The Latest from Iran (27 November): Where Now?

2020 GMT: We've posted news of a campaign, "I Am Atefeh", to express support for Atefeh Nabavi, the first woman jailed for post-election protest.

2015 GMT: Ayatollah JavAdi-Amoli announced, during today's Friday Prayers in Qom, that this was his last sermon. Since June, Javadi-Amoli had expressed his displeasure over post-election events.

NEW Iran: The Campaign to Free Atefeh Nabavi
NEW Iran: A Nobel Gesture from Obama Towards the Green Movement?
NEW Iran’s Nukes: IAEA Non-Resolution on Enrichment Means Talks Still Alive
Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? A Discussion on (Non)-Violence
Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? The EA Discussion
Latest Iran Video: BBC’s Neda Documentary “An Iranian Martyr”
NEW Iran MediaWatch: Has “Green Reform” Disappeared in Washington?
NEW Iran: 3 Problems (for the Greens, for the US, for Ahmadinejad
The Latest from Iran (26 November): Corridors of Conflict

1815 GMT: One More Time --- The Talks Go On (But Time for Tehran to Deal). Here's the White House statement on today's IAEA resolution:

Today's overwhelming vote at the IAEA's Board of Governors demonstrates the resolve and unity of the international community with regard to Iran's nuclear program. It underscores broad consensus in calling upon Iran to live up to its international obligations and offer transparency in its nuclear program. It also underscores a commitment to strengthen the rules of the international system, and to support the ability of the IAEA and UN Security Council to enforce the rules of the road, and to hold Iran accountable to those rules. Indeed, the fact that 25 countries from all parts of the world cast their votes in favor shows the urgent need for Iran to address the growing international deficit of confidence in its intentions.

The United States has strongly supported the Director General’s positive proposal to provide Iran fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor - a proposal intended to help meet the medical and humanitarian needs of the Iranian people while building confidence in Iran’s intentions. The United States has recognized Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy and remains willing to engage Iran to work toward a diplomatic solution to the concerns about its nuclear program, if - and only if - Iran chooses such a course. To date, Iran has refused a follow-on meeting to the October 1 meeting with the P5+1 countries if its nuclear program is included on the agenda. Our patience and that of the international community is limited, and time is running out. If Iran refuses to meet its obligations, then it will be responsible for its own growing isolation and the consequences.

Here's what it means:

1. The second enrichment plant at Fordoo near Qom --- of no relevance except as pretext;
2. The El Baradei statement of a "dead end" on verification --- tangential
3. The Iranian response to the Vienna "third-party enrichment" deal --- the be-all and end-all of this meeting.

In other words, this IAEA meeting has been a two-day setpiece to put Tehran's feet to the fire on the October proposal. If Iran now refuses that plan, and if the "West" decides that the Tehran counter-offer of a "swap" is out of bounds, then and only then will there a move beyond engagement. Even then, it is far from clear if that push for sanctions will have any backing from Russia and China.

1455 GMT: Forgive us for being Nukes, Nukes, Nukes, but little else is breaking at the moment. More posturing, this time from Iran's ambassador to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh, but note that this follows script of keeping channel open for discussions --- "jeopardise" is a mild democratic warning not to go farther:

.Adoption of this resolution is not only unhelpful in improving the current situation, but it will jeopardise the conducive environment vitally needed for success in the process of Geneva and Vienna negotiations expected to lead to a common understanding.

1355 GMT: At some point someone is going to figure out that IAEA members have not forced a showdown with Iran and, indeed, that they have not even moved away from talks and towards further sanctions. Here's the latest coded signal, courtesy of British Foreign Secretary David Miliband:

The resolution passed today by the IAEA Board of Governors sends the strongest possible signal to Iran that its actions and intentions remain a matter of grave international concern. As the resolution makes clear, Iran needs to comply with its obligations both to the IAEA and to the UNSC. Unless it does this, it remains impossible for the international community to have any confidence in Iranian intentions.

Britain and the other members of the E3+3 have made it very clear that our hand is stretched out to Iran. We are waiting for Iran to respond meaningfully. But if it is clear that Iran has chosen not to do so, we will have no alternative but to consider further pressure on Iran, in line with the dual track policy we have been pursuing.

And this position is not altered by Prime Minister Gordon Brown's rhetorical blast: "[Iran] should accept the offers that have been made that they can have civil nuclear power with our support, but they've got to renounce nuclear weapons. I believe the next stage will have to be sanctions if Iran does not respond to what is a very clear vote from the world community."

