
So it is critical for the opposition to clarify their goals for Iran in succinct terms and have leaders who can symbolize them.
Hamid,
I take your point and will be more direct in future analyses....
S.
Thanks Scott. I see that you are not only bright but also humble...excellent combination.
I'm not a Muslim but we can sure learn a lot from Montazeri!!!
"a pawn in a much bigger chess match inside Iran"
I would like to give Scott just a little bit of support here. Sometimes it is difficult to put some things completely into words. That is why, also sometimes, a small piece of poetry encapsulates something far better than a piece of prose. Personally, I do understand the above "verbal image" - it is not poetry, but it does paint a picture.
However, sometimes analysis of why something is the way that it is can be overdone - eg, why does the Iranian SL put his left shoe on before the right one. Is there some hidden meaning in this?? Etc.
I guess that analysis is just another way of saying " What the hell is going on??". If somebody can tell me just who runs Iran - and whether the things that come out of Iran (like statements by certain people) are co-ordinated or random, I would appreciate it. As a supposedly organized State, it sure looks anarchic to me!
Barry
Hamid- to be fair to Scott he's http://enduringamerica.com/2009/09/25/iran-rafsanjani-ahmadinejad-and-the-multi-sided-chess-match/" rel="nofollow">used the chess reference frequently in his posts on Iran, usually to show that it's a tortured metaphor which in no way captures the multi-sided, multi-issued 'game' taking place in Iran.
Mike and Barry, thanks guys for your elaboration.
I understand the chess metaphor; maybe I just didn't read the post carefully enough or I'm just not used to its flow in context of previous posts.
Regardless, what wasn't clear to me was which internal struggles it was referring to. IRI has created such many messes that we have to be more specific (read with sarcastic tone)!!!
Now I know.
Hamid,
"Which internal struggles [Scott] was referring to" --- my grandfather used to have a great saying, "You pay your money and you take your pick."
S.
Scott and Hamid,
I think we are debating semantics here regarding the tone of the article. My take is Scott presented this as "here are some facts you make up your mind" followed by "it could be this." Scott like many of us is simply trying to figure this out. His article is meant to solicit comments and get us thinking!
As we move forward I would encourage all to read up on Mark Hibbs and nuclear proliferation. Just google his name and a number of articles will pop up on the subject. Many are not aware but he is the person who largely uncovered the whole MA Khan affair with the Pakistani nukes. If you have followed him you will see a clear trail from Pakistan to Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea. Mark was quoted as saying about the Pakistani nukes and other states:
"The Pakistan government said Aug. 29 that its interrogation of [A. Q.] Khan, former head of Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), about his involvement in proliferating Pakistan's nuclear technology abroad has been completed. "As far as we are concerned, I understand that whatever information that was there has been obtained and has been shared with the relevant countries, and [that] the relevant countries are satisfied with the information," Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Naeem Khan told a weekly press briefing."(http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200601/aq-khan/7)
It is no mystery that Iran is using the old UNRENCO centrifuge designs Khan stole so one can assume Iran was "satisfied" as mark put it. Pakistan got its results and was not in the least bit remorseful they took this path nor that they shared it. Compare Pakistan's path and you will find it eerily similiar to the course Iran is taking. Pakistan told everyone they weren't pursuing nukes but peacful technology and we all know the ending of that story. This begs the following questions regarding Iran's intentions:
1) Why has Iran never allowed direct access to its chief scientists to be interviewed
2) Why have they been procuring so much dual use technology
3) What use do they have for the 3.5% U235 when they are over a decade from having a working plant
4) Why won't they allow the bulk of their stock to be sent out knowing they have no use for it
5) Why is it that any dialogue with Iran is only dialogue with no action
6) Why the open deception and concealment if they have nothing to hide
Frankly, I don't have an answer but the evidence does point in a certain direction if you follow the precedence of Pakistan. Personally, I believe they have aspirations to aquire nuclear weapons but are limited in their ability to deliver. If Iran had the technology to pursue a bomb they would have done it already. The dialogue seems to indicate they are "bluffing" in an attempt to gain as much political capital as possible. Capital? Well, now we are back to square one again. Why? Is the capital meant to garner more time to pursue weapons or eliminate sanctions? Are you confused yet? I am and whatever Iran wants they are using this confusion to their gain. For some detailed background read this PDF at : http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060412_iran_uncertainty.pdf . It's a long read but worth it for the details provided.
Thx
Bill