UPDATED Iran: The Washington-Tehran Deal on Enriched Uranium?

The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

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UPDATE 13 October 1900 GMT: For the love of Ed Murrow, is there a journalist out there who is not being led by the nose on the US-Russia Sanctions on Iran story?

Both The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times prefer to take the bait of Oh No, Russia Will Not Support US Sanctions, quoting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “Threats, sanctions, and threats of pressure in the current situation, we are convinced, would be counterproductive.” This apparently "throw[s] cold water on the Obama administration’s hopes that Russia had bxeen persuaded to cooperate with its effort to intensify the global pressure on Tehran".

Reuters prefers to be the mouthpiece for Oh Yes, Russia Will Support US Sanctions, relying on a US State Department spokesman who assures everyone that Russian President Dmitri Medvedev is "quite clear that, while pleased with the Geneva results, he expects Iran to implement them and if they don't there should be sanctions."

None of these journalists takes the time to ponder that they are being taken for a public ride. The proposal on the table for Secretary of State Clinton and her hosts is not sanctions but the Russian enrichment of 80 percent of Iran's uranium. All else at this point is a diversion.


UPDATE 1510 GMT: From Deception, Enlightenment. Want to see the clues to the possible US-Iran-Russia deal on enrichment? All you have to do is find the right angle on the mainstream media's simple reporting.

For example, Paul Harris in The Observer of London recites the finger-wagging party line of "American officials", "Clinton woos Russia over Iran sanctions", when she is in Moscow on Tuesday. Actually, in light of this story, expect the Secretary of State to be discussing --- privately, not publicly --- the details of third-party enrichment.

The Los Angeles Times has an even bigger tip-off. Modifying earlier media reports of a defiant position by the spokesman for Iran's nuclear energy organisation, it quotes from a later interview with Ali Shirzadian:

We’re looking at three options. We hand over 3.5% enriched and receive in return 20% enriched, or we buy 20% enriched on the market, or we will be allowed to enrich ourselves. I stress that no matter what option we take it will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency....Any of these options will work for both sides.

There have been been few "scoops" for the mainstream media during the post-election crisis in Iran, but Glenn Kessler of The Washington Post can claim one this morning:

"Iran four months ago discreetly contacted the United Nations-affiliated agency for nuclear energy to outline a worrisome situation: A research reactor in Tehran that produces medical isotopes that detect and treat the diseases of about 10,000 patients a week will run out of fuel by the end of 2010. Iran also had a request: Can you help us find a country that will sell us new fuel?"

The outcome? "An unusual deal, brokered largely by the United States, that aims to buy time for a diplomatic solution to the impasse over Iran's nuclear ambitions. If it works, Iran will end up with fuel necessary to treat desperately ill patients -- and greatly reduce its stock of low-enriched uranium."

This is the deal at the heart of the headline discussion of "third-party enrichment", probably by Russia, of Iran's uranium. Kessler explains that the source for the medical programme, 50 pounds enriched to almost 20 percent by Argentina, is running low. The Iranians have been asking for use of their stock of 3300 pounds, currently at about 3-4 percent enrichment, but that, of course, is tangled up in the debate over whether Tehran is looking for a pretext to produce weapons-grade uranium.

Under the Obama Administration's plan, "Iran...would have to give up about 80 percent of its stockpile to get back the same amount of uranium supplied by Argentina in 1993". Kessler, obviously using Administration sources, says that "White House official Gary Samore broached the idea to Sergei Kiriyenko, head of Russia's atomic energy agency, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. A senior U.S. official said, 'Both of them immediately said this is a great idea.'"

France is also involved, shaping the enriched fuel into uranium-aluminum
metal plates. And the International Atomic Energy Agency has helped broker the plan in talks with Tehran, including Mohammad El-Baradei's recent visit.

In the slow-moving world of international diplomacy, these are dramatic developments. However, there are two important points that Kessler --- in part because he feels obligated to sprinkle his article with superficial nay-saying ("critics question why the United States would be assisting a nuclear pariah"; "it will be too easy for Iran to extract the more highly enriched uranium for weapons") --- does not address.

First, this is the clearest possible sign that Washington --- come the hell or high water of its domestic opponents --- will be pursuing engagement. This is high-profile public relations: "senior Administration officials" have gone out of their way to place this story with the Post, knowing that it will get maximum attention over Sunday breakfasts through the capital. Every one of the boilerplate criticisms in Kessler's article is knocked back with an assurance such as "Iran has no known technical expertise at extracting uranium from a metal alloy".

Talk of deadlines and sanctions are now just window-dressing to distract the sceptics. While the Iranian regime will undoubtedly draw out negotiations, ensuring that the deal is not seen as a sign of its weakness, it sees value in the proposal: as Kessler notes, "[US officials] were relieved when, on the eve of the Geneva talks, he was quoted as saying that Iran would ship its low-enriched uranium to a third country for processing."