1210 GMT: We've just posted an urgent assessment on the International Atomic Energy Agency's resolution, passed today, on Iran's nuclear programme. The real significance --- and this is being missed by the media, who are just following the original Reuters report (see Al Jazeera English, for example) --- is that it is a very mild rebuke of Iran. That in turn means talks with Tehran on uranium enrichment are still alive.

1120 GMT: Iran's Nobel Prize Response. We saw this one coming yesterday when we reported on the Iranian Government's seizure of the Nobel Peace Prize medal and diploma of lawyer and human rights activist Shirin Ebadi. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehman-Parast said today, "Much the same as European countries, tax evasion is a crime in Iran and individuals would face legal penalties should they commit such an act."

Mehman-Parast added that if Norwegian officials really cared about human rights, they would not have abstained in the United Nations vote on the Goldstone Report on the Gaza War.

1023 GMT: Filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbaf has won the Freedom to Create Prize, donating the $125,000 prize to non-governmental organisations helping victims of Iran's post-election conflict and dedicating the award to Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. A video of the presentation has been posted on YouTube.

0955 GMT: Nuke Update. Nothing yet coming out of the International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in Vienna. The media, as in this CNN report, is just recycling yesterday's leaked soundbite of Mohammad El Baradei's statement that IAEA analysis of Iran's nuclear status is at a "dead end".

0945 GMT: Dutch television has obtained an interview with Mehdi Karroubi. The exchange is in Farsi with Dutch subtitles.

0830 GMT: Morning Media Moment. Emily Landau of The Jerusalem Post gets in a pre-emptive strike of fanciful "analysis" with her claim, "Dangerous Misreading Iran". That "misreading" is any thought that Iran's position in the nuclear talks is affected by internal development and, in particular, the post-12 June tensions:

The confusion emanating from Iran is simply the most recent manifestation of a well-known pattern that has been repeated in different forms for close to seven years. The "yes, no, maybe" answers from Iran are the tactic that serves its overall strategy in the nuclear realm.

Which would be a fair hypothesis if Landau produced a paragraph, a sentence, even a few words setting out this "well-known pattern". She doesn't.

The serious point here is a leading Israeli academic, "the director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University", could show not one scrap of perception about the internal dynamics behind Iran's nuclear programme and foreign policy. Instead, "analysis" rests on the unshakeable position: There Cannot (and Should Not) Be a Deal with Iran.

At least the headline's good: I just suspect it's better applied to the author than to her straw-person targets.

0755 GMT: The international media are likely to be dominated today by speculations and leaks about the second day of discussions at the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran's nuclear programme.

So, before getting drawn into that issue, we've taken the time --- with the help of readers and fellow bloggers --- to post two discussions about the next steps for the Green Wave(s). The use of the plural is deliberate, as you'll soon see in the debate on the evolving nature of the movement(s); the other, equally important discussion is on non-violence as protest moves towards 16 Azar (7 December) . So is our desire in posting them, not for a conclusive answer but for reflection on how and where protest and resistance develop in this marathon conflict.

Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? The EA Discussion

Yesterday an EA reader sent me this thoughtful and challenging comment:

I would like to point out what seems to be an oversight/flaw in your general understanding of the Green movement. By all counts, the vast majority of Iranians who have been out on the streets and questioning the legitimacy of [President] Ahmadi[nejad] and his cohorts, have no sympathy for Mousavi and "his" Green movement.

Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? A Discussion on (Non)-Violence

They are more being driven by their own frustrations, hopelessness and overwhelming desire to bring change. It is not likely that in any open contest, if given the choice, the majority of Iranians would be in support of the continuation of the Iranian regime as an Islamic Republic with its flawed constitution--the main refrain of [Mir Hossein] Mousavi and [Mohammad] Khatami is that there is nothing wrong with the Islamic Revolution, it is simply the deviation from the path of [Imam] Khomeini that is a problem.

So by focusing on, for example, whether [Ataollah] Mohajerani, [Mohsen] Sazegara or [Mohsen] Makhmalbaf (all figures tainted in the minds of many Iranians for their support of the regime who have only come to the party because there friends are now out of power and they would like to change that, you are missing the point about the magnitude of anger with the regime and all of its supporters over the past 30 years.

