The Latest from Iran (4 October): Waiting for Developments

NEW Iran: Rafsanjani Makes A Public Move with “Friendship Principles”
NEW Video: Sharif Uni Protest Against Javad Larijani (4 October)
You Make the Call: Leaked IAEA Report on Iran Nuclear Programme
The Latest from Iran (3 October): Debating Mousavi’s Strategy

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1705 GMT: Establishment Battles Resume? Parleman News is claiming that supporters of President Ahmadinejad have tried --- and failed --- to unseat Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani as the head of the Principlist majority group. If true, this could be a sign that the temporary reconciliation of conservative and principlist factions, prominent at the start of September with the approval of the Ahmadinejad Cabinet, may be breaking down.

And that in turn raises the question: is this split being fostered by the imminence of a National Unity Plan which may seek to marginalise Ahmadinejad?

1640 GMT: We think Hashemi Rafsanjani's statement, which we noted here earlier, is important enough to warrant a separate entry.

1625 GMT: The Unity Gesture? EA's Mr Smith predicted that this step would occur in the Supreme Leader's speech at the end of Ramadan on 20 September. Looks like he was only two weeks off: "Iran is to release on bail around 20 people accused of post-election violence, including top reformists and an Iranian-American scholar."

According to the Islamic Republic News Agency, citing a source inside Iran's judiciary, those who may be freed include former Vice President Mohammed Ali Abtahi, journalist Mohammad Atrianfar, reformist leaders Shahab Tabatabaei, Saeed Shariati and Abdollah Momeni, and Iranian-American academic Kian Tajbakhsh.

1430 GMT: Pointless Analysis of Day. A Jeffrey Kuhner, the declared President of the "Edmund Burke Institute", is allowed to take up space in The Washington Times with this: "War with Iran is now inevitable. The only question is: Will it happen sooner or later?"

1240 GMT: Good Cop, Bad Cop. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has provided the critical counterpoint to the positive signals from this morning's briefing by IAEA head Mohammad El-Baradei (0905-0920 GMT):

The [IAEA] is an international authority which should supervise all nuclear activities of states, but the agency's records indicate that it was not successful in this regard for political reasons. The agency acted successfully with regard to nuclear activities in certain places like Japan, but it bowed [to pressure] where it faced political barriers and proved unsuccessful.

The head of Iran's nuclear programme, Ali Akhbar Salehi, sounded a different tune after his press conference with El Baradei. Confirming the late October inspection date for the second enrichment plant and discusions on "third-party enrichment", he said, “As far as safeguards are concerned, Iran's nuclear issue has been fully resolved."

1200 GMT: Report that two members of the reformist student group Daftar-Tahkim-Vahdat (Unity Consolidation Bureau) are still in Evin Prison, with 16 released yesterday. Original reports were that there were 15 detainees, and all were freed.

0920 GMT: El Baradei calls for Iran to rejoin the Subsidiary Protocol (Code 3.1) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which provides a stricter framework for inspection and monitoring. Iran left the Protocol in 2007 after a dispute with the IAEA over access to information on military programmes as well as the nuclear facilities.

0915 GMT: El Baradei says, "All in all, a positive development," but he reiterates, "I have been saying for a number of years we need transparency on the part of Iran and cooperation on the part of the international community." This is "the critical moment...shifting gears from confrontation into transparency and co-operation".

0910 GMT: El Baradei praises Iran "very positive" response on both the question of access to the second enrichment facility and "third-party enrichment" of low-grade uranium for radiomedicine use.

The date for inspections of the facility near Qom is 25 October.

0905 GMT: IAEA head El Baradei and the head of Iran's nuclear programme, Ali Akhbar Salehi, are now briefing the press on their discussions in Tehran.

0620 GMT: There is little information on the biggest story in Iran because talks on the draft National Unity Plan have gone very private. For example, little has been heard from Mehdi Karroubi, for a week, possibly because discretion is needed in this critical period of negotiations.

There is also little so far on the visit of International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohammad El Baradei to Tehran beyond the Iranian insistence that this has nothing to do with the Geneva talks and is instead aimed at the "continuation of cooperation to supply fuel for Tehran research reactor which produces radiomedicine".

We are left instead with overheated "revelations" on Iran's nuclear programme. Once again, it's David Sanger and William Sanger of The New York Times who are leading the rush with the headline, "Report Says Iran Has Data to Make a Nuclear Bomb", soon picked up by everyone from Reuters to Fox News. The report in question, a study by IAEA experts, says that "sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device based upon HEU [highly-enriched uranium] as the fission fuel".

Now note that this does not mean that Iran has embarked on the process of putting highly-enriched uranium into a warhead. It does not indicate that Iran has embarked on the process of converted low-yield uranium into highly-enriched uranium. It does not establish that Iran has enough low-yield uranium to produce the HEU for a Bomb. It does not even say that Iran has a design for a nuclear weapon. It only says Iran has "sufficient information".

