More Time, Please: Ahmadinejad's Legitimacy and Iran's Nuclear Talks

Iran: Text of Ahmadinejad Speech in Mashaad (29 October)
Latest from Iran (30 October): Now to the Real Contest
The Latest from Iran (29 October): Opposition Momentum?

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Here is what President Ahmadinejad said in a nationally-televised speech from Mashaad on Thursday.

Iran is strong. I am strong. Iran is strong because I am strong.

While the President covered a range of domestic and international issues, the passage on the talks on Iran's nuclear programme will receive the most attention today. As The Daily Telegraph of London declares, "Iran claims victory in nuclear battle with the West".

Unfortunately most coverage in the West will miss the significance of the speech. The New York Times, relying on usual on unnamed "diplomats in Europe and unnamed officials", is already proclaiming, "Iran Rejects Deal to Ship Out Uranium, Officials Report", a journalistic approach echoed by the Los Angeles Times.

That is untrue, at least according to both the Iranian Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency: Tehran's reply accepts the "framework" but raises issues over timing and amount of uranium stock to be delivered to Russia for reprocessing. More importantly, it shoves aside Ahmadinejad's presentation:

I don’t want to repeat history for you but can you remember where we were a few years ago? Back then, they shouted at us, issued resolutions against us, waged psychological warfare against us and issued sanctions against us. They told us that we should completely give up our nuclear program. Where are we today? Today, they pursue nuclear cooperation with the Iranian nation.

There were days when they said that we should not have the technology at all, but today they say: let us cooperate. Iran’s position in nuclear industry is well-established. Today, Iran’s nuclear activities are considered to be a normal and obvious procedure and an absolute right of the Iranian nation.

That is not a rejection of discussions with the "West"; it is an embrace of them. But it is an embrace based on the premise that the US and other countries have knocked at Tehran's door, gone down on bended knee, and asked forgiveness. Iran is no longer an international outsider; it is an accepted nuclear power.

Iranian state media is running quickly with this line. Press TV, for example, is featuring, "Israel worried by IAEA draft accord on Iran", noting, "Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak says a draft accord presented by the IAEA would lead to recognition of Iran's nuclear enrichment program."

This is only part of the story, however. Let's get personal: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is fighting for his authority, not only against the Green opposition but against those within the establishment who object to his high-profile assertion of power. Remember how, only a few days ago, the stories were of Parliamentary leaders like Ali Larijani trashing the nuclear deal and of indications that the Supreme Leader was stepping in both to cast a veto and to put Ahmadinejad in his place?

No sign of those nay-sayers yesterday. Instead this was Iran as the President and the President as Iran.

That's not to say that, for the sake of Ahmadinejad's legitimacy and Iran's international position, Tehran will soon accept the US-led plan for third-party enrichment. To the contrary, the Iranians have serious objections to the details. The most straightforward is that the 80 percent of uranium stock to be shipped to Russia is far more than is necessary to keep Iran's medical research reactor --- the catalyst for this proposal in June --- operating for the rest of its lifespan. So, in Tehran's eyes, the current document is intended as much to keep most of its uranium "hostage" as it is to provide a stable supply for Iran's civilian needs.

And, given Ahmadinejad's position, the political advantages of spinning out the talks are there to be grasped. If there are alterations in the plan to reduce the amount shipped below 80 percent and to send it out in stages rather than in one delivery, these will be concession to Iran's and the President's strength. If the "West" walks away from the table, this will be an indication of their continuing deceptions and mistakes --- despite their apparent request for forgiveness from Tehran --- and Iran will be in the right as it maintains nuclear sovereignty.

Of course, there will be pressure in the US Congress for sanctions (the House of Representatives, despite the ongoing talks, has already passed a measure for tougher economic restrictions). Those, however, are President Obama's worry, as Russia and China are unlikely to give any support for multilateral steps.

So give Ahmadinejad credit for a political victory in Mashaad yesterday. But think of that victory as only a preliminary skirmish on an outside battlefield.

For the next time Ahmadinejad is due in Mashaad is on 13 Aban (4 November).

