Afghanistan-Pakistan Video & Text: US Envoy Holbrooke Briefing (23 November)

On Monday, President Obama's special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, held a press briefing (the video has only just emerged on the Web). Its purpose was two-fold: 1) to prove that Holbrooke, who has effectively been banished from Afghanistan by the Karzai Government, still has some role to play in US policy and 2) to set up President Obama's announcement next Tuesday, which will likely authorise some level of US military escalation, by explaining that the US is really, really serious about non-military measures and ensuring that the Afghan Government can eventually take over responsibilities.

Not sure this briefing succeeded on either count: Holbrooke now seems to be on the fringes of the Administration and the purported American programmes seem to have more style than substance: even the pro-Obama site that posted this could only point to this "highlight": "The U.S. is pulling out from financing the heroin poppy eradication program, this will now be run by the Afghan government. The U.S. will instead put substantial effort and money toward rebuilding the agricultural sector. Afghans have traditionally been very productive farmers, and it would be wise to offer support in this area."

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AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Thanks, P.J. I’m here to report on Secretary Clinton’s trip to Afghanistan, and also, since I haven’t been here since Pakistan, happy to talk about that too.

And before I go into any of the trip, I want to explain this – these members of our team from our office. This is not our whole team. These are just some of the people. But I’d like each one of them just to stand, identify who they are, and what they do because we’re here today to talk about the civilian effort, but most of the focus is understandably on the troop issue. But that’s not what we’re here to talk about. And this is the whole-of-government approach. Some of the people you know, some of the people you don’t know.

I’d just like to start here with Dereck and just let each person stand, say who they are, and what agency they’re with and what they do, and then we’ll get into the discussion.

MR. HOGAN: Good afternoon. My name is Dereck Hogan. I’m a State Department Foreign Service officer and I focus on governance and (inaudible).

MS. WHITE: I’m Maureen White and I’m the (inaudible) and I focus on refugee and (inaudible).

MR. SHY: My name is Rami Shy. I’m with the Department of Treasury, working for (inaudible).

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Some of you know Rami. It’s not for today’s – necessary, but it’s a very important issue, and we have these big State-Treasury task forces on illicit finance.

MS. GOODMAN: Hi, I’m Mary Beth Goodman. I’m a Foreign Service officer focusing on energy and economics.

MS. KOENEN: Good afternoon. Julie Koenen, working on development issues in Pakistan.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: And from AID.

MS. KOENEN: From USAID, yeah.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Sepideh.

MS. KEYVANSHAD: Hi, I’m Sepideh Keyvanshad, also from USAID on detail working on development of foreign assistance.

MR. STIGLITZ: Hello, Matt Stiglitz. I’m on detail from the Department of Justice working on rule of law and other related issues.

MR. REIMANN: Hello. Chris Riemann, detail from the FBI working on police training and capacity building.

MS. ARZT: Good afternoon, JoAnne Arzt from the State Department. I focus on civilian staffing.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: She – JoAnne has overseen this enormous increase in our civilian personnel.

MS. MARRIOTT: Hello, my name is Jane Marriott. You can tell from the accent I’m a British Foreign Service officer and (inaudible) seconded to work for Ambassador Holbrooke, and I focus on Afghanistan political issues, including elections and reintegration issues.

MS. AMIRI: Good afternoon. My name is Rina Amiri. I’m the Senior Advisor on Afghanistan to Ambassador Holbrooke and I work on election-related issues and political issues.

MR. LIST: Tim List from the Department of Homeland Security. I work mainly on cross-border and border management issues.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: And the Coast Guard, right, Tim?

MR. LIST: Yes, sir.

MS. SIMON: I’m Jessica Simon, Foreign Service officer – some of you know me – working on capacity (inaudible).

MR. GONZALEZ: Hi, I’m Otto Gonzalez. I’m on assignment from the U.S. Department of Agriculture as the agricultural advisor.

MS. FAILLACE: Karlygash Faillace. I’m the press officer in SCA (inaudible).

MS. BOMMER: Ashley Bommer, special advisor to Ambassador Holbrooke, also working on communication and (inaudible) propaganda (inaudible).

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Now, a lot of people are missing – my two deputies, Vikram Singh – some are in the field, some are traveling – Vali Nasr and Barney Rubin are both off working on projects right now. But I do want to just emphasize that this is the whole-of-government process which Secretary Clinton and President Obama committed themselves to when they announced this office two days after the inauguration. I’ve never brought this team down here before. We did one joint appearance at the CAP earlier in the summer, but it was a smaller group then.

And our purpose here today is to make clear that there’s a major civilian component to our efforts, and I do want to say one thing about Jane Marriott. This is her last two or three days here. She was on loan from the British Government, fully integrated into our staff. She will be going – am I allowed to say your next assignment? Or is it a top secret?

MS. MARRIOTT: It’s not official yet.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Unofficially --

MS. MARRIOTT: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Unofficially, the – Her Majesty’s government is sending her to Tehran as the deputy chief of mission. So we’re really – she will be replaced – she will be succeeded, but she can’t be replaced. It’s really – quite seriously, she’s done an unbelievable job. And I’ve worked with a lot of people who were on loan at the Department. I’ve never seen anyone who did a job as good as Jane, and we will sorely miss her.

Let me see, what else do I want to say about this team? We are also reorganizing our international outreach. And the counterparts – there are about 25 or 26 counterparts to my job now, established since this job was set up. And the Germans have been coordinating that effort. And with the elections now behind us, we’re going to be intensifying our efforts on coordinating the international effort. The Germans are appointing a new counterpart as part of the agreement between the CDU and the FDP. We don’t know who that will be yet, unless it was announced today. And they will remain the coordinator, but we have agreed to set up an international cell here in the building which will do a lot of the work. So we are going to accelerate our international process.

Now, to report on the Secretary’s trip. I know some of you I see here were on the trip with us, some were not, so let me just start at the beginning. This was her first trip to Afghanistan as Secretary of State, her fourth trip in her life, and it was a very important trip. She timed it to coincide with the inauguration, precisely because we felt that the inauguration marked the end of a long, complicated process – the president used the word “messy” at one point – and produced a new government.

We have been waiting a long time to work with a government that had been – that was a result of the elections. And whatever one thinks of the elections, they were not perfect. And we said from the beginning they wouldn’t be perfect. We – all of us said this publicly well before the elections. They produced a winner and a legitimate government with which we intend to work as closely as possible.

As the Secretary said, we are encouraged by what we saw during this trip. Secretary Clinton described the moment that we saw a few days ago as a window of opportunity.

On the night we arrived, she and I and Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal had dinner with President Karzai at the palace. A very warm, very cordial meeting, substantially different in tone from meetings during the election period. The election was behind us, and he brought with him his senior ministers in key areas. And the first part of the evening was devoted to very detailed discussions with the minister of agriculture, the minister of finance, the minister of education, and the chief of intelligence. The minister of interior was supposed to be there, but he was out in the city making sure that there would be no attacks during the ceremonies the next day, so we missed him.

The conversation was detailed and engaged. Those of you who knew Hillary Clinton as a senator and followed her closely may or may not know this, but she had been all over the agriculture issue as a senator. She had worked with the State University of New York – I think it’s Stony Brook, but I’m not positive – to get a big tree planting program. She had followed it very closely. She was fascinated to hear details, which normally don’t interest all of you but interested her greatly, about 12 tons of apples that were airlifted to India a few days before we arrived. This was a very big story in the Afghan press. It opened up a new opportunity for Afghan agriculture.

