The Latest from Iran (27 October): Domestic and Foreign Collide

NEW Latest Iran Video: University Protests (27 October)
NEW Iran: More on Kian Tajbakhsh and Tehran’s “Velvet Revolution”
Latest Iran Video/Translation: Karroubi on Events in the Iran Media Fair
Iran’s Political Confusion: Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and the Nuclear Agreement
Latest from Iran (26 October): After the Fair

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

2015 GMT: 13 Aban Does Not Exist. Homy Lafayette offers more detail on the Government's order to state media to "refrain from disseminating any news, photo, or topic which can lead to tension in the society or breach public order" during the demonstrations on 13 Aban (4 November).

The article includes an English translation of the document, issued by Deputy Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister Alireza Malekian.

1810 GMT: Iran's Nuclear Manoeuvre. If this story from Press TV is accurate, then Tehran is haggling over the details of third-party enrichment, rather than walking away from the deal.

The article re-quotes the source who spoke to Al Alam TV (see 1015 GMT), "Iran will announce its response to the proposal put forward by [International Atomic Energy Agency] Director-General [Mohamed] ElBaradei on Friday, October 30." The official added that Iran did not want to send 80 percent of its uranium stock in a single shipment to Russia, as set out in the deal from the Vienna talks: "Iran as a uranium buyer knows best how much uranium, enriched to a level of 19.75 percent, it needs [for its medical research reactor]; based on this argument, it will raise certain issues with this proposal."

In other words, Tehran will insist on a lower amount of uranium --- currently, the deal is for 1.2 million out of 1.5 million tonnes --- being sent to Russia in the first shipment. More would be delivered for enrichment as the medical reactor required new supplies.

The report is seconded by the head of Parliament's Foreign Policy and National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, "Iran can send the scheduled amount in separate shipments so that its fuel supply [provided by foreigners] is guaranteed....Iran can send only a part of its stockpile … and then as it receives its 20 percent enriched fuel it will send the next portion."

A word of caution on this interpretation: Boroujerdi is close to President Ahmadinejad and is putting the pro-deal view. It is unclear whether the dissenting voices such as Ali Larijani (and possibly, behind Larijani, the Supreme Leader) have come around to this position.

1750 GMT: Back from a teaching break to find that Rooz Online, following up a story prominent on the Internet this morning, has published details of an alleged Government order to censor and possibly shut out any news of mass demonstrations on 13 Aban (4 November).

1230 GMT: As reports continue to come in, with claims of 1500 students protesting at Azad University in Tehran, we've posted the first video footage.

1020 GMT: Reports that students gathered to demonstrate at Tehran University but are being forced to move by security forces.

1015 GMT: Reuters is reporting, from Iran's Al-Alam television, that Iran will accept the uranium enrichment agreement but will demand changes. The source is an "unnamed official" who indicates Iran's reply will be made within 48 hours.

0810 GMT: Detentions, Concerns, and Hunger Strikes. Human Rights Activists in Iran has posted a summary of latest developments regarding post-election detainees. Included is the information that journalist Henganeh Shahidi and student Payman Aref have started hunger strikes.

0800 GMT: Myth, Imprisonment, and "Velvet Revolution". We've just posted more on the jailed Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh and the regime's accusations and tactics with the claim of foreign-directed regime change in

0715 GMT: A reader has pointed us to a report posted by CNN on a prison riot in Karaj, west of Tehran, on Sunday. Interestingly, the story comes from the National Council of Resistance in Iran, the opposition movement headed by Maryam Rajavi and linked to Mujahedin-e-Khalq.

0635 GMT: Meanwhile CNN International (broadcast, not website) is focusing on a peripheral story. Pakistan detained and has now released 11 Iranians who crossed the border yesterday. The original line was that the detainees were Revolutionary Guard members, possibly pursuing or looking for leads on those linked to last week's bombings. Pakistan, probably after discreet talks with Tehran, is now calling the wanderers "security guards"; Press TV portrays them as "border police" pursuing smugglers.

0630 GMT: Now The Washington Post has picked up on the effect of the internal debate on the enrichment agreement (and vice-versa) with an overview by Thomas Erdbrink, "Iran officials appear split on nuclear plan".

0600 GMT: One of the standing rules for analysis, when students and I consider US foreign policy, is that what happens overseas cannot be separated from what happens at home.

So it is proving --- and may prove in a significant way in the next 72 hours --- in Iran.

Tensions over the decision on the uranium enrichment deal are now beyond simmering and openly bubbling. Even this weekend, all the signals from the Iranian Government were that it would work out any issues and sign the proposal, with a significant portion of Iran's uranium stock going to Russia for enrichment, by Wednesday or Thursday. Now, all bets are off.

