Iran: More on Kian Tajbakhsh and Tehran's "Velvet Revolution"

Iran’s American Prisoner: The Case of Kian Tajbakhsh (Continued with 15 Years in Jail)
Iran: How the Regime Constructed the “Velvet Revolution”
The Latest from Iran (27 October): Domestic and Foreign Collide

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Despite (or possibly because of) the muted public response by the US Government to the 15-year sentence handed down to Iranian-American academic Kian Tajbakhsh, the campaign for his release has picked up steam in the last week. On Sunday we featured an article by Karim Sadjadpour, and fellow scholar Haleh Esfandiari, who was detained for months with Tajbakhsh in 2007, has blogged for The New York Review of Books.

Gary Sick, a former US Government official who has been named in the regime's indictments as a "foreign operative" working with Tajbakhsh, has also offered his thoughts. Without forgetting that hundreds of others remain in post-election detention, we post this to link Tajbakhsh's case to a wider analysis of the Iranian Government's accusations and tactics in its portrayal of "velvet revolution".

Last week, an Iranian-American colleague of mine, Kian Tajbaksh, was sentenced in Tehran to 15 years in prison. The indictment included the charges that (1) he was in contact with me; (2) that he was part of the Gulf/2000 network that I manage; and (3) that I am an agent of the CIA.

Normally, I simply ignore silly accusations such as this. They are nothing new. On one hand, it has been intimated that I must be under the influence of Iranian intelligence (by prominent neoconservatives who believe that my views on Iran’s political development and especially its nuclear program are not sufficiently alarmist). I have also been accused (by such worthies as Hossein Shariatmadari, the ultra-radical editor of Iran’s Kayhan newspaper, who is also a representative of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei) of being a CIA agent. I regard these insinuations as badges of honor, since they merely confirm that I do not subscribe to the ideological extremes of either of these groups. I have always felt that my reputation could speak for itself and required no public defense.

However, this time the accusations are really not about me but about a friend and colleague. Moreover, they are not just newspaper hyperbole by people who have an ax to grind and whose desire to make a political point exceeds their respect for the truth. These assertions are a matter of law—an official indictment by the judicial authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It is often said that it is impossible to prove a negative. How do I prove that I am NOT an agent of the CIA? How do I prove that the Gulf/2000 Internet project is NOT engaged in overthrowing governments? How do I prove that Kian—a friend and a colleague—was NOT trying to lead a “velvet revolution” against the Islamic Republic of Iran?

Let me simply reverse the questions. I spent 24 years in the U.S. Navy—my only connection with the U.S. government. The Navy sponsored my education at the University of Kansas. It took me to the Persian Gulf for my first exposure to the region that has become my professional specialization. It sponsored my graduate work for a Ph.D. degree at Columbia University. And it paid my salary while I was on the National Security Council staff at the time of the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis. I never received a paycheck from any other agency of the U.S. government. Do the prosecutors in Iran have evidence to the contrary? If so, please let me know.

There are a number of commentators on Iran, such as Reuel Gerecht, Graham Fuller, and Bruce Riedel, who indeed worked for the CIA. Although their political views disagree sharply, they always identify themselves as former CIA employees. I do not identify myself that way for the very simple reason that I never worked for the CIA.

The prosecutors charge that Kian was in touch with me. Right. We were both academics in New York, and we saw each other from time to time. However, I have gone back over the past 20 years with that in mind, and I am struck by something quite different. Over that period of time, I have known every Iranian ambassador to the United Nations and many members of the staff of the Iranian U.N. mission. I have spent much more time with them than with Kian.

More important, I have been in meetings with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on four different occasions over the past three years. I have spent at least nine hours with him, much more than I ever spent with Kian. In my last meeting with Mr. Ahmadinejad, I told him that if he were simply a lowly academic, instead of the president of Iran, he would be subject to arrest upon his return to Iran for meeting with the roomful of U.S. academics and think tank representatives that he had assembled at his hotel. He scoffed at the idea. Now one of my colleagues, a lowly Iranian-American professor who was about to take up a position at my university, is being condemned to 15 years in prison because, among other things, he had contact with me.

Iranian security officials are notably lacking in any sense of irony or humor. But I do wonder whether President Ahmadinejad is being considered for indictment because of his extensive contacts with me over the past four years.

