UPDATED Iran's Nukes: Obama's Team Buys Time for Engagement

UPDATE 1110 GMT: Cole also has posted the text of the IAEA resolution, which bears out both his analysis and that of EA.

UPDATE 1050 GMT: Another useful analysis, this time from Juan Cole. Cole first offers a detailed background with his "breakout" thesis on Iran's nuclear programme:

Tehran genuinely does not want to actually construct and detonate a nuclear device....But having a rapid breakout capability --- being able to make a bomb in short order if it is felt absolutely necessary to forestall a foreign attack --- has a deterrent effect. So Iran would have the advantages of deterrence without the disadvantages of a bomb if it could get to the rapid breakout stage.

Cole's immediate reading of the current position is hit-and-miss: he's on shaky ground with his analysis that the Revolutionary Guard has vetoed the Supreme Leader's acceptance of an enrichment deal (I don't think anyone except Ayatollah Khamenei knows what he will do), but Cole is invaluable in reading the non-Iranian politics: don't expect BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) to accept a move towards harsh economic measures agianst Tehran.

And Cole's conclusion hits the bull's-eye:

Bottom line: Friday's vote was likely symbolic and a signal to Iran from the international community that there is discomfort with its secretiveness and lack of transparency, and that many are suspicious of its motives. In China's case, it may have been a warning against actions that could harm the Middle Kingdom's burgeoning economy. What it likely was not was a harbinger of tougher international sanctions against Tehran or a sign that BRIC is softening on that issue

UPDATE 0950 GMT: A ray of journalistic light --- Sharwine Narwani offers an excellent analysis, "Eleventh-hour CPR On Iran Nuclear Talks": "Our core problem is not with Iran's enrichment program or it's recently revealed Fordow nuclear plant buried under a mountainside. The central issue clogging up our hotlines is that we do not trust Iran. And they do not trust us."

Looking once more at yesterday's International Atomic Energy Agency resolution on Iran's nuclear programme, it is a most impressive two-card trick by the US Government.

Impressive initially because the first trick is on the media. So far, every major journalist whom I've read or listened to has been taken in by the magician's display of a united "hard line" against Tehran. CNN headlines, "U.N. watchdog urges suspension of Iran nuclear facility", never realising that the 2nd enrichment facility at Fordoo is now just a distraction. The New York Times, in print and in podcast, follows the same sleight-of-hand, adding the flourish that the "sharp rebuke that bore added weight because it was endorsed by Russia and China".

Iran’s Nukes: IAEA Non-Resolution on Enrichment Means Talks Still Alive

How did the White House pull off this trick?

Easily, with a sustained effort in Washington as well as Vienna, to put out the distracting message. Beyond the official statement trumpeting the "broad consensus" behind the resolution, "a senior administration official" added:

What happened in Vienna today is a significant step, and it’s a sign of the increasing seriousness of the international community [and its] growing international impatience....Time really is running out. We hope that the board of governors [vote] reinforces the message that, you know, we’re committed to putting together a package of consequences if we don’t find a willing partner.

How then to uncover the trick and reveal the real strategy of the Obama Administration? Well, the unnamed official offered a sneak peek in those final words "if we don't find a willing partner". At this point, at least some key members of the Obama Administration are still pursuing "willingness".

To be blunt, because that seems to be necessary to knock professional observers out of their wide-eyed daze: the White House has not closed off the talks for a deal of Iran's nuclear enrichment.

Those officials who want a deal, primarily those in the State Department but also I suspect the President, are not willing to give up on months of effort, and they certainly do not want to face both the diplomatic difficulties of pursuing tough sanctions --- watch how quickly it becomes near-impossible to maintain that line of "broad consensus" --- and facing the consequences. It will no longer be a question of losing possible co-operation with Tehran in areas like Afghanistan but of facing possible Iranian counter-moves in the region, including Iraq.

