Latest from Iran (26 October): After the Fair

NEW Latest Iran Video/Translation: Karroubi on Events in the Iran Media Fair
NEW Iran’s Political Confusion: Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and the Nuclear Agreement
NEW Iran: Turning Bombings into an Alliance with Pakistan
NEW Video: The Media Fair Demonstrations (25 October)

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2105 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi's website Tagheer is back on-line (see 1438 GMT).

1945 GMT: We cannot corroborate but it is being reported that flyers of Karroubi's webcast statement (see separate entry) are being put up across Tehran.

1935 GMT: Families of political prisoners have announced that they will demonstrate on Wednesday, protesting the continued imprisonment of their relatives. If the authorities do not heed the protest, the families will continue demonstrations and begin a mass hunger strike.

1925 GMT: Kalemeh, the website associated with Mir Hossein Mousavi, has published its account of the appearance of Mousavi advisor Alireza Beheshti at the Tehran Media Fair yesterday. Beheshti was with his wife and daughter, as well as supporters, when they were surrounded by 50 to 60 people who began yelling loudly against Beheshti. Kalemeh invokes the memory of Beheshti's father, the assassinated Ayatollah, claiming that many were reminded of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq's chant of “Down with Beheshti”. (English summary on Mousavi Facebook page)

1515 GMT: Radio Farda is reporting that 50 striking workers at Ahvaz Pipe Mills were arrested today. Employees have not paid for 10-14 months.

1445 GMT: Mediawatch. Credit to the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, and Time magazine for picking up on the internal dynamics affecting Iran's decision on the enrichment deal, with varying degrees of success.

Borzou Daragahi in the LA Times is the most effective, noting Ali Larijani's criticism of the proposal. He conflates this, however, with a statement from another high-ranking member of Parliament "close to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad", Alaeddin Boroujerdi --- Boroujerdi's shot fits more with moves by the Iranian Government to get better terms, while Larijani's is a direct attack against the negotiations.

David Sanger in The New York Times opens with a reference to Larijani but gets distracted by the Western perspective --- "even some of President Obama’s aides are wary that Iran is setting a trap". Andrew Lee Butters in Time asks the key question, "Why the delay?", but struggles to understand the internal situation.

1438 GMT: Coincidence? While Karroubi seizes the political initiative, his on-line newssite, Tagheer, is down.

1435 GMT: We've posted the video of Mehdi Karroubi, with English translation, drawing lessons from the events at the Iran Media Fair: "We will not retreat."

1355 GMT: A Signal? State television is quoting the Supreme Leader's blame upon foreign agents, seeking Shiite-Sunni conflict, for recent violence: "The bloody actions being committed in some Islamic countries, including Iraq, Pakistan and in some parts of the country (Iran), are aimed at creating division between the Shiites and Sunnis.....Those who carry out these terrorist actions are directly or indirectly foreign agents."

This is a far from surprising statement for Ayatollah Khamenei, but the timing, given our current thoughts about a move to cut off engagement with the West, may be significant.

1345 GMT: Playing for Time. Amidst what could be an extraordinary political story in Iran over the enrichment deal (see analysis in separate entry), Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki offered a very ordinary, non-commital statement today, "Iran's decision on the provision of necessary fuel for the Tehran reactor will be announced in the next few days. There are two options on the table ... either to buy it or to give part of our fuel for further processing abroad."

0930 GMT: We've posted an analysis from Iran, courtesy of Iran Review, pointing to Tehran's move for closer relations with Pakistan in the aftermath of the Sistan-Baluchestan bombings.

0735 GMT: The Story to Watch Today. If we're right, Iran may be on the verge of one of the most important political decisions --- with effects inside and outside the country --- since 12 June. Weekend statements by Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani and Mohammad Reza Bahonar point to the Supreme Leader's intervention to block the Vienna nuclear agreement and engagement with the US. If this happens, the even bigger effect could be on the legimitacy of President Ahmadinejad. We've got the story in a separate entry.

0720 GMT: National Unity Latest. No words for days since the National Unity Plan supposedly went to the Supreme Leader for his consideration. Mizan Press has a useful summary of the political situation, without offering any new details.