The Gulf/2000 network is an Internet project that began 16 years ago to facilitate communication and information sharing among individuals who have a professional association with issues involving the Persian Gulf. It includes individuals of widely differing backgrounds and opinions, including both private citizens and government officials from countries around the world, including Iran. If any Iranian government official wishes to know about G2K, as we call it, he need only consult his colleagues who are members.

G2K is routinely cited in international conferences in Tehran and elsewhere as a reliable source of informed commentary and factual information about issues involving the Persian Gulf. It is limited to specialists, but it is not a secret. It includes individuals of every possible political persuasion. And it is not engaged in overthrowing governments.

The indictment against Kian is in fact an indictment of the legal and security structure of the Iranian government. The charges are false, deliberately false. They consist of a series of political fabrications devoid of even the flimsiest effort to verify the truth.

These accusations cast shame on any institution that professes respect for justice and law. They substantiate the words of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, one the founders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, that this government is no longer either Islamic or a republic but merely the latest in the shabby succession of Middle Eastern military regimes. These charges remind us of the excesses of the Stalinist show trials and the abominations of the Chinese Red Guards—examples of revolutions that betrayed their own ideals.

This is not about Kian, and it is certainly not about me. It is about the abject failure of a ruling clique that has lost the confidence and support of its own people and must contrive scapegoats to excuse its own deficiencies.

The Latest on Iran (25 October): Expectation Rises

NEW Iran's American Prisoner: The Case of Kian Tajbakhsh (Continued with 15 Years in Jail)
Iran: Football’s Going Green (with the help of Press TV)
Iran: The Karroubi Effect
Iran: Karroubi Statement on Events at Iran Media Fair
Video: Karroubi & Crowd at Iran Media Fair (23 October)

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0825 GMT: Norooz has published the names of 19 reformist activists and family members, out of 71 arrested on Thursday night at the home of detainee Shahabeddin Tabatabei, transferred to Evin Prison.

0753 GMT: Nuclear Deal Still On? Your latest clue, courtesy of Press TV, that the Iranians want an agreement on enrichment: a high-profile splash on the US and Russian positions, "Medvedev, Obama find talks with Iran 'positive'".

Your latest clue, courtesy of Press TV and Iran's Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, that Tehran will spin out the process a bit longer, manoeuvring for best possible terms on "third-party enrichment" and assuring the Iranian people that it is negotiating from strength: "Iran asserts that its offer to buy nuclear fuel from the West is purely a confidence-building measure, as it has the technology to enrich uranium up to 20 percent."

0750 GMT: We've updated the story of Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh, now sentenced to 15 years in prison, with an article by Karim Sadjadpour.

0615 GMT: A morning where the significant movement is on the Iranian nuclear question. The inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency should begin their work at Iran's second uranium enrichment facility, at Fardoo near Qom, today --- Al Jazeera has video. That story will dominate "Western" coverage of Iran, possibly matched by speculation and worry over Tehran's deliberations on the Vienna agreement on enrichment. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani stirred up confusion yesterday, as we noted, with his criticism of the proposal --- still no clue, in the dramatic US-UK coverage, whether Larijani speaks for anyone (say the Supreme Leader) other than himself.

Inside Iran, however, the hot-button question yesterday was whether Mir Hossein Mousavi and/or Mohammad Khatami had showed up at the Tehran Media Fair, a day after Mehdi Karroubi appeared.

Hours later, there was no confirmation, only the continuing rumours that Khatami had been inside the Fair and Mousavi had tried to enter but turned away on the advice of security forces. Personally, I do not think either happened --- the story about Mousavi, in particular, was being pushed by pro-Government media to show the opposition leader's weakness when challenged.

Yet a non-story is still a signal. The buzz over Mousavi and Khatami amplifies the message, which we noted and evaluated yesterday, that the opposition movement is ready for another go at the regime. Fatigue and resignation give way to excitement. How much that translates into hope, rather than the energy for another show of frustration and anger, is an important but as of now unanswerable question.

Still, I think it's notable that yet another high-profile if confused Government attempt to break resistance --- the arrest of the 60 reformists and their relatives this week --- has lost its force. Indeed, the continued detention of some of the 60 contributes to the anger/frustration seen at the Media Fair and beyond. That, I suspect, will be doubly true because of the taking of women who have no "political" position in this conflict apart from the relationship to their husbands.