Iran: Text of Ahmadinejad Speech in Mashaad (29 October)

More Time, Please: Ahmadinejad’s Legitimacy and Iran’s Nuclear Talks
Latest from Iran (30 October): Now to the Real Contest
The Latest from Iran (29 October): Ahmadinejad Tries to Claim Legitimacy

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From the US Government's Open Source Center:

Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television (IRINN)
Thursday, October 29, 2009

....I would like to make a brief comment about the American government and
Iran's nuclear issue....

The American government has said (crowd interrupt, chants of slogan: Death
to America). Well done to the brave and wise people of Iran and you dear ones.

In an opinion poll which they published, they announced that more than 80
per cent of Iranian people did not trust America's promises and treated the American government's actions with doubt. (Crowd chants)

Allow me to continue. I would like to say just one sentence to the American government. You (the US government) said that you wanted change, that you wanted to change the image of America and that you want to serve the American national interests. I have a piece of advice for you. You should change your main policies in the Middle East. The change should be implemented here.

I am giving you a friendly piece of advice: you should choose between protecting your own honor and interest, and protecting the ill-omened Zionist regime. The two cannot come together. (Crowd chants: God is great)

The Iranian nation and other nations will judge your slogan of change in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon. We would like you to change your ways. This is to your benefit and to the benefit of the world. However, rest assured that it will be impossible for you to continue the policies of the past and yet maintain your honor, national interest and image. You should choose one of the two.

My second point concerns the nuclear issue. My dear ones, we have reached a very important juncture today. I don't want to repeat history for you but can you remember where we were a few years ago? Back then, they shouted at us, issued resolutions against us, waged psychological warfare against us and issued sanctions against us. They told us that we should completely give up our nuclear program.

Where are we today? Today, they pursue nuclear cooperation with the Iranian nation. (Crowd chants: Nuclear energy is our inalienable right) There were days when they said that we should not have the technology at all, but today they say: let us cooperate. Iran's position in nuclear industry is well-established. Today, Iran's nuclear activities are considered to be a normal and obvious procedure and an absolute right of the Iranian nation. (Crowd chants: God is great)

There was a time when they told us to come to the negotiating tables to discuss only the nuclear issue. We refused to do so. Today, they ask us to hold talks to increase cooperation at an international level. They tell us that we should sit together and find a solution to international problems. Look my dear ones, where we were back then and where we are now. They did not want the honor, grandeur and might of the Iranian nation to win. Today, with the grace of God, the grandeur and might of the Iranian nation has been established in the world. What is the reason? Why are we here? I am telling you that the first reason was your unique and historic steadfastness, as well as the steadfastness and strength of the supreme leader of the revolution against the bullying powers of the world. The
more important reason was the attention and kindness of our Lord of the Age, Imam Mehdi (12th Shi'i Imam) to us. (Crowd salute Imam Mehdi)

There are a few small points that should be said about our nuclear issue. Back then, they (the West) told us to close down everything; now they have expressed readiness to have cooperation over fuel supply, technological improvement, building power plants and nuclear reactors. They have reached a position of cooperation from their original position of confrontation. I want to make a few points addressed to both you and them. Be careful. We are at an important juncture which can be the start of a leap forward by the Iranian nation in the scientific and global fields.

I would first like to address them (the West) and tell them: You experienced confrontation with the Iranian nation for years. You imposed sanctions, issued resolutions and even issued military threats. You saw the result too.Today, you are saying that you want to change your actions. Very well, we welcome it. We shake any hand honest hand that is stretched towards us. However, if someone pursues plots and wants to be dishonest, the Iranian nation's response to him will be similar to the response we gave to Mr Bush and his predecessors. (Crowd chants: God is great, death to America)

Yet they were the ones who were losing out. The Iranian nation did not lose out. They (the West) faced problems, but the Iranian nation remained steadfast and, with the grace of God, overcame its main problems. The world, and some people inside the country, should know that this government will not retreat even one iota from Iran's absolute rights, as long as it enjoys the people's backing. (Crowd chants slogans, God is great)

Thankfully, today the conditions are ripe for nuclear cooperation at international levels. Supplying fuel for Tehran's reactor was an opportunity to gauge the honesty of certain individuals, governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The IAEA is expected to try to play its real and legal role, which is to render nuclear cooperation, and help independent nations achieve nuclear technology and advance in the nuclear field. The IAEA should try to establish a healthy nuclear relationship between governments.