0710 GMT: Nuclear Hype. While Iranian state media plays up Washington's alleged backed of "terrorist" organisations, "Western" media --- with the considerable assistance of unnamed Government officials and diplomats --- plays up Iran's imminent Bomb.

In this case, the drum-thumper is Reuters and "imminent" is 18 months. There's no evidence in the article, only the bland assertion of one of the officials, "It's not a formal assessment or formal agreement but a rough agreement that we can all work with more or less."

Actually, "imminent" is not so imminent in this case, perhaps indicating a bit of breathing space for Obama-led engagement as Tehran considers an enrichment deal --- previous media spin has been of an Iranian bomb within a year. Still, we offer this naive question:

Given that Iran cannot even enrich uranium to 20 percent for a medical research reactor --- the technical reality behind Tehran's consideration of third-party enrichment --- wouldn't this indicate obstacles to enrichment of uranium to the 90 percent needed for a weapon?

0650 GMT: More Finger-Pointing at US over Jundallah. Last week La Stampa and Enduring America featured the comments of the retired head of Pakistan's intelligence service, Lieutenant Hamid Gul, linking the Baluch insurgent group Jundallah and last week's deadly suicide bombing to American intelligence services.

Now Iranian state media are headlining the assertion of the former chief of staff of the Pakistani army, General Mirza Aslam Beg: "Helping the Rigi terrorist group launch terrorist attacks against Iranian civilians and military personnel in the border regions is one of the main strategies pursued by the US to confront Iran."

The Islamic Republic News Agency is featuring the interview, which also includes Beg's praise for "the positive steps Iran has taken in Afghanistan and its all-out cooperation with Pakistan", and Press TV is also pushing it.

0630 GMT: The excitement and uncertainty stirred up by Mehdi Karroubi's appearance on Friday at the Tehran Media Fair continued on Sunday, as rumors swirled around possible Green demonstrations and Government reactions. The most prominent story in the end, given that Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami did not follow up Karroubi's attendance, concerned Mousavi advisor Alireza Beheshti at the Fair. The cycle of Friday --- arrival, chants of Green support, a response from those backing the Government, Behesti's departure, and opposition celebration of another symbolic victory --- was repeated.

The events of the last 72 hours are now getting some attention outside Iran. Ramin Mostaghim and Borzou Daragahi, writing in The Los Angeles Times, pick up on the Karroubi episode and also note earlier stories such as the political back-and-forth over the "Kayhan guestbook" (see our updates throughout last week).

Iran: Turning Bombings into an Alliance with Pakistan

Iran: Taking Apart the Jundallah-US Narrative
Latest from Iran (26 October): After the Fair

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We noted last week, in the immediate aftermath of the Jundallah bombings that killed more than 40 in southeastern Iran, that the Ahmadinejad Cabinet was moving quickly to use the incident as a catalyst for discussions with Pakistan. Iran Review has translated an analysis from the Etelaat daily newspaper which points to the strategy. Notice that such a strategy, at least in this editorial, pivots on the portrayal of Saudi elements as a common enemy to both Tehran and Islamabad:

We and Pakistan
Abolqasem Qasemzadeh

We, Iranians, and Pakistan are suffering from common maladies which include terrorism and assassination. Pakistan is currently plagued with the Taliban that has frequently endangered public security in that country through assassinations and bomb blasts. The Islamic Republic of Iran too has been a victim to terrorist groups which avail of financial, military and propaganda support of Iran’s adversaries since the victory of 1979 the Islamic Revolution. For years, we and Pakistan have been hit hard by the Wahhabi thought, which seeks to divide Sunnis and Shias. Petrodollars spent by Wahhabi groups in the Islamic Iran have sought to disturb security in border regions through assassinations and acts of terrorism.

