Text: The US Draft Resolution on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

The US, Iran, and Missile Defense: The Inside Story

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From Politico:

September 11, 2009

United States Draft

UNSC Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

The Security Council,

PP1. Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,

PP2. Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

PP3. Recalling also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

PP4. Bearing in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,

PP5. Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and calling upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament,

PP6. Reaffirming its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation,

PP7. Calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,

PP8. Welcoming the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,

PP9. Welcoming the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and underlining the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,

PP10. Welcoming in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,

PP11. Welcoming and supporting the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,

PP12. Recalling the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and reaffirming that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime,

PP13. Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),

PP14. Reaffirming its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008),

PP15. Reaffirming all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,

PP16. Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the provision of nuclear material or technical assistance for the purposes of terrorism,

PP17. Mindful in this context of the risk that irresponsible or unlawful provision of nuclear material or technical assistance could enable terrorism,

PP18. Expressing its support for the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,

PP19. Affirming its support for the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,

PP20. Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,

PP21. Reaffirming UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and calling upon all UN Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008),

1. Emphasizes that a situation of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations under the Treaty, and in this regard notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

3. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms;

4 Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and calls on all other States to join in this endeavor;

5. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force;

6. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, and welcomesthe Conference on Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009;7. Deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions,

8. Encourages efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

9. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I , II and III of the Treaty,

10. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

11. Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;

12. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:

a. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,

b. Calls upon all States to adopt and implement an Additional Protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,

c. Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;

13. Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;

14. Undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while recognizing ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirmsthat a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;

15. Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement or withdraw from the NPT, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, noncompliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

16. Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has in place an Additional Protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

17. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

18. Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment;

19. Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and affirms its commitment to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540 by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

20. Reaffirms the need for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, and calls upon Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of UNSCR 1540 provisions, and in this context welcomes the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and calls upon all States to participate actively in this review;

21. Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

22. Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;

23. Calls upon all States to improve their national technical capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;

24. Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing, shipments, or illicit trafficking, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;

25. Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;

26. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Transcript/Snap Analysis: Washington's Welcome to Iran

Iran’s Nukes: Full Text of Iran’s Proposal to “5+1″ Powers

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Here's a surprise. Despite the hostility shown in the Western media towards Iran's latest proposal on its nuclear programme, notably over Tehran's negative response to the international demand to halt its nuclear enrichment programme, the State Department said Friday that the United States and the other members of the "5+1" group (Germany, China, Russia, Britain, and France) had accepted Iran's proposal to hold direct talks. Moreover, Tehran's signals of cooperation on issues such as the stability of Afghanistan and Iraq and the struggle against terrorism are appreciated by Washington.



Here is Friday's daily press briefing on Iran given by State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley:

Political directors of P-5+1 continue to study Iran document

Statement issued by Javier Solana on P-5+1 countries to arrange a face-to-face meeting

Iran paper does not reply to international community's concerns; it does not cover nuclear issue / need an early meeting to see if Iran is willing to engage seriously on these issues

We feel that they are out of compliance with their obligations under the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty], IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], Security Council resolutions/wish to have direct dialogue with Iran to see what Iran is prepared to do/5+1 countries want to have face-to-face with Iran to address all the issues that we have concerns about, including the nuclear issue.

We have great concern about Iran's support of terrorism and its role in the region/recognize that we have potentially common interests in terms of a stable Afghanistan; and a stable Iraq; willing to engage Iran on the full range of issues

Iranian election is a matter between the Iranian government and its people

Hence, despite pressure on Washington to allow an Israeli strike on Tehran and claims that the US will press for harsher sanctions, it appears that the Obama Administration is maneuvering towards an expansion of engagement. If this is the case, the next Security Council meeting on September 24 can produce an unexpected consensus with a green light for direct dialogue with Iran. Indeed, when the full transcript is read carefully, it emerges that Washington's signal for negotiations is based on wider political concerns rather than as a specific answer to Iran's nuclear proposals. As Crowley states, the only condition  is that Iran expresses its willingness to talk:

Transcript

QUESTION: On Iran? A question on Iran?