Readers took yesterday's analysis of the possible conflict between the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad to a new level with their comments, but this morning I still find myself with questions rather than answers. The straightforward explanation would be that the Supreme Leader, working through the statements of Parliamentary leaders like Ali Larijani and Mohammad Reza Bahonar, is now blocking agreement. But, if so, why did he apparently endorse "engagement" to the point where the deal was almost struck? What could be the calculation in approaching the International Atomic Energy Agency, and thus Washington, in the summer and now walking out on the deal at the 11th hour?

Other theories from our readers include an Iranian "good cop, bad cop" act which would allow Ahmadinejad to portray himself as the guy who wanted to work with Obama but had to give way to Ayatollah Khamenei and the Iranians walking out of the arrangement because their ploy --- getting uranium for the medical reactor enriched for free while retaining enough of their stock to pursue other programmes --- hasn't yielded enough of a result.

Fortunately for my confusion, if not the general situation, there should be some clarification by Friday. Iran can't spin out the post-Vienna deliberations beyond the weekend, given that the US has already let last Friday's deadline slide in expectation of a Tehran decision within a few days. So it's accept, reject, or try to bring the "5+1" powers back to the table for talks.

And that declaration from Iran will in turn give the US Government, as well as the European powers, Russia, and China, a somewhat paradoxical choice. If Tehran does not sign the enrichment agreement, does the Obama Administration continue engagement, possibly strengthening the Iranian President against his own Supreme Leader? Or does it walk away (or is forced away by Congressional and public hostility to any more talks), now watching an internal Iranian situation in which Washington is no more than a bystander?

Iran: Taking Apart the Jundallah-US Narrative

LATEST Iran Bombings: Former Pakistan Intelligence Chief Blames US
Iran Discussion: The Bombings, Jundallah, and the US
The Latest from Iran (21 October): Room for a Challenge?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

UPDATE 1945 GMT: Take this for what it's worth from former CIA operative Robert Baer: "I've been told that the Bush Administration at one point considered Jundallah as a piece in a covert-action campaign against Iran, but the idea was quickly dropped because Jundallah was judged uncontrollable and too close to al-Qaeda. There was no way to be certain that Jundallah would not throw the bombs we paid for back at us."
--
We followed up Sunday's bombing in southeastern Iran with a discussion between EA's Mr Smith and Chris Emery on the likely attackers, the Baluch insurgent group Jundallah. Meanwhile, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps and Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani were claiming that Jundallah was supported by foreign intelligence services, including US operatives.

EA correspondent Josh Mull dissects the Jundallah-US narrative to put some questions not about the claim but about the significance of the bombing. --- WSL

My immediate question is why the blaming of Jundallah head Abdolmalek Rigi automatically makes Tehran's anti-Western rhetoric more credible. Who else could they have named that would NOT lend credibility to their anti-Western rhetoric? The Kurdish PKK? The Baluchistan Liberation Army? The Mujahedin-e-Khalq? The US is said to have supported all of them against the Tehran regime at one point or another, so what makes Jundallah an extra-credible outlet for US activities?

Let's presume Tehran is telling the truth and that that was a deliberate covert action by the United States using Jundallah assets in Islamabad:

1. What is the specific motivation of the United States to use this specific tactic, with these specific assets, against this specific target, at this specific time?

2. This would be a grievous act of aggression against a country with which the US claims to be in diplomatic discussions. It is an attack massacring dozens more than the globally-condemned Taliban attacks against Indian personnel in Afghanistan. How does this reconcile with the US strategy of engagement on the nuclear issue?

3. What are China and Russia's motivations to continue along the US path, knowing that the US will commit these atrocities without regard to diplomatic consequences?

4. The Obama administration has previously claimed to have ceased aggressive covert actions against the Iranian regime, so is this an outright lie? What would be the motivation and benefits of covert operations?

5. What is the cost-benefit of outrageous suicide tactics against a worthless and irrelevant target? If you're going to use a suicide bomber, why not hit a nuclear facility, or something else important to US national security interests?

6. Why would Pakistan allow Jundallah assets to operate in Islamabad, given their well-known ties to the Baluch insurgency, who would likely jump at the chance to strike this deep in Pakistani territory?

7. Why would the US run such an incredibly sensitive operation out of one of their most watched Embassies on the planet? India, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia: all are highly operationally capable in Islamabad, and any aggressive covert actions which would compromise their own national security interests vis-a-vis the US and Iran would raise a lot of red flags and alarms.

8. Why not use closer, more efficient assets, such as an enormous special forces apparatus in Afghanistan, or similar forces in Iraq, or even sea-borne assets from the Persian Gulf? We're talking communications here, so why is a crowded and compromised embassy better than an invisible submarine or clandestine outpost?

