The Latest from Iran (18 October): Today's Bombings

NEW Iran Newsflash: National Unity Plan Submitted to Supreme Leader
NEW Video: Blame on Sunni Group Jundallah, US For Bombing
NEW Iran: Khamenei, Bahari, Hajjarian, and the "Semi-Normal"
NEW Iran: The Great Supreme Leader Health Mystery
Iran: The Supreme Leader Lives — The Picture (17 October)
The Latest from Iran (17 October): Back to Semi-Normal

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2000 GMT: The official death toll from today's bombing is now 42.

1950 GMT: Coincidence or Sabotage? A passenger train travelling from Tehran to Kerman derailed today, and a tea factory in Golestan burned to the ground.

1925 GMT: Mehr News is reporting that the explosion near the Oil Ministry in Tehran was from a faulty air tank.

Islamic Republic News Agency, repeating the air tank story, is reporting one person killed and 17 injured.

1910 GMT: Switching the Foreign "Enemy" from the US to Pakistan. This morning, when the Revolutionary Guard was claiming Washington was behind the bombings, we wrote, "Watch carefully to see if the Ahmadinejad Government maintains this line, which could derail 'engagement'."

There's a big clue tonight that Ahmadinejad has chosen engagement over the blame-US line. Fars News reports that the Iranian Cabinet has demanded that Pakistan bring forward those who carried out the bombings, a positioning reinforced by the summoning of the Pakistani Ambassador to the Foreign Ministry. There is no mention of the US anywhere in the Fars story.

1900 GMT: There are reports of an explosion near the Oil Ministry in Tehran.

1830 GMT: The Death Toll Rises.... The afternoon number of 31 dead from this morning's bombing will rise, though it is uncertain how much. Fars News reports that 35 victims have already been identified.

1625 GMT: National Unity Plan. It's alive, and it apparently has been submitted to the Supreme Leader (who is apparently also alive) for consideration. We've posted a separate entry on the newsflash.

1535 GMT: Iran's Nuclear Programme: This is Not Good. If the following report from Press TV is accurate, Iran's nuclear negotiators --- on the eve of the Vienna technical talks --- just laughed in the face of the "West": "A team of Iranian experts heads for the Austrian capital to discuss the terms of a deal to buy highly-enriched uranium without exchanging any of Tehran's low-enriched uranium."

The deal discussed quietly since June between Iran and other countries, including the US, is precisely for Tehran to transfer 80 percent of its low-enriched uranium to third countries for enrichment. Simply adding highly-enriched supplies to Iran's existing low-enriched stock has no appeal for Washington, which sees third-party enrichment as a way to ensure that Tehran stays below the 20 percent enrichment maximum for "civilian" uses of uranium.


1530 GMT: Another Suspended Sentence. A day after the five-year suspended sentence for Saeed Hajjarian, the same judgement has been handed down on Shahab Tabatabai, Head of Campaign 88 for young supporters of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami.

1430 GMT: Now Back to Politics. Mir Hossein Mousavi, writing on his website Kalameh (English summary on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) after a meeting with relatives of detained former Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Aminzadeh, says he will persist in efforts for reform in spite of the Government's attempts to suppress post-election protests:

Our people are not rioters. Reform will continue as long as people's demands are not met. Keeping these people in jail is meaningless. They should be released as soon as possible.

1340 GMT: On the international front, Fars News reports that Iran's delegation to the technical talks in Vienna tomorrow will include Ali Asghar Soltanieh, the Iranian ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Hamid Reza Asghari, deputy head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation, and Mehdi Khaniki, another IAEO chief executive. However, Ali Akhbar Salehi, the head of the IAEO is not going.

1330 GMT: Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has also taken the line that Washington carries responsibility for today's bombings, "We consider this recent terrorist act to be the result of the U.S. actions and this is a sign of their enmity."

To repeat: US and Iranian officials are due to meet tomorrow in the next step of engagement, technical talks on Iran's uranium enrichment programme.

1240 GMT: The Islamic Republic News Agency is featuring a message from President Ahmadinejad, offering his condolences to the families of those killed this morning and expressing confidence that there would be a swift response to the "criminal action".

1230 GMT: EA's Mr Smith checks in with detail on Jundallah and the bombing: "We would normally dismiss the Iranian allegations of foreign interference as the usual anti-West yarn from Tehran, but the claims against [Jundallah leader Abdolmalek] Rigi warrant extra attention. He is an extremely shadowy figure who appears to be well-protected, to the extent that his own brother has been caught and sentenced to death [Hamid Rigi was reprieved at the last minute although 13 other Jundullah members were executed] by the Iranian authorities but he himself is still at large.

"He has appeared several times on Voice of America Persian, under the label "Leader of the 'Popular Resistance Movement of Iran', which is something VOA made up --- it's not quite the Persian translation of Jundullah. Exactly how the VOA got hold of him for a live interview, via satellite phone, is quite unexplained, as is the prominence and deference accorded to him. This interview caused a serious backlash in the Iranian blogosphere and seriously discredited VOA Persian."