At the beginning of the Iraqi imposed war when Saddam was representing world powers that meant to overthrow the Islamic government, the late Saudi King Fahd had been quoted as saying that funding Saddam’s war against Iran and providing him with political, intelligence and military support of Western countries, especially the United States, would help him to win the war. However, Saddam’s ultimate defeat brought shame to all those powers that are currently carrying the mark of shame for supporting Saddam on their brows. In Pakistan, the division between Shias and Sunnis has had no other fruit but massacre of innocent Shiites and Sunnis and destruction of their living environment. Although, the conspirators have constantly taken advantage of ignorance of some societies, today, both Shias and Sunnis in Iran and Pakistan have understood that Wahhabi thought is closely related to Zionist plots and the interests of foreign colonialist powers.

Baluchestan is a common name for border provinces in Iran and Pakistan, both of which have a province under the same name. Both countries are trying to develop their Baluchestan provinces and help Baluch people by implementing development projects. The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been constantly trying to make the common border secure and has never let terrorist groups to consider Iranian Baluchestan a safe refuge after committing acts of terror. We and Pakistanis are well aware of the ominous intelligence and military conspiracies of the UK and the United States in that region and know that terrorism in the region will hit both the people of Iran and Pakistan.

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2020 GMT: Rah-e-Sabz has named 18 of the people arrested this evening.

1915 GMT: Tonight's Arrests. A group had gathered at the house of Shahabbedin Tabatabei, a detained member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front to pray for his release. Security forces entered the home. They asked 4 everyone's cell phone and filmed them, handcuffed the men, and took away several people.

Among those detained were Tabatabei's wife, Mohammad-Reza Jalaiepour, who was detained earlier in the post-election crisis, Mehrak Mirabzadeh, Faezeh Abtahi, and Saeed Nourmohammadi. Mirabzadeh and Abtahi were later released.

1800 GMT: Iranian activists on Twitter are reporting that a number of high-ranking Islamic Iran Participant Front members have been arrested, and in some cases re-arrested after previous post-election detentions, this evening.

1655 GMT: The reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front of the Islamic Revolution has condemned the sentences against political activists. It has God’s promise that no Government or country can survive with such acts; as Prophet Mohammad said, “A state can survive with infidelity but not with tyranny and oppression."

The IIPF added that the coup forces have shown that their only use of religion is to justify despotic and authoritarian actions, issuing unjust sentences against some of the most loyal children of the revolution and the country. (English summary via Mousavi Facebook page)

1640 GMT: More than 2500 students at Sharif University have signed an open letter protesting disciplinary action against their classmates for political activity.

1630 GMT: Heads-Up Announcement. I just finished a 45-minute interview with Fintan Dunne of Sea of Green Radio on Afghanistan and Iran. The broadcast should be available this evening.

1530 GMT: Failure of Day. Earlier this week, we reported on a success for the Green Wave at the Iran Media Fair, when the "hard-line" Kayhan newspaper was forced to remove a guestbook and take down a flag after they were inscribed and decorated with pro-Mousavi slogans and green ribbons.

On the other side, a stand set up by the Ministry of Islamic Guidance to collect names for a complaint against Mousavi did not do very well. So poorly, in fact, that it was taken down.

1300 GMT: Fars Makes Up Clinton Quotes. I'm  not sure if this is another signal that Iran will sign the enrichment deal --- given the image of a US making concessions to a "peaceful" Tehran --- or really bad propaganda.

Fars News is currently leading with the story, "Clinton: Iran's nuclear program is peaceful", quoting her from an interview with The New York Times. Which would be fine, except it bears no resemblance to the truth. In the article in the Times, the summary of the Secretary of State's remarks --- actually made in a speech to the US Institute of Peace --- is "Iran and North Korea must take decisive action to curb their nuclear programs, and not just talk about doing so, if they expected to enjoy an easing of global pressures".

1240 GMT: Will Iran Sign the Uranium Enrichment Deal? Yes.

At least that's the clue offered by Ali Asghar Soltanieh, the Iranian Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, "The Vienna talks are a new chapter in cooperation between Iran and the other participating states….We will be waiting to see whether they will stay true to their words and promises. The International Atomic Energy Agency will be a witness to the other states' behaviors when it comes to technical cooperation on using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

So there's Tehran's spin: We are the ones in control of this process, putting "the West" to the test on the nuclear issue.