At the same time, those pro-deal officials are fighting a contest against Administration colleagues who just want to go through the motions of negotiations to set up the increased pressure of harsh economic measures. Those colleagues (to find them, go to the National Security Council and follow the path to a Mr D. Ross' office) are the ones spinning newspapers like The Washiington Post that this IAEA resolution is the symbolic step to a sanctions regime which will include Russia and China. (They also are the ones willing to play up the "Israeli military action" that would follow if sanctions are not adopted.)

So the IAEA magic-show pulls out two tricks: it holds the Obama White House together while setting a very real line on the discussions with Iran. The Ahmadinejad Government and the Supreme Leader are being told publicly that "third-party enrichment" has to occur outside Iran; no swaps of uranium inside the country. This is getting close to a take-it-or-leave-it declaration to the regime.

But what if Ahmadinejad and/or Khamenei says "Leave It"? Then, I suspect, you'll see the magic evaporate. For while Ross and others wanting a showdown may get it, I'm not sure they have thought through their next tricks.

Iran MediaWatch: Has "Green Reform" Disappeared in Washington?

UPDATE: Within minutes of posting this, I read an article in The Washington Post which points to an answer to my question:

Two weeks before President Obama visited China.... Dennis Ross and Jeffrey Bader, both senior officials in the National Security Council...traveled to Beijing on a "special mission" to try to persuade China to pressure Iran to give up its alleged nuclear weapons program. If Beijing did not help the United States on this issue, the consequences could be severe.

The Chinese were told that Israel regards Iran's nuclear program as an "existential issue and that countries that have an existential issue don't listen to other countries," according to a senior administration official. The implication was clear: Israel could bomb Iran, leading to a crisis in the Persian Gulf region and almost inevitably problems over the very oil China needs to fuel its economic juggernaut, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

Earlier this week, the White House got its answer. China informed the United States that it would support a toughly worded, U.S.-backed statement criticizing the Islamic republic for flouting U.N. resolutions by constructing a secret uranium-enrichment plant. The statement, obtained by The Washington Post, is part of a draft resolution to be taken up as soon as Thursday by the 35 nations that make up the governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog.

1. Key personnel in the National Security Council, notably Ross, are hell-bent on getting sanctions as soon as talks with Iran are declared to have broken down.
2. To pursue those sanctions, these officials are prepared to exaggerate to the point of hysteria: "Israe could bomb Iran".
3. To pursue those sanctions, these officials will leak private conversations with foreign powers and sensitive documents to accommodating reporters.
4. To pursue those sanctions, these officials will ignore obvious difficulties: "While diplomats and arms-control experts welcomed China's support of the IAEA resolution, some acknowledged that it is not clear whether Russia or China would go further and agree to new sanctions against Iran."
5. The issue of what is happening inside Iran --- be that "reform", "justice", "human rights" --- is irrelevant to these officials.

Iran: 3 Problems (for the Greens, for the US, for Ahmadinejad)
The Latest from Iran (26 November): Corridors of Conflict

Have "the Greens" disappeared in Washington?

Yesterday's New York Times editorial is an exercise in frustration, bluster, and irrelevance. Its legimitate concern at the oppressions of the Iranian regime falls away into obsession with and distortions of the nuclear issue --- "time is running out"; "Iran’s repressive leaders cannot be allowed to threaten the rest of the world with a nuclear weapon" --- and the knee-jerk call for tougher sanctions through the United Nations Security Council. ( To recap: 1. The Security Council won't adopt such sanctions; 2. They would have little effect on Tehran's position on the nuclear programme; 3. They do nothing to solve the dilemmas of engagement on issues such as Afghanistan; 4. They do nothing with respect to the human rights issue which supposedly concerned the NYT at the start of the editorial.)

Far more interesting is this morning's opinion piece in The Washington Post by Maziar Bahari, the journalist detained for 118 days after the June election, especially if his sentiments are shared by Obama's officials.

After making a striking assertion, "The [Revolutionary] Guards are becoming stronger than the President and the Supreme Leader," Bahari offers an equally striking recommendation,

Can the West, especially the United States, have a dialogue with these people? Yes. Because there is no other choice. The West has to negotiate with Iran on the nuclear program and the stability of Iraq and Afghanistan. Not talking to Tehran doesn't work.