The loss inflicted by the Islamic Republic on Iran and Iranians is unfathomable for non-Iranians. The movement in Iran (which is not Green) is a manifestation of 30 years of pain and represents a demand for fundamental change. It would be a huge shame if that change is ultimately represented by Mousavi, Sazegara, Makhbalbaf and their friends....

This was my immediate response:

If you read between the lines, I think you may see our evolving thought that those at the grassroots and prominent figures such as Mousavi should no longer be conflated (I agree fully that --- being on a learning curve here --- we have made that conflation). At the same time, I think our sense has been that there is a synergy of pressure brought by the different aspects, i.e., if a Karroubi or Mousavi made a public move, that might energise the mass movement (and, conversely, that protest such as that on 30 July or Qods Days could bolster the challenge of those figures).

What recent weeks have raised, I think, is the question of whether the challenge still rests on that synergy, as I sense a disillusionment with Mousavi's inability to be visible on occasions such as 13 Aban and his recent manoeuvres and with Khatami's rather vague comments, accompanied by Karroubi's growing caution. How does the mass movement organise itself to maintain a lasting challenge?

My thought --- strictly as an outsider, I have to add --- is that your comment does not necessarily lead to a separation of the grassroots from the political figures. Another EA reader just posted, "The Iranian people were still shouting [their] names during their protests." I do wonder now, however, if waiting for leadership --- given not only specific issues about the figures you mention but the wider political environment in Iran --- means Waiting for Godot.

So, as the demonstrations of 16 Azar (7 December) approach but, more importantly, as the movement passes that marker and six months of resistance, I wonder again, "How now to organise?"

An hour after I drafted this response, another contributing twist: Agh Bahman, via Pedestrian's blog, has put together the thoughts of activists about the strategy for 16 Azar. The immediate concern of "Flowers for Bullets", the strategy advocated by recently-released detainee Emad Bahavar: how to maintain a peaceful and effective Green protest?

We've posted those thoughts in a separate entry.

Iran: 3 Problems (for the Greens, for the US, for Ahmadinejad)

0645 GMT: A busy Wednesday, not only in political updates but in conversations with those who have a window into what is happening in Washington and Tehran. The politics and possibilities are so complex that days will be needed to work through the analysis but:

1. The chief problem for the Green movement vis-a-vis the US is not if there is an envoy --- Mohajerani, Makhmalbaf, Sazegara --- but its lack of a clear policy (how would it take power? what would it do if it held power? is there even a single Movement rather than movements?). Then again, does that matter? In other words, if the Green movement focuses on changing the situation inside Iran, giving the US Government (and everyone else) a different political scene to consider, can "Obama: You're with them or you're with us" be treated as a slogan rather than a pressing concern?

2. The chief problem for the Obama Administration is that its nuclear-first policy of engagement is facing the twin difficulty of 1) an Iranian Government that is too fractured and too weak to accept soon a "third-party enrichment" deal taking uranium outside the country and 2) its self-imposed artificial deadline of December to close off the talks and move to tougher sanctions. No doubt, since the talks are still "live" --- International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohmammad El Baradei, Russia, and Turkey are all pushing Tehran to accept a compromise on the Vienna third-party plan --- the US Government will try to push back the cut-off date into the New Year.

It is unlikely, however, that either Congress or the loud sections of the US media and "think tanks" will be willing to accept even a few months of grace. So Obama and advisors  face either the prospect of getting a sudden break-through in Iran's position (how to get to the Supreme Leader so he will endorse this?) or having to accept a "compromise" sanctions regime (probably financial and banking measures outside the United Nations framework).

And that in turn has consequences, because any rupture in the engagement with Iran will affect US strategy in near-by countries. All together now....Afghanistan.

3. And the problem for the Ahmadinejad Government? Take your pick.

The Green movement, whatever the indecisions and vagaries of prominent figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami and the recent caution of Mehdi Karroubi, won't go away. And the calendar is moving towards 16 Azar (7 December).

Unless the Supreme Leader has an immediate conversion, there will not be a nuclear agreement which both bolsters President Ahmadinejad's legitimacy and gives the impression of Iranian strength.

The "threats within" have resurrected: the Larijanis, Rafsanjani, other Parliamentarians, Ministries who don't like the quest for control of Ahmadinejad (or those allied with him). And they have plenty to work with --- the nuclear dispute, the Government's economic plans, the running sore of the post-election abuses.