You won't see this in Western media yet --- they're distracted for the moment by the tangential comments of Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar that the deal "is not acceptable to us". Bahonar has no role in the nuclear negotiations; his words only come into play if the Parliament decides to resist the Government's engagement with Washington.

1145 GMT: Not Going to Let It Go. The "US linked to Jundallah bombing" narrative lives on. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has repeated his claims from Sunday that this is an American connection to the attack in southeastern Iran that killed at least 41 people: "Unfortunately, a trace of the US crimes can be seen in the latest events in our country. Although [the US] has denied any involvement in the terrorist attack, it is not enough and not unacceptable to us. They should explain why such things are taking place."

I have to say I'm surprised, given the context of this week's talks in Vienna on Iran's uranium enrichment. Perhaps Larijani is maintaining political pressure on Washington. But is that a prelude to walking away from the draft agreement? Is it to maintain a tough public stance, even as Iran accepts the arrangement?

Even more curious, and complicating the questions above, is that Larijani is the only front-line politician to complement the Revolutionary Guard's criticism of Washington. So is the Speaker speaking for the Ahmadinejad Government or cutting an independent path?

0825 GMT: The Shark Surfaces. Fararu News reports that Hashemi Rafsanjani has spoken with scholars at the Qom seminary.

He emphasized the principles of Islam and the Islamic Revolution to deal with the country's "many fundamental problems". The Iranian system was sound but, unfortunately, certain operations had raised public and international concerns. It was important, therefore, that all institutions and individuals respected and upheld the Constitution. And, to support that, there must be "free and uncensored information of events and issues", without lies and distortions.

Nothing unusual or dramatic in those general statements. What may be more significant, as we watch Qom's evolving interest in a resolution to post-election disputes, is the timing of Rafsanjani's encounter.

0600 GMT: In contrast to events in Vienna, where Tehran and the "West" neared an agreement on uranium enrichment, a quieter Wednesday in Iran. There were reports of scattered demonstrations, but rumours of a confrontation between President Ahmadinejad and students at Tehran University never turned into reality.

The quest by pro-Ahmadinejad members of Parliament to put pressure on Mir Hossein Mousavi through a formal complaint appeared to run aground in confusion. For the moment, the Revolutionary Guard continues to be preoccupied with the aftermath of the Sistan-Baluchestan bombing.

On the opposition side, movement is still restricted by the Government's formal and informal measure, but a drip-feed of news continues as the calendar moves towards 13 Aban (4 November). Mehdi Karroubi, meeting the members of the Defenders of Human Rights and the National Peace Council, strongly criticised the measures trying to cut off his communications with the people, such as the shutdown of his newspaper and official website, the arrest of his close allies, and the closure of his office. He assured the audience that he was ready for any further regime moves, e.g. that would be taken against him. The Government's ignorance of the rights of the people made the situation worse, and the Green movement would continue until those rights are reinstated. (English summary available via Radio Zamaneh)

The report of a forthcoming meeting between senior clerics and members of Parliament over the proposed National Election Committee promises another front in the challenge to the President and possibly the Supreme Leader. And reformists took heart from the announcement that former President Mohammad Khatami had won the inaugural Global Dialogue Prize, given for cultural and intercultural research in global communication and cooperation.

One item from the prisons: Mostafa Tajzadeh, the former deputy Minister of Interior, told his wife during a visit that he was unaware of the process of his Detained since June, he remained defiant: " Let [the regime] say whatever they want in an unchallenged environment and in our absence; there is no doubt that there will be an opportunity for the people to hear our side of the story! "

The Latest from Iran (21 October): Room for a Challenge?

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UPDATED Iran’s Nukes: The Real Story on Vienna Talks and the Deal for Uranium Enrichment
The Latest from Iran (20 October): Green Waves or Green Mirage?

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1850 GMT: Spoiler Alert. And while Tehran is being encouraging about the draft enrichment agreement, the "Western" campaign to undercut it has already begun.