So engagement has to be pursued, even if we don't like the Iranians in charge (including Bahari's jailers).What is most striking, however, is Bahari's treatment of Iranians beyond the Guards, the Supreme Leader, and the Ahmadinejad Government. In contrast to his clear position on engagement, this seems to be a muddled attempt at escapism from his earlier political calculations:

The rumor du jour in Iran is that Obama and the Guards are reaching a deal to normalize relations, in exchange for which America will ignore human rights abuses in Iran. Hence, the opposition movement's slogan "Obama, either with them or with us." The United States has acted against the interests of the Iranian people in the past. Repeating that mistake for tactical gains would be the biggest mistake of the Obama administration.

As for the Iranian people, the more immediate victims of the brutal regime, we have to think long-term. Our anger should be sublimated into something more positive. We have been brutalized to think of the world in black and white. Seeing the shades of gray can be our strongest weapon against those who would jail, beat and torture us.

Given the New York Times flight into nuclear worry and sanctions and the reality of Bahari's engagement --- it is not with the reformists, either as individual figures like Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami or with the grassroots mass of the protest movement, what exactly is the "long-term more positive"?

The Latest on Iran (23 November): Releases, Rumours, and Battles

NEW Iran: Economics, Missing Money, and Ahmadinejad v. Parliament
NEW Latest Iran Video: Protest at Khaje Nasir University (22 November)
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Iran Video and Text: Maziar Bahari on His 118 Days in Detention
Video and English Text: Mousavi Interview with Kalemeh (21 November)
The Latest from Iran (22 November): Abtahi Sentenced, Ahmadinejad Scrambles

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2030 GMT: Punishment Going Up. Reports now indicate that Ahmad Zeidabadi, whose sentencing we reported earlier (1620 GMT), received a six-year prison sentence. In addition, he will spend five years in exile in the northeastern city of Gonabad and be banned from civil activities for life. Bail for his freedom while the case is appealed is $500,000.

2025 GMT: Ahmadinejad in Brazil. That's right, it's a second continent today on the I'm a World Leader, Get Me Out of Tehran tour (see 0635 GMT), though there is little more than a picture to report.

1925 GMT: More on Larijani v. Ahmadinejad. Khabar Online (the online version of the newspaper which either chose to close today in favour of Web publication or which has been suspended by the Government) is schizophrenic over a possible bust-up between the Parliament and the President.

The English-language version goes to great pains to deny tries to curb talk of a rift, with MPs blaming media and anti-Ahmadinejad opposition for the rumours. The Persian-language site, however, highlights a speech by Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani warning against "dictatorship" and defending former President Hashemi Rafsanjani.



1645 GMT: We've posted a video of yesterday's demonstration, one in a series of ongoing protests, at Khaje Nasir University.

And it looks like we might be covering a major emerging story of the conflict between Iran's Parliament, specifically Speaker Ali Larijani, and President Ahmadinejad. The first installment has been posted; more to come after we take a break for academic duties.

1620 GMT: Journalist and reformist activist Ahmad Zeidabadi has reportedly been sentenced to five years in prison and released on $350,000 bail while the verdict is appealed.

1535 GMT: Here's Why Obama's Engagement Lives. Skip the headlines in the "mainstream" US press and go to Halifax, Canada, where Washington's officials are urging Iran to "engage" the West.

On the surface, Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security talked tough to the delegates at the security forum, "We would prefer that the Iranian regime follow through on the opportunity to engage....[Tehran] asked for engagement with the United States. It has it. Now what is it going to do? Is it going to stand up and say that they're going to take our deal... or are they going to use some other flimsy excuse to duck."

The overriding point is, however, that Tauscher's comments were based on a continued engagement rather than cut-off of talks with Iran. Why might that be? The security forum's main item for discussion, Afghanistan, is the blunt answer. Iran is the prevailing outside power in western Afghanistan, so it has a place in the future American plans for the country.