1215 GMT: Press TV's reporting is not only emphasising Jundallah's responsibility for the bombings but playing up a US connection. In a video we've posted in a separate entry, Press TV claims --- from an interview with the captured brother of Junduallah's leader, Abdolmalek Rigi --- that the group "has been in constant contact with the US Embassy in Islamabad [Pakistan] and this has been certified by different groups and sources [of Press TV]".

1200 GMT: The latest from Iranian state media puts the death toll from this morning's larger bombing at 29, including six senior Revolutionary Guard commanders, with 28 injured. The Sunni rebel group Jundallah is reported to have claimed responsibility for the attack. The Revolutionary Guard continue to allege that the US is involved, while state television has also blamed Britain.

0945 GMT: We've moved our initial morning analysis, considering the politics of the Supreme Leader's health, the release on bail of journalist Maziar Bahari, the suspended sentence for Saeed Hajjarian, and more arrests, to a separate analysis.

0920 GMT: Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting has identified the site of the larger of the two bombings as the gates of a conference hall, where the Revolutionary Guard meeting with tribal elders was to take place, in the city of Sarbaz in Sistan-Baluchestan.

0845 GMT: Press TV adds an interesting detail on the bombing, pointing to coordinated attacks: "At around the same time, another group of IRGC commanders were caught in an explosion as their convoy came under attack at a road junction" in the town of Pishin in Sistan-Baluchestan.

0840 GMT: No new details on the suicide boming, but Revolutionary Guard officials have issued a communique saying "foreign elements" linked to the US were responsible.

Watch carefully to see if the Ahmadinejad Government maintains this line, which could derail "engagement". US and Iranian delegations are due to meet tomorrow in the "5+1" technical talks on Iran's uranium enrichment.

0725 GMT: Iranian state media is reporting that "several" senior commanders have been killed by a suicide bombing in Zahedan, the capital of Sistan-Baluchestan Province in southeastern Iran, which left 60 dead and injured.

Those killed include General Noor Ali Shooshtari, the deputy commander of the IRGC ground forces, and Rajab Ali Mohammadzadeh, the IRGC's commander in Sistan-Baluchestan.

The IRGC commanders had gathered to meet tribal elders, purportedly for Shia-Sunni reconciliation. (English summary avaiable via Associated Press)

UPDATED Iran: The Washington-Tehran Deal on Enriched Uranium?

The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

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UPDATE 13 October 1900 GMT: For the love of Ed Murrow, is there a journalist out there who is not being led by the nose on the US-Russia Sanctions on Iran story?

Both The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times prefer to take the bait of Oh No, Russia Will Not Support US Sanctions, quoting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “Threats, sanctions, and threats of pressure in the current situation, we are convinced, would be counterproductive.” This apparently "throw[s] cold water on the Obama administration’s hopes that Russia had bxeen persuaded to cooperate with its effort to intensify the global pressure on Tehran".

Reuters prefers to be the mouthpiece for Oh Yes, Russia Will Support US Sanctions, relying on a US State Department spokesman who assures everyone that Russian President Dmitri Medvedev is "quite clear that, while pleased with the Geneva results, he expects Iran to implement them and if they don't there should be sanctions."

None of these journalists takes the time to ponder that they are being taken for a public ride. The proposal on the table for Secretary of State Clinton and her hosts is not sanctions but the Russian enrichment of 80 percent of Iran's uranium. All else at this point is a diversion.


UPDATE 1510 GMT: From Deception, Enlightenment. Want to see the clues to the possible US-Iran-Russia deal on enrichment? All you have to do is find the right angle on the mainstream media's simple reporting.

For example, Paul Harris in The Observer of London recites the finger-wagging party line of "American officials", "Clinton woos Russia over Iran sanctions", when she is in Moscow on Tuesday. Actually, in light of this story, expect the Secretary of State to be discussing --- privately, not publicly --- the details of third-party enrichment.

The Los Angeles Times has an even bigger tip-off. Modifying earlier media reports of a defiant position by the spokesman for Iran's nuclear energy organisation, it quotes from a later interview with Ali Shirzadian:

We’re looking at three options. We hand over 3.5% enriched and receive in return 20% enriched, or we buy 20% enriched on the market, or we will be allowed to enrich ourselves. I stress that no matter what option we take it will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency....Any of these options will work for both sides.

There have been been few "scoops" for the mainstream media during the post-election crisis in Iran, but Glenn Kessler of The Washington Post can claim one this morning:

"Iran four months ago discreetly contacted the United Nations-affiliated agency for nuclear energy to outline a worrisome situation: A research reactor in Tehran that produces medical isotopes that detect and treat the diseases of about 10,000 patients a week will run out of fuel by the end of 2010. Iran also had a request: Can you help us find a country that will sell us new fuel?"

The outcome? "An unusual deal, brokered largely by the United States, that aims to buy time for a diplomatic solution to the impasse over Iran's nuclear ambitions. If it works, Iran will end up with fuel necessary to treat desperately ill patients -- and greatly reduce its stock of low-enriched uranium."

This is the deal at the heart of the headline discussion of "third-party enrichment", probably by Russia, of Iran's uranium. Kessler explains that the source for the medical programme, 50 pounds enriched to almost 20 percent by Argentina, is running low. The Iranians have been asking for use of their stock of 3300 pounds, currently at about 3-4 percent enrichment, but that, of course, is tangled up in the debate over whether Tehran is looking for a pretext to produce weapons-grade uranium.

