Transcript: Obama and Sarkozy Statements on Iran Nuclear Programme

The Latest from Iran (25 September): The Nuclear Distraction

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PRESIDENT OBAMA: Good morning. We are here to announce that yesterday in Vienna, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France presented detailed evidence to the International Atomic Energy Agency demonstrating that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been building a covert uranium enrichment facility near Qom for several years.

Earlier this week, the Iranian government presented a letter to the IAEA that made reference to a new enrichment facility, years after they had started its construction. The existence of this facility underscores Iran’s continuing unwillingness to meet its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions and IAEA requirements. We expect the IAEA to immediately investigate this disturbing information, and to report to the IAEA Board of Governors.

Now, Iran’s decision to build yet another nuclear facility without notifying the IAEA represents a direct challenge to the basic compact at the center of the non-proliferation regime. These rules are clear: All nations have the right to peaceful nuclear energy; those nations with nuclear weapons must move towards disarmament; those nations without nuclear weapons must forsake them. That compact has largely held for decades, keeping the world far safer and more secure. And that compact depends on all nations living up to their responsibilities.

This site deepens a growing concern that Iran is refusing to live up to those international responsibilities, including specifically revealing all nuclear-related activities. As the international community knows, this is not the first time that Iran has concealed information about its nuclear program. Iran has a right to peaceful nuclear power that meets the energy needs of its people. But the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program. Iran is breaking rules that all nations must follow — endangering the global non-proliferation regime, denying its own people access to the opportunity they deserve, and threatening the stability and security of the region and the world

It is time for Iran to act immediately to restore the confidence of the international community by fulfilling its international obligations. We remain committed to serious, meaningful engagement with Iran to address the nuclear issue through the P5-plus-1 negotiations. Through this dialogue, we are committed to demonstrating that international law is not an empty promise; that obligations must be kept; and that treaties will be enforced.

And that’s why there’s a sense of urgency about the upcoming meeting on October 1st between Iran, the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and Germany. At that meeting, Iran must be prepared to cooperate fully and comprehensively with the IAEA to take concrete steps to create confidence and transparency in its nuclear program and to demonstrate that it is committed to establishing its peaceful intentions through meaningful dialogue and concrete actions.

To put it simply: Iran must comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions and make clear it is willing to meet its responsibilities as a member of the community of nations. We have offered Iran a clear path toward greater international integration if it lives up to its obligations, and that offer stands. But the Iranian government must now demonstrate through deeds its peaceful intentions or be held accountable to international standards and international law.

I should point out that although the United Kingdom, France, and the United States made the presentation to Vienna, that Germany, a member of the P5-plus-1, and Chancellor Merkel in particular, who could not be here this morning, wished to associate herself with these remarks.

I would now like to turn to President Sarkozy of France for a brief statement.

PRESIDENT SARKOZY: (As translated.) Ladies and gentlemen, we have met yesterday for a meeting — a summit meeting of the Security Council on disarmament and nuclear disarmament. I repeated my conviction that Iran was taking the international community on a dangerous path. I have recalled all the attempts that we have made to offer a negotiated solution to the Iranian leaders without any success, which what has been revealed today is exceptional. Following the enriching plant of Natanz in 2002, it is now the Qom one which is revealed. It was designed and built over the past several years in direct violation of resolutions from the Security Council and from the IAEA. I am expecting from the IAEA an exhaustive, strict, and rigorous investigation, as President Obama just said.

We were already in a very severe confidence crisis. We are now faced with a challenge, a challenge made to the entire international communities. The six will meet with the Iranian representatives in Geneva. Everything — everything must be put on the table now.

We cannot let the Iranian leaders gain time while the motors are running. If by December there is not an in-depth change by the Iranian leaders, sanctions will have to be taken. This is for the peace and stability. Thank you.

PRIME MINISTER BROWN: America, the United Kingdom, and France are at one. Iran’s nuclear program is the most urgent proliferation challenge that the world faces today.