So while some table-thumpers at the gathering like former Bush National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, hinted that Israel may strike Iran, don't be fooled. The Obama Administration, caught up in its Afghan conundrum, cannot afford renewed hostility with Tehran.

1525 GMT: More Iran-Russia conflict. The tension between Tehran and Moscow, which is a key motive for the Iranian counter-proposal on uranium enrichment, emerged again today. Iran's deputy foreign minister Manouchehr Mohammadi declared, “The problems regarding the Bushehr plant has a technical as well as a political aspect. The Russians… want to launch the plant under certain conditions, but we will not surrender to them."

1255 GMT: Not Big Politics, Just a Baha'i Temple. Appears that Hamshahri was not closed because of a major political move within the Iranian regime but because it included a tourist advertisement showing a Baha'i temple.

1220 GMT: More Bust-Up, Another Paper Banned. Now it's the principlist newspaper Hamshahri which has been banned.

However, an Iranian activist now reports that Hamshahri will be suspended for only a few hours and will likely reappear today.

1050 GMT: A Shot at Larijani? The word is spreading that Khabar, the principlist newspaper close to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has been closed by Government order this morning. I'm sensing a real bust-up between Larijani and the allies of President Ahmadinejad (see 0555 GMT and the separate entry on MP Ali Reza Zamani's revelations).

1025 GMT: Rumour of the Day (Denied). On Sunday we noted that questions were being raised about the whereabouts of former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi, unseen in public for two months, with the most provocative rumour that he was in Evin Prison.

Still no verification of those claims, but at least one conservative Iranian website has gone to the trouble of noticing and denying them. Parcham says Mortazavi, now one of Iran's Deputy Prosecutor Generals, is being reclusive because he is waiting to be confirmed as the new division chief handling financial crimes.

0905 GMT: Bluster. Of course, even if the air-defence show is propaganda (see 0810 GMT), that doesn't mean the Revolutionary Guard will do it quietly (especially if, as I think, this is being done to undercut those in the Iranian establishment pushing for a deal or, alternatively, to cover up any impression of "weakness" from such a bargain).

"One step out of line and Israeli warplanes will be completely destroyed," IRGC Air Force Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh declared. "Even if they escape our sophisticated defense system, they will never see their bases again; because our surface-to-surface missiles are on their marks to target Israeli military bases before the dust settles."

0810 GMT: Shrug. The Washington Post devotes its Iran article this morning to Sunday's air defence exercise, loudly announced by Iran's military --- not surprising, given the supposed drama and the "military warning to Israel" theme in the Post's sub-headline.

We had not even bothered to mention the exercise, which was clearly a propaganda move by Iranian commanders rather than a significant military development. If there is any importance here, it lies in the relationship to the more important story: Iran's uranium enrichment talks with the "West". Is the Revolutionary Guard fighting back against those Iranian leaders who want a deal --- which is still very much on the table, despite the Post's limited knowledge of it --- through their aggressive posturing?

0800 GMT: Yesterday Pedestrian posted a most interesting speech from pro-Government, high-ranking member of Parliament Ali Reza Zamani which is a virtual admission of election fraud. We've put up the blog, as well as our analysis, in a separate entry.

0635 GMT: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's I'm a World Leader, Get Me Out of Tehran tour has opened in Gambia with talk of expanding investments in industry and agriculture.

0555 GMT: Mohammad Javad Larijani, the high-ranking judiciary official, has stepped beyond his official brief to intervene on the nuclear issue. He declared Sunday, "Iran has "many reasons 2 distrust West, but they have no reason 2 distrust us," and added:

If the West won't sell 20% enriched uranium [for the Tehran medical research reactor], we will produce it ourselves. To produce 20% enriched uranium we must change orientation of centrifuges. We know how & we will do it.

MJ Larijani, joins his brothers, Speaker of Parliament Ali and head of judiciary Sadegh (who also went beyond his designated position to speak out), in criticising the Vienna deal for uranium enrichment. However, the question is left open: are the Larijanis wiling to accept the Iran Government's counter-offer of a "swap" inside the country?