But here's the second point that does not even dawn on Kessler. "Four months ago", when Iran contacted the IAEA, was also "four months ago" when Iran was holding its Presidential election. Kessler does not identify when the US was informed of Tehran's approach, but one can assume it was soon afterwards.

So the Obama Administration took the decision that any position on Iran's internal turmoil was secondary to striking a nuclear deal. If the cost of that bargain was a granting of "legitimacy" to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it was a price worth paying.

Iran's Power Politics: A Warning To Moscow

The Latest from Iran (10 October): Karroubi is Back

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In the aftermath of the Geneva talks on Iran's nuclear programme, there are clear signals that Tehran wants some re-assurance of Russia's support. Moscow may have backed away from its initial signal, after the revelation of the second enrichment plant, that it might accept tougher sanctions, but there is far more in play, as Iran tipped off in its high-profile references at Geneva to "regional issues". Beyond the headlines on "missile defense", positions from the Middle East to the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Basin are being contested.

These two articles from Iran Review--- the first by Dr Hassan Behestipour on the Iran-Russia-US triangle and the second by Behzad Ahmadi Lafuraki on the threat of Russia's accommodation with NATO --- are far more than academic exercises in making the point:

Iran and Washington’s Game with Moscow
Dr. Hassan Beheshtipour

After Obama was elected president in February 2009, relations between Russia and the United States somehow changed after two years that had passed since the Munich meeting. The new administration had given up past conservative policies and Obama paid a visit to Moscow in July 2009. In the new era, Washington ignores repression of Chechens by Russia, which in turn, helps the United States in Afghanistan.

The United States has also temporarily postponed implementation of its missile defense shield for Eastern Europe in order to convince Moscow to be more cooperative on Afghanistan and Iran. Russia has tried to expand its relations with pro-West Arab countries as well as countries critical of the United States in Latin America in order to secure a foothold in a region which has been traditionally considered a US backyard. This will not only increase political clout of Russia, but also provide Moscow with a good market to sell arms.

Perhaps the zenith of the confrontations between Moscow and Washington in recent months has been establishment of a missile shield by the United States in the Czech Republic and Poland. Hearing about postponement of the plan, Moscow has taken contradictory stances on it. While President Medvedev has welcomed the development, Russian military are skeptical about the true intention of the United States and consider the move to be aimed at deceiving Russia and buying time.

However, the Russians have officially announced that in return for the postponement, they would give up a plan to deploy missiles in Kaliningrad, which is a Russian enclave near the border with Poland.

Bilateral relations between Moscow and Washington

Despite the rhetoric between the United States and Russia after the election of Obama, bilateral conditions are still plagued with many challenges. The fact that Medvedev received Obama at his family resort in Moscow and the warm meetings between the two sides on the sidelines of G20 meeting in Weisberg, US, have shown that neither of the two sides want their differences to lead to a major confrontation. In other words, Russia is planning to compete with the United States for benefits while it had resigned to some form of confrontation with the US under the Bush Administration. Therefore, Russia will not seek war and conflict with the United States in the coming years. Unlike the past, the Russians know where and how to deal with the Americans and when and where to confront them in order to both guarantee their own interests and make the rival withdraw.

Role of Iran in Washington’s game with Russia

This policy, however, has cost Russia dearly as the country has damaged its international credit as a result of giving in to US pressures over Iran’s nuclear case. The Americans have made the most of the Russians to achieve their goals the latest instance of which was adoption of the fourth Security Council resolution against Iran in early 2009. In order to keep its bargaining power in the face of the United States, Russia cannot afford to lose the Iran trump card. But what obstacles lay ahead of Russia?

In order to curb further US advances toward its western and southern borders, it should first build confidence in its relations with countries like Iran because Russia is usually faced with two charges in relation to its foreign policy.

Firstly, Russia opposes US unilateralism at international level, but pursues a similar policy in the region. International experts maintain that international and regional forms of unilateralism are equally inefficient and cause distrust, thus, reducing cooperation among nations.

Secondly, in its interactions with the United States, Russia easily trades its allies’ interest with the West when needed, but when its own national security or national interests are at stake, like what happened with the missile defense system, it would not be ready for any deal with the West. Continuation of this policy, which is considered by journalists as trading other countries’ interests for its own, will isolate Russia in the long run.

Vladimir Eskusirov and Andrei Terekhov, Russian correspondents of Nezavisimaia Gazeta in Tehran wrote an article on Monday saying that Tehran was surprised by the Russian president’s remarks who noted that ‘under some circumstances, sanctions are the only choice’. Those remarks seem strange because Russia is well aware that Iran has no nuclear weapons.

Last Friday, the Russian president issued a special statement on the uranium enrichment facility near Qom and noted that construction of a new enrichment plant is against frequent requests by the United Nations Security Council for Iran to stop uranium enrichment on its soil.