We welcome exchange of fuel, technical cooperation and construction of power plants and reactors. We are ready for cooperation. We expect the negotiating governments to remain committed to their previous obligations too. We have signed nuclear agreements for which we paid 30 years ago, and those projects remain on hold since the beginning of the revolution. Well if we are to have cooperation, these agreements should be delivered to the Iranian nation.

We have signed agreements on technical issues, reactors and power plants. If we are to cooperate with one another, then these agreements and previous arrangements should be implemented.

My dear ones, we are moving in the right direction. With the grace of God, we are moving toward summits of honor. We are in no way concerned about engaging in right and legal cooperation (with the West), as long as it protects the rights of the Iranian nation. We will see this through....

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1940 GMT: Mondo Bizarro Analogy of the Day. A superficial Daily Telegraph report, "Iran accused of playing games on nuclear deal", is redeemed by this quote from "one diplomati close to the talks": "It's like playing chess with a monkey. You get them to checkmate, and then they swallow the king."

1920 GMT: Throughout yesterday and today (1210 GMT) we have been noting the significance of a meeting between Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. We have posted an English translation, courtesy of Khordaad 88, of the account of the discussion from Mousavi's Kalemeh.

1645 GMT: Defiance of the Day. Mowj-e-Sabz features the story of a mathematics student at Sharif University who challenged the Supreme Leader on Wednesday with a series of points about politics, media, and the Iranian leadership.

1505 GMT: Iran has formally submitted its response to the International Atomic Energy. As expected, Tehran has accepted the "framework" of third-party enrichment but wants further discussions on details, such as the timing and amount of uranum stock to be sent to Russia for enrichment.

The IAEA press release says merely, "The Director General is engaged in consultations with the government of Iran as well as all relevant parties, with the hope that agreement on his proposal can be reached soon."



1210 GMT: Now to Make Your Head Spin. In the current context of Ahmadinejad's move, this quote from Mir Hossein Mousavi in his latest talk with Mehdi Karroubi takes on significance: "The discussions in Geneva were really surprising and if the promises given (to the West) are realised, then the hard work of thousands of scientists would be ruined. And if we cannot keep our promises then it would prepare the ground for harder sanctions against the country."

Got it? Mousavi is against the third-party enrichment deal, trying to outbid Ahmadinejad as the defender of Iran's interests and sovereignty.

1200 GMT: Spinning Ahmadinejad Out of Control. The "Western" misunderstanding of the President's manoeuvre, not seeing the internal dimension in Ahmadinejad's quest for legitimacy through the nuclear talks, is escalating. CNN reproduces some of the quotes we have highlighted but reduces them to a "rare conciliatory note" struck by Ahmadinejad.

1110 GMT: Another note on the Ahmadinejad Nuclear Play (0850 and 1040 GMT). It is also significant that the Iranian President emphasised responsibility for past contracts in his talk today, calling on other countries to "fulfill their previous obligations"

We have nuclear contracts. It has been 30 years. We have paid for them…such agreements must be fulfilled … for technical activities, for reactors and power plants. If we intend to cooperate, such contracts must be addressed and the previous commitments must be fulfilled.

As an EA reader shrewdly noted during the Vienna talks, when Iran tried to sideline France from any agreement, Tehran is determined to get either finanical or political advantage out of pre-1979 payments to Western countries for nuclear reactors that were never completed.

1105 GMT: An EA source claims that Iran's judiciary officials are refusing to allow the lawyer of Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh to file an appeal against his 15-year prison sentence.

1040 GMT: Western media are buzzing about President Ahmadinejad's statement on the nuclear talks (see 0850 GMT), to the point of mis-reading it.

The Los Angeles Times has a lengthy snap analysis which declares, "Iran's president appears to back nuclear proposal". That's not quite right. Ahmadinejad did not refer to the specific deal on third-party enrichment which Iran is still considering (its reply is supposed to be presented by its Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency today). Instead he declared:

In the past ["the West"] said that we had to halt our nuclear activities. But today they say, 'Come consult about finding solutions for world problems,' and they want to cooperate for the exchange of fuel and development of nuclear technology and establishing a nuclear plant.

