The Latest from Iran (29 November): Iran's Nuclear Bluff

2055 GMT: No Big Deal for Engagement. Iran's declaration of plans for "10 enrichment plants" changes little in the political equation. Here is the statement from British Foreign Minister David Miliband:

We have stated over and again that we recognise Iran's right to a civilian nuclear programme, but they must restore international confidence in their intentions. Instead of engaging with us Iran chooses to provoke and dissemble. Iran can flaunt its isolation but this will only increase the calm, determination and unity of the international community. I urge Iran to recognise this, and to accept the outstretched hand on offer.

2020 GMT: A Holiday from Protests. Pedestrian has noted the Government's sudden declaration that schools will be closed on 14 Azar (5 December) and that Government offices must give employees the day off if they wish. As 15 Azar (6 December) is already a holiday for Eid-e Ghadir, Pedestrian summarises:

This means that on Monday, 16 Azar, the day of the student demonstrations, many students will be away on holiday. Workers and employees will not able to take some of the day off having just gotten back after a 4 day holiday [Thursday --- some government offices, all universities and some schools are closed on Thursdays --- Friday, Saturday and Sunday]. More importantly, this will also mean that the crucial days before the demonstrations, all schools will be closed and students will not have the chance to do last minute planning.

This is not a new trick: I recall that, earlier in the post-election crisis, the Government also offered a last-minute holiday before one of the mass gatherings.

NEW Today’s Iran Non-Story: Some Guy Who Looked Like Ahmadinejad Protested in 1984
NEW Video: The Mothers of Martyrs Protest (28 November)
NEW Iran: The Routes of 16 Azar
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Iran: The Campaign to Free Atefeh Nabavi
The Latest on Iran (28 November): Turning Attention Back to Tehran

1944 GMT: Advar News has posted a story and photographs of today's protest at Tehran University.

1930 GMT: Sigh. After the rush of of political manoeuvring this morning, little news coming out from inside Iran. Instead, the "Western" media has gone viral over the "10 enrichment plants" story (see 1635 GMT). This is understandable, as it fits the narrative of devious Iran.

It also ignores the political dynamics: this is the logical (if ham-fisted) symbolic response to the "third-party enrichment" deal, keeping the uranium stock inside Iran. It ignores the technical issue that Iran does not have the uranium supply to keep its primary enrichment facility at Natanz 100% busy, let alone 10 more (see 1645 GMT).

And, perhaps surprisingly, the media are not even reflecting on their shock-horror claim that Iran is making this move to control the process of 20% enrichment for its medical research reactor. That's a civilian use of uranium, a long way from the "Iran is on the verge of military capability" narrative.

1700 GMT: Nukes Plus Internal Situation = A Challenge? And while everybody watches the Parliament and Government strike their poses, here comes Hashemi Rafsanjani. The former President has used a speech today to twin the latest on the nuclear issue with a swipe at the internal situation. After criticising the IAEA resolution, Rafsanjani declared that "street violence is caused by the lack of an atmosphere of free criticism".

1645 GMT: Why the Government Response is a Bluff. While Western media quickly seizes on the Government's declaration of 10 new enrichment plants, consider this: the immediate problem for Iran is not enrichment capacity but the lack of uranium stock. The response to the IAEA resolution means little unless Tehran can establish new lines of uranium supply.

1635 GMT: The Nuclear Response. The Parliament appears to have established its challenge not only to the "West" but to President Ahmadinejad. It has approved a resolution asking Ahmadinejad to submit plans for reduced interaction with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

However, the most recent development indicates that the Government will not have to be pushed, at least in the symbolic short-term. Iranian state television reports that the Government, declaring that it will ensure the production of 20 percent uranium for civilian use, has approved plans to build 10 new uranium enrichment plants. The Iranian nuclear agency has been instructed to begin construction on five plants, with locations for five more to be established over the next two months.

1630 GMT: Report that university lecturer, journalist, and activist Dr. Fayaz Zahed has been released on bail after 80 days in detention.