Caveats have to be played on the above reading. Once again, we are seeing events which are almost exclusively in Tehran. While there are significant reports of demonstrations outside the capital, especially at universities and in factories (EA sources in particular are watching Shiraz), it is impossible to assess how far the challenge to the regime extends. At the same time, what happens in Tehran --- even if it is propelled by a "minority", as pro-Government interpretation will claim --- will have a ripple effect, 4 1/2 months after the Presidential election.

It is 10 days to 13 Aban (4 November).

Iran's American Prisoner: The Case of Kian Tajbakhsh (Continued with 15 Years in Jail)

Iran’s American Detainee: The Case of Kian Tajbakhsh
Iran: How the Regime Constructed the “Velvet Revolution”

In early August, we featured the case of Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh, arrested at his home in Tehran a few weeks earlier. Within days of the report, Tajbakhsh was amongst the defendants in the first Tehran trial, held up as a prime agent in the "velvet revolution".

Last week Tajbakhsh was sentenced to 15 years in prison. In contrast to the attention given to previous US citizens held by Iran, such as journalist Roxana Saberi, but in parallel to the case of the three American "hikers" detained this summer and still held, Tajbakhsh's fate has received little attention. There was a perfunctory State Department declaration of concern, but the US Government apparently is making its efforts for Tajbakhsh's release behind the scenes and very quietly.

Karim Sadjadpour provides further information and thoughts in this article from Foreign Policy:

My friend, the Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh, was recently  sentenced to 15 years in Tehran's Evin prison. For those familiar with the ways of authoritarian regimes, the charges against him will ring familiar: espionage, cooperating with an enemy government, and endangering national security.

Since his arrest last July -- he was accused of helping to plan the post-election uprisings -- Kian's family and friends have made countless appeals for clemency to the Iranian government, written letters to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad pleading his innocence, and signed dozens of petitions. All to no avail.

I've come now to realize that the regime probably thinks we're obtuse. Indeed, they know better than anyone that Kian is an innocent man. As the expression goes in Persian, "da'va sar-e een neest," i.e. that's not what this fight is about.

Allow me to explain.

Kian was first arrested in 2007. His crime was having previously worked as a consultant for the Open Society Institute (OSI), a U.S.-based NGO. Though his work was nonpolitical, focused on educational and developmental projects, and had received the explicit consent of the Iranian government, he was accused of trying to foment a "velvet revolution" on behalf of U.S.
intelligence agencies.

While in solitary confinement in Evin, he was subjected to countless hours of interrogation. Had the authorities found any evidence for the above charges during all this, Kian certainly would not have been freed after four months.

He was permitted to leave the country after his release, but chose to remain in Tehran with his wife and newborn daughter. He reassured his worried family and friends that he was now an open book to the Iranian government and there could be no further rationale or pretext to detain him.

Over the last two years, he regularly met with his minder from the Ministry of Intelligence. Aware of the fact that the government was monitoring all of his activities and communications -- including e-mail and telephone conversations -- he kept a very low profile and exhibited
great caution.

During this period, Kian and I regularly exchanged e-mails. He urged me to read his favorite book, Polish writer Czeslaw Milosz's brilliant novel, The Captive Mind, which examines the moral and intellectual conflicts faced by men and women living under totalitarianism of the left or right.

On the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Shah we debated the successes and failures of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and he told me he believed that the former outweigh the latter. Hardly the worldview of a subversive counterrevolutionary.

Even amid the massive popular uprisings following the tainted June 2009 presidential elections, Kian remained cautious and unmoved, steering way clear of any political activity and continuing to meet with his minder.

On June 14, two days after the election, he wrote me an email saying, "I'm keeping my head down ... I have nothing to add to all the reports that are here." In the same e-mail, Kian even expressed skepticism about the opposition's accusations of electoral fraud, saying he had seen "little hard evidence."

A few weeks later he was arrested, bafflingly, on charges of helping to
plan the post-election unrest.

Read rest of article....