Under the Obama Administration's plan, "Iran...would have to give up about 80 percent of its stockpile to get back the same amount of uranium supplied by Argentina in 1993". Kessler, obviously using Administration sources, says that "White House official Gary Samore broached the idea to Sergei Kiriyenko, head of Russia's atomic energy agency, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. A senior U.S. official said, 'Both of them immediately said this is a great idea.'"

France is also involved, shaping the enriched fuel into uranium-aluminum
metal plates. And the International Atomic Energy Agency has helped broker the plan in talks with Tehran, including Mohammad El-Baradei's recent visit.

In the slow-moving world of international diplomacy, these are dramatic developments. However, there are two important points that Kessler --- in part because he feels obligated to sprinkle his article with superficial nay-saying ("critics question why the United States would be assisting a nuclear pariah"; "it will be too easy for Iran to extract the more highly enriched uranium for weapons") --- does not address.

First, this is the clearest possible sign that Washington --- come the hell or high water of its domestic opponents --- will be pursuing engagement. This is high-profile public relations: "senior Administration officials" have gone out of their way to place this story with the Post, knowing that it will get maximum attention over Sunday breakfasts through the capital. Every one of the boilerplate criticisms in Kessler's article is knocked back with an assurance such as "Iran has no known technical expertise at extracting uranium from a metal alloy".

Talk of deadlines and sanctions are now just window-dressing to distract the sceptics. While the Iranian regime will undoubtedly draw out negotiations, ensuring that the deal is not seen as a sign of its weakness, it sees value in the proposal: as Kessler notes, "[US officials] were relieved when, on the eve of the Geneva talks, he was quoted as saying that Iran would ship its low-enriched uranium to a third country for processing."

But here's the second point that does not even dawn on Kessler. "Four months ago", when Iran contacted the IAEA, was also "four months ago" when Iran was holding its Presidential election. Kessler does not identify when the US was informed of Tehran's approach, but one can assume it was soon afterwards.

So the Obama Administration took the decision that any position on Iran's internal turmoil was secondary to striking a nuclear deal. If the cost of that bargain was a granting of "legitimacy" to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it was a price worth paying.

The Latest from Iran (4 October): Waiting for Developments

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NEW Video: Sharif Uni Protest Against Javad Larijani (4 October)
You Make the Call: Leaked IAEA Report on Iran Nuclear Programme
The Latest from Iran (3 October): Debating Mousavi’s Strategy

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1705 GMT: Establishment Battles Resume? Parleman News is claiming that supporters of President Ahmadinejad have tried --- and failed --- to unseat Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani as the head of the Principlist majority group. If true, this could be a sign that the temporary reconciliation of conservative and principlist factions, prominent at the start of September with the approval of the Ahmadinejad Cabinet, may be breaking down.

And that in turn raises the question: is this split being fostered by the imminence of a National Unity Plan which may seek to marginalise Ahmadinejad?

1640 GMT: We think Hashemi Rafsanjani's statement, which we noted here earlier, is important enough to warrant a separate entry.

1625 GMT: The Unity Gesture? EA's Mr Smith predicted that this step would occur in the Supreme Leader's speech at the end of Ramadan on 20 September. Looks like he was only two weeks off: "Iran is to release on bail around 20 people accused of post-election violence, including top reformists and an Iranian-American scholar."

According to the Islamic Republic News Agency, citing a source inside Iran's judiciary, those who may be freed include former Vice President Mohammed Ali Abtahi, journalist Mohammad Atrianfar, reformist leaders Shahab Tabatabaei, Saeed Shariati and Abdollah Momeni, and Iranian-American academic Kian Tajbakhsh.

1430 GMT: Pointless Analysis of Day. A Jeffrey Kuhner, the declared President of the "Edmund Burke Institute", is allowed to take up space in The Washington Times with this: "War with Iran is now inevitable. The only question is: Will it happen sooner or later?"

1240 GMT: Good Cop, Bad Cop. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has provided the critical counterpoint to the positive signals from this morning's briefing by IAEA head Mohammad El-Baradei (0905-0920 GMT):

The [IAEA] is an international authority which should supervise all nuclear activities of states, but the agency's records indicate that it was not successful in this regard for political reasons. The agency acted successfully with regard to nuclear activities in certain places like Japan, but it bowed [to pressure] where it faced political barriers and proved unsuccessful.

The head of Iran's nuclear programme, Ali Akhbar Salehi, sounded a different tune after his press conference with El Baradei. Confirming the late October inspection date for the second enrichment plant and discusions on "third-party enrichment", he said, “As far as safeguards are concerned, Iran's nuclear issue has been fully resolved."

1200 GMT: Report that two members of the reformist student group Daftar-Tahkim-Vahdat (Unity Consolidation Bureau) are still in Evin Prison, with 16 released yesterday. Original reports were that there were 15 detainees, and all were freed.

0920 GMT: El Baradei calls for Iran to rejoin the Subsidiary Protocol (Code 3.1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which provides a stricter framework for inspection and monitoring. Iran left the Protocol in 2007 after a dispute with the IAEA over access to information on military programmes as well as the nuclear facilities.

