Iran: 3 Problems (for the Greens, for the US, for Ahmadinejad)

0645 GMT: A busy Wednesday, not only in political updates but in conversations with those who have a window into what is happening in Washington and Tehran. The politics and possibilities are so complex that days will be needed to work through the analysis but:

1. The chief problem for the Green movement vis-a-vis the US is not if there is an envoy --- Mohajerani, Makhmalbaf, Sazegara --- but its lack of a clear policy (how would it take power? what would it do if it held power? is there even a single Movement rather than movements?). Then again, does that matter? In other words, if the Green movement focuses on changing the situation inside Iran, giving the US Government (and everyone else) a different political scene to consider, can "Obama: You're with them or you're with us" be treated as a slogan rather than a pressing concern?

2. The chief problem for the Obama Administration is that its nuclear-first policy of engagement is facing the twin difficulty of 1) an Iranian Government that is too fractured and too weak to accept soon a "third-party enrichment" deal taking uranium outside the country and 2) its self-imposed artificial deadline of December to close off the talks and move to tougher sanctions. No doubt, since the talks are still "live" --- International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohmammad El Baradei, Russia, and Turkey are all pushing Tehran to accept a compromise on the Vienna third-party plan --- the US Government will try to push back the cut-off date into the New Year.

It is unlikely, however, that either Congress or the loud sections of the US media and "think tanks" will be willing to accept even a few months of grace. So Obama and advisors  face either the prospect of getting a sudden break-through in Iran's position (how to get to the Supreme Leader so he will endorse this?) or having to accept a "compromise" sanctions regime (probably financial and banking measures outside the United Nations framework).

And that in turn has consequences, because any rupture in the engagement with Iran will affect US strategy in near-by countries. All together now....Afghanistan.

3. And the problem for the Ahmadinejad Government? Take your pick.

The Green movement, whatever the indecisions and vagaries of prominent figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami and the recent caution of Mehdi Karroubi, won't go away. And the calendar is moving towards 16 Azar (7 December).

Unless the Supreme Leader has an immediate conversion, there will not be a nuclear agreement which both bolsters President Ahmadinejad's legitimacy and gives the impression of Iranian strength.

The "threats within" have resurrected: the Larijanis, Rafsanjani, other Parliamentarians, Ministries who don't like the quest for control of Ahmadinejad (or those allied with him). And they have plenty to work with --- the nuclear dispute, the Government's economic plans, the running sore of the post-election abuses.

The current manoeuvres to ease difficulties are no more than short-term bandages. Allow the most prominent reformists (e.g. Abtahi) to escape their recent sentences and face both the impression of weakness and the risk that those figures will not remain silent. Put them back in prison with "compromise" sentences (2-3 years) and make them martyrs.

And the solutions which sweep away all these little problems? They risk taking down even the symbolic appearance of the Islamic Republic. A Revolutionary Guard public move to assume power, a negotiation to keep rule in the hands of the Supreme Leader (and his family), a new set of the "right" Grand Ayatollahs: any of these bring the pillars of 1979 crashing down.

Problems, problems, problems.....