As I think you all know, after the security issue, we believe agriculture is our highest immediate priority in the civilian area, for the simplest reason: it’s 80 percent of the people. They’re great farmers. They had mass – they had big export markets until 1978. They exported pomegranates and raisins, they dominated the world raisin export market – almonds, pistachios, saffron, wheat. And they want to get back to that, but they need help. We inherited a situation where we were – the United States was putting less money into agriculture than were in poppy crop destruction. That didn’t make a lot of sense to us. So as I mentioned the last time I was here, we phased out supporting poppy crop eradication. Some may still go on, but that’s Afghan-run now. The U.S. is not involved. The military is focusing on interdiction. They’re working closely with the DEA and the FBI and other parts of the U.S. Government, and they have had very substantial success in interdiction.

And meanwhile, we’re putting a lot of money into agriculture. Otto Gonzalez, who introduced himself a moment ago, is our liaison with the Agriculture Department. Secretary Vilsack will be going to Afghanistan soon. Date is not yet clear. We’ve had to reschedule it because he’s involved in some high domestic priorities. But he will be going early next year, and that will be a very important trip for us. So she engaged in a very detailed discussion of agriculture with Minister Rahimi.

Then the finance minister discussed both economic issues, the ongoing negotiations on the transit agreement, which President Obama had mentioned specifically in the May 6th and 7th trilateral summit. Mary Beth Goodman is our point person on that, both here and in Islamabad and Kabul. We talked about anti-corruption efforts and the general financial state of Afghanistan. Then the minister of education gave a very encouraging report on the extraordinary progress that has been made despite the Taliban in that field – and this was an impressive performance in these fields, and then the intelligence chief talked about the Taliban. And then – and she talked about that in her public comments in Afghanistan which have been issued by P.J. and the Department.

On the personnel side, we are dramatically increasing our personnel, and JoAnne Arzt is in charge of that effort. When we came into office, there were about 300 American civilians in all of Afghanistan, and most of them were on six-month tours and they had very substantial leave arrangements to go to Dubai or Abu Dhabi or somewhere else regularly. And there was no real continuity. There are no more six-month tours. Spouses are allowed to come, indeed encouraged to come, if they take jobs. And the school-aged children issue is a big problem, but there are plenty of spouses there now. And that, of course, has multiple payoffs. Leaves have been changed, and more and more people are signing up for lengthier tours. And some of the people here have had tours in Afghanistan and will rotate back.

And so we are going to be at about 900 people. I think Jack gave you the figures in his lengthy press conference the other day. And some of you went to Camp Atterbury with Jack Lew on Thursday, the same day we were in Kabul, and you saw the training process out there, which Dereck Hogan has been responsible for setting up.

The – so the civilian effort is going quite well, and I must say a tripling while we eliminate six-month tours – is really more than a tripling in terms of person days in the field. It’s far more. So it’s – this is an extraordinary increase. And if you consider that each one of the Americans has a footprint of nine or 10 support people – Afghans, third-country nationals, NGOs – it’s a very large increase, proportionally larger than the military.

We will have 900, about 900 by the --

PARTICIPANT: One thousand.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Say again?

PARTICIPANT: About 974 by the end of the year.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Yeah, 974 by the end of the year is the current target. Actually, to be even more precise, 974 by the early weeks of next year. We’re going to run a couple of weeks behind the original buildup schedule, not because we don’t have the people, but simply because of the vetting and personnel process. It’s as simple as that. I don’t want to go into all these figures because that’s not why you’re here and you’ve already heard from Jack on that, but it is very important. And more American civilians will be on their way next year. We’re in advance talks with Ambassador Eikenberry, Jack Lew, AID and elsewhere on that.

On Thursday of last week – the dinner was Wednesday night – on Thursday of last week, after the inauguration ceremonies, Secretary Clinton and I, General McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry met with an extraordinary and impressive group of American civilians and military who had come in from the field. All of the seniors except the Secretary of State sat off the table. The table was only the people from the provinces run by Ambassador Tony Wayne.

And for a very long time, I would say an hour and a half or more, and she – and this actually delayed our departure from Kabul, and this is the reason, for those of you who remember, why we didn’t land till after 4:00 in the morning. It was this meeting because she was enjoying it so much. She really drilled down on rule of law, on agriculture, on civilian-military integration. And I know that she has already described this to her colleagues on the principals committee, and I’m sure she will do so again in the meetings that are coming up. It was a terrific meeting, and she was enormously proud of this integrated civilian-military process. We all talk about civ-mil integration, and the bottom line on it is the closer you get to the battlefield, the closer the integration. And at the province level and the district level, it is really remarkable.

Now, on Pakistan – we haven’t met in this room on Pakistan since she returned – I have traveled with and watched many secretaries of state. I have never seen a Secretary of State have a trip in which the public diplomacy part of it was more extraordinary than this trip. Everywhere that she went, she was greeted as an iconic person, but then hit very aggressively on issues. And she just kept taking the questions and making an extraordinary impact on the Pakistani people.

As many of you in this room know firsthand, everything she did was covered live. Her visit to the shrine was particularly successful and got huge approval. She met with women’s groups – hundreds of women – students in Lahore, businessmen and women in Lahore, parliamentarians, tribal leaders from FATA and elsewhere. And she gave interviews to the radio journalists of Afghanistan – of Pakistan. And as it evolved, it was a conversation. She seemed to be saying – and this is me, this is in my words, not hers – she seemed to be saying we are friends with a disagreement and this is the way friends talk about things. And you could see the impact.

She also had very important private meetings with President Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani, Foreign Minister Qureshi, General Kiyani and General Pasha, and Nawaz Sharif and Chief Minister Sharif in Lahore. So she had one of those trips that those of you who accompanied know how intense it was. I was very proud to be part of that trip, and I think it marked a – the beginning of a turn in our relations with Pakistan. You’re not going to see it show up immediately in public opinion polls, but the goal here was to lay the foundations for a partnership, a deeper, more productive, genuine partnership among two sovereign nations.

She also agreed to a new strategic dialogue. In the previous administration, the strategic dialogue was conducted by the Deputy Secretary of State on the American side. She will personally lead the strategic dialogue. Now, there’s been a lot of talk about trilateral and bilateral and not coupling Afghanistan and Pakistan. The truth is we have bilateral relations with each country. But they are interrelated, and this addresses it directly. She’s elevated the strategic dialogue with Pakistan to the ministerial level and will personally lead it, and we will tee that up for early next year – not too early. It takes – we don’t want to just have a meeting for a photo op. And meanwhile, we will continue the trilateral process. So we will parallel track here.

We are completing a new civilian assistance program which will broaden the scope of our relations with Pakistan and help Pakistan address its long-term development needs. The reason we were late to this meeting is we were meeting with Ambassador Raphel. She’s back from Islamabad. She is essentially our chief of operations in Pakistan now. And she and Vali Nasr – is Vali here? No, Vali is – Vali and she are working right now on this.

We are working out the operationalizing of the general agreements as we speak, and we’re talking about how to improve our economic assistance and to help the overall – the people of Pakistan in their major needs like energy and water. Water came up more than any other issue on the trip, even more than energy, and we took that very seriously. And our NGO officer, Ronan Farrow, who is not here right now, is – was working on the water NGO issue, because expertise on water is much greater in the private sector. All of this is going to complement our new public diplomacy effort, which Judith McHale and Ashley Bommer are jointly spearheading. And we hope that the Pakistani people will recognize our deep respect for their sovereignty and our deep commitment to help them deal with the pressing problems they face.

We – so that’s a brief report on the two trips. I think with that, I’ll be happy to take your questions, and if it’s too technical, I would defer to one of my colleagues.

QUESTION: Ambassador Holbrooke, one on Afghanistan and one on Pakistan, if I might. There has been a lot of talk about whether the Afghan military force is kind of a reliable partner. But I’m wondering in terms of the civilian, from what you’ve seen on the ground as you ramp up your civilian presence, do you think you have enough of a well-trained kind of Afghan civilian reliable partner to do what you need to do? Or do you think that there will be as much need for training of the Afghans and --

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: As – sorry, go ahead.