0915 GMT: El Baradei says, "All in all, a positive development," but he reiterates, "I have been saying for a number of years we need transparency on the part of Iran and cooperation on the part of the international community." This is "the critical moment...shifting gears from confrontation into transparency and co-operation".

0910 GMT: El Baradei praises Iran "very positive" response on both the question of access to the second enrichment facility and "third-party enrichment" of low-grade uranium for radiomedicine use.

The date for inspections of the facility near Qom is 25 October.

0905 GMT: IAEA head El Baradei and the head of Iran's nuclear programme, Ali Akhbar Salehi, are now briefing the press on their discussions in Tehran.

0620 GMT: There is little information on the biggest story in Iran because talks on the draft National Unity Plan have gone very private. For example, little has been heard from Mehdi Karroubi, for a week, possibly because discretion is needed in this critical period of negotiations.

There is also little so far on the visit of International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohammad El Baradei to Tehran beyond the Iranian insistence that this has nothing to do with the Geneva talks and is instead aimed at the "continuation of cooperation to supply fuel for Tehran research reactor which produces radiomedicine".

We are left instead with overheated "revelations" on Iran's nuclear programme. Once again, it's David Sanger and William Sanger of The New York Times who are leading the rush with the headline, "Report Says Iran Has Data to Make a Nuclear Bomb", soon picked up by everyone from Reuters to Fox News. The report in question, a study by IAEA experts, says that "sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device based upon HEU [highly-enriched uranium] as the fission fuel".

Now note that this does not mean that Iran has embarked on the process of putting highly-enriched uranium into a warhead. It does not indicate that Iran has embarked on the process of converted low-yield uranium into highly-enriched uranium. It does not establish that Iran has enough low-yield uranium to produce the HEU for a Bomb. It does not even say that Iran has a design for a nuclear weapon. It only says Iran has "sufficient information".

This, however, is enough for Broad and Sanger to pretend that this is a dramatic revelation of a super-secret plot, as the information "go[es] well beyond the public positions taken by several governments, including the United States". And it is the platform for them to take a swipe at El Baradei for refusing to make the study public.

Heck, the extracts from the study are not even "new". They were revealed in an Associated Press article by George Jahn on 17 September. What is significant is the timing of the Broad-Sanger piece, published less than 72 hours after the Geneva talks. If they really wanted to give us some meaningful information, they would reveal whether their Page 1 quest started with a reading of the Jahn piece, notice of a 2 October report by the Institute for Science and International Security (which mentioned Jahn's article and published extracts of the IAEA report, but which is only mentioned deep in The New York Times piece --- we've posted full text in a separate entry), or  a helpful pointer from an Administration source.

It's perfect fodder for bang-the-war-drum headcases like Elliott Abrams, the former Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush and convicted criminal in the Iran-Contra scandal. Here's Abrams explaining that "most Iranians" would accept a military attack on their country:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OLYujym5wNU&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

Video and Transcript: US Ambassador to UN Rice on NBC (4 October)

Video, Transcript, and Analysis: National Security Advisor Jones on CBS (4 October)

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In terms of foreign policy, this is a relatively insignficant interview. Susan Rice, the US Ambassador to the UN, is not a heavy-hitter in the Obama Administration, so her appearance is merely a prop for the more important comments of the National Security Advisor, James Jones, on CBS and CNN.

Where this is notable is as an indicator of the domestic problems the Administration faces with the tangles in its policies. Rice stutters her way through the dilemma posed by the military's open pressure on President Obama over Afghanistan troop numbers --- "Why [won't] the president immediately grant the request of his commanders?"

And on Iran, this is simply appalling. David Gregory uses the misleading and quasi-hysterical New York Times report and the opinion of Charles Krauthammer, a drum-beater for war on Tehran, to steer the discussion towards the inevitable of "crippling sanctions". Faced with the inanities, Rice can only --- like the President she is serving --- play for time.

Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy

DAVID GREGORY: Ambassador Rice, welcome.

MS. SUSAN RICE: Thank you. Good to be with you.

GREGORY: Let's get right to this New York Times reporting this morning. This is what the article actually says.

The headline: "Report Says Iran Has the Data to Make a Nuclear Bomb. Senior staff members of the United Nations nuclear agency have concluded in a confidential analysis that Iran has acquired `sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable' atom bomb. The report by experts in the IAEA stresses in its introduction that its conclusions are tentative, subject to further confirmation of the evidence, which it says came from intelligence agencies and its own investigations. But the report's conclusions, described by senior European officials, go well beyond the public positions taken by several governments, including the United States." First off, does the U.S. concur with these conclusions?

MS. RICE: Well, David, I'm not going to get into characterizing the substance of a confidential report or our own intelligence. But suffice it to say, our whole approach is predicated on an urgent need to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capacity. And that's why a united P5+1 last week presented Iran with a very plain choice: Prove to our satisfaction that their program is, as they claim, for peaceful purposes and open up their facilities to inspections, freeze their uranium enrichment program, commit, as they have done, and follow through on that commitment to provide fuel for enrichment outside of the country or face real pressure and consequences.

GREGORY: But they have the know-how to make a bomb.

MS. RICE: I'm not in a position to characterize that report or our own intelligence. But the point is whether they have it now, whether they seek it or whether they will obtain it down the road, we are very focused on preventing that from occurring.