0545 GMT: For the opposition, Sunday's headline event was confirmation of the release of Mohammad Ali Abtahi from more than five months in detention. The photograph of Abtahi and his family is one of the most joyous pictures amdist and despite the post-12 June conflict.

It should not be forgotten that Abtahi was sentenced to six years in jail and is only free on a very high ($700,000) bail while he appeals. Others were also sentenced this weekend, including the journalist Mohammad Atrianfar, although the prison terms are not yet known.

Still, the symbolism and impact of Abtahi's release should be noted. As the Green movement tries to withstand yet more arrests of activists and student leaders and prepares for the 16 Azar (7 December) protests, the freeing of the former Vice President --- accompanied by his promise to resume blogging --- is a welcome boost.

It also may be a sign that there may be a limited fightback within the regime against the power of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps. More and more evidence is accumulating, as in journalist Maziar Bahari's account released this weekend, of the Revolutionary Guard's key, perhaps dominant, role in overseeing detentions and eclipsing the power of other agencies like the Ministry of Intelligence and Iran's judiciary. In recent weeks, high-ranking judiciary officials and members of Parliament have been demanding a process to "wrap up" the detentions with formal sentences; since last Tuesday, it seems that the trials and verdicts have accelerated.

"Let America Be America": An Exit Strategy for Afghanistan

Afghanistan: The Great Lock ‘n Load Swindle
Afghanistan: Karzai’s Victory over the US

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Another Sunday, another set of articles and punditry setting out the US can "win" the conflict in Afghanistan. The latest spin is that of the US military supporting a series of local militias throughout the country to defeat the Taliban: this, I presume, is more a signal of Washington's careful distancing from the perceived weakness of the Karzai Government to sell a troop escalation. The New York Times packages the spin as a report by Dexter Filkins, while David Ignatius openly backs the initiative in his opinion piece in The Washington Post, "Afghan Tribes to the Rescue?"

In a guest column for Juan Cole's website, William Polk, a former member of the State Department and professor at the University of Chicago, puts forth an alternative: political and economic steps linked to a measured withdrawal of US troops:

In its war in Afghanistan, the United States has come to a crossroads. President Obama will be forced to choose one of four ways ahead. The choices are cruel, expensive and dangerous for our country; so we must be sure that he chooses the least painful, least expensive and safest of the possible choices.

The first possible choice is to keep on doing what we are now doing. That is, fighting the insurgency with about 60,000 American troops and 68,197 mercenaries at a cost of roughly $2,000 a day per person. That is, we now actually have a total complement of over 120,000 people on the public payroll at an overall cost, of roughly $100 billion a year. We can project a loss of a few hundred American soldiers a year and several thousand wounded. Our senior commander in the Central Command, General David Petraeus, tells us that we cannot win that war.

The second possible road ahead would involve adding substantial numbers of new troops. In General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency doctrine, the accepted ratio of soldiers to natives is 20 to 25 per thousand natives.1 Afghanistan today is a country of about 33 million. Even if we discount the population to the target group of Pashtuns, we will must deal with 15 or so million people. So when he and General Stanley McChrystal ask for 40,000, it can only be a first installment. Soon -- as the generals did in Vietnam – they will have to ask for another increment and then another, moving toward the supposedly winning number of 600,000 to 1.3 million. That is just the soldiers. Each soldier is now matched by a supporter, rather like medieval armies had flocks of camp followers, so those numbers will roughly double. Thus, over ten years, a figure often cited, or 40 years, which some of the leading neoconservatives have suggested, would pretty soon, as they say in Congress, involve “talking about real money.” In addition to the Congressionally-allocated outlay, the overall cost to our economy has not yet been summed up, but by analogy to the Iraq war, it will probably amount to upwards of $6 trillion.