QUESTION: And then on – if I might, on Pakistan, there’s a lot of uncertainty about the future stability of the Zardari government, given that – some rulings that are going to be coming up. I was wondering how much of that – of a concern is that that there could be a vacuum on the --

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I’m not going to comment on the internal affairs of Pakistan. I just want to make that clear right now. We’re well aware of it. We’re following it very carefully. But if it’s an internal political issue, it needs to be dealt with by the Pakistani people. It’s – and that’s all I think I should say on that.

On your first question, like any government, there are ministers that are better than other ministers. There are some ministers who are put up to extraordinary records. I go back again, for example – well, I’m afraid if I single one out, it won’t be good for his health, but – so I won’t single any out. But we want to work with the strong ministries, and we also recognize that the leadership in Afghanistan is thin because of the high illiteracy rate, the horrific consequences of 30 years of continuous war, the enormous set of refugees, the diaspora people who left the country, and very few of whom have returned, and the conditions in Afghanistan.

This is one of the main reasons we’re increasing our civilian role. And it’s extremely delicate to get the mix right. We want to help the Afghans help themselves. We do not want to replace a sovereign government with internationals. And by the way, many other countries are increasing, too. So if you go into a ministry now, you may run into people from the UN, from EU countries, Japan. It’s quite complicated. And one of our major goals is to coordinate this better, and that’s what I meant when I alluded earlier to our new efforts to coordinate international.

So what is our belief in the capacity here? Well, that’s – it’s very hard to answer this question. We know how important it is. Building the Afghan Government’s capacity to run their own affairs is one of the three or four sine qua non of a process by which eventually, on a timetable I can’t give you, the international combat troops, including the U.S., can be replaced by local security and the international civilian advisors can phase down over time. But international economic assistance from – to Afghanistan will continue for a long, long time, as Secretary Clinton has said publicly during her trip. And I want to stress that point.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. I’m (inaudible) Dawn newspaper. Two things. There was – there’s a statement by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who said that he believed that the Pakistanis do not necessarily share the U.S. commitment or U.S. intention for Afghanistan and they have their own intentions and they may be pursuing that. Your comment on that?

And also, he said that he is not sure whether the – who is running the Pakistan army, the (inaudible) government or not. And there was also a report in the Pakistani media today that probably U.S. Government representatives in Afghan and the Pakistani Government representatives had a meeting with the Taliban somewhere.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: The first two questions, I’m not going to answer because I haven’t seen the statement. And what was your third?

QUESTION: And a meeting between the U.S. and Afghan and Pakistani Government representatives and the Taliban.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: To my knowledge, and I believe – and this is absolutely true – there has been no direct meetings between American officials and Taliban officials. There was one accidental engagement about a year ago, actually before the inauguration of President Obama. It was inadvertent and it wasn’t a real Taliban, and that was – that became public and we cleared that up. There are no – we are not having direct contacts with the Taliban. Secretary Clinton in her speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in – what was it, June or July –

STAFF: July.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: July 15th, she made a speech which – in which only a few of you noticed the paragraph on Afghanistan. One or two of you reported it. But that was very important. She laid out the conditions by which the U.S. believes people fighting with the Taliban can rejoin, reintegrate into Afghan society. And the first point she mentioned was renounce al-Qaida. Remember and never forget, we are in Afghanistan because of 9/11. And the other thing was to renounce violence and to lay down their arms and participate in life peacefully. In fact, many, many Taliban have done that since 2002 – people who were senior officials . And but – and some of them are in the National Assembly. You have former Taliban in the National Assembly. And there’s regular contact between them and internationals, including Americans. But what you’re talking about, no, sir.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: And – how reassured –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Can you identify yourself? If you could identify yourself.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) from the BBC. How reassured were you by what you were hearing about the fight against corruption? And can I ask you what is it that concerns you? I mean, corruption can cover a whole host of different activities?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Corruption is an enormously complicated issue. It’s easy just to put the word in a headline. But when you really get down to it, what does it mean what – when – what’s the difference between traditional bakshish and big corruption – these are very complicated issues. Let me be very, very clear on this: We are deeply concerned about corruption. And Secretary Clinton did not hesitate to discuss this.

The – a lot of – we have – because the international community, led by the United States, has such a large footprint in Afghanistan, and a lot of the targets of opportunity for corruption come from the international community. And so we have a legitimate concern on that score, and that’s what the GAO and SIGAR, the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, focus on, and because we have American troops and our allies on the line risking their lives, we have a legitimate reason to ask for better performance on corruption. President Karzai in his speech, in his inaugural speech, addressed this problem, saying he would set up a commission, he would – excuse me – he would strengthen the existing Commission on Corruption and he would hold some special conferences on it, I believe was his word. I don’t have the speech in front of me. But we discussed this subject at considerable length with him.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Ambassador Holbrooke, John Terrett from Al Jazeera, English Television. This is a question about the visit of Manmohan Singh and it straddles both your two key areas of responsibility. India wants more influence in Afghanistan, as you know, and has already pumped in $1.2 billion into the country. You talked about the apples – the 12 tons coming back the other way.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: That’s just trade and balances. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Pakistan on the other hand, remains suspicious of Indian kind of hegemony – they talk about putting, you know, the Afghan – the Indian reach. How can the U.S. balance the interests of these two key partners, one of which is the key ally in the war on terror?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Well, first of all, all Americans and certainly everyone in this Administration are just delighted that the first state visit of this Administration is for India. I think this is very appropriate. And no one in Pakistan, and no one in any other country, should read this in any way as a diminution of the importance we attach to them. It’s entirely appropriate that someone has to have the first trip. And it – it usually used to be in the past, a European ally, but they come over in informal trips. A state dinner, a state visit is a big deal, different level of intensity. And President Obama thought this was the right way to go, and we’re thrilled. It in no way should be read as a diminution.

We seek to improve our relations with Pakistan. We seek to improve our relations with China. We seek to improve our relations with India. This is not a zero-sum gain. Every country benefits from improvement in the area. I’m not going to go into the specifics of it. First of all, it’s not part of my formal responsibilities, although I look forward to participating on some of the meetings, and seeing some of my old friends from New Delhi.

But I do just want to say that I read the press, I understand what New Delhi and Islamabad, Lahore say about each other. But it’s really – it really is not justified by the facts in many cases. These two countries live side by side and have to live together. And our role is to assist both of them in different ways, according to their own desires and their own view of their own sovereignty.

Indira.

QUESTION: Thanks, Ambassador. Before we met up with you in Kabul, you had been in Moscow, and we never got a readout of that leg of your trip in between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Could you tell us what did you accomplish in Russia? Did you get any specific commitments with regard to Afghanistan?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Actually, I was in Berlin and Paris, then Moscow.

QUESTION: Right.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: And I also met with the British along the way. And then, I would add, since I’ll do the whole international , that in Kabul, as you saw, we had foreign ministers from France, the Netherlands, deputy foreign minister of Japan. And I would draw your attention to the fact that the Japanese quadrupled their aid last week and went up to $5 billion commitments – a tremendously important decision by the new government. Canada, their foreign ministers there, the Indian foreign minister was there, and the senior officials from many other countries.

Specifically to Russia, as you know, I’ve been trying to go to all the concerned countries, but I haven’t been able to get to all of them up to now. I still haven’t gotten to all of them, simply because of two things: the need to make – in the early part of my job, I had to go to Afghanistan and Pakistan a lot, because there were so many issues to straighten out. We were in a period of transition in our leadership in Afghanistan, and we had to put a whole new team in place, and we had to rethink our Pakistan policy in conjunction with Anne Patterson and – our ambassador there, who was – who has been kept on, because of the high confidence we all have in her.