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: Regarding the proposal the Iranians made this week, you said yesterday – and your comments yesterday seemed to be focused on the fact that they didn’t address the central – the issue of central interest to the U.S., which is the nuclear program, enrichment activity. I’m wondering if, nonetheless, the P-5+1 countries have decided that they will tell the Iranians that they accept the offer to have talks.

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I would kind of bother to turn that around, first and foremost, and recall that it was the nations of the P-5+1 who made a specific offer to Iran to engage directly to address the concerns that the United States has, the international community has, the United Nations Security Council has. So it is Iran providing a paper that responds in a way to the invitation. There was a conference call this morning of the political directors of the P-5+1, and I think we continue to study the Iran document. At the same time, I believe brief – a short time ago, there was a statement made by the EU, by Javier Solana, indicating that he will be in touch with the Iranians on behalf of the P-5+1 countries to arrange a face-to-face meeting as soon as possible.

QUESTION: Just on the one-on-one –

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: The face-to-face meeting – him and – or all the P-5 --

MR. CROWLEY: I mean, the P-5+1 was put in place to provide a mechanism to address the concerns that the international community has about Iran’s nuclear program. And, clearly, the Iranian paper does not reply to these concerns. It does not cover the nuclear issue. That’s precisely why we think we need an early meeting. We’re not interested in talking for talking’s sake. We’re looking to see – and through an early meeting, should Iran be willing, we’ll be looking to see if they are willing to engage seriously on these issues, but within the context of the P-5+1, the full range of issues that we have among these countries and Iran.

QUESTION: So you’re talking about talks about talks? Because I mean --

MR. CROWLEY: We’re not interested in talks about talks.

QUESTION: Well, okay, but that’s --

MR. CROWLEY: We’re interested in finding out if – I mean, if you go to the Iran document, it says the Iranian nation is prepared to enter into dialogue and negotiation, and so on and so forth. We are going to – as Javier Solana has indicated, we will seek an early meeting and we will seek to test Iran’s willingness to engage. Clearly, from the standpoint of the international community, the central issue that we have is the nuclear issue. If we have talks, we will plan to bring up the nuclear issue. We will hope, as we said earlier this week in the IAEA, that Iran will choose to engage the international community to address the concerns that we have about the nuclear program. So we are seeking a meeting because, ultimately, the only way that we feel we’re going to be able to resolve these issues is to have a meeting. But it’s not just a meeting for meeting’s sake. It is a meeting to be able to see if Iran is willing to engage seriously on these issues.

QUESTION: But they just sent you this response to your offer. You offered them talks on the nuclear issue and other issues. They came back to you and said we’re willing to talk, but not about our nuclear program. So what’s the point of talking to them if you got your response – I mean, then how can you say these are not talks about talks? I mean, they’ve shown you through their official paper their willingness to engage on the nuclear issue, which is not to engage on the nuclear issue. So why would you want to have talks with them if it didn’t? And are you saying that you would sit down with Iran to talk about whether they’re willing to engage on the nuclear issue, or are you not going to sit across the table from Iran unless the nuclear issue is on the table?

MR. CROWLEY: We would expect, if we have a meeting with Iran, that it will be a – we would hope that it would be a substantive exchange. We will go into such a meeting, should Iran agree to prepare to talk about the substance of the issues and concerns that we have on Iran’s nuclear program, as was outlined this week at the IAEA. We feel that they are out of compliance with their obligations under the NPT, IAEA, Security Council resolutions. We wish to have a direct dialogue with Iran. We believe, and the President has said repeatedly, that we feel this is the way in which we will be able to, and hopefully can, resolve these issues. Our objective is clear: to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. I don’t think that we can resolve this issue any other way but through the kind of direct dialogue --

QUESTION: But what in that --

MR. CROWLEY: -- that leads to negotiation that we hope will lead to an understanding --

QUESTION: But what in that letter – you said we expect that there’ll be substantive talks. What gives you that expectation?