Then there are the casualties: we have so far lost about a thousand -- or a quarter as many as in Iraq. Casualties we can count, but the number of seriously wounded keeps growing because many of the effects of exposure to modern weapons do not show up until later. We have no reliable figures yet on Afghanistan. In Iraq at least 100,000 of the one and a half million soldiers who served there suffered severe psychological damage and about 300,000 have reported post-traumatic stress disorder and a similar number have suffered brain injuries. Crassly put, these “walking wounded” will not only be unable fully to contribute to American society but will be a burden on it for many years to come. It has been estimated that dealing with a brain-injured soldier over his remaining life will cost about $5 million. Cancer, from exposure to depleted uranium is, only now coming into full effect. All in all, it is sobering to calculate that 40 percent of the soldiers who served in the 1991 Gulf war – which lasted only a hundred hours – are receiving disability payments. Inevitably, more “boots on the ground” will lead to more beds in hospitals.

General McChrystal has told us that we must have large numbers of additional troops to hold the territory we “clear.” He echoes what the Russian commanders told the Politburo: in a report on November 13, 1986, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev commented that the Russians attempted the same strategy but admitted that it failed. “There is no piece of land in Afghanistan,” he said, “that has not been occupied by one of or soldiers at some time or another. Nevertheless, much of the territory stays in the hands of the terrorists. We control the provincial centers, but we cannot maintain political control over the territory we seize . . . Without a lot more men, this war will continue for a very, very long time.”

The Russian army fought a bloody, brutal campaign, using every trick or tool of counterinsurgency ever identified. The Russians killed a million Afghanis and turned about 5 million into refugees, but after a decade during which they lost 15,000 soldiers and virtually bankrupted the Soviet Union, they gave up and left. General McChrystal says it may take him a decade or more to “win.” But what “winning” means is unclear.

Third, we could marginally increase our troop strength. That is, adding only between 10,000 and 30,000 troops and a comparable number of mercenaries. Not the full complement that General McChrystal has now demanded. This road, according to Petraeus, McChrystal and their acolytes would lead to “mission failure.”

Not meeting the generals’ demands also brings forward the danger to the Obama administration of being charged with putting our soldiers at risk “with one hand tied behind their backs,” a phrase from the acrimonious aftermath of the Vietnam war which even General James Jones, President Obama’s director of the National Security Council, has recently repeated. The potential ugly campaign, against which even Henry Kissinger has warned us, could pose risks to our political culture and even to our legal structure: some military men are already talking about their restiveness in obeying civilian government. “You kind of get used to it after years of service” one Army general said at a convention in Washington last month. Forgetting the constitution, he continued, “We tend to live with it.” Maybe they will or maybe anger will be channeled into a further extension of the military into politics, intelligence and diplomacy.

For the first time that I know of in recent American history, the uniformed military have created what amounts to a pressure group of their own. Generals Petraeus and McChrystal are the leaders but, by influencing or controlling promotions panels, they have fostered the advancement of middle grade and junior officers who agree with them. Some have been brought into a group called “the Colonels’ council.” And numbers of retired senior officers have joined not only in what President Eisenhower called the “military-industrial complex” but have become the opinion-makers on foreign policy in the media. Private soldiers and non-commissioned officers have, at the same time, become a major component of the private armies of such groups as Xe (formerly Blackwater) and form an active part of the constituency of the right wing of the Republican Party.

In the dangerous months and years ahead, if this road is taken, we are apt to hear echoes – particularly in the next presidential election --of the post Vietnam rhetoric that the civilians sold out the military. In short, while this option sounds moderate and “business-like” I believe that it is the worst option for President Obama and, more importantly, for the nation.

Or, fourth, we could Get out.

Read rest of article....

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The Latest in Iran (19 November): It’s the Nukes Today

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2225 GMT: Today's UN Condemnation of Iran. The Third (Human Rights) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly has "expresse[d] its deep concern at serious ongoing and recurring human rights violations" in Iran. The non-binding resolution passed 74-48, with 59 abstentions.

The Committee voiced "particular concern at the response of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the Presidential election of 12 June 2009 and the concurrent rise in human rights violations", including "harassment, intimidation and persecution, including by arbitrary arrest, detention or disappearance, of opposition members, journalists and other media representatives, bloggers, lawyers, clerics, human rights defenders, academics, (and) students".

The outcome, the Committee asserted, had been "numerous deaths and injuries" Iwith "forced confessions and abuse of prisoners including ... rape and torture".