Now, I was unable to get to Moscow earlier for logistical reasons, and just scheduling. And in that talk, we outlined to the Russians our strategic view and put forward the simple proposition that Russia and the United States, like all the countries in the neighborhood, have a common strategic symmetry, that stability is something that’s important to all the neighbors and near neighbors.

The Russians pointed out to us that they had legitimate strategic concerns in the area, which we agree with. And they have one overriding issue, which is mentioned prominently in the joint communiqué of President Obama and President Medvedev, dated July 2nd or June 2nd – I can’t remember which, but one of those two dates – and that is narcotics. That is a big, big issue for the Russians. And we talked a lot about how we could work together on that issue, and we explained our policies.

I met with the deputy national security advisor, the national security advisor being out of the country in Singapore. I met with Sergey Lavrov, the foreign minister, my old counterpart at the United Nations and a close friend. I met with members of the ministry of defense and reassured them that the United States does not seek a permanent NATO presence in Afghanistan. I met with the drug czar, with the Russian equivalent of FEMA, and with many other officials on the trip. It was a very productive opening meeting, and we agreed we will continue the dialogue. I took an interagency team with me from various agencies. And we will continue the dialogue in the near future. We also had a team in China before the President’s trip. And we have had consultations with Turkey and – which we are going to continue. So there’s a lot of activity going on.

QUESTION: Did the Russians make any specific pledge or promise or agree to give any particular kind of assistance or –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: No, no, no.

QUESTION: -- routes, land routes for the –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: They – well, I leave to General Petraeus the logistical issue, and you know about that. They didn’t give any promises, but they showed considerable interest and readiness to do more to help repair some of the damage that has been brought over the last 30 years. It’s a complicated issue for reasons you all understand. But in the non – but we are – but we were very pleased with these initial talks.

MR. TONER*: We have time for just a couple more questions.

QUESTION: Yes. Ambassador Holbrooke, Charlie Wolfson with CBS. Given that you’re here to talk about the civilian side, but recognizing that a lot of the civilians who will be in the field depend on the increased military, and given that the President’s announced a meeting tonight at the White House, he’s had eight – and I believe this is the ninth – where does thoroughness and decision making stop and indecisiveness start, since he’s been accused of that?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Last time I was at this podium, I said very frankly that my experience on these issues, and I – as a very junior officer, I lived through the Lyndon Johnson decision-making process in 1965, and when I was in Saigon, and in 1968 when I was assistant to a deputy secretary of state. As I’ve seen a lot of these things, this is the most thorough, the most sustained, most thoughtful process I have ever seen. And over the long course of it, we have seen – we have all learned a great deal from each other in a way which I think is exactly the way decisions should be made.

I’m not going to get into public debates. I’m not going to go in that direction. I just feel that what you’ve seen is a very serious debate, and that’s really all I want to say about it. But I’m honored to have been a small part of it.

QUESTION: Sir, (inaudible) with (inaudible) MBC Television. Since you talked about corruption, and you said you were very concerned about it, and considering you had a minister who was accused – allegedly accused of taking $30 million in a bribe, would the Administration pick the ministers in President Karzai’s new government?

And on the reconciliation issue, President Karzai talked about a loya jirga type of meeting, he invited the Taliban and Abdullah Abdullah. Both declined and they’ve been very negative. Does this undermine the effort in terms of having a stable new government and the security efforts?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: On the first half of your question, we’re not picking the ministers in the government. But we certainly hope that the ministers are the best possible ministers. And who they are and how effective they are and the issue you just mentioned will all be factors in determining our interaction with them.

And on the loya jirga question, to be quite honest with you, I want to learn a little more about what is in – the government has in mind before I opine on it. But it’s not a hundred percent clear yet how it will work or what its purpose would be. And it’s part of another process where there are some international conferences. In his – in President Karzai’s inaugural speech, he talked about a conference in Kabul next year, and that’s also part of the process.

I think there’s one or two – one more.

QUESTION: Thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke. You said that the United States can assist Pakistan and India toward peace and security (inaudible). Would you –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Now, please be careful here. I don’t think that’s what I said. I said that we think that good relations between the U.S. and India, and good relations between the U.S. and Pakistan are not incompatible, and that we are not going to get involved in negotiating these kinds of things. Please, it’s really important, because when we get misquoted or twisted by some of the press in these countries, we really have to spend a lot of time – poor P.J. has to spend the whole night with the time difference cleaning it up. Let’s stick to the precise words I used here.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Would you support a resumption of talks between the two countries? Because Pakistan says that it will feel more at ease to fight terrorists on its (inaudible).

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: If the two countries decide to resume talks or have any sort of talks, of course we’ll support them. But we’re not their midwife. We’re not their intermediaries. We’re not trying to play a role that goes beyond our legitimate area of involvement.

QUESTION: Sue Pleming with Reuters. Just to follow on from my colleague’s question on the talks with the Taliban, apparently the Saudis and the British are involved in those talks with the Taliban, along with the Pakistanis. Do you have any details on those discussions?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I can’t speak about the British. You have to ask them. As far as the Saudis go, President Karzai mentioned them by name in his speech. It’s well known that he asked King Abdullah to play a role here, and I will let the Saudis speak for themselves. I have talked to the Saudis. I’ve been to Riyadh. I talked to King Abdullah about it myself. We would be supportive of anything that the kingdom chose to do in this regard.

QUESTION: But I was talking about Pakistan there.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I think --

QUESTION: About the talks with the – between – with Pakistan and –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Oh, I don’t know anything about that.

QUESTION: And then –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I mean, I read a news account. But I don’t know what the facts are.

QUESTION: And then you also mentioned the trade transit agreement. What is the status of those negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan? It seems that they are stalled and that you won’t make the deadline at the end of the year.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I don’t think that’s a fair conclusion. Have any of you have ever seen a negotiation which didn’t go down to the wire – international negotiations? I think we have a good shot at making the deadline. There are two or three outstanding issues.

Is that right, Mary Beth?

MS. GOODMAN: Right.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: And if you want more details on that, why don’t you call our office and – I don’t want to involve everyone in it. But we are hopeful it will be done. This is – let me – let’s be clear for those of you who haven’t followed this negotiation. This negotiation began before half of you in this room were born. It’s 44 years old. It’s the – really, older than you are; I can tell. (Laughter.) Not older than me, unfortunately.

This is 44 years, and President Obama asked the two leaders of their countries to try to finish it by the end of the year. It’s a very ambitious goal. It’s not easy to do. And we have gotten it down to two or three issues. And my hat’s off to Mary Beth Goodman for the role she has played here.

So you want to do one more? Okay. Last question, I guess.

QUESTION: I’m Lachlan Carmichael from AFP. As you – as the Obama Administration conducts the review on Afghanistan, how much are you consulting with the Pakistanis? The reason I ask is Foreign Minister Qureshi said November 1st that Pakistan could offer a lot more and implied there have been almost zero consultation –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I don’t think he implied that. The Secretary of State was in Islamabad and Lahore, the National Security Advisor was in Islamabad. Foreign Minister Qureshi has been here twice in the last – how long – five weeks, six weeks? Yeah. We are in constant contact, also through their excellent ambassador in Washington.

They’re – I don’t believe that anyone seriously thinks we’re not having detailed consultations with Pakistan. So if that was said, I think it has to be put into context. But there’s no country we’re consulting more closely than Pakistan, nor is there any country that’s more integrally related to this issue. Admiral Mullen is in constant contact with the Pakistani military. I’m in constant contact with leaders of their government by phone and other means. So I just don’t see that as a real issue.

Oh, well, thank you very much.