GREGORY: Well, why can't you say when you think they're going to have it or if they have it now?

MS. RICE: Well, there are various assessments and they don't all align. But the point is we share the concern that an Iran with nuclear weapons would pose a great threat to U.S. national security and the security of, of allies and partners in the region. And that is why we're very determined to take the steps necessary to prevent them from obtaining that capacity.

GREGORY: But given this report, given that the president has talked about a deadline of September, what is the deadline for Iran to either put up, to negotiate away its nuclear potential or face consequences?

MS. RICE: Well, we're very much in a, a period of intense negotiations now. What happened last week was a constructive beginning, but it was only a beginning, David. And the onus is now squarely on Iran to adhere to the commitments it has made. If it doesn't, time is short. We're not interested in talking for talking's sake, we're not interested in interminable negotiations. They have to demonstrate conclusively that their program is for peaceful purposes.

GREGORY: You talk about these--the potential for consequences. You won't negotiate indefinitely. The question is how much leverage does the U.S. really have? Charles Krauthammer, critical of the approach, saying, "Look, you don't have China and Russia really on board." This is what he wrote in an opinion piece on Friday: "Do the tally. In return for selling out Poland and the Czech Republic by unilaterally abrogating a missile-defense security arrangement that Russia had demanded be abrogated, we get from Russia...what? An oblique hint, of possible support, for unspecified sanctions grudgingly offered and of dubious authority--and, in any case, leading nowhere because the Chinese have remained resolute against any Security Council sanctions. Confusing ends and means, the Obama administration strives mightily for shows of allied unity, good feeling and pious concern about Iran's nuclear program--whereas the real objective is stopping that program. This feel-good posturing is worse than useless, because all the time spent achieving gestures is precious time granted Iran to finish its race to acquire the bomb." Is this a cat and mouse game?

MS. RICE: No. Look, this is a very serious process where we are together aligned with the P5+1--that's Russia, China, France, Britain, Germany and the United States--presenting Iran with a very stark choice: Either they give up their nuclear weapons program conclusively to our satisfaction, or they will face additional pressure. That is the agreed position of the P5+1. Now, it's, it's true that Russia and China have historically resisted sanctions, but we have moved Russia and China in a very constructive direction just recently on North Korea, where we now have in place, with their unanimous support, the toughest Security Council sanctions on any country in the world. We are united in presenting this choice to Iran, and Iran new--now has the responsibility either to adhere to its obligations internationally or face that pressure.

GREGORY: What, what crippling sanctions are you considering? What kind of pressure against Iran if they don't comply?

MS. RICE: There are a range of, of sanctions, David, under consideration. There are those that we might pursue multilaterally in the context of the Security Council, there are others that we could do outside of the Security Council with partners in Europe and elsewhere, and then there are those that we can take by ourselves unilaterally. There's a wide range.

GREGORY: Economic sanctions?

MS. RICE: Economic and otherwise. But that is one option. But right now we are in a period of intense negotiations. It's not a, it's not an infinite period, it's a very finite period.

GREGORY: So what's the period?

MS. RICE: Well, we will--we have some very important milestones that we are expecting...

GREGORY: I know, but the president...

MS. RICE: David...

GREGORY: The president has said September.

MS. RICE: This--no, the president said...

GREGORY: And now you're saying a finite period. So what, what's the period?

MS. RICE: The president said that we would take stock in September, and indeed we did. And we presented Iran with a very stark choice on October 1st. Now we have some deadlines that the Iranians themselves have committed to. They will meet October 19th at the expert level to discuss the Tehran Research Reactor. That's an important step. ElBaradei, the IAEA director, today confirmed that on October 25th the Qom reactor will be open to IAEA inspections. The Iranians have also said that they will come back to the table within the month of October. So we will look and see whether those steps are indeed fulfilled. If they are, that will indicate a degree of seriousness that we've not seen yet. If they're not fulfilled, then obviously we are in a two-track posture and we have the pressure track before us.

GREGORY: You talk about engagement with Iran. Most Americans, when they think about a relationship with Iran, this is what they think about. They think about the hostage crisis back in 1979. If I interview you a year from now, what would you like to be able to say about the U.S. relationship with Iran?

MS. RICE: I'd like to say that we are on track to conclusively prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capacity. You know, we've had many years, David, of drift, where we have refused to engage in negotiations, the Iranians have pursued their enrichment program unabated and we haven't been able to put in tougher sanctions. We're in a different place. We have unity among the P5, we have a clear opportunity here...

GREGORY: Yeah, but the question I asked was about what's, what's the relationship the U.S. would like to have with Iran? What's the future look like?

MS. RICE: Well, obviously the optimal outcome is an Iran without nuclear weapons, that is peacefully integrated into the international community, that no longer poses a threat to its neighbors, no longer supports terrorism, treats its people with respect and allows them to participate peacefully in a democratic process. That's the Iran we hope to see. Iran has, and the people of Iran have a tremendous history and a great opportunity to be much more constructive players in the international community or they face another choice, and that's up to them. But we hope very much that Iran would be in a position where it can be a responsible player.

