Israel Video: Obama Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel at the Jewish Federation of North America

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On Tuesday, President Obama's chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, spoke at the Jewish Federation of North America's annual general assembly .He shared his Jewish roots with the audience and reiterated the rhetoric of the Obama Administration on the "significance of Israel's security to United States", "Palestinian responsibilities for stabilization", and "the rights of Palestinians on settlements and final borders [on] pre-1967 lines" Then he called on both parties to the negotiation table.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gmt3ElbMJJw[/youtube]

Emanuel declared:

It is only through dialogue that we can achieve the lasting peace that Israel seeks.

Make no mistake, the path toward peace is not one that Israel should be asked to walk alone. That is why the U.S. will remain actively engaged, and Israel's one true friend. The Palestinians must come to the table, recognize Israel's right to exist and reject violence.

As the president has said many times, as the president said in Cairo, the bond between the Israel and the U.S. is unbreakable. It's a bond rooted in shared interests and shared values.

Emananuel reassured Israelis that Washington's engagement with the Muslim world was not at the expense of Israel's interests:

There are those who have questioned that, as this administration has sought to be engaged in the region. There are some who suggest this implies a diminished level of support for Israel... That is not the intent and that is not the case, and never will be.

At the end of the speech, Emanuel touched the Iranian question, "Today thanks to the work of the president there is strong and growing international consensus against a nuclear armed Iran. Israel has been "a beacon of democracy in a region too often defined by strife."

Iran Video Special: When Khamenei Met the US Hostage (and Why It's Important Now)

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The video below is extraordinary, showing Deputy Minister of Defense and MP Ali Khamenei in discussion with US diplomat John Limbert, one of the 52 American hostages in the 1979/81 US Embassy takeover. But the 2009 sequel to the story may be even more significant.



Although the footage had been shown on Iranian television at the time and had been posted by Liveleak in 2008, it rose to prominence when it was posted on the Supreme Leader's website on 2 November. At that time John Limbert was a prominent ex-diplomat, soon to appear on US television talking about the 30th anniversary of the Revolutionary and Embassy crisis. Now, however, John Limbert has been appointed to the new post of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran.

So why does Ayatollah Khamenei's camp "out" this video just before the Obama Administration offers a significant signal on US-Iranian relations? Could it be that the Supreme Leader is wanting to turn Embassy pictures of 1979, which have spurred anti-Iran hostility for a generation in the US, into images of warmth and friendship? And could it be that the US Government, far from pushing a hard line on the Iranian nuclear programme (and the post-election crisis and human rights) leading to further sanctions or a suspension of talks, is demonstrating its renewed dedication to "engagement"?

In other words, are the Leader of Iran and the Leader of the Free World now walking alongside each other, unclenched fist in unclenched fist?

Summary of video from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty:

In the video Khamenei, who was then a deputy defense minister and a member of parliament, is seen chatting with one of the hostages, who appears to be U.S. diplomat John Limbert, who speaks fluent Persian.

Khamenei asks him about the detention conditions and issues such as food, hygiene, or whether the hostages have access to books. “Any shortcomings, problems, or difficulties can be removed,” says Khamenei.

The U.S. hostage responds that there is only one problem. Khamenei quickly reacts by saying “right, the fact that you’re here” and then expresses hope that “the Iranian criminal,“ the shah, will be delivered to Iran and the hostages will be free to go. The hostage replies: “Inshallah.”

Later in the video Khamenei appears to be giving an interview to Iranian state television. He describes his meeting with the hostages and gives details about their detention, including what he says is the good library they have access to.

In the interview, Khamenei says that the hostages are “very happy” with their living conditions and the food they’re receiving. “American food is being specially prepared for them,” says Khamenei.