MR. CROWLEY: Well --

QUESTION: What in that letter gives you any reason to believe that you would have substantive talks with Iran about its nuclear issue?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, and that’s why we will seek a meeting to see what is – Iran is prepared to do. We’ve been waiting for some months --

QUESTION: So you’re ignoring their letter?

MR. CROWLEY: We have been waiting for some months for Iran to respond to the – to Javier Solana’s invitation earlier this year. We are seeking a meeting now based on the Iranian paper to see what Iran is prepared to do. And then, as the President has said, if Iran responds to our interest in a meeting, we’ll see when that can occur. We hope that will occur as soon as possible, and that as we head towards United Nations General Assembly, I expect there will be further meetings within the P-5+1. As the President has said, we will use this month to assess where we are in terms of our offer of engagement, and then that would lead to a conclusion by the end of the year as to what that approach has yielded.

So I don’t – we’ve gone through this situation where there have been various public statements over the past few weeks. But ultimately, the only way we’re going to resolve the serious and – concerns that we have is to have direct dialogue, see if Iran is willing to engage on these issues. If they’re not, then, obviously, that will – we’ll draw conclusions from that.

QUESTION: Just to clarify, it seems that you think the door is still open to talks on the enrichment because they didn’t explicitly refuse in the letter to talk about that subject.

MR. CROWLEY: Well --

QUESTION: Is that correct?

MR. CROWLEY: -- all I can say is our position has not changed. The United States, the other members of the P5+1 – we seek engagement with Iran, we seek to have better answers, better information, better cooperation from Iran to seriously address the issues that we have. And now it is up to Iran to determine what they are prepared to do. They have given – they’ve provided a paper. It says that they are open to dialogue. The paper itself does not address our nuclear concerns. But we will seek a meeting, as Javier Solana indicated today. And then based on that approach, we’ll see if Iran is willing to have a meeting. At that meeting, we will hope that there will be serious engagement. From that engagement, we hope there will be a willingness to address these issues. And then – but through this process, we’ll be able to determine what Iran is prepared to do, what it’s not prepared to do, and that will lead us to make judgments and there will be consequences going forward.

QUESTION: Let me put it another way. I mean, the paper, the proposals – are they better than their public statements where they refuse strictly to discuss engagement – enrichment?

MR. CROWLEY: The paper itself, I don’t think, broke any new ground. It’s, in a way, a warmed-over version of a previous paper they provided some time ago.

QUESTION: So, P.J., why wouldn’t you just see that as stalling then? I mean, the Iranians for the last several years have done this. You get right up to the deadline and then they put these papers out, then you say, okay, we’re going to go talk to them again, and it just keeps going and going down the road.

MR. CROWLEY: Well – and we will draw conclusions based on how Iran responds to the invitation by Javier Solana and the EU.

QUESTION: And their past behavior hasn’t given you any indication?

MR. CROWLEY: And we will draw conclusions if their past behavior – or their future behavior reflects their past behavior.

QUESTION: I’m sorry, but I still don’t understand – and I think probably most of us don’t – that you say that you’re going to ask Iran for talks based on their response --

MR. CROWLEY: No.

QUESTION: – based on this letter that they sent you.

MR. CROWLEY: No, no, no, no, no. We are – once again, we are making the offer of – for direct dialogue to Iran. It is a consistent approach that --

QUESTION: You made that offer, and they said we’re willing to talk to you about everything that we want to talk to you about and nothing that you want to talk to – about. So why are you – are you, like, ignoring this letter or ignoring the contents, or saying the fact that they sent us anything is a good sign and we’ll see if we could build something on that? Because if you’re saying that we’re asking them for talks based on this piece of paper that they sent you, I don’t see where there’s anything to talk about.

MR. CROWLEY: Well – and we seek direct negotiations. We want to see Iran sit down face to face with the P-5+1 countries and address all of the issues that we have concern about, including the nuclear issue. If we have a meeting, we’re going to bring up the nuclear issue, and we’ll see how Iran responds to that. And this is – this is --

QUESTION: But what – but what about this – I’m sorry, but what about this letter makes you think that they’re willing to talk to you about that? They said no thank you.