GREGORY: Let's turn to Afghanistan and the other breaking news overnight, insurgents storming an outpost, killing eight U.S. soldiers. Back in August the president the topic of Afghanistan, speaking to veterans, and this is what he said.

(Videotape, August 17, 2009)

PRES. OBAMA: But we must never forget this is not a war of choice, this is a war of necessity.

(End videotape)

GREGORY: If this is a war of necessity, why wouldn't the president immediately grant the request of his commanders to fully resource this war of necessity?

MS. RICE: Well, let me begin by pointing out what has been and remains our objective here. The objective, David, is to prevent al-Qaeda from being in a position to launch attacks on the American homeland again. Our goal is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and prevent it from obtaining safe haven to come and attack us as they did on 9/11. That is the clear goal. The president set that out in March. And he said in March, when he laid out the policy, that after the Afghan elections in August we would review where we are; we would review the goals, the methods and the resources needed to obtain them. In the interim we've had several things happen. We've had General McChrystal come in with his assessment of the situation on the ground. He has said that the Taliban is, is gaining in strength and that, that we have a somewhat deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. We've had progress in Pakistan, critically important political security and even economic progress. And at the same time we've had an election in Afghanistan which has not lived up to the hopes and expectations of the Afghan people. We are now in a process that I'm part of which is a very responsible process to assess where we are, how the circumstances now affect our strategic goals and what methods and resources we need to obtain them.

GREGORY: But I just...

MS. RICE: That is a responsible, necessary process.

GREGORY: That may be the case. But the question I asked is, if this is a war of necessity, as the president has said, then why would he not immediately grant the wishes of his commanders to fully resource what is a war of necessity, to fully resource--which was the promise made by presidential aides after he launched his strategy--this war of necessity?

MS. RICE: We are fully resourcing it. We have put in place 21,000 additional troops. They are still completing their deployment. We have increased the number of civilians and we have increased the financial resources to Afghanistan and Pakistan substantially. The president has to make a judgment based not only on the military assessment of his commander on the ground, also the inputs of his diplomats, his ambassadors. He has to look at the military, the security situation. We have NATO partners involved. We also have Pakistan next door, which is critically important to this equation, and the entire global effort to fight and defeat al-Qaeda. The president, as commander in chief, has to look at more than what is happening in a single theater. He has to look at what is necessary to advance our goal of defeating al-Qaeda globally. That's a clearly very important theater. We're going to do what is necessary to accomplish our goal in Afghanistan, but we're not going to do it without having taken stock, without going through a comprehensive and responsible assessment where all voices are heard and the president makes a judgment. There's no decision more serious, David, than putting more Americans into harm's way. The president will do what is necessary to keep America safe.

GREGORY: The...

MS. RICE: But he's going to do it after a thoughtful and thorough analysis.

GREGORY: General McChrystal said this, speaking to military specialists in London about the difference in views in the national security team about whether you go in with kind of a lighter footprint, without committing more forces, just focus on counterterrorism. This is what he said earlier this week.

(Videotape, Thursday)

GEN. STANLEY McCHRYSTAL: You have to navigate from where you are, not from where you wish you were. A strategy that does not leave Afghanistan in a stable position is probably a short-sighted strategy.

(End videotape)

GREGORY: Is the president committed to at least not leaving Afghanistan unless it is stable?

MS. RICE: The president is committed to doing what is essential to keep America safe. And obviously we have made important and substantial investments in Afghanistan. We are not talk--nobody's talking about walking away from Afghanistan.

GREGORY: No, but will the president stay in Afghanistan as long--until it is stable?

MS. RICE: The, the president will do what is necessary to keep America safe. And that relates not only to Afghanistan, but Pakistan, where we face a very serious...

GREGORY: But you won't commit to staying in Afghanistan until it's stable?

MS. RICE: We'll, we'll commit to staying in Afghanistan as long as it takes to keep America safe, David. We have challenges and threats...

GREGORY: But those could be two different things, right?

MS. RICE: They have--there are challenges and threats that face the United States that come from multiple quarters.

GREGORY: Right. But you can see, those, those could be two different things.

MS. RICE: They may or may not be two different things. I'm not going to prejudge the outcome of this review. It's a very important step that needs to be taken to ensure that we are not just reacting and operating on autopilot. The president's responsibility to the American people is to look at circumstances as they evolve, to make a judgment about what is necessary in the current circumstances to ensure that we are doing all that we can to prevent al-Qaeda from being in a position to attack us, whether in--from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Southeast Asia or any of the other places where we have been active and on the offensive against al-Qaeda.

GREGORY: Is politics the biggest factor here?

MS. RICE: Absolutely not.

GREGORY: Is the, the political pressure from the left not to escalate in the war a big factor for the president?

MS. RICE: Absolutely not. This is a president who is going to do what is necessary, irrespective of politics, to protect the American people.

GREGORY: In the short amount of time left, going for the gold in Copenhagen. Was it a mistake for the president to go out on the world stage and, and be rebuffed by the IOC and not bring the games home?

MS. RICE: It's never a mistake for the president of the United States to be willing to fight and compete on behalf of our country. And that's what he did, and he would do it again in a nanosecond. This is--this was about competing with three other compelling candidacies for the Olympics and bringing that home to the United States. The day I'll get concerned is when we have a president in the White House who refuses to fight for the United States and compete because he's concerned about pundits or, or political criticism.