1325 GMT: Fighting the Velvet Revolutionaries. The Iranian Parliament passed a law today earmarking $20 million to "support progressive currents that resist illegal activities by the governments of the US and Britain", to "confront plots and unjust restrictions" by Washington and London against Tehran, and to disclose "human rights abuses by the two countries".

The proposal of the $20 million was tabled months ago, and there had been reports that up to $50 million would be sought.

A committee with representatives from Iran's intelligence services, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Foreign Ministry, and the communication and culture ministries will oversee the funds.

1140 GMT: Today's Media Iran Low-Light. The Mail on Sunday in Britain has a classic non-story about someone who is probably Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who protested in London in 1984. We've bowed down to this journalistic triumph in a separate entry.

1115 GMT: We've posted a video of yesterday's weekly gathering of the "Mothers of Martyrs" and sympathisers at Laleh Park in Tehran.

1023 GMT: More Detainee Testimony. An EA reader follows up the account of a detainee in Evin Prison (see 0805 GMT) with the letter from lawyer and human rights activist Heshmatollah Tabarzadi to the Supreme Leader. The reader has kindly provided an English translation on a video featuring the letter, which details abuses of detainees.

0813 GMT: Half the Story. Press TV has posted the Ali Larijani comments denouncing the IAEA resolution on Iran's nuclear programme (see 0755 GMT):

If you keep up this ludicrous carrot and stick policy, Iran will make 'new arrangements' in its interaction with the Agency. The resolution passed by the Board of Governors shows that we must be more alert when considering their proposals. This motion shows that they had no intention whatsoever to negotiate a solution but were engaged in "political chicanery”.

No mention, however, in the Press TV article that Larijani has been a determined foe of the Government's strategy and that this could be part of a broader Parliamentary challenge to President Ahmadinejad.

0810 GMT: We've split off our first update of the morning, "The Routes of 16 Azar", as a separate analysis.

0805 GMT: EA readers point me to the account of a detainee who spent 21 months in Evin Prison for political activities, "Abandon Hope All Ye Who Enter Here".

0755 GMT: Here Comes Larijani. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who has been hostile toward a nuclear deal to the point of challenging President Ahmadinejad, told Parliament today, "If the West continues to pressure us, then parliament can review Iran's cooperation level with the IAEA."

More important than any threat to suspend inspections or even leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty is Larijani's growing confidence. The IAEA resolution is a boost for him, as it helps him play the nationalist card against a Government that has been eager to engage with the "West", especially the US.

Indeed, if I was playing cynical politics, I would suggest that continuing the threat of sanctions and denouncing Iran's motives is a way to build up an alternative to President Ahmadinejad, especially as Larijani has been linked to an even bigger post in a National Unity Plan.

But Washington can't be looking that many moves ahead, can it?

0745 GMT: Brazil Says No Sanctions. A quick post-script on the International Atomic Energy Agency resolution on Iran's nuclear programme: Brazil's ambassador to the IAEA is making clear that his country stands against harsher measures, as sanctions "will only lead to a hardening of the Iranian position". Brazil abstained in the IAEA vote.

The South American country has no seat on the United Nations Security Council, so the statement is more significant as an indicator that major countries outside the Council may stand back from any US-led effort to turn from engagement to confrontation.

Iran: The Routes of 16 Azar

The most interesting news last night was low-key but noticeable. In early evening details of the routes for the protests of 16 Azar (7 December) spread across Twitter. There were references to new student movements organised in recent days.

It is still more than a week before National Students Day, but I have a sense that precisely because of the Government efforts to stamp out any significant dissent, particularly through the arrests of student activists, that the efforts to ensure a mass turnout have re-doubled. This may also be fuelled by the determination to show that the movement is not dependent on statements and actions "from the top" but is ready to press its demands at the grassroots.

The irony is that, on National Students Day, there will have to many non-students who are also on the streets. If the Government can represent this as "only" the protest of trouble-makers at universities --- because students, free from jobs and responsibility, are always the source of mischief --- then it will have contained the challenge.

8 days to go.

The Latest from Iran (27 November): Where Now?

2020 GMT: We've posted news of a campaign, "I Am Atefeh", to express support for Atefeh Nabavi, the first woman jailed for post-election protest.