QUESTION: Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Thanks.

Britain's Role in Pakistan Torture: Video and Human Rights Watch Report

UPDATE 1115 GMT: Spectacle has posted the video of an interview with Omar Deghayes, speaking about his interrogation by British Intelligence agents while detained in Islamabad, Pakistan and Bagram, Afghanistan.
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Long-time EA readers will know that I have been none-too-happy with the evasions of the British Government over torture in the War on Terror, criticising Foreign Secretary David Miliband for using deceptions as well as court action to prevent the truth from emerging.

This week Human Rights Watch brought out a bit of that truth, publishing a 46-page report on Britain's involvement (not observation, involvement) in the torture of detainees in Pakistan. This is the summary, followed by a link to the full report:

A key lesson from the past eight years of global efforts to combat terrorism is that the use of torture and ill-treatment is deeply counterproductive. It undermines the moral legitimacy of governments who rely on it and serves as a recruiting sergeant for terrorist organizations. This is recognized in the UK government's counterterrorism strategy, "CONTEST II," which asserts that the protection of human rights is central and that the UK's response to terrorism will be based on the rule of law.

However, this principled and pragmatic assertion of core values is being undermined by the official whitewash surrounding the complicity of UK intelligence and security agencies in torture in Pakistan, with ministers repeatedly rejecting calls for an independent judicial inquiry from a cross-party parliamentary committee and human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) alike. Research by Human Rights Watch and path-breaking investigative reporting by The Guardian newspaper makes it clear that British hands are not clean. The refusal of the government to order an independent and transparent investigation has been an important missed opportunity.

This report provides accounts from victims and their families about the cases of five UK citizens of Pakistani origin --- Salahuddin Amin, Zeeshan Siddiqui, Rangzieb Ahmed, Rashid Rauf and a fifth individual who wishes to remain anonymous --- tortured in Pakistan between 2004 and 2007. The men were tortured and ill-treated by the military-controlled Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, the civilian-controlled Intelligence Bureau (IB), or other Pakistani security agencies. Their abuse was part of a longstanding pattern of routine, systematic torture by the Pakistani authorities that has been extensively documented. The accuracy of their accounts of mistreatment has been confirmed by Pakistani and British security and intelligence officials.

Primary responsibility for the use of torture against these individuals lies with the Pakistani authorities. No one in Pakistan has been held accountable. The Pakistani authorities have not prosecuted or disciplined any security officers alleged to have been involved in these incidents, or indeed in any other of the myriad cases of torture. There is no sign that they have even initiated any inquiries. While deeply disappointing, this is hardly surprising --- Pakistani and international human rights groups, lawyers, the media, the US State Department, and the United Nations have long documented torture, arbitrary arrests and detention, enforced disappearances, and other human rights abuses by Pakistani government security forces and intelligence agencies taking place with complete impunity.

In Pakistan, torture often follows illegal abductions or "disappearances" by the ISI, other intelligence agencies, the military, or other security services. These practices are systematic and routine, whether in ordinary criminal matters to obtain confessions or information, against political and ideological opponents, or in more sensitive intelligence and counterterrorism cases.

Human Rights Watch has no evidence of UK officials directly participating in torture. But UK complicity is clear. First, it is inconceivable that the UK government was unaware of the systematic use of torture in Pakistan. In the circumstances of the close security relationship between the two countries this would represent a significant failure of British intelligence. Reports by governments, including the United States, reports by NGOs, including Human Rights Watch, court cases in Pakistan, and media accounts put everyone on notice that torture has long been endemic in Pakistan. No one in government in Pakistan has ever challenged this in conversations with Human Rights Watch.

Second, UK officials engaged in acts that virtually required that they knew about the use of torture in specific cases. Four men --- Salahuddin Amin, Zeeshan Siddiqui, Rangzieb Ahmed, and an individual who wishes to remain anonymous --- have described meeting British officials while detained in Pakistan. In some cases this happened shortly after sessions in which the individuals had been tortured, when it was likely that clear and visible signs of torture were present. For example, Rangzieb Ahmed alleges that he was interrogated by British security officials shortly after three fingernails had been pulled out.

Further, UK officials supplied questions and lines of enquiry to Pakistan intelligence sources in cases in which detainees were tortured. UK officials knew that interrogations of these UK citizens were taking place and that torture was routinely used in interrogations. The UK was also putting pressure on Pakistani authorities for results. In this environment, passing questions and offering other cooperation in such cases without ensuring that the detainees were treated appropriately was an invitation to abuse.

Members of Pakistani intelligence agencies have corroborated Human Rights Watch's information from detainees that British officials were aware of specific cases of mistreatment. They have said that British officials knew that Pakistani intelligence agencies routinely tortured detained terror suspects-what Pakistani officers described to Human Rights Watch as being"processed"in the "traditional way."Officials describe being under immense pressure from the UK and the United States to "perform" in the "war on terror," and have noted "we do what we are asked to do." Pakistani intelligence sources described Salahuddin Amin, for example, as a "high pressure" case, saying that the British (and American) agents involved were "perfectly aware that we were using all means possible to extract information from him and were grateful that we were doing so."

Not only do British officials and agents appear to have been complicit in torture, but their cooperation in the unlawful conduct of the ISI has interfered with attempts to prosecute terrorist suspects in British courts. Rashid Rauf, the alleged mastermind of plans for a second 9/11 involving planes departing Heathrow airport in London, was tortured so badly that British officials quickly realized he could not be prosecuted in a British court. His guilt or innocence has never been established, and never will, since he was reportedly killed in a US drone missile strike in Pakistan in November 2008. If he was indeed guilty, the failure to bring Rauf to justice represents an enormous missed opportunity for intelligence services and the public to learn more about this terror plot.

The UK government's response has been far from decisive. Rather than investigating the alleged complicity of its intelligence services, the UK government has responded with assurances that it does not use or condone torture and by making general denials to specific allegations. It has never responded to the specific claims made by victims, their lawyers, the media, or Human Rights Watch.

In March 2009, in the face of mounting evidence of UK complicity in torture in Pakistan, Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the rules determining how the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) are allowed to interrogate suspects, including strict guidance banning the use of torture, would be published. Brown also said that he had asked parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee to review any developments and relevant information following allegations that British intelligence officers were involved in the torture of terrorism suspects. "Torture has no place in a modern democratic society. We will not condone it. Nor will we ever ask others to do it on our behalf," Brown said. The public document, he said, would cover "the standards that we apply during the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas."

However, the UK government has subsequently backed off publishing the guidance in force at the time of the arrests documented in this report. Announcing this in June 2009, Foreign Secretary David Miliband said that doing so could "give succor to our enemies," though he offered no compelling reason why this would be so. At the same time, Miliband indicated that the latest version of the rules would be made public once "consolidated and reviewed." As yet, even these rules remain unpublished.

The reasons for official reluctance possibly became clearer when on June 18 TheGuardian newspaper reported the existence of "a secret interrogation policy." Formulated after the September 11, 2001 attacks, this allegedly provided guidance to MI5 and MI6 officers interrogating detainees in US military custody in Afghanistan. British intelligence officers were given written instructions that they could not "be seen to condone" torture and that they must not "engage in any activity yourself that involves inhumane or degrading treatment of prisoners." However, they were advised that they were under no obligation to intervene to prevent detainees from being mistreated. "Given that they are not within our custody or control, the law does not require you to intervene to prevent this," The Guardian quoted. The newspaper also alleged that then Prime Minister Tony Blair was aware of the policy.