That is not an endorsement of a specific agreement but of the general process, and it is an endorsement based on the political advantage for the President rather than any benefit to Iran's nuclear position.

In other words, as we predicted and then debated in early October, Ahmadinejad is trying to use the Geneva and Vienna talks to establish an internal legitimacy that has been in question since 12 June. Whether that effort, which is largely going unnoticed by "Western" media succeeds, will be highlighted by the events up to and including the 13 Aban demonstrations.

0925 GMT: Human Rights Activists in Iran has issued its latest update on the status of post-election detainees, including the hunger strikes of Fariba Pajooh and Hengameh Shahidi.

0850 GMT: Ahmadinejad's Nuclear Play. The Iranian President has asserted, in a televised speech from Mashaad, that Iran will not retreat "one iota" on its nuclear rights, but it is ready to cooperate on uranium enrichment and nuclear technology. The proposed deal for third-party enrichment for Tehran's medical research reactor is Iran's opportunity to evaluate the "honesty" of world powers and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The President's trip to Mashaad, which is to be the first in a series of visits around Iran, and Iranian press --- as opposed to colleagues in the "West" --- are noting his general references to various issues in housing, industry, agriculture, water and natural resources, and urban planning. However, I'll repeat: Ahmadinejad is clearly using the nuclear figure to strike the pose of confident leader defending Iran. However, focusing on the international front is risky, given the bubbling internal situation leading up to 13 Aban (4 November).

0830 GMT: Ayatollah Khamenei is not the only political figure making a headline statement. The reformist politician and cleric Abdollah Nouri, in an interview with Advar News (summary via Pedestrian), declared that the post-election detentions were a signs of the regime's "hopelessness":

Each of these prisoners is connected to a bigger network. And their family, their friends, the country, we all feel close to them. The establishment has kept them in prison, to keep this protest against the establishment alive? What kind of strategy is that? I am guessing that certain analysis are offered to the lord of the establishment, which predicts that if the prisoners are freed, the establishment’s problems will grow. This is an analysis made out of hopelessness and must not be the basis for decision making.

But Nouri's attack went much farther:

They consider the parts of the constitution which stresses the rights of the people to be worthless trash and other parts as a holy book. When people act on their legal rights, they consider it an act against national security and a step towards overthrowing the system. So who is not acting according to the constitution, the protesters or the establishment?

0815 GMT: The Supreme Leader also made a public statement in his meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Wednesday, focusing in this case on Iran's regional position: "The Western prescription for solving problems in the [Middle East] is not justice-based and efficient and cannot solve the region's issues, including the issues of Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan."

Khamenei praised Erdogan's policies, declaring, "Your stance in supporting the Palestinian people was rational and a right move in line with Islam. Adopting such stances will strengthen Turkey's position in the Muslim world."

0720 GMT: We begin today with an analysis of the Supreme Leader's threat to the opposition, handed down in a statement on Wednesday, which may surprise some readers.

Far from seeing it as a move of strength to break up the movement before 13 Aban (4 November), I am reading it as a speech coming out of regime uncertainty and worry over recent signs of protest, both from leaders and from the general public.

Meanwhile, the Government has flexed its muscles, albeit against another "foreign agent" with no connection to the Green movement. Hossein Rassam, an Iranian employee of the British employee, has been sentenced to four years in prison. Rassam was arrested soon after the 12 June election and paraded in the Tehran trials --- like Kian Tajbakhsh, the Iranian-American scholar recently given a 15-year jail term --- as a prime example of the "velvet revolution".

On the international front, a International Atomic Energy Agency team has returned from its three-day inspection of the second uranium enrichment plant at Fordoo near Qom. The head of the team called it a "good trip". Data from the plant will now be analysed and summarised in a report for the IAEA's Governing Board.

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2015 GMT: 13 Aban Does Not Exist. Homy Lafayette offers more detail on the Government's order to state media to "refrain from disseminating any news, photo, or topic which can lead to tension in the society or breach public order" during the demonstrations on 13 Aban (4 November).

The article includes an English translation of the document, issued by Deputy Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Alireza Malekian.

1810 GMT: Iran's Nuclear Manoeuvre. If this story from Press TV is accurate, then Tehran is haggling over the details of third-party enrichment, rather than walking away from the deal.