9. If Iran really could decrypt US covert satellite communications, why not such evidence to the United Nations and/or the International Criminal Court? It constitutes a smoking gun.

If any of those questions could be answered, we might be on to something in blaming the US for a suicide bombing against an Iranian army base. Failing that, perhaps a simpler explanation might hold up. It appears that Jundallah has pulled off a spectacular and vicious attack against the institution most involved in the systematic oppression of Sunni and Baloch Iranian citizens.

We can presume that Jundallah perceives, far more acutely than we do, weakness in the regime. It may seek to exacerbate that weakness by antagonizing the military, the institution which oppresses them but would also be used to maintain order against a restive reformist movement as well. It can be reasoned that Jundallah calculates a reformist regime would be slightly more open to their demands than a fanatical, military-supported regime.

UPDATED Iran: The Politics of the Death Sentences

The Latest from Iran (14 October): Watching Karroubi, Rafsanjani, and the Supreme Leader’s Health

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis



UPDATE 14 October 0655 GMT: According to Peykeiran, a fifth death sentence over post-election conflict and "subversion" has been handed out to a "Davoud Mir Ardebili". The report claims that Ardebili is not a monarchist, the allegation made against three other condemned men, but merely called a radio station to report union protests.

For several days, post-election news and rumours have swirled around the death penalties being handed out to detainees. There are now four sentenced to hang: three alleged "monarchists" (Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani, Arash Pour-Rahmani, and Hamed Rouhinejad) and one alleged member of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq.

Replying to an Italian journalist on Sunday, I suggested:

A blunt description for a rather blunt move by the regime: as with the Tehran trials from early August and the raids on opposition offices in Sept., this is a flexing of muscle by the President's office, the Revolutionary Guard, and their allies in the judiciary which says, "If you challenge us, we can crush you."

The rather frightening aspect of this move is that it was telegraphed weeks ago. Have a look on our website at the Press TV set-up with the broadcast "confessions" (by the way, I don't anyone in the "Western" media has noticed this) by two of those sentenced to death.

The "safety" for the regime is that they have chosen those to die (the 4th sentence has just been announced) based on two "enemy" groups: 1) monarchists and 2) the terrorist MKO. The clear aspiration is to get widespread Iranian public support for the enforcement of justice. This, in combination with the the continued invocation of the "foreign threat", draws the line against pressure for reforms.

Personally, I think it is an ill-judged move. Even though none of the 4 can bring the immediate sympathy --- because of their membership in suspect organisations --- of a Neda Agha Soltan or a Sohrab Arabi, they will be generic martyrs for the cause, and this could give impetus for the movement. The Internet furour today over the execution of Behnoud Shojai is very strong, and that is for someone who had no ties to post-election protest.

Reflecting on this, I may have underestimated the thought behind the regime's move. It has emerged that Ali Zamani and Pour-Rahmani were arrested in April, before the post-election furour, and the lawyer for Rouhinezhad had said that his client had nothing to do with anti-Government protests.

In these cases, the Government strategy is not a direct assault against Green activists; instead, it is a "guilt by association" move to tarnish the opposition. Featuring these four, the regime puts out the message that the demonstrations are led by retrograde supporters of the Pahlavi dynasty and the terrorist MKO, who have pursued the overthrow of the Islamic Republic since 1979 with sabotage, bombings, and assassinations. At the same time, the line that these groups are led by "foreign agents" continues, with the specific Ali Zamani and Pour-Rahmani "confessions" that they were trained by the Americans and met an Israeli intelligence officer.

So challenge has been set for the Green opposition. Defend the four accused and run the risk of being labelled as apologists for foes of the Islamic Republic. Conversely, leave the four to hang and risk the impression that the movement does not really stand up against injustices and penalties of the State.

I still think the Government's move is misguided because it is so clumsy: from the start of the Tehran trials, it has tried to elevate Ali Zamani as a key figure --- he was the first defendant to testify and, of course, he featured in the mid-August video. The evidence against all four men is thin, with no direct link to any anti-Government operation, and that will only be exposed further if the quartet are put to death.

Nothing is simple in this crisis, however, so the cases will be a test of the political acumen of the opposition movement as the regime continues its attempt to intimidate it out of existence.

The Latest from Iran (10 October): The Death Sentences

NEW Nobel Peace Prize Shock: Ahmadinejad Wins!
Iran’s Power Politics: A Warning To Moscow
Iran: Karroubi Reply to Ahmadinejad’s Appearance on US TV (9 October)
Now, for the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize: Mehdi Karroubi
The Latest from Iran (9 October): Almost Four Months

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

1920 GMT: A Bit of Official Hesitation? Press TV's website posts an article confirming the death sentences on three post-election detainees: "two are responsible for a deadly bombing and the remaining convict is a member of a terrorist organization". It names only Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani.