MR. CROWLEY: And we’ll find out. We’ll find out. But I – again, I go back --

QUESTION: Why aren’t you taking no for an answer, though?

MR. CROWLEY: Libby, I – Elise, I go back to the – there’s language in the letter that simply says the Government of Iran is willing to enter in a dialogue. We are going to test that proposition. Okay? And if Iran is willing to enter into serious negotiations, then they will find a willing participant in the United States and the other P-5+1 countries. If the – Iran dissembles in the future, as it has in the past, then we will draw conclusions from that.

Recall, we have a two-track strategy here. We are willing to engage, but we are also going to continue to look for ways to pressure Iran to change the path that it’s on. And we are willing to do both of those simultaneously. But ultimately, because these are serious issues, because we have a strategy that will prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, we feel the only way you’re ultimately going to resolve these issues is through direct dialogue. We recognize that Iran may or may not be willing to do so.

And as the President said, we’re going to assess where we are during the course of this month, including meetings that we’ll have at the UN General Assembly. And then at the end of the year, we’ll be able to draw some conclusions as to how successful our engagement offer has been.

QUESTION: P.J., can I follow up on that?

MR. CROWLEY: Sure.

QUESTION: Isn’t your second track in trouble, though? I mean, you’ve got the Russian foreign minister out there saying yesterday that new sanctions shouldn’t be considered, especially anything on petroleum. That’s the same thing the Russians have been saying since this process got underway back in 2003. It just seems – how are you going to implement the second track?

MR. CROWLEY: These are not mutually exclusive. I’ll let the Russian foreign minister characterize his own words. There is unanimity within the P-5+1 in support of our two-track approach that involves engagement and pressure. Now – and we are willing to meet with Iran. We hope to meet with Iran. We want to see serious engagement on the nuclear issue, in particular. Within the context of the P-5+1, we are willing to address any other issues that they want to bring to the table. But clearly, if Iran refuses to negotiate seriously, we the United States and the international community and the Security Council can draw conclusions from that. And then based on that, we’ll make some judgments in the future.

QUESTION: P.J. --

QUESTION: I’m sorry, a quick procedural question since the announcement happened while we were in here. What level would the talks be on? Is that – the Solana announcement, what level of talks would take place with Iran? Is it political directors?

MR. CROWLEY: I would say likely at the political director level. But again, that will be part of what will be negotiated, depending on what Iran’s response is.

QUESTION: The U.S. will be at the table for that, or would it be only Solana? I’m trying to understand.

MR. CROWLEY: Oh, no. I would expect – I mean, we would seek a meeting –

QUESTION: At the initial meeting here --

MR. CROWLEY: Yes.

QUESTION: – that Solana is requesting, would it be with all six parties plus him?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, again, as he indicated in his statement, Javier Solana will be in touch with Iranian authorities, look for a meeting at an early date. And then we’ll work those details based on the Iranian response.

QUESTION: So you’re not closed to being at an initial meeting, as opposed to the follow-up meeting?

MR. CROWLEY: But I would – I think we would hope that there’d be a full P-5+1 meeting at a senior level. We’ll be looking, for example, to see from the Iranian standpoint, should this happen, what level of interlocutor will they send, what kind of authority will that person have. But we’re looking for a serious engagement by Iran, address these issues that we have. If it’s there, that will be a positive development. If it’s not there, we’ll draw conclusions from that.

QUESTION: Does that –

MR. CROWLEY: Go ahead. Go ahead.

QUESTION: So, basically, this is probably a last chance for Iran to engage on its nuclear issue, which is sort of a precondition for the talks?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I wouldn’t say – it is a – it is certainly a best opportunity for Iran. As we said at the IAEA earlier this week, we have made an offer to Iran; it’s out of mutual interest and mutual respect. But clearly, we expect to see Iran be willing to address the concerns that we have. As we said earlier this week, Iran says it has rights, but with those rights come responsibilities. So we’ll see what happens. But obviously, should Iran decide to engage, we will be at the table. Should Iran decide not to engage, that will have consequences and we’ll make judgments based on what Iran does or does not do.