GREGORY: Finally, you--talking about the United Nations, the body where you are now serving as our ambassador. Recently during the U.N. General Assembly Meeting in New York, Americans saw this kind of parade of anti-Americanism. You see Chavez of Venezuela, Ahmadinejad of Iran and Gadhafi--who, you know, may still be speaking for as far as we know. You once said that the U.N. is imperfect but it is also indispensable. When you look at that showing, what is the indispensable part?

MS. RICE: David, there are 192 countries in the United Nations. You picked out three that provided some barroom drama during the course of the General Assembly. The United Nations is critically important to our national security because it is the one place that we can marshal with the force of law the commitment of other nations to do things that we need to protect our security. For example, when we got the Security Council last June to pass the toughest sanctions on the books today against any country in the world, North Korea, we got something that was much more powerful than anything we could muster on our own. We are not able, given transnational threats, proliferation, terrorism, climate change, pandemic, to tackle these challenges along. No country is, even one as powerful as our own. We need to marshal the active support of others. Now, sometimes the U.N. falls short, it doesn't do all that we want it to do, and particularly in cases like human rights and, and, and cases of atrocities. And that's an area where we need to, to push for improvements. But when it comes to issues of critical importance to our security, like proliferation, like terrorism, we have seen progress come from the United Nations when we can get them to come together and pressure countries like North Korea to do what is necessary to keep us and others safer.

GREGORY: All right, Ambassador Susan Rice, good luck with your work.

MS. RICE: Thank you.

GREGORY: Thank you very much.

MS. RICE: Good to be with you.

You Make the Call: Leaked IAEA Report on Iran Nuclear Programme

The Latest from Iran (4 October): Waiting for Developments
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama’s Balance Wobbles

We were very critical this morning about The New York Times' exaggeration of extracts from an International Atomic Energy Agency report, assessed by the Institute for Science and International Security, on Iran's nuclear programme. Although the NYT article mentioned the ISIS study, posted Friday, it quoted only a few words, preferring to rely on the "interpretations" of Government officials.

This is the entire text of the ISIS study, with an analysis followed by extracts from the IAEA report:

Writing in the trade publication Nucleonics Week, Mark Hibbs describes a debate taking place within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the extent to which the Agency should publicize its findings regarding potential weaponization activities by Iran. This debate is also described in a September 17, 2009 article by Associated Press journalist George Jahn, which revealed excerpts from internal IAEA documents assessing the veracity of the allegations about Iran as well as the Agency‟s assessment on Iran‟s current capability to make nuclear weapons. This report contains further excerpts from what ISIS understands to be a working document and not necessarily a final report.

ISIS understands that IAEA experts, including one nuclear weapons specialist, prepared the document. Their objective was to summarize and assess the set of records from 2004 and earlier obtained by the IAEA about the possible military dimensions of Iran‟s nuclear program. The information analyzed included documents and data from electronic media procured inside Iran and obtained by the United States, information and documents from other member states about suspected nuclear weaponization activities inside Iran, and procurement data. This document also included the IAEA‟s expert assessments of the information. Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General for Safeguards, described some of this information in a technical briefing for member states in February 2008. The September 17 AP article contains extensive quotes about assessments by IAEA experts, possibly in consultation with nuclear weapon experts in member states. The information below is taken from one version of this IAEA assessment cited by the AP; it is a 67-page long report titled “Possible Military Dimensions of Iran‟s Nuclear Program.” ISIS is not certain of the date of this document but understands it was authored in the past 6 to 12 months.

Much of the IAEA‟s information, including test data, reports, diagrams, and videos, was reportedly contained on a laptop. This laptop has received considerable attention since its public revelation in 2005. ISIS now understands that the term “laptop” might refer to the method by which the United States shares sensitive data and not the form in which the data
were removed from Iran. ISIS has learned from intelligence officials with direct knowledge of the case that electronic media was smuggled out of Iran by the wife of an Iranian who was recruited by German intelligence. Iranian authorities had discovered his activities, and one of his last acts before arrest was the passing of the records to his wife. Intelligence officials told ISIS that they assume he is dead. His wife fled to Turkey and turned the electronic media over to U.S. authorities. Questions have arisen about the authenticity of these records, which are
inevitable given the sensitivity of this issue. For several years, ISIS has queried nuclear and other experts who have examined these data and documents. They have consistently told ISIS that the information appears authentic. One intelligence official who examined the information said that the electronic media contains extensive amounts of data obtained in
experiments, and noted that it would be extremely difficult to falsify such a large quantity of data.

It is also important to note that the IAEA has addressed this issue in its most recent safeguards report, stating that "the information contained in that documentation appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, appears to be generally consistent, and is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran with a view to removing the doubts which naturally arise, in light of all of the outstanding issues, about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran‟s nuclear programme."

In addition to the electronic media records, other member states have provided information relevant to this issue, which also forms the basis for the assessments contained in this internal IAEA document. Less controversy surrounds the authenticity of this information. ISIS
emphasizes that these excerpts appear to be from a working document that has been revised at least once. Its author is unknown. It is subject to revision both substantively and editorially.