2015 GMT: Ayatollah JavAdi-Amoli announced, during today's Friday Prayers in Qom, that this was his last sermon. Since June, Javadi-Amoli had expressed his displeasure over post-election events.

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Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? A Discussion on (Non)-Violence
Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? The EA Discussion
Latest Iran Video: BBC’s Neda Documentary “An Iranian Martyr”
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The Latest from Iran (26 November): Corridors of Conflict

1815 GMT: One More Time --- The Talks Go On (But Time for Tehran to Deal). Here's the White House statement on today's IAEA resolution:

Today's overwhelming vote at the IAEA's Board of Governors demonstrates the resolve and unity of the international community with regard to Iran's nuclear program. It underscores broad consensus in calling upon Iran to live up to its international obligations and offer transparency in its nuclear program. It also underscores a commitment to strengthen the rules of the international system, and to support the ability of the IAEA and UN Security Council to enforce the rules of the road, and to hold Iran accountable to those rules. Indeed, the fact that 25 countries from all parts of the world cast their votes in favor shows the urgent need for Iran to address the growing international deficit of confidence in its intentions.

The United States has strongly supported the Director General’s positive proposal to provide Iran fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor - a proposal intended to help meet the medical and humanitarian needs of the Iranian people while building confidence in Iran’s intentions. The United States has recognized Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy and remains willing to engage Iran to work toward a diplomatic solution to the concerns about its nuclear program, if - and only if - Iran chooses such a course. To date, Iran has refused a follow-on meeting to the October 1 meeting with the P5+1 countries if its nuclear program is included on the agenda. Our patience and that of the international community is limited, and time is running out. If Iran refuses to meet its obligations, then it will be responsible for its own growing isolation and the consequences.

Here's what it means:

1. The second enrichment plant at Fordoo near Qom --- of no relevance except as pretext;
2. The El Baradei statement of a "dead end" on verification --- tangential
3. The Iranian response to the Vienna "third-party enrichment" deal --- the be-all and end-all of this meeting.

In other words, this IAEA meeting has been a two-day setpiece to put Tehran's feet to the fire on the October proposal. If Iran now refuses that plan, and if the "West" decides that the Tehran counter-offer of a "swap" is out of bounds, then and only then will there a move beyond engagement. Even then, it is far from clear if that push for sanctions will have any backing from Russia and China.

1455 GMT: Forgive us for being Nukes, Nukes, Nukes, but little else is breaking at the moment. More posturing, this time from Iran's ambassador to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh, but note that this follows script of keeping channel open for discussions --- "jeopardise" is a mild democratic warning not to go farther:

.Adoption of this resolution is not only unhelpful in improving the current situation, but it will jeopardise the conducive environment vitally needed for success in the process of Geneva and Vienna negotiations expected to lead to a common understanding.

1355 GMT: At some point someone is going to figure out that IAEA members have not forced a showdown with Iran and, indeed, that they have not even moved away from talks and towards further sanctions. Here's the latest coded signal, courtesy of British Foreign Secretary David Miliband:

The resolution passed today by the IAEA Board of Governors sends the strongest possible signal to Iran that its actions and intentions remain a matter of grave international concern. As the resolution makes clear, Iran needs to comply with its obligations both to the IAEA and to the UNSC. Unless it does this, it remains impossible for the international community to have any confidence in Iranian intentions.

Britain and the other members of the E3+3 have made it very clear that our hand is stretched out to Iran. We are waiting for Iran to respond meaningfully. But if it is clear that Iran has chosen not to do so, we will have no alternative but to consider further pressure on Iran, in line with the dual track policy we have been pursuing.

And this position is not altered by Prime Minister Gordon Brown's rhetorical blast: "[Iran] should accept the offers that have been made that they can have civil nuclear power with our support, but they've got to renounce nuclear weapons. I believe the next stage will have to be sanctions if Iran does not respond to what is a very clear vote from the world community."