Afghanistan: The Pentagon (and US Companies) Dig In for "Long War"

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The US in Afghanistan: “The Long War” Still Waits for a Strategy

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Writing for TomDispatch, Nick Turse reveals the extent of US military and corporate plans and operations for a long-term involvement in Afghanistan:

In recent weeks, President Obama has been contemplating the future of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. He has also been touting the effects of his policies at home, reporting that this year's Recovery Act not only saved jobs, but also was "the largest investment in infrastructure since [President Dwight] Eisenhower built the Interstate Highway System in the 1950s." At the same time, another much less publicized U.S.-taxpayer-funded infrastructure boom has been underway. This one in Afghanistan.

While Washington has put modest funding into civilian projects in Afghanistan this year -- ranging from small-scale power plants to "public latrines" to a meat market -- the real construction boom is military in nature. The Pentagon has been funneling stimulus-sized sums of money to defense contractors to markedly boost its military infrastructure in that country.

In fiscal year 2009, for example, the civilian U.S. Agency for International Development awarded $20 million in contracts for work in Afghanistan, while the U.S. Army alone awarded $2.2 billion -- $834 million of it for construction projects. In fact, according to Walter Pincus of the Washington Post, the Pentagon has spent "roughly $2.7 billion on construction over the past three fiscal years" in that country and, "if its request is approved as part of the fiscal 2010 defense appropriations bill, it would spend another $1.3 billion on more than 100 projects at 40 sites across the country, according to a Senate report on the legislation."



Bogged Down at Bagram

Nowhere has the building boom been more apparent than Bagram Air Base, a key military site used by the Soviet Union during its occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. In its American incarnation, the base has significantly expanded from its old Soviet days and, in just the last two years, the population of the more than 5,000 acre compound has doubled to 20,000 troops, in addition to thousands of coalition forces and civilian contractors. To keep up with its exponential growth rate, more than $200 million in construction projects are planned or in-progress at this moment on just the Air Force section of the base. "Seven days a week, concrete trucks rumble along the dusty perimeter road of this air base as bulldozers and backhoes reshape the rocky earth," Chuck Crumbo of The State reported recently. "Hundreds of laborers slap mortar onto bricks as they build barracks and offices. Four concrete plants on the base have operated around the clock for 18 months to keep up with the construction needs."

The base already boasts fast food favorites Burger King, a combination Pizza Hut/Bojangles, and Popeyes as well as a day spa and shops selling jewelry, cell phones and, of course, Afghan rugs. In the near future, notes Pincus, "the military is planning to build a $30 million passenger terminal and adjacent cargo facility to handle the flow of troops, many of whom arrive at the base north of Kabul before moving on to other sites." In addition, according to the Associated Press, the base command is "acquiring more land next year on the east side to expand" even further.

To handle the influx of troops already being dispatched by the Obama administration (with more expected once the president decides on his long-term war plans) "new dormitories" are going up at Bagram, according to David Axe of the Washington Times. The base's population will also increase in the near future, thanks to a project-in-progress recently profiled in The Freedom Builder, an Army Corps of Engineers publication: the MILCON Bagram Theatre Internment Facility (TIF) currently being built at a cost of $60 million by a team of more than 1,000 Filipinos, Indians, Sri Lankans, and Afghans. When completed, it will consist of 19 buildings and 16 guard towers designed to hold more than 1,000 detainees on the sprawling base which has long been notorious for the torture and even murder of prisoners within its confines.

While the United States officially insists that it is not setting up permanent bases in Afghanistan, the scale and permanency of the construction underway at Bagram seems to suggest, at the least, a very long stay. According to published reports, in fact, the new terminal facilities for the complex aren't even slated to be operational until 2011.

One of the private companies involved in hardening and building up Bagram's facilities is Contrack International, an international engineering and construction firm which, according to U.S. government records, received more than $120 million in contracts in 2009 for work in Afghanistan. According to Contrack's website, it is, among other things, currently designing and constructing a new "entry control point" -- a fortified entrance -- as well as a new "ammunition supply point" facility at the base. It is also responsible for "the design and construction of taxiways and aprons; airfield lighting and navigation aid improvements; and new apron construction" for the base's massive and expanding air operations infrastructure. The building boom at Bagram (which has received at least a modest amount of attention in the American mainstream press) is, however, just a fraction of the story of the way the U.S. military -- and Contrack International -- are digging in throughout Afghanistan.