David Sanger of The New York Times, who seems to hang around in a hallway until a Government official tells him how to interpret a story, has fired the warning shot. After headlining, "Iran Agrees to Draft of Deal on Exporting Nuclear Fuel", Sanger swings a journalistic hammer at the apparent success. Making clear that "Western suspicions that Iran is secretly developing a nuclear weapon despite its repeated denials", rather than say, Iran's approach to the IAEA over its medical research reactor, "are at the heart of the negotiations", he "reports":

If the 2,600 pounds of fuel leave Iran in batches...experts warn, Iran would be able to replace it almost as quickly as it leaves the country....The estimate that Iran has about 3,500 pounds of low-enriched uranium “assumes that Iran has accurately declared how much fuel it possesses, and does not have a secret supply,” as one senior European diplomat [French? See 1835 GMT] put it....[President Obama] has not made the cessation of enrichment a prerequisite to talks, and the work is still under way, in violation of three United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Perhaps needless to say, Sanger doesn't name any of his "experts". Because this is not an analysis, it's a scare story. [Remember, it was Sanger who only on Monday was saying that Iran was threatening to walk out of the talks.] You Just Can't Trust the Big, Bad Iranians.

Well, perhaps not. But I'm not sure You Can Trust the Objective New York Times either.

1835 GMT: Iran Presses Its Nuclear Advantage. Ali Aghbar Soltanieh has offered a revealing summary of the Vienna talks to the Iranian Student News Agency. First, he made clear that Tehran would be holding Moscow close as the talks progressed:

We have announced that we are willing to cooperate with Russia within the framework of an agreement. Although certain other countries, including the U.S. and France, have been mentioned in the draft agreement, the main party in the agreement will be Russia.

Then Iranian diplomats celebrated an apparent victory over France. Not only had Paris been a vehement critic of Iran's nuclear programme in the run-up to the talks, but Iran --- as our readers noticed --- has a long-standing grievance against Paris over money paid for pre-1979 nuclear projects that were never completed. According to ISNA, "The French delegation apologized to Iran on Wednesday for their country’s past conduct toward Iran and asked IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to make an effort to put France back in the draft agreement with Tehran."

1635 GMT: Not So Quiet Anymore. This may be the most significant piece of news that will go unnoticed this week.

This morning we wrote, "Watch Qom....The Grand Ayatollahs and Ayatollahs --- Dastgheib, Bayat-Zanjani, Sane'i, Safi Golpaygani --- are pressing for reforms to meet the post-election challenge, and he adds that none of those clerics are fans of Ahmadinejad. Just as significant, they do not operate in a vacuum but interact with secular' players in the political game."

Mehr News now reports:

Majlis Cleric Committee members are going to visit Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kanni, MP Mohammad Taqi Rahbar said on Wednesday. The committee members, during their meeting, will discuss the incidents that followed up the June 12 presidential election and the proposal for the establishment of a national election committee, Rahbar, who also heads the committee, added.

The National Election Committee, put forward by 2009 Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, may not be as prominent in discussions as the National Unity Plan, but it has still provoked heated opposition, both from those who think President Ahmadinejad's legitimacy is being questioned and those who believe it would curb the powers of the Supreme Leader. Conversely, it is galvanising senior clerics who are looking to press their challenge against the post-election abuses of the regime.

1445 GMT: A relatively quiet afternoon. There are rumours and uncertainty over whether or not President Ahmadinejad went to Tehran University today (see 1050 GMT). In the Parliament, there are twists over the complaint that pro-Ahmadinejad MPs were going to file about post-election behaviour by their opponents; the latest story is that Mir Hossein Mousavi is not named.

Meanwhile Press TV is featuring the story that the IAEA has passed the draft plan for uranium enrichment to national delegations for confirmation. It adds no details to reports from Western journalists.

1135 GMT: With many thanks to an EA reader, we've posted the news of a Dutch human rights awards for lawyer Shadi Sadr.

1055 GMT: Breakthrough? According to reporters in Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohammad El Baradei has declared that a draft agreement on Iran's uranium enrichment has been reached. Deadline for confirmation by states is Friday.

1050 GMT: We're chasing the report that President Ahmadinejad has made a surprise visit to Tehran University and has been greeted by student protests.