1210 GMT: We've just posted an urgent assessment on the International Atomic Energy Agency's resolution, passed today, on Iran's nuclear programme. The real significance --- and this is being missed by the media, who are just following the original Reuters report (see Al Jazeera English, for example) --- is that it is a very mild rebuke of Iran. That in turn means talks with Tehran on uranium enrichment are still alive.

1120 GMT: Iran's Nobel Prize Response. We saw this one coming yesterday when we reported on the Iranian Government's seizure of the Nobel Peace Prize medal and diploma of lawyer and human rights activist Shirin Ebadi. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehman-Parast said today, "Much the same as European countries, tax evasion is a crime in Iran and individuals would face legal penalties should they commit such an act."

Mehman-Parast added that if Norwegian officials really cared about human rights, they would not have abstained in the United Nations vote on the Goldstone Report on the Gaza War.

1023 GMT: Filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbaf has won the Freedom to Create Prize, donating the $125,000 prize to non-governmental organisations helping victims of Iran's post-election conflict and dedicating the award to Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. A video of the presentation has been posted on YouTube.

0955 GMT: Nuke Update. Nothing yet coming out of the International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in Vienna. The media, as in this CNN report, is just recycling yesterday's leaked soundbite of Mohammad El Baradei's statement that IAEA analysis of Iran's nuclear status is at a "dead end".

0945 GMT: Dutch television has obtained an interview with Mehdi Karroubi. The exchange is in Farsi with Dutch subtitles.

0830 GMT: Morning Media Moment. Emily Landau of The Jerusalem Post gets in a pre-emptive strike of fanciful "analysis" with her claim, "Dangerous Misreading Iran". That "misreading" is any thought that Iran's position in the nuclear talks is affected by internal development and, in particular, the post-12 June tensions:

The confusion emanating from Iran is simply the most recent manifestation of a well-known pattern that has been repeated in different forms for close to seven years. The "yes, no, maybe" answers from Iran are the tactic that serves its overall strategy in the nuclear realm.

Which would be a fair hypothesis if Landau produced a paragraph, a sentence, even a few words setting out this "well-known pattern". She doesn't.

The serious point here is a leading Israeli academic, "the director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University", could show not one scrap of perception about the internal dynamics behind Iran's nuclear programme and foreign policy. Instead, "analysis" rests on the unshakeable position: There Cannot (and Should Not) Be a Deal with Iran.

At least the headline's good: I just suspect it's better applied to the author than to her straw-person targets.

0755 GMT: The international media are likely to be dominated today by speculations and leaks about the second day of discussions at the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran's nuclear programme.

So, before getting drawn into that issue, we've taken the time --- with the help of readers and fellow bloggers --- to post two discussions about the next steps for the Green Wave(s). The use of the plural is deliberate, as you'll soon see in the debate on the evolving nature of the movement(s); the other, equally important discussion is on non-violence as protest moves towards 16 Azar (7 December) . So is our desire in posting them, not for a conclusive answer but for reflection on how and where protest and resistance develop in this marathon conflict.

Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? A Discussion on (Non)-Violence

This analysis by Agh Bahman, via the blog of Pedestrian, complements our discussion this morning of the challenges and possibilities for the Green movement(s) as they move into the next phase of protest and politics, six months after the disputed Presidential election:

There’s only two weeks left to [the protests of] 16 Azar [7th of December] and some are expecting it to be like 13 Aban [4 November], if not like Quds Day [18 September]. At the same time, after 13 Aban, some conclude that the violence of security forces is really to provoke people towards violence too. And this will pave the way for more violence on the part of security.

Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? The EA Discussion

The harsher tone and actions of some demonstrators has worried some and certain political figures and activists have expressed their worries about the green movement becoming violent. (note I am not referring to some really funny or cool slogans, but the general demands of the movement).



I too am slightly worried about this. That is, I am worried about the movement getting more violent or its demands going beyond the “total implementation of the constitution” and the “full release of political prisoners”. I think this will reduce the universality of the movement. Not to mention that we must measure the strength of every movement in its demands. If the green movement can reach a full implementation of the constitution, it has done more than anyone can imagine (if you have some time, go and read the constitution, and note this also that [Mir Hossein] Mousavi and especially [Mehdi] Karoubi have stressed that they want to go back to the draft of the constitution written in 1979).