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The US in Afghanistan: "The Long War" Still Waits for a Strategy

Understanding “Mr Obama’s Wars”: Five Essential Analyses on Afghanistan and Pakistan

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Throughout our coverage of the US intervention in Afghanistan this year, there is a recurrent theme. As I wrote for an essay for The New Americanist, published as a separate entry in September:

In such a war [as that in Afghanistan and Pakistan], the strategic ends of not only a military "victory” for US forces but political, economic, and social resolution for the populaces in those countries are peripheral; the ongoing battle is an end in itself. “War” and “national security” take over, rationalised by a permanent fear.

Which is why, when asked in the Newsweek interview, “Can anything get you ready to be a war president?”, Obama could reduce “strategic issues” to an 18-word question:

I think that it certainly helps to know the broader strategic issues involved. I think that’s more important than understanding the tactics involved….The president has to make a decision: will the application of military force in this circumstance meet the broader national-security goals of the United States?

This week Spencer Ackerman published an outstanding and troubling article picking up on this lack of a US strategy in Afghanistan: "The truth is that an inability or unwillingness to define the ends of the Afghanistan conflict has been the rule in Washington for the last eight years":

Everything about the ballroom of the St Regis Hotel indicates Washington courtliness. The entranceway is filled with glittering chandeliers and polished marble, giving way to high ceilinged majesty. Located steps away from the White House, the hotel signals power, control and spectacle. So it was the natural venue for Richard Holbrooke, the Obama administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to unveil in August the dozen-member team he assembled to reverse the flagging civilian assistance efforts for the troubled region, at the moment this summer when the city began, for the first time, to question the wisdom of the war.

Holbrooke choreographed the event with his characteristic attention to atmospherics. It was moderated by John Podesta, the former Clinton chief of staff who ran Barack Obama’s presidential transition. Holbrooke was flanked by his team, which represented every significant US agency and department and even the British government. The dozens of journalists in the room might not have appreciated the policy details – about contesting Pakistani Taliban short-wave radio communications; microcredit programmes for Afghan agriculture; and supporting the forthcoming Afghan elections – but Holbrooke, who has decades of experience with the elite press, evidently gambled that the more their eyes glazed over, the more they would be likely to write that the Obama administration had gathered together an impressive and united civilian team to match the military effort.

And then Holbrooke stepped on his own script. Asked how he would know when he had achieved the ultimate endpoint of the entire enterprise he’d assembled hundreds of people at the St Regis to discuss, Holbrooke replied that it was like the famously vague test enunciated by Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart for determining when an artwork was pornographic. “We’ll know it when we see it,” he said. There was little chance of the event’s elaborate stagecraft being remembered after that.

********************************

The foreign-policy community in Washington is an entity powered by euphemism. As much as the fraternity of experts and analysts wishes to congratulate itself for its deep thinking and farsightedness, debate occurs within rigid boundaries that exist to make policymakers believe they can unlock every intractable problem of geopolitical management. Like all good boundaries, these both protect and corral: they insulate the members of the foreign policy establishment against embarrassment when disasters emerge, provided that no one admits a situation is indeed helpless.

Holbrooke’s awkward admission at the St Regis may have pierced this illusion of control, but the truth is that an inability or unwillingness to define the ends of the Afghanistan conflict has been the rule in Washington for the last eight years. There has never been a debate about when the United States will meet its goals in the region it entered after the September 11 attacks, just as there has never been a clarification of those goals. The Iraq war provided everyone with an alibi.

The Bush administration viewed Afghanistan as a nation-building sinkhole that distracted from the war it wanted to fight. Accordingly, the military prioritised Iraq, and so no talented officer had any incentive to innovate in Afghanistan. The Democratic Party, all the way up to Barack Obama, insisted that Afghanistan was the truly necessary war, and turned it into a cudgel to be used against the Iraq war. American Journalists made careers in Iraq and barely asked for embeds in Afghanistan; their editors ticked the box by running an annual short feature, usually about how Afghanistan was the “forgotten war”. There was no critical thought from anyone about arresting Afghanistan’s deterioration, and half-true clichés about a “Graveyard of Empires” accumulated. That was the brittle architecture underlying the national consensus about Afghanistan. Without the supporting wall of Iraq, it has now collapsed.