QUESTION: Does that include Iran’s views on Israel and also support of terrorism?

MR. CROWLEY: We have great concern about Iran’s support of terrorism and its role in the region. At the same time, we recognize that we have potentially common interests in terms of a stable Afghanistan, in terms of a stable Iraq. As we have said frequently, we are willing to engage Iran on a full range of issues, but obviously, first on our list, first on the international community’s list, is Iran’s nuclear program.

QUESTION: And their views on Israel – wipe out Israel off the world map?

MR. CROWLEY: Obviously, that is a repugnant statement from the United States[1]. And we – but we are willing to – we have great concerns about Iran’s role in the region. It has been – hardly been a constructive player, and we will be clearly prepared to talk about that.

QUESTION: Can you take another one on Iran from another angle? Every year at the end of the month of Ramadan, the Iranian regime has begun this demonstration in support of the Palestinians. It’s coming up. It’s next week, actually. And today, Khamenei threatened the opposition that if they use that demonstration to voice their own displeasure with the results of the presidential elections that they would be faced with a harsh response and full force and everything.

Could that play – this recent comment play – have any room to play in your decision on the talks in general?

MR. CROWLEY: Well, I mean, as we have said many, many times, the situation in the aftermath of the election is really a matter between the Iranian Government and its people. Clearly, there are many within the political structure, within the clerical structure, that want to see a broader political process, a genuine political process, the formation of a genuine political opposition. And clearly, the regime is determined, and has taken direct actions, to inhibit that from happening both in terms of the arrest of those who have expressed their views publicly of intention and inhibitions given to journalists, and so on and so forth. And obviously, this continues to roil within Iran.

I think it’s not for us to give the Iranian regime advice, other than they should continue to take actions, or should start to take actions, to meet the genuine aspirations of their people.

QUESTION: Well, in that proposal they mentioned that they respect the right of people for free – to have free elections, and they talk about justice and rule of law and --

MR. CROWLEY: I think we would say that actions speak more loudly than words. And clearly, their activities of the past few weeks hardly show a government that is interested in having a free and fair and open political process.

Iran Document: Ahmadinejad's Aide on Economics, Politics, & Nuclear Discussions

The Latest from Iran (11 September): Prayers and Politics

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The Washington Post carries an interview with Iran's Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, a top aide to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in which he talks about Iran's proposal on its nuclear programme to the "5+1" powers and challenges the understanding of the liberal democracy in the West.

Hashemi talked about a three-fold Iranian response to the west: economic cooperation, political engagement, and revision of international arrangements. The economic approach focuses on cooperation in the energy sector while the political engagement seeks the improvement of the situation in Afghanistan and cooperation to stop smuggling, narcotics, and terrorism. On uranium enrichment , Iran is proposing a systemic revision to eliminate all current nuclear weapons and to prevent the proliferation of these weapons.

The first response to this initiative came from Russia, where the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Thursday that Iran's proposals contained something that powers "could work with".

Transcript:

Q: What are the contents of the proposal given by Iran to the permanent members of the Security Council and Germany?

A: In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful, I thank you for this chance to speak. We are currently in the holy month of Ramadan and also commemorate the nights of Qadr.

One of the specialties of these nights for our nation is that they belong to the first imam, Ali. When his name is mentioned, the first thing that comes to mind is his commitment to justice. He has been quoted as saying that "if you offer me the whole world, but ask me to take a grain from the mouth of an ant with oppression, I will not accept."

A famous historian says about Imam Ali (peace be upon him): "He was killed while leading prayers, because of the greatness of his justice."

The Iranian nation follows such an imam. Not only Muslims, but all of humanity pride themselves that such a human existed. I say these things as a prologue to the answer to your question.