I’m going to bring in some analysis and statements released in the past few days about the need to abstain from violence on 16 Azar. Note that one of these was released by Tahkim Vahdat [Iranian student organisation], one of the most radical factions within Iran. Maybe they are truly worried that they are speaking out about this. You can read the full statements via the links I’ve put, here I only repost those parts which have to do with this discussion.

Statement by Tahkim Vahdat

Political activists are going through one of the most difficult times since the revolution. They no longer have minimum freedoms to hold even a small gathering. In this atmosphere we ask citizens to participate in upcoming demonstrations in the most peaceful manner and to shout slogans which keep the green movement within the frameworks of a peaceful movement and to keep from any radicalization, because the highest aim of this movement is to save Iran from the hands of those radicals which are willing to sacrifice all for the benefit of their own faction.

The Green Movement lives on because of its emphasis on peaceful protest, abiding the law, an emphasis on the constitution, and ethical behavior. Attributes which all go against the current dominant authority which sets up a tragedy like Kahrizak and blames one doctor for all the atrocities and through doing so only brings back the horrors of the student dormitories and a stolen plastic shaver [the only person charged with the assault on the student dormitories in 1999 was convicted of stealing a plastic shaver].

Statement by the Iran Freedom Movement

The state will have to pay a heavy price for using this much violence. It will want to continue this path. Thus, it will need to justify it. The authorities want to radicalize this movement. Experience has shown us that once citizens utilize violence, this only gives the state an excuse to use more of it.

Paramilitary forces infiltrate the ranks of protesters and try to provoke them to react violently. This is while militants always have the upper hand in violent combat because of the resources they have available to them. At the same time, the radicalization of this movement will only reduce its universality, and reduce the number of people willing to stand with it. Thus, a movement which allowed for all people, whether young or old, man or woman, family or individuals to participate in its gatherings might evolve into something that few will be willing to participate in.

The Freedom Movement of Iran believes that this movement will only triumph if it abides by peaceful, paths of reform. “Non-violence” is not only a temporary tactic. But rather, from the birth of this movement, it has been the main strategy.

Unfortunately, some opposition forces outside the country which do not have realistic views of the realities inside, willingly or unwillingly are provoking students to violence for 16 Azar. They are urging students to use the militia’s tactics on 13 Aban to “get revenge” on 16 Azar.

Iranian Labor News Agency's interview with Ezatollah Sahabi, head of the Freedom Movement

A movement which is not hierarchical has advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that the movement can not be uprooted and can not be silenced because it has no particular leaders and is spread out strongly across society. At the same time, it can easily sway or go in different directions exactly because it has no particular leaders. But we must keep from radical, violent reactions.

On the Strategy of Flowers for Bullets, by Emad Bahavar [recently released from prison]

The state has yet to even acknowledge the existence of the green movement. When the head of the political wing of the Islamic Coalition Part was asked “how the country should exit this current crisis/situation” he replied: “there is no situation. The fact that chaos has reached a minimum shows that we are no longer in any situation.” Their analysis is based on an old calculation: historically, 20% of Tehran has been in disagreement with them, but has been sitting silently at home and has posed no particular to the state. The events following the elections has given this minority “hope” to create chaos and change the political system. This group will eventually go home when they discover that nothing has really changed.

There is no doubt that this analysis is wrong. Do they choose to ignore this reality or simply do not see it? … We can assess that the state has entered this equation based on a wrong analysis. This movement truly exists. This movement is not only on the surface but is rooted within society. Its demands are serious and not meeting them or even minding them will create serious obstacles and crises be it in the social, political or economic realms for the system. The persistence of these demands will only slowly eat away at the legitimacy of the system itself. But even while activists, professors and intellectuals warn of this, the state pays no heed. One reason for this lack of attention will always be that the state will claim these analyses are provided by “Western Humanities” and have nothing to do with our “Eastern, Islamic” culture. They claim that the very roots of legitimacy of the state are defined differently in the Islamic context.