The UK government continues to assert that it will use evidence gained from torture from third countries for intelligence and policing purposes, arguing, as it did in the FCO Annual Human Rights Report 2008 published in March 2009, that where intelligence "bears on threats to life, we cannot reject it out of hand." There is no evidence that the government has in fact faced such a situation. If it were to do so, it would have a duty to act on the information, but also a duty to take urgent measures to ensure that those responsible for the torture were held to account, and that similar acts did not take place in the future. Indeed, the possibility of such a situation underlines the obligation to proactively and strenuously intervene with security allies and other parties to prevent illegal acts such as torture. In countries like Pakistan where there is a high likelihood of torture taking place, the UK should take special steps to prevent torture and to avoid being placed in the legally, morally and politically invidious position the UK government now finds itself. Furthermore, as the government itself recognizes, evidence acquired under torture is not admissible in court, whoever carried it out or wherever it was committed. Torture undermines the government's ability to deal with terrorism through proper legal channels.

On August 4, 2009, the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) concluded that the UK government was "determined to avoid parliamentary scrutiny" about its knowledge of the torture of terror suspects held by the intelligence services in Pakistan and elsewhere. The JCHR report said that an independent inquiry was the only way to restore public confidence in the intelligence and security agencies.

On August 9, 2009, the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) also raised its concerns about involvement in the torture and other ill-treatment of terror suspects held abroad. The FAC stated in its report on the FCO Annual Human Rights report that, "[t]here is a risk that use of evidence which may have been obtained under torture on a regular basis, especially where it is not clear that protestations about mistreatment have elicited any change in behaviour by foreign intelligence services, could be construed as complicity in such behaviour."

Thus far, the government has treated expressions of concern from parliamentary committees dismissively. The foreign and home secretaries refused to appear before the Joint Committee on Human Rights in 2009 to respond to questions about possible UK complicity in torture in Pakistan and elsewhere. The government has even refused to respond to a Foreign Affairs Committee question about whether UK officials met any UK citizens in detention in Pakistan. Then, in early October 2009, the UK's secretaries of state for foreign and home affairs rejected the call for an independent inquiry out of hand, claiming that, "the Government unreservedly condemns the use of torture and our clear policy is not to participate in, solicit, encourage or condone torture."

Action by the UK government is a legal requirement. The actions of UK officials documented in this report violate the UK's obligations under international law and require that those responsible be held accountable. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Convention against Torture) prohibits torture and other ill-treatment, and complicity in such acts, by state officials and agents. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which is incorporated into British law by the UK Human Rights Act 1998, similarly prohibits torture.

The Convention against Torture requires states to reinforce the prohibition against torture through legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures. States are to ensure that all acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law, including complicity or participation in torture. International law places an obligation on states to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish torture and other ill-treatment. The obligation to prosecute torture includes those who are complicit and who directly participate in torture, as well as those responsible in the chain of command. A state is obligated to take necessary measures to establish its jurisdiction over acts of torture when the alleged offender is a national of that state or when the victim is a national and the state considers it appropriate.

The United Nations Committee Against Torture, which monitors state compliance with the Convention against Torture, has indicated that an individual is complicit in torture if he or she has given "tacit consent" or "acquiesced" to the torture and knew or should have known that it was taking place. British officials who assisted in the transfer of individuals to Pakistani intelligence agencies, provided questions or in other ways sought to benefit from their interrogation in Pakistani custody, or met with such detainees who showed visible signs of being tortured but did nothing to prevent further mistreatment, would very likely have been complicit in torture.

Section 134 of the UK Criminal Justice Act of 1988 creates a legal obligation in British law to prosecute acts of torture. The law provides that the person charged needs to be a public official or a person acting in an official capacity "whatever his nationality" and that the offense can be committed "in the United Kingdom or elsewhere." Further, the UK government should establish a code of conduct for British security services consistent with Britain's human rights obligations under domestic and international law, including the Convention against Torture and the European Convention on Human Rights.

Human Rights Watch believes that the UK government needs to address a number of outstanding questions regarding its counter-terror policies. Among them:

What steps as a matter of policy does the UK government, including all intelligence and security agencies, take to ensure that torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are not used in any cases in which it has asked the Pakistani authorities for assistance or cooperation?

What does the UK government do when it learns that torture or ill-treatment has occurred in a particular case?

What conditions has the UK government put on continuing cooperation and assistance with Pakistan in counter-terror and law enforcement activities?

Has the UK government ever conditioned continuing cooperation or assistance with Pakistan on an end to torture and other ill-treatment?

Has the UK government ever withdrawn cooperation in a particular case or cases because of torture or ill-treatment?

What is the policy and legal advice in force to ensure that UK officials and agents do not participate or acquiesce in, or are complicit in torture or ill-treatment?

The security relationship between Pakistan and the UK remains close. Human Rights Watch calls upon the British government and its security services to condition their cooperation with Pakistani law enforcement and intelligence services on the end of torture, enforced disappearance, arbitrary arrests, and other illegality. This will not only ensure compliance with Britain's domestic and international legal obligations, it will help Pakistan become a more humane society, a country that, with an elected government, rules by law and not by thuggery.

The evil of terrorism does not justify participating in or even being the beneficiary of torture. UK counterterrorism strategy and UK officials rightly emphasize the importance of respecting human rights and the rule of law while countering terrorism. This will be undermined if the UK is complicit or even suspected of being complicit in torture and other human rights violations. The government should heed the call for an independent public inquiry into alleged complicity in torture, enabling the issue to be fully and finally addressed in a way that transparently demonstrates the reassertion of the UK government's commitment to the protection of human rights.

Read full report....

Afghanistan: CIA Trying to Set Up Talks with Taliban?

An interesting item from an Afghanistan news site. The article, while shaky at points (Central Investigation Agency?), intersects with other stories pointing to a quiet US effort to get Taliban to the negotiating table as well as President Hamid Karzai's public declarations, and has been picked up by analysts such as Juan Cole:

The US proposal to hold talks with the Afghan Taliban leadership, with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia playing the role of mediators, has fallen apart.

The US Central Investigation Agency had been working to hold secret talks with the Taliban leadership, with the help of the Saudi leadership and the General Intelligence Directorate of Saudi Arabia and the Pakistani leadership and the Inter Services Intelligence.

But with the Taliban hell-bent upon fighting the US-led international forces, the initiatives have failed to yield any desired result.

The News has quoted sources as saying the massive trust deficit between the two sides plus Taliban’s obstinacy had rendered the talks useless.

The US recently said it would not be opposed to the idea of holding talks with the Taliban to establish peace in the Afghanistan region.

Of late, the US intelligence services have been attempting to encourage the Taliban to discontinue their ties with Al-Qaeda.

However, sources privy to the issue, have said only middle rank Taliban leaders had agreed to talks, and any decision made by these leaders would not have made any major impact on Afghan insurgency.

Assassination in Pakistan: Is Blackwater Involved with US Military Hit Squads?

Jeremy Scahill, author of the breakthrough book on Blackwater in Iraq, now casts an eye on the possible involvement of the company, renamed Xe, in the US military's covert operations in Pakistan. He writes in The Nation:

At a covert forward operating base run by the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the Pakistani port city of Karachi, members of an elite division of Blackwater are at the center of a secret program in which they plan targeted assassinations of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, "snatch and grabs" of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan, an investigation by The Nation has found. The Blackwater operatives also assist in gathering intelligence and help run a secret US military drone bombing campaign that runs parallel to the well-documented CIA predator strikes, according to a well-placed source within the US military intelligence apparatus.

Coming Soon to Your Country: US Government “Hit Squads”?

The source, who has worked on covert US military programs for years, including in Afghanistan and Pakistan, has direct knowledge of Blackwater's involvement. He spoke toThe Nation on condition of anonymity because the program is classified. The source said that the program is so "compartmentalized" that senior figures within the Obama administration and the US military chain of command may not be aware of its existence.