The package that the Islamic Republic of Iran has proposed, I will point out some of the generalities of the package.

This package speaks at least about three fields: one economic, one political and the third international issues.

In the economic subject, there are widespread opportunities for cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and different countries, including European nations and the members of the 5-plus-1. Especially you know that Western nations are generally heavily affected by the international economic crisis, while the Islamic Republic has been affected much less. So much so that even according to international organizations and observers, the Iranian stock market is among the best in the world.

Q: Can you give me some more examples?

A: Especially in the field of energy, providing energy, there are many opportunities for cooperation. The other subject of the package is political cooperation.

It pays attention to peace, regional and international security, fighting narcotics smuggling, cooperation in fighting terrorism, in fighting organized crime. International cooperation can also be formed in this subject.

Q: What are the details of this subject of paying attention to peace and international security?

A: For instance, one of the crisis-ridden regions of the world is our neighbor Afghanistan. In spite of the increased presence of allied forces in that country, peace and security have not increased. At this point there are over 100,000 [foreign troops] in Afghanistan, while we see that the area of control of the central government has not increased. And the security of citizens is threatened even more. There have been demonstrations by people in Kabul and in other Afghan cities against the presence of foreign forces.

Apart from that, drug smuggling has strongly increased. Events inside Afghanistan have a wide range of regional and international effects. Some of the narcotics produced in Afghanistan are shipped to Europe, and Iran is paying a very high price in fighting smugglers. Apart from these, the infrastructure in that country has not been rebuilt or developed. Today a large number of Afghans are living unemployed and in poverty. This might be one of the main reasons behind the increased production of narcotics.

This is a subject that, with the participation of the legal Afghan government, can be focused on by everyone, and Iran can play its constructive role there. This can be a subject for discussions and cooperation.

We should all help the government of Afghanistan to be able to rule all over Afghanistan. We should all make sure that only useful and productive crops substitute for narcotics. We should all help to rebuild Afghanistan.

This is a good example on interaction, negotiations and speaking together, and all will benefit from it: the people, government and neighbors of Afghanistan, and also the region and the West.

This is just an example. There are many, many other examples where cooperation is possible.

Q: Is there any mention in the proposal of suspending uranium enrichment, a key demand in three rounds of United Nations sanctions?

A: The methods of preventing development of nuclear weapons and a widespread system for preventing the multiplying and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are a part of the package.

Since nuclear weapons are an international threat, with the cooperation of all countries we can design an international framework that, basically, prevents research, production, multiplying and keeping nuclear weapons and also moves toward destruction of present nuclear weapons.

Iran is ready in this path to offer any and every kind of cooperation and effort. No country must be exempt from this international framework against nuclear weapons.

Q: So you are confirming that Iran has no plans to give up uranium enrichment in the proposed package?

A: It's very obvious that all the nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran until now, and from now on, were within the framework of the laws of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and agreements and contracts made with the International Atomic Energy Agency and their rules and conventions.

And it is also very obvious that legal and lawful activities are the right of every nation.

Q: So in the proposal you suggest this international framework against nuclear weapons in order to also remove doubts that Iran is making such weapons?

A: Since today the threat of nuclear weapons comes from countries that have them, and to be secure and safe from future activities of countries that in the future will join the nuclear club, this framework must be widely be implemented from now on.

Q: So that we don't have any misunderstandings about your words, this doesn't mean that you are planning to make a nuclear weapon, but an international system in which no one will be allowed to make nuclear weapons?

A: Iran not only does not want to make nuclear weapons, but is actually intensely against nuclear weapons. In all truth, Iran is trying to establish a new regime to prevent nuclear weapons worldwide, which are an international anxiety.

Q: "The U.S. representative in the International Atomic Energy Agency said on Wednesday that Iran has enough low-enriched material to make one nuclear bomb. What is your reaction?

A: These are not the words of the Americans. This is the Israelis speaking. It's better that the Americans give their own opinion.