The current manoeuvres to ease difficulties are no more than short-term bandages. Allow the most prominent reformists (e.g. Abtahi) to escape their recent sentences and face both the impression of weakness and the risk that those figures will not remain silent. Put them back in prison with "compromise" sentences (2-3 years) and make them martyrs.

And the solutions which sweep away all these little problems? They risk taking down even the symbolic appearance of the Islamic Republic. A Revolutionary Guard public move to assume power, a negotiation to keep rule in the hands of the Supreme Leader (and his family), a new set of the "right" Grand Ayatollahs: any of these bring the pillars of 1979 crashing down.

Problems, problems, problems.....

The Latest from Iran (24 November): A Larijani-Rafsanjani Alliance?

1910 GMT: Prosecuting Journalists. Reporters without Borders has published a summary of latest news on journalists who have been convicted and arrested (and even one who was released).

1900 GMT: Some Good News for Mahmoud. President Ahmadinejad and his Brazilian counterpart, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, signed 13 cooperation agreements on trade, energy, stocks and banking, agriculture, news agenices, technology, culture, and visa requirements.

1735 GMT: Mortazavi Mystery Over? After days of rumours that he was in Evin Prison, former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi has appeared at the memorial service for Ali Kordan, the former Minister of Interior who died this weekend.

1725 GMT: Isolating Rafsanjani? Division of opinion here amongst EA staff: one colleague is saying Hashemi Rafsanjani is a spent force while another is arguing strongly that "the Shark" is far from finished and about to make another move.

If the latter, those in the regime opposed to Rafsanjani (and possibly worried about the possibility of his working in combination with Ali Larijani) will try to block it. Having dismissed him from the rota for Friday Prayers in Tehran and the Qods Day Prayer, authorities are now taking away the Eid al-Adha Prayer from Rafsanjani and giving it to Ahmad Khatami.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Protest at Qazvin University (23 November)
NEW Iran: Maziar Bahari Tells CBS of His Detention and Post-Election Conflict
NEW Iran: While the President’s Away…..The Contest Inside Tehran’s Establishment
Iran: Economics, Missing Money, and Ahmadinejad v. Parliament
Latest Iran Video: Protest at Khaje Nasir University (22 November)
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen: An Introduction to Conflict
Iran Revelation: Pro-Government MP Admits Election Was Manipulated

1715 GMT: Back from teaching break to find that Mousavi activist Majid Zamani has been released on bail.

1335 GMT: Your Daily University Demonstration. Video is now in of Monday's protest at Qazvin University; we've posted it in a separate entry.

1320 GMT: Atrianfar Sentenced. A reliable Iranian activist reports that journalist Mohammad Atrianfar's sentence, passed this weekend, was six years in jail and that he --- like former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi and student organisation leader Ahmad Zeidabadi --- has been released on bail while the sentence is appealed.

The same source claims that student activist Atafeh Nabavi has been sentenced to four years.

1230 GMT: A Persian-language site has published the names of more than 70 students who have been detained recently by the regime.

1100 GMT: Mr Smith Gets It Right. Back from a research seminar on Chomsky to find that Iran's Foreign Ministry has opened the door a bit on the talks on uranium enrichment:

Iran is not opposed to sending its low-enriched uranium (LEU) abroad but wants 100 percent guarantees of receiving higher-enriched fuel in return for a medical research reactor...."Nobody in Iran ever said that we are against sending 3.5 percent-enriched uranium abroad," Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said. "If we say we are looking for 100 percent guaranteees, it means that we want 3.5 percent enriched uranium to be sent out under such circumstances that we make sure that we will receive the 20 percent fuel."

That statement seems to bear out the analysis from EA's Mr Smith, offered last week: "[Iran's proposed] arrangement would allay Iranian fears that its uranium supply might be held indefinitely by some foreign party, including Russia."

0840 GMT: Today's Bang the War Drum Moment. The Guardian of London reaches far this morning in its presentation of all shades of opinion. Benny Morris, once a good historian and now a loud polemicist, wrings his hands over an Israeli military attack on Iran: "Obama will soon have to decide whether to give Israel a green light, and how brightly it will shine."

I think Morris would like the missiles to fly but he's passed the buck to the US President because of...