The White House did not return calls or email messages seeking comment for this story. Capt. John Kirby, the spokesperson for Adm. Michael Mullen, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told The Nation, "We do not discuss current operations one way or the other, regardless of their nature." A defense official, on background, specifically denied that Blackwater performs work on drone strikes or intelligence for JSOC in Pakistan. "We don't have any contracts to do that work for us. We don't contract that kind of work out, period," the official said. "There has not been, and is not now, contracts between JSOC and that organization for these types of services."

The previously unreported program, the military intelligence source said, is distinct from the CIA assassination program that the agency's director, Leon Panetta, announced he had canceled in June 2009. "This is a parallel operation to the CIA," said the source. "They are two separate beasts." The program puts Blackwater at the epicenter of a US military operation within the borders of a nation against which the United States has not declared war--knowledge that could further strain the already tense relations between the United States and Pakistan. In 2006, the United States and Pakistan struck a deal that authorized JSOC to enter Pakistan to hunt Osama bin Laden with the understanding that Pakistan would deny it had given permission. Officially, the United States is not supposed to have any active military operations in the country. Blackwater, which recently changed its name to Xe Services and US Training Center, denies the company is operating in Pakistan. "Xe Services has only one employee in Pakistan performing construction oversight for the U.S. Government," Blackwater spokesperson Mark Corallo said in a statement to The Nation, adding that the company has "no other operations of any kind in Pakistan."

A former senior executive at Blackwater confirmed the military intelligence source's claim that the company is working in Pakistan for the CIA and JSOC, the premier counterterrorism and covert operations force within the military. He said that Blackwater is also working for the Pakistani government on a subcontract with an Islamabad-based security firm that puts US Blackwater operatives on the ground with Pakistani forces in counter-terrorism operations, including house raids and border interdictions, in the North-West Frontier Province and elsewhere in Pakistan. This arrangement, the former executive said, allows the Pakistani government to utilize former US Special Operations forces who now work for Blackwater while denying an official US military presence in the country. He also confirmed that Blackwater has a facility in Karachi and has personnel deployed elsewhere in Pakistan. The former executive spoke on condition of anonymity.

His account and that of the military intelligence source were borne out by a US military source who has knowledge of Special Forces actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan. When asked about Blackwater's covert work for JSOC in Pakistan, this source, who also asked for anonymity, told The Nation, "From my information that I have, that is absolutely correct," adding, "There's no question that's occurring."

"It wouldn't surprise me because we've outsourced nearly everything," said Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, who served as Secretary of State Colin Powell's chief of staff from 2002 to 2005, when told of Blackwater's role in Pakistan. Wilkerson said that during his time in the Bush administration, he saw the beginnings of Blackwater's involvement with the sensitive operations of the military and CIA. "Part of this, of course, is an attempt to get around the constraints the Congress has placed on DoD. If you don't have sufficient soldiers to do it, you hire civilians to do it. I mean, it's that simple. It would not surprise me."

The Counterterrorism Tag Team in Karachi

The covert JSOC program with Blackwater in Pakistan dates back to at least 2007, according to the military intelligence source. The current head of JSOC is Vice Adm. William McRaven, who took over the post from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who headed JSOC from 2003 to 2008 before being named the top US commander in Afghanistan. Blackwater's presence in Pakistan is "not really visible, and that's why nobody has cracked down on it," said the source. Blackwater's operations in Pakistan, he said, are not done through State Department contracts or publicly identified Defense contracts. "It's Blackwater via JSOC, and it's a classified no-bid [contract] approved on a rolling basis." The main JSOC/Blackwater facility in Karachi, according to the source, is nondescript: three trailers with various generators, satellite phones and computer systems are used as a makeshift operations center. "It's a very rudimentary operation," says the source. "I would compare it to [CIA] outposts in Kurdistan or any of the Special Forces outposts. It's very bare bones, and that's the point."

Blackwater's work for JSOC in Karachi is coordinated out of a Task Force based at Bagram Air Base in neighboring Afghanistan, according to the military intelligence source. While JSOC technically runs the operations in Karachi, he said, it is largely staffed by former US special operations soldiers working for a division of Blackwater, once known as Blackwater SELECT, and intelligence analysts working for a Blackwater affiliate, Total Intelligence Solutions (TIS), which is owned by Blackwater's founder, Erik Prince. The military source said that the name Blackwater SELECT may have been changed recently. Total Intelligence, which is run out of an office on the ninth floor of a building in the Ballston area of Arlington, Virginia, is staffed by former analysts and operatives from the CIA, DIA, FBI and other agencies. It is modeled after the CIA's counterterrorism center. In Karachi, TIS runs a "media-scouring/open-source network," according to the source. Until recently, Total Intelligence was run by two former top CIA officials, Cofer Black and Robert Richer, both of whom have left the company. In Pakistan, Blackwater is not using either its original name or its new moniker, Xe Services, according to the former Blackwater executive. "They are running most of their work through TIS because the other two [names] have such a stain on them," he said. Corallo, the Blackwater spokesperson, denied that TIS or any other division or affiliate of Blackwater has any personnel in Pakistan.

The US military intelligence source said that Blackwater's classified contracts keep getting renewed at the request of JSOC. Blackwater, he said, is already so deeply entrenched that it has become a staple of the US military operations in Pakistan. According to the former Blackwater executive, "The politics that go with the brand of BW is somewhat set aside because what you're doing is really one military guy to another." Blackwater's first known contract with the CIA for operations in Afghanistan was awarded in 2002 and was for work along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

One of the concerns raised by the military intelligence source is that some Blackwater personnel are being given rolling security clearances above their approved clearances. Using Alternative Compartmentalized Control Measures (ACCMs), he said, the Blackwater personnel are granted clearance to a Special Access Program, the bureaucratic term used to describe highly classified "black" operations. "With an ACCM, the security manager can grant access to you to be exposed to and operate within compartmentalized programs far above 'secret'--even though you have no business doing so," said the source. It allows Blackwater personnel that "do not have the requisite security clearance or do not hold a security clearance whatsoever to participate in classified operations by virtue of trust," he added. "Think of it as an ultra-exclusive level above top secret. That's exactly what it is: a circle of love." Blackwater, therefore, has access to "all source" reports that are culled in part from JSOC units in the field. "That's how a lot of things over the years have been conducted with contractors," said the source. "We have contractors that regularly see things that top policy-makers don't unless they ask."

According to the source, Blackwater has effectively marketed itself as a company whose operatives have "conducted lethal direct action missions and now, for a price, you can have your own planning cell. JSOC just ate that up," he said, adding, "They have a sizable force in Pakistan--not for any nefarious purpose if you really want to look at it that way--but to support a legitimate contract that's classified for JSOC." Blackwater's Pakistan JSOC contracts are secret and are therefore shielded from public oversight, he said. The source is not sure when the arrangement with JSOC began, but he says that a spin-off of Blackwater SELECT "was issued a no-bid contract for support to shooters for a JSOC Task Force and they kept extending it." Some of the Blackwater personnel, he said, work undercover as aid workers. "Nobody even gives them a second thought."

The military intelligence source said that the Blackwater/JSOC Karachi operation is referred to as "Qatar cubed," in reference to the US forward operating base in Qatar that served as the hub for the planning and implementation of the US invasion of Iraq. "This is supposed to be the brave new world," he says. "This is the Jamestown of the new millennium and it's meant to be a lily pad. You can jump off to Uzbekistan, you can jump back over the border, you can jump sideways, you can jump northwest. It's strategically located so that they can get their people wherever they have to without having to wrangle with the military chain of command in Afghanistan, which is convoluted. They don't have to deal with that because they're operating under a classified mandate."