This, however, is enough for Broad and Sanger to pretend that this is a dramatic revelation of a super-secret plot, as the information "go[es] well beyond the public positions taken by several governments, including the United States". And it is the platform for them to take a swipe at El Baradei for refusing to make the study public.

Heck, the extracts from the study are not even "new". They were revealed in an Associated Press article by George Jahn on 17 September. What is significant is the timing of the Broad-Sanger piece, published less than 72 hours after the Geneva talks. If they really wanted to give us some meaningful information, they would reveal whether their Page 1 quest started with a reading of the Jahn piece, notice of a 2 October report by the Institute for Science and International Security (which mentioned Jahn's article and published extracts of the IAEA report, but which is only mentioned deep in The New York Times piece --- we've posted full text in a separate entry), or  a helpful pointer from an Administration source.

It's perfect fodder for bang-the-war-drum headcases like Elliott Abrams, the former Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush and convicted criminal in the Iran-Contra scandal. Here's Abrams explaining that "most Iranians" would accept a military attack on their country:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OLYujym5wNU&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

You Make the Call: Leaked IAEA Report on Iran Nuclear Programme

The Latest from Iran (4 October): Waiting for Developments
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama’s Balance Wobbles

We were very critical this morning about The New York Times' exaggeration of extracts from an International Atomic Energy Agency report, assessed by the Institute for Science and International Security, on Iran's nuclear programme. Although the NYT article mentioned the ISIS study, posted Friday, it quoted only a few words, preferring to rely on the "interpretations" of Government officials.

This is the entire text of the ISIS study, with an analysis followed by extracts from the IAEA report:

Writing in the trade publication Nucleonics Week, Mark Hibbs describes a debate taking place within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the extent to which the Agency should publicize its findings regarding potential weaponization activities by Iran. This debate is also described in a September 17, 2009 article by Associated Press journalist George Jahn, which revealed excerpts from internal IAEA documents assessing the veracity of the allegations about Iran as well as the Agency‟s assessment on Iran‟s current capability to make nuclear weapons. This report contains further excerpts from what ISIS understands to be a working document and not necessarily a final report.

ISIS understands that IAEA experts, including one nuclear weapons specialist, prepared the document. Their objective was to summarize and assess the set of records from 2004 and earlier obtained by the IAEA about the possible military dimensions of Iran‟s nuclear program. The information analyzed included documents and data from electronic media procured inside Iran and obtained by the United States, information and documents from other member states about suspected nuclear weaponization activities inside Iran, and procurement data. This document also included the IAEA‟s expert assessments of the information. Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General for Safeguards, described some of this information in a technical briefing for member states in February 2008. The September 17 AP article contains extensive quotes about assessments by IAEA experts, possibly in consultation with nuclear weapon experts in member states. The information below is taken from one version of this IAEA assessment cited by the AP; it is a 67-page long report titled “Possible Military Dimensions of Iran‟s Nuclear Program.” ISIS is not certain of the date of this document but understands it was authored in the past 6 to 12 months.

Much of the IAEA‟s information, including test data, reports, diagrams, and videos, was reportedly contained on a laptop. This laptop has received considerable attention since its public revelation in 2005. ISIS now understands that the term “laptop” might refer to the method by which the United States shares sensitive data and not the form in which the data
were removed from Iran. ISIS has learned from intelligence officials with direct knowledge of the case that electronic media was smuggled out of Iran by the wife of an Iranian who was recruited by German intelligence. Iranian authorities had discovered his activities, and one of his last acts before arrest was the passing of the records to his wife. Intelligence officials told ISIS that they assume he is dead. His wife fled to Turkey and turned the electronic media over to U.S. authorities. Questions have arisen about the authenticity of these records, which are
inevitable given the sensitivity of this issue. For several years, ISIS has queried nuclear and other experts who have examined these data and documents. They have consistently told ISIS that the information appears authentic. One intelligence official who examined the information said that the electronic media contains extensive amounts of data obtained in
experiments, and noted that it would be extremely difficult to falsify such a large quantity of data.

It is also important to note that the IAEA has addressed this issue in its most recent safeguards report, stating that "the information contained in that documentation appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, appears to be generally consistent, and is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran with a view to removing the doubts which naturally arise, in light of all of the outstanding issues, about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran‟s nuclear programme."

In addition to the electronic media records, other member states have provided information relevant to this issue, which also forms the basis for the assessments contained in this internal IAEA document. Less controversy surrounds the authenticity of this information. ISIS
emphasizes that these excerpts appear to be from a working document that has been revised at least once. Its author is unknown. It is subject to revision both substantively and editorially.

Excerpts

The following texts are taken from the internal IAEA report; the headings are ISIS‟s own.

The Role of the Ministry of Defense in the Development of a Nuclear Payload for the Shahab 3 Missile

“The Agency has information, known as the Alleged Studies, that the Ministry of Defence of Iran has conducted and may still be conducting a comprehensive programme aimed at the development of a nuclear payload to be delivered using the Shahab 3 missile system.