...the likely devastating repercussions –-- regional and global. These will probably include massive rocketing of Israel's cities and military bases by the Iranians and Hezbollah (from Lebanon), and possibly by Hamas (from Gaza). This could trigger land wars in Lebanon and Gaza as well as a protracted long-range war with Iran. It could see terrorism by Iranian agents against Israeli (and Jewish) targets around the world; a steep increase in world oil prices, which will rebound politically against Israel; and Iranian action against American targets in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf. More generally, Islamist terrorism against western targets could only grow.

0830 GMT: As for Dissent.... In this morning's New York Times, Robert Worth picks up on several developments in recent weeks to summarise the regime's efforts to defeat the opposition:

Stung by the force and persistence of the protests, the government appears to be starting a far more ambitious effort to discredit its opponents and re-educate Iran’s mostly young and restive population. In recent weeks, the government has announced a variety of new ideological offensives.

It is implanting 6,000 Basij militia centers in elementary schools across Iran to promote the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, and it has created a new police unit to sweep the Internet for dissident voices. A company affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards acquired a majority share in the nation’s telecommunications monopoly this year, giving the Guards de facto control of Iran’s land lines, Internet providers and two cellphone companies. And in the spring, the Revolutionary Guards plan to open a news agency with print, photo and television elements.

The government calls it “soft war,” and Iran’s leaders often seem to take it more seriously than a real military confrontation.

0815 GMT: Rooz Online are pressing the idea of co-operation between Ali Larijani and Hashemi Rafsanjani against the President. An analysis has highlighted Larijani's defense of Rafsanjani as a "pillar of the revolution" and, as we have in a separate entry, contrasted this with a view of Ali Reza Zakani's speech on the election and the National Unity Plan as an attack on Larijani.

0730 GMT: The US View of the Green Movement. Over the last two weeks, we have had intense debate over Washington's perception, inside and outside the US Government, of the Iranian opposition. Amongst this was a discussion of how the American elites might view filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbaf, with his recent talk at the Carnegie Endowment, as the spokesman for the Green Wave.

Interesting then to see Robin Wright, one of the top US-based journalists on Iran and the Middle East, highlight Makhmalbaf's speech and declare, with one quick qualification, "Iran's Green Movement Reaches Out to U.S."

0720 GMT: Nuclear Rhetoric or a Powerful Signal? Fars News' English-language site is putting a clear message on top of Deputy Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mohammadi's comments on Sunday: "Leader Has Final Say on Iran-US Talks". Mohammadi said in a roundtable at Tehran's Amir Kabir University:

The negotiation with the US is not possible without the permission by Imam and the Leader, and any kind of talks with the US must be permitted by the Supreme Leader. No Iranian President or Foreign Minister has had or will have the permission to act on establishment of relations with the US.

So is Mohammadi's declaration just the formal reiteration that Ayatollah Khamenei is atop the Iranian system? Is it a reassurance that any show of engagement with the US and Iranian proposals have the backing of the Supreme Leader? Or is this a message to Ahmadinejad and pro-deal allies to step away from the discussions?

0710 GMT: The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps has stepped up its line of US and Pakistani support of the Baluch insurgent group Jundallah, including last month's deadly suicide bombing in Baluchistan.

Addressing IRGC commanders in Isfahan, Brigadier General Gholam-Reza Soleimani said the US Central Intelligence Agency has been spending millions of dollars in its campaign against the Islamic Republic: "The CIA makes a contribution of more than one billion dollar each year to Pakistan's intelligence agency (Inter-Service Intelligence) as part of a campaign to eliminate individuals with anti-U.S. mentalities." He added that there was evidence of ISI and US involvement in many terrorist incidents in Iran, including the October bombing that claimed several IRGC commanders amongst more than 40 dead: "There exists documented evidence of links between (Abdolmalek) Rigi's terrorist group (Jundallah) and the CIA."

The Latest from Iran (20 November): Manoeuvres in Washington and Tabriz

NEW Iran: The Ahmadinejad Speech in Tabriz (19 November)
NEW Iran: Green Message to Obama "Back Us Instead of Dealing With Ahmadinejad"
Iran: What Happened on Election Night? The Ghalam News Editor’s Account
Iran Nuclear Special: What Tehran’s Latest Offer Means (and Why the West Should Consider It)
Iran’s 16 Azar Video: Greens Fight “The Pirates of the Persian Gulf”
Latest Iran Video: “A Death in Tehran” on Neda Agha Soltan (17 November)
The Latest in Iran (19 November): It’s the Nukes Today

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

2225 GMT: Today's UN Condemnation of Iran. The Third (Human Rights) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly has "expresse[d] its deep concern at serious ongoing and recurring human rights violations" in Iran. The non-binding resolution passed 74-48, with 59 abstentions.