In addition to planning drone strikes and operations against suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Pakistan for both JSOC and the CIA, the Blackwater team in Karachi also helps plan missions for JSOC inside Uzbekistan against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, according to the military intelligence source. Blackwater does not actually carry out the operations, he said, which are executed on the ground by JSOC forces. "That piqued my curiosity and really worries me because I don't know if you noticed but I was never told we are at war with Uzbekistan," he said. "So, did I miss something, did Rumsfeld come back into power?"

Read rest of article....

The Latest from Iran (24 November): A Larijani-Rafsanjani Alliance?

1910 GMT: Prosecuting Journalists. Reporters without Borders has published a summary of latest news on journalists who have been convicted and arrested (and even one who was released).

1900 GMT: Some Good News for Mahmoud. President Ahmadinejad and his Brazilian counterpart, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, signed 13 cooperation agreements on trade, energy, stocks and banking, agriculture, news agenices, technology, culture, and visa requirements.

1735 GMT: Mortazavi Mystery Over? After days of rumours that he was in Evin Prison, former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi has appeared at the memorial service for Ali Kordan, the former Minister of Interior who died this weekend.

1725 GMT: Isolating Rafsanjani? Division of opinion here amongst EA staff: one colleague is saying Hashemi Rafsanjani is a spent force while another is arguing strongly that "the Shark" is far from finished and about to make another move.

If the latter, those in the regime opposed to Rafsanjani (and possibly worried about the possibility of his working in combination with Ali Larijani) will try to block it. Having dismissed him from the rota for Friday Prayers in Tehran and the Qods Day Prayer, authorities are now taking away the Eid al-Adha Prayer from Rafsanjani and giving it to Ahmad Khatami.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Protest at Qazvin University (23 November)
NEW Iran: Maziar Bahari Tells CBS of His Detention and Post-Election Conflict
NEW Iran: While the President’s Away…..The Contest Inside Tehran’s Establishment
Iran: Economics, Missing Money, and Ahmadinejad v. Parliament
Latest Iran Video: Protest at Khaje Nasir University (22 November)
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen: An Introduction to Conflict
Iran Revelation: Pro-Government MP Admits Election Was Manipulated

1715 GMT: Back from teaching break to find that Mousavi activist Majid Zamani has been released on bail.

1335 GMT: Your Daily University Demonstration. Video is now in of Monday's protest at Qazvin University; we've posted it in a separate entry.

1320 GMT: Atrianfar Sentenced. A reliable Iranian activist reports that journalist Mohammad Atrianfar's sentence, passed this weekend, was six years in jail and that he --- like former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi and student organisation leader Ahmad Zeidabadi --- has been released on bail while the sentence is appealed.

The same source claims that student activist Atafeh Nabavi has been sentenced to four years.

1230 GMT: A Persian-language site has published the names of more than 70 students who have been detained recently by the regime.

1100 GMT: Mr Smith Gets It Right. Back from a research seminar on Chomsky to find that Iran's Foreign Ministry has opened the door a bit on the talks on uranium enrichment:

Iran is not opposed to sending its low-enriched uranium (LEU) abroad but wants 100 percent guarantees of receiving higher-enriched fuel in return for a medical research reactor...."Nobody in Iran ever said that we are against sending 3.5 percent-enriched uranium abroad," Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said. "If we say we are looking for 100 percent guaranteees, it means that we want 3.5 percent enriched uranium to be sent out under such circumstances that we make sure that we will receive the 20 percent fuel."

That statement seems to bear out the analysis from EA's Mr Smith, offered last week: "[Iran's proposed] arrangement would allay Iranian fears that its uranium supply might be held indefinitely by some foreign party, including Russia."

0840 GMT: Today's Bang the War Drum Moment. The Guardian of London reaches far this morning in its presentation of all shades of opinion. Benny Morris, once a good historian and now a loud polemicist, wrings his hands over an Israeli military attack on Iran: "Obama will soon have to decide whether to give Israel a green light, and how brightly it will shine."

I think Morris would like the missiles to fly but he's passed the buck to the US President because of...

...the likely devastating repercussions –-- regional and global. These will probably include massive rocketing of Israel's cities and military bases by the Iranians and Hezbollah (from Lebanon), and possibly by Hamas (from Gaza). This could trigger land wars in Lebanon and Gaza as well as a protracted long-range war with Iran. It could see terrorism by Iranian agents against Israeli (and Jewish) targets around the world; a steep increase in world oil prices, which will rebound politically against Israel; and Iranian action against American targets in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf. More generally, Islamist terrorism against western targets could only grow.

0830 GMT: As for Dissent.... In this morning's New York Times, Robert Worth picks up on several developments in recent weeks to summarise the regime's efforts to defeat the opposition:

Stung by the force and persistence of the protests, the government appears to be starting a far more ambitious effort to discredit its opponents and re-educate Iran’s mostly young and restive population. In recent weeks, the government has announced a variety of new ideological offensives.

It is implanting 6,000 Basij militia centers in elementary schools across Iran to promote the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, and it has created a new police unit to sweep the Internet for dissident voices. A company affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards acquired a majority share in the nation’s telecommunications monopoly this year, giving the Guards de facto control of Iran’s land lines, Internet providers and two cellphone companies. And in the spring, the Revolutionary Guards plan to open a news agency with print, photo and television elements.

The government calls it “soft war,” and Iran’s leaders often seem to take it more seriously than a real military confrontation.

0815 GMT: Rooz Online are pressing the idea of co-operation between Ali Larijani and Hashemi Rafsanjani against the President. An analysis has highlighted Larijani's defense of Rafsanjani as a "pillar of the revolution" and, as we have in a separate entry, contrasted this with a view of Ali Reza Zakani's speech on the election and the National Unity Plan as an attack on Larijani.

0730 GMT: The US View of the Green Movement. Over the last two weeks, we have had intense debate over Washington's perception, inside and outside the US Government, of the Iranian opposition. Amongst this was a discussion of how the American elites might view filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbaf, with his recent talk at the Carnegie Endowment, as the spokesman for the Green Wave.

Interesting then to see Robin Wright, one of the top US-based journalists on Iran and the Middle East, highlight Makhmalbaf's speech and declare, with one quick qualification, "Iran's Green Movement Reaches Out to U.S."

0720 GMT: Nuclear Rhetoric or a Powerful Signal? Fars News' English-language site is putting a clear message on top of Deputy Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mohammadi's comments on Sunday: "Leader Has Final Say on Iran-US Talks". Mohammadi said in a roundtable at Tehran's Amir Kabir University:

The negotiation with the US is not possible without the permission by Imam and the Leader, and any kind of talks with the US must be permitted by the Supreme Leader. No Iranian President or Foreign Minister has had or will have the permission to act on establishment of relations with the US.

So is Mohammadi's declaration just the formal reiteration that Ayatollah Khamenei is atop the Iranian system? Is it a reassurance that any show of engagement with the US and Iranian proposals have the backing of the Supreme Leader? Or is this a message to Ahmadinejad and pro-deal allies to step away from the discussions?

0710 GMT: The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps has stepped up its line of US and Pakistani support of the Baluch insurgent group Jundallah, including last month's deadly suicide bombing in Baluchistan.

Addressing IRGC commanders in Isfahan, Brigadier General Gholam-Reza Soleimani said the US Central Intelligence Agency has been spending millions of dollars in its campaign against the Islamic Republic: "The CIA makes a contribution of more than one billion dollar each year to Pakistan's intelligence agency (Inter-Service Intelligence) as part of a campaign to eliminate individuals with anti-U.S. mentalities." He added that there was evidence of ISI and US involvement in many terrorist incidents in Iran, including the October bombing that claimed several IRGC commanders amongst more than 40 dead: "There exists documented evidence of links between (Abdolmalek) Rigi's terrorist group (Jundallah) and the CIA."