Q: Iran has been saying that it is waiting for change from the U.S. What is your stance on the Obama administration?

A: For Iran, the paradoxical statements by American politicians have been strange. This shows that apparently there is no central decision-making unit in the American government. Of course, the Obama government is under intense pressure from the Zionist lobby [to pressure Iran], but ultimately the Obama administration has been elected by the American people, and everybody expects their decisions to be based upon the interest of the American people.

Until now we have only seen words from the American government, but there have been no actions taken. Iran sent a message of congratulations after Obama's election victory. Iran said that within the framework of justice and international respect we are ready to interact with America. We even gave practical proposals to the American government in the past.

Q: Like what?

A: For instance, just as a step we asked for direct flights between Tehran and New York, but the Americans gave no response. This would have been the smallest step. With such an atmosphere, how can we count on their claims that they are ready for negotiations or a rebuilding of relations with Iran?

One point that is very important for Iran is the interference of some elements of the American government in Iran's election and especially some of the American media, in directing and intensifying street unrest in Tehran. They had an important role.

Q: Who are you talking about? Hillary Clinton? U.S. media? Iran makes many of these claims.

A: Both of them. I think they know it very well. For example, one of them is VOA [Voice of America - Persian Service]. Both radio and TV.

With all of these ups and downs, still the road is not closed. Ultimately, if there are going to be interactions or relations, there should be really some practical, positive signs.

Q: Can you give me some practical signs that you would like to see from United States?

A: Maybe one of them could be apologizing for their interfering in Iran's election and other instances of meddling, which are not few.

Q: The supreme leader in his speech during the [Persian] new year holidays in Mashhad referred to a letter supposedly sent by Obama. Recently we have heard of a second letter sent by Mr. Obama. What was in this letter and why did he send the letter to the supreme leader and not to the president?"

A: I postpone the answer of this question to the future. Let's respond later.

Q: So the letters have been sent by Mr. Obama?

A: Well, I think I answered you.

Q: Yes, okay, but so you say that two letters have been sent?

A: American sources have said that they have sent those letters.

Q: And how about Iranian sources?

A: I told you, I will answer in the future.

Q: Okay, there has been talk of establishing a U.S. consulate or special interests section [in Tehran]? Do you see at this point in time any chance for the opening of such a special interests section?

A: This kind of request is not yet received.

Q: And if the request comes? How will Iran answer?

A: The president has said that if such a request comes, we will study it positively.

Q: Imagine that the U.S. sources are right about the letters. Why would Mr. Obama send the letters to the [supreme leader] and not to the president?"

A: The answer to this question depends on the last question. If they were right about the letters, you have ask this question of them.

Q: I did. They said they want to try approaching the supreme leader because they have a feeling that there is a difference between the government and the supreme leader in their points of view. They think it's better for them to approach him directly.

A: The response to such a question has been given previously by president and the supreme leader in their speeches. The policies of the Islamic Republic are homogenous. When policies are made and chosen, everybody follows them. So there is no difference in the policies of the supreme leader or those of the government.

Of course, the government is the executive power, and it's the government that carries out the policies. Mr. President [Ahmadinejad] is the head of Supreme National Security Council, in fact. The representatives of the supreme leader are also on that council. Therefore, the decisions made in that council are coordinated decisions which are carried out throughout the system and government. Such a difference is just the belief of some American officials.

Q: What if the Western countries turn down the package? What will be Iran's reaction?

A: If they decline the package, it means they don't agree with the development of economic, political and international relations and economic cooperation. That means that they still wish to continue their nuclear policies on building, multiplying and preparation of nuclear weapons and shy away from disarmament. Of course, I don't think this will happen because it's a great opportunity for them.

Q: Ahmadinejad has said that the Western nations are in a gradual downfall and that this is an exceptional chance for the Islamic revolution to present its own theory on how to run the world appropriately. Does this mean that we face a much more active Iranian foreign policy in the coming four years?

A: Yes, you do.

Q: Could you elaborate more on this in practice?

