Wednesday
Sep092009
Iran: Ahmadinejad's "All-In" Move?
Wednesday, September 9, 2009 at 6:58
The Latest from Iran (9 September): The Stakes Are Raised
Iran Urgent Analysis: Is This the Defining Showdown?
The Latest from Iran (8 September): Picking A Fight?
NEW Iran: Ahmadinejad Chooses Confrontation Over Compromise and Governing
UPDATED Iran: Mousavi HQ Raided by Security Forces
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Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
An admission: for the first time in three months, I feel very uncertain about an analysis. Up to this point, with the immense help of colleagues and readers, I could read and analyse the move of various participants in the post-election conflict, watching them act and react against each other. Even in mid-August, when we tried to figure out the manoeuvres of Hashemi Rafsanjani, I think we came to a secure conclusion about his complex, cautious steps.
Yesterday afternoon changed all this. We were in the midst of reading yet another turn of the kaleidoscope: an apparent alignment between the Supreme Leader and other elements in the Iranian Establishment to find a compromise that would contain the reformists by offering a limited "compromise", thus securing the system. This would have entailed a loudly-proclaimed but strictly-defined enquiry into detentions and abuses, public but relatively gentle criticism of the President's handling of the crisis, and perhaps the "Ramadan present" of a release of high-profile prisoners.
It seemed this was the latest but one of the most important chess moves in the conflict. Then at 3 p.m. Tehran time yesterday, 24 hours after security forces raided an office run by the staff of Mir Hossein Mousavi, someone --- most likely, the President, working with the Revolutionary Guard --- ordered the seizure of the main office of Mehdi Karroubi and the Etemade Melli political party and website, arresting the editor-in-chief of etemademelli.ir and perhaps shutting the site down. And a few hours after that, Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief advisor, Alireza Beheshti, was arrested.
I think the difficulty in evaluating these steps is that Ahmadinejad is not playing chess. Dismissing our once-favourite cliche for a new analogy, with the attack on the Mousavi and Karroubi camps, the President and the Revolutionary Guards are palying cards, and they just put all their chips in the middle.
It's called an "all-in" bet. It's far more brutal than the intricate moves on the chessboard, and it forces your opponent not only to think but to make a make-or-break decision. In the face of this assault, does the Green movement fold its cards, conceding that for now Ahmadinejad has the authority, however illegitimate that might be? Or does it "call", preparing for a showdown that could mean more arrests and the effectively dismantling of an organised opposition for the near-future?
This, however, is the easy part of the analysis. The much tricker reading is that Ahmadinejad's move (again, considering "Ahmadinejad" as the President, his close allies, and Revolutionary Guard leaders) may not have been solely against the opposition.
With the dramatic measures taken in the last 48 hours, supported by his confrontational rhetoric, the President is moving not only against the "Green Path of Hope" but against other members of the Establishment and even the Supreme Leader.
I'll add the caution that my view is not universally held here at EA, where heated debate will continue today. And Josh Shahryar, who is working on a must-read analysis that should appear by Friday, has a slightly different perspective.
The immediate question: did the Supreme Leader know of the steps for raids and arrests, even as he was publicly advising Ahmadinejad yesterday morning to listen to "benevolent criticism"?
The interpretation that Ayatollah Khamenei is in line with the President/IRGC crackdown argues that the plans to move against Mousavi and Karroubi were in place before the Supreme Leader announced he would be leading Friday prayers in Tehran. Thus, by the time he took the podium, a message to the reformists that "enough is enough" would be backed up by a velvet fist. Behave yourselves, and Alireza Behesti will be released in a few days, your offices can be re-opened, and you can maintain your websites and newspapers (while adhering to our guidelines for proper reporting and analysis).
(An important note: this of course is also an important message to Hashemi Rafsanjani: "Do not make a move, my friend." If you lead prayers on Qods Day, 18 September, do not offer any opening for continued opposition to this Government.)
The price of the deal? Control of the enquiry into the post-election abuses would pass into the hands of the Government, with Mehdi Karroubi giving up any significant role and intervention. A few scapegoats could take the fall for the deaths at Kahrizak prison, thus appeasing conservative/principlist politicians who were angered by the abuse of Mohsen Ruholamini, and possibly for the raid on Tehran University at the start of the crisis.
Seeing it on paper after hearing it from colleagues, it makes sense. But I'm still not sure.