1045 GMT: We've updated our page on the Supreme Leader's health after his appearance with female scholars yesterday.

0900 GMT: Following up our analysis of the effect of Sunday's bombing on Iranian politics and its relations with countries such as the US, we've posted an analysis by Josh Mull posing questions over the alleged link between the Baluch insurgent group Jundallah and the US Government.

0750 GMT: As the death toll from Sunday's bombing rose to 57, the UN Security Council "underlined the need to bring perpetrators, organisers, financiers and sponsors of this reprehensible act of terrorism to justice and urged all states ... to co-operate actively with the Iranian authorities in this regard".

0735 GMT: And just to add one more not-so-weak signal of both opposition potential and Government uncertainty from the last 48 hours. The videos from the University protests are striking: a Government representative shows up at a discussion to face loud protests and even a thrown shoe; 1000s gather despite the threat of academic punishment if not detention.

0645 GMT: Never underestimate the importance of timing. For all the plans and resources that a Government might have, the convergence of events can put a question mark over its efforts. For all the challenges that an opposition faces, developments far removed from their immediate concerns can provide opportunities.

And so, 96 hours after the Supreme Leader's reappeared, 72 hours after the bombings in southeastern Iran, 48 hours after the opening of the technical talks on Iran's nuclear programme, the Ahmadinejad Government --- which had been reasserting its position after the 18 September demonstrations --- seems to be drifting in the political arena. And, to add to its concerns, those who might take advantage are not just the Green Wave; "conservatives" and "principlists" who back the National Unity Plan that has gone to the Supreme Leader know that its first effects will be upon the authority of the President.

Ironically, the present show of strength for Ahmadinejad and Co. is in Vienna rather than Tehran. Iran's diva-ish manoeuvres yesterday, apparently refusing to show up for talks and then pursuing bilateral talks with the US to limit or exclude France in any plan, put the message that any "third-party enrichment" will not be imposed on Tehran but will be framed to meet its concerns. Whether this is because Iran wants a direct return of processed uranium from Russia or --- as a reader helpfully evaluates --- because it is punishing France for holding Iranian payments for pre-1979 nuclear contracts that were never fulfilled, the Iranian Government is dividing the "5+1" countries while maintaining engagement with Washington.

The regime's response to Jundallah's Sunday attacks is not so secure. Politically, the line set out by Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki yesterday was quite clever, looking to turn the bombing into co-operation with the Pakistani Government. The Revolutionary Guard appears to be spiralling into threats of vengeance, not only against Jundallah but against any foreign Government that comes to mind. The Guard's latest demand, that Pakistan allow Iranian troops to enter the country and hunt down insurgents, seems to be pointless bluster, as Islamabad will turn down the request quickly, if not sharply. This follows statements by Guard commander General Jafari, with the promise to retaliate against the US and Britain, that could have put the Government's political strategy --- based on engagement despite Sunday's events --- into disarray.

Possibly Ahmadinejad and the Guard are pursuing a good cop/bad cop strategy. Even so, the eyes of the Iranian military seem to have been diverted from the internal political situation. And with the Government occupied with other matters, there has been a curious silence --- both with respect to the Green movement and with respect to the National Unity Plan --- since last week.

This does not mean that the Government's power to assert its authority has been diminished. To the contrary, yesterday's announcement that the Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh would spend 12 to 15 years in jail (a sentence passed several days ago) was meant to show that the fist was still clenched against supposed opponents at home and abroad.

Still, the space for political manouevre --- the space the regime hoped to close down with its threats, surveillances, and disruptions of communication --- has reopened. We still await the responses and unfoldings around Mir Hossein Mousavi's Sunday statement. Meanwhile, a well-placed EA source gives us another, equally important dimension.

This source advises, "Watch Qom". His interpretation is that the Grand Ayatollahs and Ayatollahs --- Dastgheib, Bayat-Zanjani, Sane'i, Safi Golpaygani --- are pressing for reforms to meet the post-election challenge, and he adds that none of those clerics are fans of Ahmadinejad. Just as significant, they do not operate in a vacuum but interact with "secular" players in the political game. So the vehement attack of the "conservative" member of Parliament Ali Motahari on the legitimacy of the President is not just because of Motahari's personal animosity and his connection with the Larijani brothers; it is also because Motahari, the son of an Ayatollah, is working with and reaction to another wave, this one from the Qom seminary.