The article re-quotes the source who spoke to Al Alam TV (see 1015 GMT), "Iran will announce its response to the proposal put forward by [International Atomic Energy Agency] Director-General [Mohamed] ElBaradei on Friday, October 30." The official added that Iran did not want to send 80 percent of its uranium stock in a single shipment to Russia, as set out in the deal from the Vienna talks: "Iran as a uranium buyer knows best how much uranium, enriched to a level of 19.75 percent, it needs [for its medical research reactor]; based on this argument, it will raise certain issues with this proposal."

In other words, Tehran will insist on a lower amount of uranium --- currently, the deal is for 1.2 million out of 1.5 million tonnes --- being sent to Russia in the first shipment. More would be delivered for enrichment as the medical reactor required new supplies.

The report is seconded by the head of Parliament's Foreign Policy and National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, "Iran can send the scheduled amount in separate shipments so that its fuel supply [provided by foreigners] is guaranteed....Iran can send only a part of its stockpile … and then as it receives its 20 percent enriched fuel it will send the next portion."

A word of caution on this interpretation: Boroujerdi is close to President Ahmadinejad and is putting the pro-deal view. It is unclear whether the dissenting voices such as Ali Larijani (and possibly, behind Larijani, the Supreme Leader) have come around to this position.

1750 GMT: Back from a teaching break to find that Rooz Online, following up a story prominent on the Internet this morning, has published details of an alleged Government order to censor and possibly shut out any news of mass demonstrations on 13 Aban (4 November).

1230 GMT: As reports continue to come in, with claims of 1500 students protesting at Azad University in Tehran, we've posted the first video footage.

1020 GMT: Reports that students gathered to demonstrate at Tehran University but are being forced to move by security forces.

1015 GMT: Reuters is reporting, from Iran's Al-Alam television, that Iran will accept the uranium enrichment agreement but will demand changes. The source is an "unnamed official" who indicates Iran's reply will be made within 48 hours.

0810 GMT: Detentions, Concerns, and Hunger Strikes. Human Rights Activists in Iran has posted a summary of latest developments regarding post-election detainees. Included is the information that journalist Henganeh Shahidi and student Payman Aref have started hunger strikes.

0800 GMT: Myth, Imprisonment, and "Velvet Revolution". We've just posted more on the jailed Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh and the regime's accusations and tactics with the claim of foreign-directed regime change in

0715 GMT: A reader has pointed us to a report posted by CNN on a prison riot in Karaj, west of Tehran, on Sunday. Interestingly, the story comes from the National Council of Resistance in Iran, the opposition movement headed by Maryam Rajavi and linked to Mujahedin-e-Khalq.

0635 GMT: Meanwhile CNN International (broadcast, not website) is focusing on a peripheral story. Pakistan detained and has now released 11 Iranians who crossed the border yesterday. The original line was that the detainees were Revolutionary Guard members, possibly pursuing or looking for leads on those linked to last week's bombings. Pakistan, probably after discreet talks with Tehran, is now calling the wanderers "security guards"; Press TV portrays them as "border police" pursuing smugglers.

0630 GMT: Now The Washington Post has picked up on the effect of the internal debate on the enrichment agreement (and vice-versa) with an overview by Thomas Erdbrink, "Iran officials appear split on nuclear plan".

0600 GMT: One of the standing rules for analysis, when students and I consider US foreign policy, is that what happens overseas cannot be separated from what happens at home.

So it is proving --- and may prove in a significant way in the next 72 hours --- in Iran.

Tensions over the decision on the uranium enrichment deal are now beyond simmering and openly bubbling. Even this weekend, all the signals from the Iranian Government were that it would work out any issues and sign the proposal, with a significant portion of Iran's uranium stock going to Russia for enrichment, by Wednesday or Thursday. Now, all bets are off.

Readers took yesterday's analysis of the possible conflict between the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad to a new level with their comments, but this morning I still find myself with questions rather than answers. The straightforward explanation would be that the Supreme Leader, working through the statements of Parliamentary leaders like Ali Larijani and Mohammad Reza Bahonar, is now blocking agreement. But, if so, why did he apparently endorse "engagement" to the point where the deal was almost struck? What could be the calculation in approaching the International Atomic Energy Agency, and thus Washington, in the summer and now walking out on the deal at the 11th hour?