Some of the article is repetition of the very thin pretext for conviction: Zamani and the other member [Arash Pour-Ramani] of the "Iran Royal Association" are not tied to any criminal incident; however, "the group is responsible for a deadly bombing in the southern city of Shiraz back in April 2008, in which 13 people were killed and hundreds were wounded". The third detainee [Naser Abdul Hosseini] will die simply because his alleged membership in the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization, the armed wing of the People's Mujahideen Organization of Iran.

Yet, if you read closely, there are a couple of chinks in the article's open-and-shut case. You'll notice in the headline, "In Iran, three 'terrorists' are placed on death row", the quote marks of uncertainty. And the text notes that Ali Zamani's case has been highlighted by Amnesty International.

1630 GMT: A report by AUT News names the three post-election detainees sentenced to death: "monarchists" Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani and Arash Pourrahmani (both of whom are in the mid-August "confession" video run by Press TV, posted in a separate entry) and Naser Abdol Hosseini, alleged to be a member of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran.

1530 GMT: Yahoo! Makes It into State Media. It looks like the allegation over Yahoo! passing 200,000 usernames to Iran authorities will now die down, as there is no verification of the Iranian Students Solidarity Organization's claim of a source inside the Iranian Government. Still, the Islamic Republic News Agency gave the story several paragraphs today.

1520 GMT: Radio Netherlands has posted an English summary of the condemnation by the Dutch Foreign Minister (noted in comments below) of the death sentence for Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani.

1505 GMT: Minutes after we told a BBC radio reporter of the death sentences for post-election detainees, the BBC website adds, from the judiciary official who spoke to the Iranian Students News Agency, that "MZ" (probably Mohammad Ali Reza Zamani) and "AP" had been convicted for ties with the Kingdom Assembly of Iran, a banned monarchist group, and "NA" for links with the People's Mujahideen Organization of Iran, which has sought the overthrow of the Islamic government since 1979.

On Thursday, an Iranian reformist website reported that Mr Zamani, 37, had been sentenced to death. It is unclear whether he is the "MZ" mentioned by Isna.

1445 GMT: Parleman News reports that Mir Hossein Mousavi met Thursday with the representative of Grand Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardebili in Tehran. The description of the discussion is vague, saying that it apparently centred on senior clerics' input into Mousavi's plans for a "social network" for the Green Path of Hope.

1435 GMT: The original Iranian Students News Agency report says only that three post-election detainees have received death sentences. The three cannot be named, according to the newspaper, because appeals are ongoing.

1410 GMT: More Death Sentences? Al Jazeera English, claiming information from Iranian Students News Agency, says a total of three post-election detainees, including Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani, have been sentenced to death by the Tehran Revolutionary Court.

Caution is needed here. We've been following this assertion, first posted by Twitter activists, for several hours. Those reports say three death sentences in addition to Ali Zamani. With the help of readers, we have now found the original ISNA story (see 1435 GMT), but there is no other verification.

0920 GMT: The Persian2English blog has published the English text of a new post-election movement, The Green Thinkers’ Network. Considering "What Is True Freedom For Iran?", the Network writes, "Are we liberal democrats? Is it even necessary to label ourselves with these names? Each name has a history. Why should we carry the history of liberalism on our shoulders? Maybe we can have new customs. In our custom we have religion, but also freedom."

0755 GMT: The Washington Post's alternative to Barack Obama for the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize? Neda Agha Soltan.

0630 GMT: Another quiet start after a relatively gentle Friday, but no doubt that there is one development of significance.

Mehdi Karroubi's letter, posted in the name of his son, to the head of Iran state broadcasting may not seem that dramatic. On the surface, it restates Karroubi's charges of detainee abuse, made since late July, to counter the message of President Ahmadinejad put out on American television. It returns to the battleground of the "enquiry" by the three-member judiciary panel, which unceremoniously threw out Karroubi's claims last month.

But there is a broader message here, both symbolic and very practical. Ahmadinejad might be posing himself on the international stage as Iran's leader, but Karroubi's letter is a reminder that the President has very clay feet. And it comes after weeks in which the Government appeared to have cut off Karroubi's communications. The Etemade Melli newspaper was closed and the website of Karroubi's reformist party was taken down, shutting off the daily drip-drip of allegations that was wearing away the Government authority.

Now the cleric is back, with a resurrected website and the certainty that he is still noticed. He is not mincing words --- Ahmadinejad's "[US] interview was pure lies"; "traitors have viciously attacked me" --- and telling the authorities that he will not be stopped: "The late Imam [Khomeini] said that he would sacrifice his life for the people of this nation."

And the last line of the letter contains pages of meaning, after all the Government attempts to bottle up the opposition in a vacuum of news: "Despite all the efforts, borders have been broken and people have access to information."