It is 14 days to 13 Aban (4 November).

Iran: Taking Apart the Jundallah-US Narrative

LATEST Iran Bombings: Former Pakistan Intelligence Chief Blames US
Iran Discussion: The Bombings, Jundallah, and the US
The Latest from Iran (21 October): Room for a Challenge?

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UPDATE 1945 GMT: Take this for what it's worth from former CIA operative Robert Baer: "I've been told that the Bush Administration at one point considered Jundallah as a piece in a covert-action campaign against Iran, but the idea was quickly dropped because Jundallah was judged uncontrollable and too close to al-Qaeda. There was no way to be certain that Jundallah would not throw the bombs we paid for back at us."
--
We followed up Sunday's bombing in southeastern Iran with a discussion between EA's Mr Smith and Chris Emery on the likely attackers, the Baluch insurgent group Jundallah. Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani were claiming that Jundallah was supported by foreign intelligence services, including US operatives.

EA correspondent Josh Mull dissects the Jundallah-US narrative to put some questions not about the claim but about the significance of the bombing. --- WSL

My immediate question is why the blaming of Jundallah head Abdolmalek Rigi automatically makes Tehran's anti-Western rhetoric more credible. Who else could they have named that would NOT lend credibility to their anti-Western rhetoric? The Kurdish PKK? The Baluchistan Liberation Army? The Mujahedin-e-Khalq? The US is said to have supported all of them against the Tehran regime at one point or another, so what makes Jundallah an extra-credible outlet for US activities?

Let's presume Tehran is telling the truth and that that was a deliberate covert action by the United States using Jundallah assets in Islamabad:

1. What is the specific motivation of the United States to use this specific tactic, with these specific assets, against this specific target, at this specific time?

2. This would be a grievous act of aggression against a country with which the US claims to be in diplomatic discussions. It is an attack massacring dozens more than the globally-condemned Taliban attacks against Indian personnel in Afghanistan. How does this reconcile with the US strategy of engagement on the nuclear issue?

3. What are China and Russia's motivations to continue along the US path, knowing that the US will commit these atrocities without regard to diplomatic consequences?

4. The Obama administration has previously claimed to have ceased aggressive covert actions against the Iranian regime, so is this an outright lie? What would be the motivation and benefits of covert operations?

5. What is the cost-benefit of outrageous suicide tactics against a worthless and irrelevant target? If you're going to use a suicide bomber, why not hit a nuclear facility, or something else important to US national security interests?

6. Why would Pakistan allow Jundallah assets to operate in Islamabad, given their well-known ties to the Baluch insurgency, who would likely jump at the chance to strike this deep in Pakistani territory?

7. Why would the US run such an incredibly sensitive operation out of one of their most watched Embassies on the planet? India, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia: all are highly operationally capable in Islamabad, and any aggressive covert actions which would compromise their own national security interests vis-a-vis the US and Iran would raise a lot of red flags and alarms.

8. Why not use closer, more efficient assets, such as an enormous special forces apparatus in Afghanistan, or similar forces in Iraq, or even sea-borne assets from the Persian Gulf? We're talking communications here, so why is a crowded and compromised embassy better than an invisible submarine or clandestine outpost?

9. If Iran really could decrypt US covert satellite communications, why not such evidence to the United Nations and/or the International Criminal Court? It constitutes a smoking gun.

If any of those questions could be answered, we might be on to something in blaming the US for a suicide bombing against an Iranian army base. Failing that, perhaps a simpler explanation might hold up. It appears that Jundallah has pulled off a spectacular and vicious attack against the institution most involved in the systematic oppression of Sunni and Baloch Iranian citizens.

We can presume that Jundallah perceives, far more acutely than we do, weakness in the regime. It may seek to exacerbate that weakness by antagonizing the military, the institution which oppresses them but would also be used to maintain order against a restive reformist movement as well. It can be reasoned that Jundallah calculates a reformist regime would be slightly more open to their demands than a fanatical, military-supported regime.