While the Supreme Leader has taken a tough line with the direct challenge of the opposition throughout this crisis, he has also compromises within the Establishment to strengthen it politicially. So his 19 June Friday Prayer address, while defying the Green movement on calls to review the election, also sought to bring Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani together. Other steps have tried to check the President, notably the insistence on the removal of the First Vice President, Esfandiari Rahim-Mashai, and on the appointment of Sadegh Larijani to head Iran's judiciary. While Ayatollah Khamenei did swing behind full approval of Ahmadinejad's Cabinet, my reading was still that he was doing this for the sake of the system, rather than the President.
It was for this reason that (with hindsight, erroneously) I had been writing that Ahmadinejad was relatively weak in this crisis. I had not counted in his street-fighting resilience and aggression, which meant that (to return to the card table) he would raise the stakes rather than fold. At the same time, it has been for this reason that I had seen the Supreme Leader making move after move to balance and bring together elements of the Establishment who were in tension and even fighting one another.
The Ahmadinejad-IRGC risks that balance by substituting the blunt showdown of political poker for the nuances of the chessboard. So, for me, it is a bet that forces the hand of the Supreme Leader as well as the Green opposition and Rafsanjani. His response comes in 48 hours when he addresses the Friday faithful in Tehran.
Yet, even if I'm wrong on the short-term --- Khamenei is in line with the Ahmadinejad-IRGC strike at the reformists --- there is an even more important dimension beyond. The cold conclusion is that the President and his allies have seized the initiative, and that sets a precedent.
The foundation of the Islamic Republic from its inception by Ayatollah Khomeini has been the concept of velayat-e-faqih, ultimate clerical authority. This has not been an authority that has rested on the Supreme Leader maintaining a detachment from politics (a mistaken assumption of some who have read Khamenei's moves in this crisis as a break from the past) but being able to define the political, at times overruling his President and the Executive.
When he intervened after 12 June (and, indeed, before that) over the Presidential election, the Supreme Leader was trying to maintain control over that process. Whatever the fate of this week's "all-in" bet by Ahmadinejad and the IRGC, the Supreme Leader has not been able to accomplish that. Velayat-e-faqih has been eroded.
So if we could conclude one chapter of this crisis by taking the Green movement off the table (and I don't think that even this can be set down --- watch for Qods Day), there are other players in this game. And the biggest to date of those players, a Mr Ali Khamenei, now may have his make-or-decision decision.
Call or fold?
Iran Urgent Analysis: Is This the Defining Showdown?
The Latest from Iran (8 September): Picking A Fight?
NEW Iran: Ahmadinejad Chooses Confrontation Over Compromise and Governing
UPDATED Iran: Mousavi HQ Raided by Security Forces
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
An admission: for the first time in three months, I feel very uncertain about an analysis. Up to this point, with the immense help of colleagues and readers, I could read and analyse the move of various participants in the post-election conflict, watching them act and react against each other. Even in mid-August, when we tried to figure out the manoeuvres of Hashemi Rafsanjani, I think we came to a secure conclusion about his complex, cautious steps.Yesterday afternoon changed all this. We were in the midst of reading yet another turn of the kaleidoscope: an apparent alignment between the Supreme Leader and other elements in the Iranian Establishment to find a compromise that would contain the reformists by offering a limited "compromise", thus securing the system. This would have entailed a loudly-proclaimed but strictly-defined enquiry into detentions and abuses, public but relatively gentle criticism of the President's handling of the crisis, and perhaps the "Ramadan present" of a release of high-profile prisoners.
It seemed this was the latest but one of the most important chess moves in the conflict. Then at 3 p.m. Tehran time yesterday, 24 hours after security forces raided an office run by the staff of Mir Hossein Mousavi, someone --- most likely, the President, working with the Revolutionary Guard --- ordered the seizure of the main office of Mehdi Karroubi and the Etemade Melli political party and website, arresting the editor-in-chief of etemademelli.ir and perhaps shutting the site down. And a few hours after that, Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief advisor, Alireza Beheshti, was arrested.
I think the difficulty in evaluating these steps is that Ahmadinejad is not playing chess. Dismissing our once-favourite cliche for a new analogy, with the attack on the Mousavi and Karroubi camps, the President and the Revolutionary Guards are palying cards, and they just put all their chips in the middle.
It's called an "all-in" bet. It's far more brutal than the intricate moves on the chessboard, and it forces your opponent not only to think but to make a make-or-break decision. In the face of this assault, does the Green movement fold its cards, conceding that for now Ahmadinejad has the authority, however illegitimate that might be? Or does it "call", preparing for a showdown that could mean more arrests and the effectively dismantling of an organised opposition for the near-future?