The information, which originates from several Member States and the Agency's own investigations, points to a comprehensive project structure and hierarchy with clear responsibilities, timeline and deliverables. The information, which has been obtained from multiple sources, is detailed in content and appears to be generally consistent. The information refers to known Iranian persons and institutions under both the military and civil apparatuses, as well as to some degree to their confirmed procurement activities.”

Alleged Studies

“The Alleged Studies conducted by Iran refer, inter alia, to the development work performed to redesign the inner cone of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead. The Studies further describe the development and testing of high voltage detonator
firing equipment and multiple exploding bridge wire (EBW) detonators as well as an underground testing infrastructure and the probable testing of one full-scale hemispherical explosively driven shock system that could be applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device. Another aspect concerns the conversion of (UO2) to uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), also known as Green Salt.”

On Whether the Missile Re-entry Vehicle is Intended to be Nuclear

“From the documents presented by a number of Member States and the Agency‟s own activities, it is possible to assess that in early 2002 Iran formally declared the start of its warhead development programme, which very likely comprised at least two projects under the leadership and auspices of the Ministry of Defence – Project 111 and Project 110. Project 111 was to design the inner cone of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle and the production of an explosives operations control set (ECS). Project 110 was to produce the contents of the spherical warhead payload. The Agency assesses that the development work to design a suitable chamber
inside the re-entry vehicle is intended to accommodate a new warhead payload that is quite likely to be nuclear.”

Did Iran develop a high explosive implosion system small enough to fit inside the Shabah 3 missile re-entry vehicle?

“Information received from a Member State indicates a round, semi-round and semi-spherical shock generator system for which an EBW detonator is being developed. It is said that the shock generator was fired in field test conditions with one detonator using a firing cable. Without knowledge as to what exactly is being referred to under the term „shock generator
system,‟ the Agency assesses that it is highly likely to be some form of distributed explosive-filled channel system for initiating hemispherical high explosive charges.”

“The significance of the information is that Iran may have developed an effective high explosive implosion system, which could be contained within a payload container believed to be small enough to fit into the re-entry body chamber of the Shahab 3 missile.”

"In October 2005, the Agency was able to examine the 15-page uranium metal document amongst centrifuge-related material in Iran. Based on the information in the document, the Agency assesses that it is possible that Iran has knowledge regarding the contents of a nuclear package, including fissile components that would be inserted inside the high explosive
charge."

"The Agency suspects that this document belongs to a larger package that Iran may have obtained but which has not yet come to the Agency's attention. The Agency is concerned that Iran may have nuclear weapon design information which could be used in a specific nuclear package which would fit within the mass and volume constraints as seen in projects 110
and 111.”

Steady Progress on Nuclear Fuel Cycle

“The Agency assesses that Iran is steadily making progress in the development of its own indigenous nuclear programme. Iran has been reporting on a regular basis major achievements in mastering the various parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, which the Agency has been able to
verify.”

High Explosive Manufacturing Industry for Nuclear Weapons

“It is believed that Iran has developed exploding bridgewire detonators and associated electronic high voltage firing systems. The Agency assesses that Iran has managed to develop a high explosives industry capable of synthesizing and formulating the raw materials into explosive compositions and that could be used in a nuclear weapon. It is very likely that Iran
has the required engineering skills to machine explosives into the weapon components. It is assessed that Iran has succeeded in combining its detonator development work with other related studies to manufacture a relatively compact high explosives initiation system that has probably been tested with comprehensive diagnostic equipment.”

Sufficient Information to Design and Build a Crude Nuclear Weapon

“The Agency further assesses that Iran has sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device based upon HEU [highly-enriched uranium] as the fission fuel. The necessary information was most likely obtained from external sources and probably modified by Iran. The Agency believes that non-nuclear experiments conducted in Iran would give confidence that the implosion system would function correctly. The Agency
has evidence from which it is possible to assess that Iran has the ability to make a neutron initiator which may have been tested. Provided Iran has relevant detectors, it should be possible to diagnose whether any product made would function satisfactorily.”

On Finishing a Nuclear Warhead for the Shabab 3 Missile

“The Agency assesses that Iran has conducted studies relating to the aspects necessary to incorporate a device into a conventional delivery system such as the Shahab 3 missile. Further studies on payload integration are also accompanied by the electronic engineering studies to
produce an arming and fuzing system. From the evidence presented to the Agency it is possible to suggest that, for the Shahab 3 delivery system, Iran has conducted R&D into producing a prototype system. However, further work is necessary to manufacture a more robust unit capable of producing an airburst fuzing option that would function both safely and reliably.
Overall the Agency does not believe that Iran has yet achieved the means of integrating a nuclear payload into the Shahab 3 missile with any confidence that it would work. Nonetheless, with further effort it is likely that Iran will overcome problems and confidence will be built up.”