A Brilliant Neo-Con Idea: Crippling Iran to Save It

The Latest from Iran (16 October): Rumours and Drama, Khamenei and Karroubi

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Yesterday I noticed an opinion piece in the Los Angeles Times by John Hannah, a former assistant to Vice President Dick Cheney. Hannah --- notable in the Bush years for being Cheney's fixer, running over other Government agencies to ensure the Vice President's will was done on issues from "enhanced interrogation" to rendition to Iraq --- is now declaring his concern for the Iranian people, who will accept "additional hardships" to remove their regime. Fortunately, whereas his boss Cheney pressed in 2007 for the "additional hardship" of bombing Iran, Hannah is now merely talking about a range of damaging economic sanctions.

Once my temperature cooled, I could not bring myself to acknowledging Hannah's piece by responding to it. Fortunately, Maryam from Keeping the Change can, in this effective decimation of the rhetoric and reality of Hannah's proposal. Hannah's original words follow her comment:

John Hannah Want to "Cripple Iran to Save It"

We have to admit: John Hannah's op-ed in the Los Angeles Times (below) takes a clever approach to the old-line heard from most U.S. neo-conservatives on the need to confront Iran with "harsh sanctions" and/or "military action". Citing to an anonymous group of Iranian activists with which he purportedly met while in Europe, Hannah argues in his article that the Iranian Opposition movement wants, but cannot openly call for, "crippling sanctions" against Iran. A provocative point --- should we believe him?

For several reasons, all signs point to no.

Leaving aside the fact that he was formerly a close advisor to Dick Cheney, one of the most vocal proponents of military action against Iran, Hannah is currently affiliated with the right-wing Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, a think tank founded by members of the American-Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) in the mid-1980s. AIPAC is a powerful pro-Israel lobby and one of the most influential lobbying groups in the United States. Appreciating that AIPAC's partisan reputation limited its abilities to push the U.S. government on certain policy and legislative proposals, its founders established the Institute in the hopes of having a credible, "objective" vehicle through which to push AIPAC's agenda. In the nearly 25 years since its creation, the Institute has, by and large, taken policy positions that support a more right-wing approach to the Middle East, which are generally in-line with AIPAC's political goals and have included advocating military confrontation with and other harsh measures against Iran.

Now, Hannah's op-ed seems cleverly designed to make challenging his position difficult. According to Hannah, while members of the Opposition Movement, such as former Presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi, have publicly opposed sanctions they have little choice but to take this position. While it is surprisingly hard to confront such a claim, no matter how contradictory it may seem, a quick canvassing of comments made by high-profile members of the "Movement in Exile" suggests the deception of Hannah's argument. To whit, his claims are directly at odds with public statements made by prominent Opposition figures currently based outside Iran, such as the human rights activist Shirin Ebadi and the U.S.-based dissident cleric Mohsen Kadivar, both of whom have opposed wide-raging economic sanctions of the sort suggested by Hannah. Now maybe Hannah could convince us that even these individuals are too fearful of government reprisals to speak out in favor of sanctions -- but, then, one wonders, why this fear has not stopped them from coming out in support of the Opposition Movement over the last four months. Moreover, Hannah's selective quotation of Iran analyst and Obama advisor Karim Sajjadpour also appears to be misleading. His attempt to equate Sajjadpour's purported suggestion that "punitive measures" imposed by the United States may be to the liking of Opposition leader, with Hannah's call for "crippling sanctions" is a tenuous argument at best.

We do not doubt that Hannah did in fact speak to Iranian activists while in Europe. But, based upon the statements he attributes to these individuals, he most likely met with members of the exiled Iranian dissident group Mojahedin-e-Khalq, an organization which is in no way affiliated with the Green Movement. For the last thirty years, the Mojahedin has been the most organized Iranian exile group, actively working to bring down the regime. With an army base in Iraq, along the Iran-Iraq border, and a political headquarters in Paris, the group's primary support comes from members of the Iranian diaspora (particularly in Europe), rather than from amongst people inside Iran. During the Bush Presidency, the Mojahedin was widely known to have allied itself closely with the Administration's neo-conservative hawks and to have consistently pushed for military attack against Iran. Since the organization's activities inside the United States were significantly curtailed after September 11th (the group was officially designated by the State Department as a terrorist organization in 1997, in response to pressure from Iran and in the hopes of achieving a detente with the Reformist Government of then-President Mohammad Khatami), any meeting with high-profile group members would likely have required Hannah to travel to Europe.