The Committee voiced "particular concern at the response of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the Presidential election of 12 June 2009 and the concurrent rise in human rights violations", including "harassment, intimidation and persecution, including by arbitrary arrest, detention or disappearance, of opposition members, journalists and other media representatives, bloggers, lawyers, clerics, human rights defenders, academics, (and) students".

The outcome, the Committee asserted, had been "numerous deaths and injuries" Iwith "forced confessions and abuse of prisoners including ... rape and torture".

2115 GMT: The Brussels Non-Talks and Non-Sanctions. The New York Times has snippets of the statement issued by the delegations of the "5+1" powers after their review of the nuclear talks with Iran (see 1240 GMT):

We are disappointed by the lack of follow-up to the three understandings reached [at Geneva on 1 October]....[Iran has] not responded positively to the I.A.E.A. proposed agreement for the provision of nuclear fuel for its Tehran research reactor...[or] engaged in an intensified dialogue. ....[Iran should] reconsider the opportunity offered by this agreement to meet the humanitarian needs of its people and to engage seriously with us in dialogue and negotiations....[We will meet again soon] to complete our assessment of the situation and to decide on our next steps.

Read this carefully and you'll see that "the meeting...a sign of exasperation with Iran" is issuing a holding statement while the "West" tries to figure out a response to the Iran counter-offer, giving the appearance of stern action when nothing has been or will be decided.

It's good enough to take in The Times, which has seems to have no clue about the Mottaki counter-offer (1315 GMT), Iran's manoeuvres with Russia and Turkey (0945 and 1620 GMT), or even the manoeuvres of the International Atomic Energy Agency (1620 GMT). Thus, its simple depiction of the Iranian position as "rejection".

2020 GMT: Today's Media Stupidity Awards. First, the Gold Medal for Reasoned Argument for Mindless Violence. Step up, editorial writers of The Washington Times: "Get Ready to Bomb Iran: It's the last best chance for peace".

And now the Gold Medal for "Intellectual" Dismissal of The Other Side. It's Mamoun Fandy of the Christian Science Monitor:

Should the West trust Iranian promises? The short answer is "no." But the underlying question is "Why not?"

The answer lies in Iranian belief systems – notably the doctrine of taqiyya, a difficult concept for many non-Muslims to grasp. Taqiyya is the Shiite religious rationale for concealment or dissimulation in political or worldly affairs. At one level it means that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his regime can tell themselves that they are obliged by their faith not to tell the truth.

1955 GMT: More on Student Arrests (see 1410 GMT). Radio Zamaaneh have published summaries of the detentions of student leaders this week. Payvand also has information.

1945 GMT: You Better Watch Out. Back from a break for a debate on climate change and the Copenhagen summit to Iran’s Prosecutor General and former Minister of Intelligence, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, is getting tough with protesters. He warned yesterday on Iranian state television, "The Judiciary is determined to decisively and primitively confront any new unrest [caused] by those against the results of the Presidential Elections of Iran.”

1620 GMT: You Read It Here --- The Iran-Turkey Deal. Mr Smith checks in, and we think he may have an exclusive on the nuclear discussions:

It's interesting to spot smoke signals on the nuclear issue. The meeting of Ahmadinejad and Turkish Foreign Davutoglu meeting in Tabriz makes no sense unless Davutoglu was called in to discuss the nuclear issue, given the frequency of Iranian-Turkish encounters in the past weeks.

And I find El-Baradei's statements in Berlin to be subtly quite important. He said, according to AFP, "We have not received any written response from Iran. What I got...is an oral response, which basically said, 'We need to keep all the material in Iran until we get the fuel.' That to me is a case of extreme mistrust."

This is the gist of what I wrote in my own analysis the other day: mistrust by Iran, low-enriched uranium remaining inside Iran UNTIL fuel arrives. El Baradei's statement cannot be underestimated, as it gives hope to Turkey to be able to broker the deal. Needless to say, this would be the diplomatic coup of the century by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. It would raise his stature incommensurably and allow him to press on with the politics of the Nabucco energy pipeline.