Excerpts

The following texts are taken from the internal IAEA report; the headings are ISIS‟s own.

The Role of the Ministry of Defense in the Development of a Nuclear Payload for the Shahab 3 Missile

“The Agency has information, known as the Alleged Studies, that the Ministry of Defence of Iran has conducted and may still be conducting a comprehensive programme aimed at the development of a nuclear payload to be delivered using the Shahab 3 missile system.

The information, which originates from several Member States and the Agency's own investigations, points to a comprehensive project structure and hierarchy with clear responsibilities, timeline and deliverables. The information, which has been obtained from multiple sources, is detailed in content and appears to be generally consistent. The information refers to known Iranian persons and institutions under both the military and civil apparatuses, as well as to some degree to their confirmed procurement activities.”

Alleged Studies

“The Alleged Studies conducted by Iran refer, inter alia, to the development work performed to redesign the inner cone of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead. The Studies further describe the development and testing of high voltage detonator
firing equipment and multiple exploding bridge wire (EBW) detonators as well as an underground testing infrastructure and the probable testing of one full-scale hemispherical explosively driven shock system that could be applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device. Another aspect concerns the conversion of (UO2) to uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), also known as Green Salt.”

On Whether the Missile Re-entry Vehicle is Intended to be Nuclear

“From the documents presented by a number of Member States and the Agency‟s own activities, it is possible to assess that in early 2002 Iran formally declared the start of its warhead development programme, which very likely comprised at least two projects under the leadership and auspices of the Ministry of Defence – Project 111 and Project 110. Project 111 was to design the inner cone of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle and the production of an explosives operations control set (ECS). Project 110 was to produce the contents of the spherical warhead payload. The Agency assesses that the development work to design a suitable chamber
inside the re-entry vehicle is intended to accommodate a new warhead payload that is quite likely to be nuclear.”

Did Iran develop a high explosive implosion system small enough to fit inside the Shabah 3 missile re-entry vehicle?

“Information received from a Member State indicates a round, semi-round and semi-spherical shock generator system for which an EBW detonator is being developed. It is said that the shock generator was fired in field test conditions with one detonator using a firing cable. Without knowledge as to what exactly is being referred to under the term „shock generator
system,‟ the Agency assesses that it is highly likely to be some form of distributed explosive-filled channel system for initiating hemispherical high explosive charges.”

“The significance of the information is that Iran may have developed an effective high explosive implosion system, which could be contained within a payload container believed to be small enough to fit into the re-entry body chamber of the Shahab 3 missile.”

"In October 2005, the Agency was able to examine the 15-page uranium metal document amongst centrifuge-related material in Iran. Based on the information in the document, the Agency assesses that it is possible that Iran has knowledge regarding the contents of a nuclear package, including fissile components that would be inserted inside the high explosive
charge."

"The Agency suspects that this document belongs to a larger package that Iran may have obtained but which has not yet come to the Agency's attention. The Agency is concerned that Iran may have nuclear weapon design information which could be used in a specific nuclear package which would fit within the mass and volume constraints as seen in projects 110
and 111.”

Steady Progress on Nuclear Fuel Cycle

“The Agency assesses that Iran is steadily making progress in the development of its own indigenous nuclear programme. Iran has been reporting on a regular basis major achievements in mastering the various parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, which the Agency has been able to
verify.”

High Explosive Manufacturing Industry for Nuclear Weapons

“It is believed that Iran has developed exploding bridgewire detonators and associated electronic high voltage firing systems. The Agency assesses that Iran has managed to develop a high explosives industry capable of synthesizing and formulating the raw materials into explosive compositions and that could be used in a nuclear weapon. It is very likely that Iran
has the required engineering skills to machine explosives into the weapon components. It is assessed that Iran has succeeded in combining its detonator development work with other related studies to manufacture a relatively compact high explosives initiation system that has probably been tested with comprehensive diagnostic equipment.”

Sufficient Information to Design and Build a Crude Nuclear Weapon

“The Agency further assesses that Iran has sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device based upon HEU [highly-enriched uranium] as the fission fuel. The necessary information was most likely obtained from external sources and probably modified by Iran. The Agency believes that non-nuclear experiments conducted in Iran would give confidence that the implosion system would function correctly. The Agency
has evidence from which it is possible to assess that Iran has the ability to make a neutron initiator which may have been tested. Provided Iran has relevant detectors, it should be possible to diagnose whether any product made would function satisfactorily.”

On Finishing a Nuclear Warhead for the Shabab 3 Missile

“The Agency assesses that Iran has conducted studies relating to the aspects necessary to incorporate a device into a conventional delivery system such as the Shahab 3 missile. Further studies on payload integration are also accompanied by the electronic engineering studies to
produce an arming and fuzing system. From the evidence presented to the Agency it is possible to suggest that, for the Shahab 3 delivery system, Iran has conducted R&D into producing a prototype system. However, further work is necessary to manufacture a more robust unit capable of producing an airburst fuzing option that would function both safely and reliably.
Overall the Agency does not believe that Iran has yet achieved the means of integrating a nuclear payload into the Shahab 3 missile with any confidence that it would work. Nonetheless, with further effort it is likely that Iran will overcome problems and confidence will be built up.”