In short, John Hannah's claims that Opposition figures support sanctions against Iran is nothing but smoke and mirrors. Those who want to "Cripple Iran to Save It" remain the same individuals who pushed to attack Iran during the Bush years, namely, a coterie of neo-conservative hardliners and exiled Iranian political groups out of touch with the realities of the country.

"Cripple Iran to Save It" by John Hannah

"If current negotiations falter, international efforts to curtail Iran's nuclear program may escalate to the imposition of "crippling sanctions" or even the use of military force. A crucial question that policymakers must consider is whether such punitive measures would help or hinder the popular uprising against the Iranian regime that emerged after the country's fraudulent June 12 presidential elections.

The so-called green movement -- the color has been adopted by the opposition -- poses the most serious challenge to the survivability of the Islamic Republic in its 30-year history. Few analysts doubt that if it succeeded in toppling Iran's hard-line regime, the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program would become far more susceptible to diplomatic resolution.

Before June 12, conventional wisdom suggested that both harsh sanctions and military action would likely strengthen the Islamic Republic by triggering a "rally around the regime" effect. Iran's rulers, so the argument went, would exploit outside pressure to stoke Persian nationalism, deflecting popular anger away from the regime's own cruelty onto the perceived foreign threat -- in effect, short-circuiting the country's incipient democratic revolution.

But the conventional wisdom has taken something of a beating post-June 12. Before the elections, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sought to blame all of Iran's travails -- a deteriorating economy, international isolation, the mounting threat of war -- on the United States and Israel. But the Iranian people were buying none of it. On the contrary, by the millions they have gone to considerable lengths over the last four months to make one thing clear: When affixing responsibility for the misery, shame and danger being visited on their once-great nation, they focus overwhelmingly on the ruling regime itself -- on its economic incompetence, its tyrannical nature, its international belligerence.

There's good reason to doubt they would react differently now were the United States and its partners to impose painful sanctions. If anything, the bloody crackdown the Iranian people have endured since the election has only fueled their hatred of the current ruling clique and their determination to be rid of it as soon as possible. Popular loathing of the regime has reached such levels that almost any negative development is likely to be seized on as ammunition to attack its gross misrule. Almost any outside action that further squeezes Iran's tyrants and calls into question their legitimacy in the eyes of the world will be welcomed, even at the risk of imposing additional hardships on the Iranian people. The last thing on their minds is defending an indefensible regime in the face of tough international sanctions.

That was certainly the message I heard at a recent gathering of Iranian activists in Europe, including figures closely linked to the green movement's leadership. Sanctions must be imposed, and in strong doses, the group urged. A weak dose, or gradual approach, only allows the regime to adjust, they said. To be effective, sanctions must act like a shock, not a vaccine.

Similarly, prominent Iran expert Karim Sadjadpour told a Washington conference last month: "Whereas in the past [the leaders of Iran's opposition] were ... unequivocally opposed to any type of punitive measures by the United States ... that's not the case anymore."

While it remains too risky for the opposition's leadership to call publicly for sanctions, Sadjadpour claimed that privately they are eager to discuss what measures would be most effective and to synchronize their activities with U.S. actions against the regime.

What about military action? This is a much harder call. Iran experts are split. The majority still maintain that Iranians would quickly unite to confront any foreign attacker. While opposition representatives I heard in Europe think that's unlikely, they are deeply worried that if the regime is not crippled in any military attack, it will move ruthlessly to crush their movement for good.

But a few Iranians -- especially in private -- see other possibilities. They suggest that a bombing campaign that spared civilians while destroying Iran's nuclear installations as well as targets associated with the regime's most repressive elements -- the Revolutionary Guard and Basij militia -- might well accelerate the theocracy's final unraveling at the hands of an already boiling population.

Accurately assessing how these different scenarios will play out is crucial for U.S. interests. The stakes could not be higher, and the answers are far from certain. But it does seem likely that the international community's room for maneuvering may be far more extensive than many believed before this summer's uprising. Just how extensive should be the subject of urgent review by the United States and its allies as they seek to ensure that the Islamic Republic's unprecedented domestic vulnerability is fully exploited to stop its dangerous march toward nuclear weapons.