Out of its wreckage, Obama will make two critical decisions in the coming weeks: whether a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan is suitable for the country’s woes; and whether a second troop increase in the span of a year is required to wage it. Obama’s advisers, military and civilian, are locked in a debate over how to provide an alternative to Holbrooke’s admission. Some, like Vice President Joseph Biden, contend that the complexities of counterinsurgency are both insurmountable and unmoored from the stated goal of removing al Qa’eda as a security threat. Others, like Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal, contend that the United States has already spent eight years attacking al Qa’eda and senior Taliban leaders without regard for the conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan that the militants exploit to retain support.

But there is another debate layered on top of that one, both inside the administration and across the Washington foreign-policy community in general. That debate is about the meaning of the Afghanistan war and the scope of American commitment to it. But it is also about what lessons to draw from the Iraq war, and whether they can be exported to Afghanistan.

All of the ideological attention in Washington previously committed to Iraq is now flooding into Afghanistan – or at least to the simulacrum of Afghanistan that exists in Washington. That still-congealing ideology forms the prism through which Obama’s ultimate decisions will be viewed. What was once a relatively simple (though operationally complex) mission to avenge the September 11 attacks has since been overtaken by theories about how to establish lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If those theories are correct, the United States may endure a period of bloody hardship but reap the benefits of radically diminishing the threat of al Qa’eda. If not, it will court disaster.

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Israel-Palestine: Clinton's Cairo Visit Pushes Talks Into the Distance

Video & Transcript: Clinton Press Conference in Egypt (4 November)

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On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Ali Aboul Gheit spoke to the public after a meeting they had with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.

A day earlier, Egyptian Foreign Minister was asking for guarantees for Palestinians and was warning all sides "not to waste time", even as Clinton was playing up "unprecedented concessions" by Israel on settlements. At the conference, this translated into an amiable exchange of Gheit's satisfaction with Washington's "unchanged" position and Clinton's repetition of her rhetoric "calling both sides on the negotiation table."

On settlements, Clinton said:

I want to start by saying our policy on settlements has not changed. And I want to say it again, our policy on settlement activity has not changed. We do not accept the legitimacy of settlement activity.

Well, I can repeat to you what President Obama said in his speech at the United Nations and what he said here in Cairo – that the United States believes that we need a state that is based on the territory that has been occupied since 1967.

That seems a consistent position, since it is impossible to talk about a Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders without the prospect of halting settlements in the West Bank. The difficulty remains, however, that Washington has put forward no possibility of pressure on the Israeli side to bring a settlement freeze and thus a move towards the negotiation table.

That difficulty may have been complicated by Clinton's description of the Goldstone Report on Gaza as an "impediment": "We’re not going to let anything deter us or prevent us from working as hard as we possibly can, going forward." Thus, far from showing how Washington could press Israel to recognise the international position, Clinton effectively set up Goldstone as another pretext for Israeli refusal or delay on negotiations: Tel Aviv can simply argue that there will be no talks without a repudiation of the report.

Clinton, offsetting these difficulties, reiterated her "unprecedented concessions" statement from Jerusalem, "What we have received from the Israelis to halt all new settlement activity –-- and I’ll repeat that again, too –-- to halt all new settlement activities and to end the expropriation of land, and to issue no permits or approvals, is unprecedented."

Someone might want to update Madame Secretary that the Netanyahu Government has already approved additional 3,000 housing units and has put an exception of "natural growth" problems to justify further construction.

So where is "unprecedented" in this picture? And where is the stimulus for both sides to come to the oft-upheld negotiation table? If anything, the prospect for talks appears to have receded. After the conference, the chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat declared that Palestinians may have to abandon the goal of creating an independent state, "It may be time for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to tell his people the truth, that with the continuation of settlement activities, the two-state solution is no longer an option."