1500 GMT: Not much fuss about Friday Prayers today, but there's a short clip up on YouTube.

1455 GMT: Ahmadinejad's Move for Legitimacy. We've posted a copy of the President's Thursday speech in Tabriz.

1410 GMT: Cracking Down on the Students. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty summarises a story we've been following for days: "arrests [as] a move by the authorities to prevent students from protesting against the government on December 7".

1315 GMT: The Mottaki Counter-Offer. Just picking up, after prompting from an EA reader, on an important signal from Iran's Foreign Minister. Most of the Western coverage of Iran's "rejection" of the deal on uranium enrichment (rather than consideration of Iran as taking the next step in negotiations) is based on a weak translation of Mottaki's interview with the Iranian Students News Agency. Almost unnoticed was the Foreign Minister's words to the Hindu newspaper:

We believe that with the continuation of the diplomacy going on now, it is possible to reach an agreement and compromise.... The truth of the matter is [the] interaction [of the "5+1" with the Iran proposal] could somehow build confidence among the Iranians.

1255 GMT: Nuke Discussions Still On. Can't be clearer than this. The US position, as outlined in Kabul yesterday:

The U.S. doesn’t consider the Iranian foreign minister’s rejection of a United Nations- brokered proposal to enrich Iran’s uranium overseas to be “the final word,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said.

While disappointing, she said, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki’s Nov. 18 statement won’t yet trigger the “consequences” that the U.S. and other nations on the UN Security Council have threatened.

1240 GMT: The Brussels "5+1" Talks. First (non)-news out of Brussels on discussions amongst representatives of the US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China after Wednesday's counter-offer by Iran for a "swap" of uranium. The meeting was of Foreign Ministry/State Department officials below ministerial level --- the US was represented by Undersecretary of State William Burns and Russia by Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. The delegates reviewed the situation but made no decisions.

This is unsurprising. Contrary to the partial and inaccurate reports in Western media this morning (see 0725 GMT), Washington has not closed the door on discussions and is not moving aggressively for more sanctions. This meeting most likely considered a response to the Iranian counter-offer --- expect to see signals at the start of next week.

1155 GMT: Mahmoud is Proud of His Election. In his tour of Tabriz, President Ahmadinejad is emphasising that while elections in other countries are "entirely predetermined", the 85 percent participation in Iran's Presidential election in June shows the endpoint of the Islamic Republic's development.

Ahmadinejad also spoke about his economic plans, including subsidy and tax proposals, but it is notable that he --- or at least the Islamic Republic News Agency --- relegate this to a secondary position behind the President's words about an election hed more than five months ago.

0945 GMT: Two Smoke Signals on the Nuclear Deal. Turkish Foreign Ahmet Davutoglu will meet President Ahmadinejad in Tabriz today "to discuss the latest developments in Iran's nuclear case" with a view "to solv[ing] tensions between Iran and the West".

That reads as an effort by Iran to get Turkey's support for the "swap" of uranium inside Iran, rather than sending Tehran's uranium stocks outside the country for enrichment. It should be considered alongside Iran's manoeuvres with Russia: it is being reported that Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko has told the Iranian Ambassador that "Russia will continue its cooperation with Iran".

0900 GMT: We've now posted an analysis of the significance of the mission by Mohsen Makhmalbaf, the campaign spokesman for Mir Hossein Mousavi, to Washington.

0725 GMT: On the surface, a quiet morning and a day that --- for the "Western" media --- will again be dominated by coverage of developments in the nuclear talks.

If last night's advance copies of articles are an indication, expect a distorted piece in The Washington Post claiming an Iranian rejection of the "5+1" proposals, highlighting a tough US response, and ignoring the significance of Wednesday's Iranian counter-offer. (That's distorted on two important counts: Tehran, or at least the Ahmadinejad Government is pushing for a deal and may have gotten some movement from the Supreme Leader to make the counter-offer, and the Obama Administration is far from concluding that the talks are over.)

That means a development which is just as important, if not more so, will be missed. The Wall Street Journal breaks the news of an "unofficial" visit by filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbaf (pictured left) to Washington. Makhmalbaf, the spokesman for Mir Hossein Mousavi's Presidential campaign, "called for President Barack Obama to increase his public support for Iranian democrats and significantly intensify financial pressure on Tehran's elite military unit, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps".

A disturbing piece of news. Sources are claiming that Iranian security services are sending ominous SMS texts warning against further demonstrations.