Other theories from our readers include an Iranian "good cop, bad cop" act which would allow Ahmadinejad to portray himself as the guy who wanted to work with Obama but had to give way to Ayatollah Khamenei and the Iranians walking out of the arrangement because their ploy --- getting uranium for the medical reactor enriched for free while retaining enough of their stock to pursue other programmes --- hasn't yielded enough of a result.

Fortunately for my confusion, if not the general situation, there should be some clarification by Friday. Iran can't spin out the post-Vienna deliberations beyond the weekend, given that the US has already let last Friday's deadline slide in expectation of a Tehran decision within a few days. So it's accept, reject, or try to bring the "5+1" powers back to the table for talks.

And that declaration from Iran will in turn give the US Government, as well as the European powers, Russia, and China, a somewhat paradoxical choice. If Tehran does not sign the enrichment agreement, does the Obama Administration continue engagement, possibly strengthening the Iranian President against his own Supreme Leader? Or does it walk away (or is forced away by Congressional and public hostility to any more talks), now watching an internal Iranian situation in which Washington is no more than a bystander?

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0825 GMT: Norooz has published the names of 19 reformist activists and family members, out of 71 arrested on Thursday night at the home of detainee Shahabeddin Tabatabei, transferred to Evin Prison.

0753 GMT: Nuclear Deal Still On? Your latest clue, courtesy of Press TV, that the Iranians want an agreement on enrichment: a high-profile splash on the US and Russian positions, "Medvedev, Obama find talks with Iran 'positive'".

Your latest clue, courtesy of Press TV and Iran's Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, that Tehran will spin out the process a bit longer, manoeuvring for best possible terms on "third-party enrichment" and assuring the Iranian people that it is negotiating from strength: "Iran asserts that its offer to buy nuclear fuel from the West is purely a confidence-building measure, as it has the technology to enrich uranium up to 20 percent."

0750 GMT: We've updated the story of Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh, now sentenced to 15 years in prison, with an article by Karim Sadjadpour.

0615 GMT: A morning where the significant movement is on the Iranian nuclear question. The inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency should begin their work at Iran's second uranium enrichment facility, at Fardoo near Qom, today --- Al Jazeera has video. That story will dominate "Western" coverage of Iran, possibly matched by speculation and worry over Tehran's deliberations on the Vienna agreement on enrichment. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani stirred up confusion yesterday, as we noted, with his criticism of the proposal --- still no clue, in the dramatic US-UK coverage, whether Larijani speaks for anyone (say the Supreme Leader) other than himself.

Inside Iran, however, the hot-button question yesterday was whether Mir Hossein Mousavi and/or Mohammad Khatami had showed up at the Tehran Media Fair, a day after Mehdi Karroubi appeared.

Hours later, there was no confirmation, only the continuing rumours that Khatami had been inside the Fair and Mousavi had tried to enter but turned away on the advice of security forces. Personally, I do not think either happened --- the story about Mousavi, in particular, was being pushed by pro-Government media to show the opposition leader's weakness when challenged.

Yet a non-story is still a signal. The buzz over Mousavi and Khatami amplifies the message, which we noted and evaluated yesterday, that the opposition movement is ready for another go at the regime. Fatigue and resignation give way to excitement. How much that translates into hope, rather than the energy for another show of frustration and anger, is an important but as of now unanswerable question.

Still, I think it's notable that yet another high-profile if confused Government attempt to break resistance --- the arrest of the 60 reformists and their relatives this week --- has lost its force. Indeed, the continued detention of some of the 60 contributes to the anger/frustration seen at the Media Fair and beyond. That, I suspect, will be doubly true because of the taking of women who have no "political" position in this conflict apart from the relationship to their husbands.

Caveats have to be played on the above reading. Once again, we are seeing events which are almost exclusively in Tehran. While there are significant reports of demonstrations outside the capital, especially at universities and in factories (EA sources in particular are watching Shiraz), it is impossible to assess how far the challenge to the regime extends. At the same time, what happens in Tehran --- even if it is propelled by a "minority", as pro-Government interpretation will claim --- will have a ripple effect, 4 1/2 months after the Presidential election.

It is 10 days to 13 Aban (4 November).