A: The actions today by the West are based on a certain specific philosophy and ideology, which is so-called liberal democracy. Both the internal and external signs of this Western liberal democracy show that it's approaching defeat and collapse.

The opportunity for Westerners to speak their views and to participate in determining their fate is very limited and weak. You see, for example, in the United States there are only two major parties that are active in politics. If somebody is not affiliated with either of these parties, he won't be able to reach high positions within the government, for example to become president.

Can you find a president of America who won the election without being dependent on one of these parties? The political parties take away the possibility of the presence of original forces in the nation. Power just changes hands between members of two parties.

And if this were the only thing, there would be less criticism.

But unfortunately there are organized groups and parties behind the scenes that force their views even on those two parties.

Not only in the United States; they are only one example. Unfortunately, an important part of politicians in Europe -- not all of them -- who are in parliament or parties, or have the media, are forced to act under the pressure of the Zionist lobby.

They don't have the necessary independence. We received this conception from political negotiations between Iran and many of these politicians. I, myself, have talked with some high-ranking European officials and authorities. When we speak to them about international events and we ask them to take a fair position, they say they are under pressure.

There are many examples. It shows what liberal democracy is today. It's not only in politics. It can be expanded to economics, the media and to international relations. But the present time is not sufficient for such talks now. I'm ready to open this completely for you.

I want to say in summary: justice as the basic principle, of keeping the dignity of human beings, is not paid attention to by those politicians. . . . The interests of special power groups have higher priority than this. [Examples are] what happened in Iraq, like American interference, harsh prisons in Iraq and the U.S.A., injuring and killing people in Iraq and not caring about civilian citizens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. So much so that even the NATO secretary general says that in order to make Afghanistan secure, civilians will be killed

In fact, they divide the world into two groups: first-degree and second-degree humans.

This shows liberal democracy is just a claim and has no essence.

But what we say must happen as a basic principle are a number of things. The first is justice as a general human requirement; it should be one of the first fundamentals of everything. Safeguarding human dignity is another. Kindness and love should be the basis of peace and security. Mutual respect is another principle which must be considered in international relations, in governance, in economic relations, in financial relations and other dimensions.

If you discuss the international economic crisis, a big part of this crisis is rooted in the injustices that exist in the world, which are because of the relations and structures that the great powers have forced onto the world. If these injustices did not exist, this event would not happen.

There are many things that should be changed: the structure of the U.N., structure of the U.N. [Security Council], the work procedure in [the Security Council] and the veto privilege for the permanent members.

All of these show that the present structure ruling the world belongs to 60 years ago and is the result of the Second World War, in which some were victorious and one group lost. At that point, they planned things in such a way so the whole world would always be controlled by themselves. I think the time has come to evaluate these relations and new relations to be created.

Q: What steps will Iran take in order to spread its world view? Will this be some kind of diplomatic offensive?

A: I think that if the present structure and relations are properly explained to the people, and if the media help to clarify the realities and truth for the people with respect to the general request for creating justice in the world and the activities of the political elite, we can reform the present situation.

The request is there; the circumstances are ready. The great powers have no replacement for their present unsuccessful rule. If they had, they would have solved the 60-year problem of Palestine. They would have solved the problems of Afghanistan. They would have solved the problems of regional wars and other international issues. But nothing has been solved in the world. People don't feel secure. They don't even implement international disarmament, while everybody knows that nuclear weapons are a general threat.

I remember a U.S. politician talked about a bomber plane carrying atomic weapons which flew from one airport to another. He said that if something had happened to that plane, a great tragedy would have been created for America.

Even though they know that production and storage of nuclear weapons [are dangerous], they still continue. This shows that they are too irresponsible to run the world. Naturally, everything needs to be changed.

Q: Do we see all of this reflected in the package?

A: Of course, what Iran proposes is based upon international interest, justice, cooperation and mutual respect: principles which are accepted worldwide. All wise and logical people accept this.

Q: So in the U.N., [Ahmadinejad] will announce this diplomatic offensive?

A: It has been like this until now.