2115 GMT: The Brussels Non-Talks and Non-Sanctions. The New York Times has snippets of the statement issued by the delegations of the "5+1" powers after their review of the nuclear talks with Iran (see 1240 GMT):

We are disappointed by the lack of follow-up to the three understandings reached [at Geneva on 1 October]....[Iran has] not responded positively to the I.A.E.A. proposed agreement for the provision of nuclear fuel for its Tehran research reactor...[or] engaged in an intensified dialogue. ....[Iran should] reconsider the opportunity offered by this agreement to meet the humanitarian needs of its people and to engage seriously with us in dialogue and negotiations....[We will meet again soon] to complete our assessment of the situation and to decide on our next steps.

Read this carefully and you'll see that "the meeting...a sign of exasperation with Iran" is issuing a holding statement while the "West" tries to figure out a response to the Iran counter-offer, giving the appearance of stern action when nothing has been or will be decided.

It's good enough to take in The Times, which has seems to have no clue about the Mottaki counter-offer (1315 GMT), Iran's manoeuvres with Russia and Turkey (0945 and 1620 GMT), or even the manoeuvres of the International Atomic Energy Agency (1620 GMT). Thus, its simple depiction of the Iranian position as "rejection".

2020 GMT: Today's Media Stupidity Awards. First, the Gold Medal for Reasoned Argument for Mindless Violence. Step up, editorial writers of The Washington Times: "Get Ready to Bomb Iran: It's the last best chance for peace".

And now the Gold Medal for "Intellectual" Dismissal of The Other Side. It's Mamoun Fandy of the Christian Science Monitor:

Should the West trust Iranian promises? The short answer is "no." But the underlying question is "Why not?"

The answer lies in Iranian belief systems – notably the doctrine of taqiyya, a difficult concept for many non-Muslims to grasp. Taqiyya is the Shiite religious rationale for concealment or dissimulation in political or worldly affairs. At one level it means that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his regime can tell themselves that they are obliged by their faith not to tell the truth.

1955 GMT: More on Student Arrests (see 1410 GMT). Radio Zamaaneh have published summaries of the detentions of student leaders this week. Payvand also has information.

1945 GMT: You Better Watch Out. Back from a break for a debate on climate change and the Copenhagen summit to Iran’s Prosecutor General and former Minister of Intelligence, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, is getting tough with protesters. He warned yesterday on Iranian state television, "The Judiciary is determined to decisively and primitively confront any new unrest [caused] by those against the results of the Presidential Elections of Iran.”

1620 GMT: You Read It Here --- The Iran-Turkey Deal. Mr Smith checks in, and we think he may have an exclusive on the nuclear discussions:

It's interesting to spot smoke signals on the nuclear issue. The meeting of Ahmadinejad and Turkish Foreign Davutoglu meeting in Tabriz makes no sense unless Davutoglu was called in to discuss the nuclear issue, given the frequency of Iranian-Turkish encounters in the past weeks.

And I find El-Baradei's statements in Berlin to be subtly quite important. He said, according to AFP, "We have not received any written response from Iran. What I got...is an oral response, which basically said, 'We need to keep all the material in Iran until we get the fuel.' That to me is a case of extreme mistrust."

This is the gist of what I wrote in my own analysis the other day: mistrust by Iran, low-enriched uranium remaining inside Iran UNTIL fuel arrives. El Baradei's statement cannot be underestimated, as it gives hope to Turkey to be able to broker the deal. Needless to say, this would be the diplomatic coup of the century by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. It would raise his stature incommensurably and allow him to press on with the politics of the Nabucco energy pipeline.

1500 GMT: Not much fuss about Friday Prayers today, but there's a short clip up on YouTube.

1455 GMT: Ahmadinejad's Move for Legitimacy. We've posted a copy of the President's Thursday speech in Tabriz.

1410 GMT: Cracking Down on the Students. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty summarises a story we've been following for days: "arrests [as] a move by the authorities to prevent students from protesting against the government on December 7".