Russian analysts maintain that Washington had reserved news about the new plant secret until October 1 when Iranians had to make a final choice. Interestingly, Obama told Medvedev about the new plant only on Wednesday with China and Russia being fed accurate information on Thursday, that is, later than France and UK. Statements by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, who said in an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that Russia expected its allies to immediately share any information on Iran with Moscow, clearly indicated that Moscow was not happy with the current state of affairs. Russia was unhappy both with the level of cooperation with Western members of P5+1, and with Iran which had not said anything to Russia about the new plant.

In reality, if Russia wants to have Iran’s cooperation, it should prove that Moscow is a trustworthy partner, not a country which passes good times with others while sharing bad times with Iran and other critics of the West.



NATO’s Call on Russia for Cooperation: Goals and Possibilities
Behzad Ahmadi Lafuraki

After the tension in Russia’s relations with NATO increased due to what happened in Southern Ossetia in August 2008, the two sides met at high level on the Greek island of Corfu on June 29, 2009 and agreed to resume political and military cooperation.

The then NATO secretary-general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, announced resumption of NATO – Russia cooperation and mentioned reduction in weapons of mass destruction and fighting illicit drugs as major fields in which the two sides can collaborate. His successor, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, also called for resumption of negotiations with Kremlin in order to create a new atmosphere and work out new strategic partnership according to which both sides could cooperate on Afghanistan, terrorism, and piracy. He declared reduction of common security concerns in Europe and fighting common threats as the main areas of cooperation between NATO and Russia.

The turning point in renewed relations between NATO and Russia, however, is a recent decision by the United States to give up its plan for the establishment of a missile defense shield in eastern and central Europe. Just one day after the announcement of the above decision by US officials, secretary-general of NATO declared that a major hurdle on the way of expanding relations with Russia has been removed and the two sides should now focus on commonalities. The secretary-general did not suffice to general terms and pointed to four main areas of cooperation between Russia and NATO, that is, fighting terrorism at international level, fighting drug trafficking in Afghanistan, preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, and establishment of joint missile defense systems.

Russia also lost no time to show positive reaction to the US decision by commending Washington. Kremlin did not suffice to lip service and announced that it will stop deployment of new missiles in Kaliningrad.

The above developments and Rasmussen’s call on Russia to cooperate with NATO indicate a U-turn in NATO’s security policy, on the one hand, and Moscow’s keen interest in improving relations with the United States and NATO for better management of challenges, on the other hand. Since Russia’s relations with NATO have been constantly a function of the country’s relations with the United States and Europe, improvement in bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow has left its mark on Russia’s relations with NATO and common goals have overshadowed discrepancy in values.

On the whole, the West has reached the conclusion that convergence with Russia will be more beneficial for the security of transatlantic system than isolation of the country. Two main reasons have prompted Russia to cooperate with NATO despite threats posed to it by eastward expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The first reason is that Moscow is willing to be part of the transatlantic community. The second reason is having common security concerns with other NATO members, including the issue of stability in Afghanistan and drug trafficking in that country, fighting terrorism, especially transnational Islamist tendencies, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as challenges it is facing due to increased population and influence of China. In doing this, Russia is pursuing the following three goals:

1. To avoid isolation in international issues which are related to global security like Afghanistan by being present in international decision-making bodies such as NATO;

2. To prevent NATO from possibly taking anti-Russia positions; and

3. To creates opportunities for solving problems in the Caucasus by cooperating with NATO on such issues as Afghanistan or terrorism.

On the other hand, the United States and its allies are currently attaching more significance to Russia’s cooperation with NATO as problems like the instability in Afghanistan or the nuclear standoff with Iran greatly overshadowed the war in Georgia and its consequences. As for Afghanistan, it is possible for Russia to either limit the number of NATO flights over its airspace or instigate Central Asian states, as it did with Uzbekistan, to shut down US bases on their soil, thus, causing serious problems for NATO in supporting its forces in Afghanistan.

As for Iran, it seems that the United States has managed through introduction of the missile shield plan and its later rescission to make Moscow cooperate with Washington on Iran’s nuclear case. In fact, the United States has taken advantage of something that did not exist and has dealt with Russia over it. This has precedence in the US foreign policy and many similar instances can be seen in relation to various issues in the world. It was in line with this policy that as soon as the United States announced its decision to rescind the missile shield plan, Rasmussen moved to ask Russia to put the maximum possible diplomatic pressure on Iran in order to prevent Tehran from building a nuclear bomb.

The secretary-general of NATO warned the world on September 19, 2009 and on the verge of Group 5+1 meeting that if Iran were turned into a nuclear power, its model would be followed by some neighboring countries and emergence of multiple nuclear powers would not be in the best interests of NATO and Russia.

Since Russia has been consistently following a defensive policy toward NATO in the past decade and considered NATO’s decisions a function of the interests of its main power, that is, the United States, it seems that improvement in Washington – Moscow relations would certainly lead to improvement in Russia’s relations with NATO, just as happened in 2002.

The signs of such improvement are already on the horizon. Russian leaders have not ruled out the possibility of more sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program and have even expressed concerns over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.