This, however, is the easy part of the analysis. The much tricker reading is that Ahmadinejad's move (again, considering "Ahmadinejad" as the President, his close allies, and Revolutionary Guard leaders) may not have been solely against the opposition.
With the dramatic measures taken in the last 48 hours, supported by his confrontational rhetoric, the President is moving not only against the "Green Path of Hope" but against other members of the Establishment and even the Supreme Leader.
I'll add the caution that my view is not universally held here at EA, where heated debate will continue today. And Josh Shahryar, who is working on a must-read analysis that should appear by Friday, has a slightly different perspective.
The immediate question: did the Supreme Leader know of the steps for raids and arrests, even as he was publicly advising Ahmadinejad yesterday morning to listen to "benevolent criticism"?
The interpretation that Ayatollah Khamenei is in line with the President/IRGC crackdown argues that the plans to move against Mousavi and Karroubi were in place before the Supreme Leader announced he would be leading Friday prayers in Tehran. Thus, by the time he took the podium, a message to the reformists that "enough is enough" would be backed up by a velvet fist. Behave yourselves, and Alireza Behesti will be released in a few days, your offices can be re-opened, and you can maintain your websites and newspapers (while adhering to our guidelines for proper reporting and analysis).
(An important note: this of course is also an important message to Hashemi Rafsanjani: "Do not make a move, my friend." If you lead prayers on Qods Day, 18 September, do not offer any opening for continued opposition to this Government.)
The price of the deal? Control of the enquiry into the post-election abuses would pass into the hands of the Government, with Mehdi Karroubi giving up any significant role and intervention. A few scapegoats could take the fall for the deaths at Kahrizak prison, thus appeasing conservative/principlist politicians who were angered by the abuse of Mohsen Ruholamini, and possibly for the raid on Tehran University at the start of the crisis.
Seeing it on paper after hearing it from colleagues, it makes sense. But I'm still not sure.
While the Supreme Leader has taken a tough line with the direct challenge of the opposition throughout this crisis, he has also compromises within the Establishment to strengthen it politicially. So his 19 June Friday Prayer address, while defying the Green movement on calls to review the election, also sought to bring Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani together. Other steps have tried to check the President, notably the insistence on the removal of the First Vice President, Esfandiari Rahim-Mashai, and on the appointment of Sadegh Larijani to head Iran's judiciary. While Ayatollah Khamenei did swing behind full approval of Ahmadinejad's Cabinet, my reading was still that he was doing this for the sake of the system, rather than the President.
It was for this reason that (with hindsight, erroneously) I had been writing that Ahmadinejad was relatively weak in this crisis. I had not counted in his street-fighting resilience and aggression, which meant that (to return to the card table) he would raise the stakes rather than fold. At the same time, it has been for this reason that I had seen the Supreme Leader making move after move to balance and bring together elements of the Establishment who were in tension and even fighting one another.
The Ahmadinejad-IRGC risks that balance by substituting the blunt showdown of political poker for the nuances of the chessboard. So, for me, it is a bet that forces the hand of the Supreme Leader as well as the Green opposition and Rafsanjani. His response comes in 48 hours when he addresses the Friday faithful in Tehran.
Yet, even if I'm wrong on the short-term --- Khamenei is in line with the Ahmadinejad-IRGC strike at the reformists --- there is an even more important dimension beyond. The cold conclusion is that the President and his allies have seized the initiative, and that sets a precedent.
The foundation of the Islamic Republic from its inception by Ayatollah Khomeini has been the concept of velayat-e-faqih, ultimate clerical authority. This has not been an authority that has rested on the Supreme Leader maintaining a detachment from politics (a mistaken assumption of some who have read Khamenei's moves in this crisis as a break from the past) but being able to define the political, at times overruling his President and the Executive.
When he intervened after 12 June (and, indeed, before that) over the Presidential election, the Supreme Leader was trying to maintain control over that process. Whatever the fate of this week's "all-in" bet by Ahmadinejad and the IRGC, the Supreme Leader has not been able to accomplish that. Velayat-e-faqih has been eroded.
So if we could conclude one chapter of this crisis by taking the Green movement off the table (and I don't think that even this can be set down --- watch for Qods Day), there are other players in this game. And the biggest to date of those players, a Mr Ali Khamenei, now may have his make-or-decision decision.
Call or fold?