1315 GMT: The Mottaki Counter-Offer. Just picking up, after prompting from an EA reader, on an important signal from Iran's Foreign Minister. Most of the Western coverage of Iran's "rejection" of the deal on uranium enrichment (rather than consideration of Iran as taking the next step in negotiations) is based on a weak translation of Mottaki's interview with the Iranian Students News Agency. Almost unnoticed was the Foreign Minister's words to the Hindu newspaper:

We believe that with the continuation of the diplomacy going on now, it is possible to reach an agreement and compromise.... The truth of the matter is [the] interaction [of the "5+1" with the Iran proposal] could somehow build confidence among the Iranians.

1255 GMT: Nuke Discussions Still On. Can't be clearer than this. The US position, as outlined in Kabul yesterday:

The U.S. doesn’t consider the Iranian foreign minister’s rejection of a United Nations- brokered proposal to enrich Iran’s uranium overseas to be “the final word,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said.

While disappointing, she said, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki’s Nov. 18 statement won’t yet trigger the “consequences” that the U.S. and other nations on the UN Security Council have threatened.

1240 GMT: The Brussels "5+1" Talks. First (non)-news out of Brussels on discussions amongst representatives of the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China after Wednesday's counter-offer by Iran for a "swap" of uranium. The meeting was of Foreign Ministry/State Department officials below ministerial level --- the US was represented by Undersecretary of State William Burns and Russia by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. The delegates reviewed the situation but made no decisions.

This is unsurprising. Contrary to the partial and inaccurate reports in Western media this morning (see 0725 GMT), Washington has not closed the door on discussions and is not moving aggressively for more sanctions. This meeting most likely considered a response to the Iranian counter-offer --- expect to see signals at the start of next week.

1155 GMT: Mahmoud is Proud of His Election. In his tour of Tabriz, President Ahmadinejad is emphasising that while elections in other countries are "entirely predetermined", the 85 percent participation in Iran's Presidential election in June shows the endpoint of the Islamic Republic's development.

Ahmadinejad also spoke about his economic plans, including subsidy and tax proposals, but it is notable that he --- or at least the Islamic Republic News Agency --- relegate this to a secondary position behind the President's words about an election hed more than five months ago.

0945 GMT: Two Smoke Signals on the Nuclear Deal. Turkish Foreign Ahmet Davutoglu will meet President Ahmadinejad in Tabriz today "to discuss the latest developments in Iran's nuclear case" with a view "to solv[ing] tensions between Iran and the West".

That reads as an effort by Iran to get Turkey's support for the "swap" of uranium inside Iran, rather than sending Tehran's uranium stocks outside the country for enrichment. It should be considered alongside Iran's manoeuvres with Russia: it is being reported that Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko has told the Iranian Ambassador that "Russia will continue its cooperation with Iran".

0900 GMT: We've now posted an analysis of the significance of the mission by Mohsen Makhmalbaf, the campaign spokesman for Mir Hossein Mousavi, to Washington.

0725 GMT: On the surface, a quiet morning and a day that --- for the "Western" media --- will again be dominated by coverage of developments in the nuclear talks.

If last night's advance copies of articles are an indication, expect a distorted piece in The Washington Post claiming an Iranian rejection of the "5+1" proposals, highlighting a tough US response, and ignoring the significance of Wednesday's Iranian counter-offer. (That's distorted on two important counts: Tehran, or at least the Ahmadinejad Government is pushing for a deal and may have gotten some movement from the Supreme Leader to make the counter-offer, and the Obama Administration is far from concluding that the talks are over.)

That means a development which is just as important, if not more so, will be missed. The Wall Street Journal breaks the news of an "unofficial" visit by filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbaf (pictured left) to Washington. Makhmalbaf, the spokesman for Mir Hossein Mousavi's Presidential campaign, "called for President Barack Obama to increase his public support for Iranian democrats and significantly intensify financial pressure on Tehran's elite military unit, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps".

A disturbing piece of news. Sources are claiming that Iranian security services are sending ominous SMS texts warning against further demonstrations.