The system will try its best to reduce this movement to a demonstration of a few thousand students alone. If the demonstrations get violent, the state will use “its legal permission to use legitimate violence”. Not to mention that if the movement itself grows violent, fewer individuals will be willing to join its ranks. This will only reduce the movement to a violent, chaotic effort that will soon be killed off completely by security forces. Some opposition forces outside the country, willingly or unwillingly are trying to make this happen. It is obvious that anti-establishment opposition forces outside the country did not start this movement, but they can certainly try to see it end.

On the part of the state, it has thus been decided that violence is preferred to any sort of negotiation or compromise. They are determined to shut down any “chaos” using force and security measures. To do this more broadly, they need a radicalized, violent demonstration. They are thus counting on a mass violent reaction for 13 Aban. 16 Azar is the best opportunity to use the anger of the students. The authorities will at the same time force the leaders of the movement to loudly break ranks with those who are willing to go too far and thus create one of the greatest cracks in the movement so far.

Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? The EA Discussion

Yesterday an EA reader sent me this thoughtful and challenging comment:

I would like to point out what seems to be an oversight/flaw in your general understanding of the Green movement. By all counts, the vast majority of Iranians who have been out on the streets and questioning the legitimacy of [President] Ahmadi[nejad] and his cohorts, have no sympathy for Mousavi and "his" Green movement.

Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? A Discussion on (Non)-Violence

They are more being driven by their own frustrations, hopelessness and overwhelming desire to bring change. It is not likely that in any open contest, if given the choice, the majority of Iranians would be in support of the continuation of the Iranian regime as an Islamic Republic with its flawed constitution--the main refrain of [Mir Hossein] Mousavi and [Mohammad] Khatami is that there is nothing wrong with the Islamic Revolution, it is simply the deviation from the path of [Imam] Khomeini that is a problem.

So by focusing on, for example, whether [Ataollah] Mohajerani, [Mohsen] Sazegara or [Mohsen] Makhmalbaf (all figures tainted in the minds of many Iranians for their support of the regime who have only come to the party because there friends are now out of power and they would like to change that, you are missing the point about the magnitude of anger with the regime and all of its supporters over the past 30 years.

The loss inflicted by the Islamic Republic on Iran and Iranians is unfathomable for non-Iranians. The movement in Iran (which is not Green) is a manifestation of 30 years of pain and represents a demand for fundamental change. It would be a huge shame if that change is ultimately represented by Mousavi, Sazegara, Makhbalbaf and their friends....

This was my immediate response:

If you read between the lines, I think you may see our evolving thought that those at the grassroots and prominent figures such as Mousavi should no longer be conflated (I agree fully that --- being on a learning curve here --- we have made that conflation). At the same time, I think our sense has been that there is a synergy of pressure brought by the different aspects, i.e., if a Karroubi or Mousavi made a public move, that might energise the mass movement (and, conversely, that protest such as that on 30 July or Qods Days could bolster the challenge of those figures).

What recent weeks have raised, I think, is the question of whether the challenge still rests on that synergy, as I sense a disillusionment with Mousavi's inability to be visible on occasions such as 13 Aban and his recent manoeuvres and with Khatami's rather vague comments, accompanied by Karroubi's growing caution. How does the mass movement organise itself to maintain a lasting challenge?

My thought --- strictly as an outsider, I have to add --- is that your comment does not necessarily lead to a separation of the grassroots from the political figures. Another EA reader just posted, "The Iranian people were still shouting [their] names during their protests." I do wonder now, however, if waiting for leadership --- given not only specific issues about the figures you mention but the wider political environment in Iran --- means Waiting for Godot.

So, as the demonstrations of 16 Azar (7 December) approach but, more importantly, as the movement passes that marker and six months of resistance, I wonder again, "How now to organise?"

An hour after I drafted this response, another contributing twist: Agh Bahman, via Pedestrian's blog, has put together the thoughts of activists about the strategy for 16 Azar. The immediate concern of "Flowers for Bullets", the strategy advocated by recently-released detainee Emad Bahavar: how to maintain a peaceful and effective Green protest?

We've posted those thoughts in a separate entry.