As President Obama and President Sarkozy have just said, the level of deception by the Iranian government, and the scale of what we believe is the breach of international commitments, will shock and anger the whole international community, and it will harden our resolve.

Confronted by the serial deception of many years, the international community has no choice today but to draw a line in the sand. On October the 1st, Iran must now engage with the international community and join the international community as a partner. If it does not do so, it will be further isolated.

And I say on behalf of the United Kingdom today, we will not let this matter rest. And we are prepared to implement further and more stringent sanctions.

Let the message that goes out to the world be absolutely clear: that Iran must abandon any military ambitions for its nuclear program. Thank you.

Iran: Obama's "Get-Tough" Move for Engagement

The Latest from Iran (25 September): The Nuclear Distraction

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Chris Emery reads behind and beyond the media fury and President Obama's statement on the Iran nuclear programme:

What must be emphasised is that the entire Obama policy in Iran, including the New Years message and the broad engagement strategy, was conceived with the full knowledge that the US could always bring out the "secret nuclear plant". This was the ace in the hole, which Obama always had, if he needed to inject a sense of urgency into the process of engagement.

Today's statement was not necessarily to set up an inevitable process of sanctions. Indeed, despite the strength of the President's words, there remains very little consensus on what sanctions should be adopted and almost no belief that they will be effective. Instead, this high-profile initiative by Obama was designed to get movement on engagement.

The aim is thus to counter Iran's delaying tactics by massively increasing the stakes for cooperation. The Iranians, if they have any ambitions for engagement --- and I believe they probably do --- will have to offer something extremely substantial in October. That may not be a disastrous outcome. The regime is probably not ready to make a grand bargain encompassing all the areas of mutual interest. However, they are in a position to offer a lot more transparency on the nuclear issue in return for economic carrots.

The fact that Obama has been sitting on this revelation for so long also indicates the risks that he was prepared to endure for engagement. Even now, it was left to French President Nicolas Sarkozy to talk of sanctions; Obama consistently emphasised that all offers to Tehran stand.

It will certainly shock opponents of engagement that Obama was prepared to offer so much knowing that the Iranians were building this facility. They will also now assume that all of the current US Government assessments regarding how long it will take for Iran to get the bomb, including the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, are incorrect. The immediate pressure, however, is on the International Atomic Energy Agency, especially as judgement has already been passed that the configuration of this site, and the nature of its concealment, are not consistent with a peaceful program.

If the Iranians continue to stonewall the nuclear issue then I do envisage sanctions by the United Nations Security Council around Christmas. I suspect that the Russians are now on board with that. This was probably part of the missile defence deal. That leaves the Chinese, who I doubt will apply the veto alone to block sanctions.

Yet, the point is that the engagement strategy remains in tact.

Text: The US Draft Resolution on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

The US, Iran, and Missile Defense: The Inside Story

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From Politico:

September 11, 2009

United States Draft

UNSC Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

The Security Council,

PP1. Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,

PP2. Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

PP3. Recalling also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

PP4. Bearing in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,

PP5. Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and calling upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament,

PP6. Reaffirming its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation,

PP7. Calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,

PP8. Welcoming the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,

PP9. Welcoming the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and underlining the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,

PP10. Welcoming in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,

PP11. Welcoming and supporting the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,

PP12. Recalling the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and reaffirming that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime,

PP13. Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),

PP14. Reaffirming its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008),

PP15. Reaffirming all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,

PP16. Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the provision of nuclear material or technical assistance for the purposes of terrorism,

PP17. Mindful in this context of the risk that irresponsible or unlawful provision of nuclear material or technical assistance could enable terrorism,

PP18. Expressing its support for the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,

PP19. Affirming its support for the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,

PP20. Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,

PP21. Reaffirming UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and calling upon all UN Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008),

1. Emphasizes that a situation of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations under the Treaty, and in this regard notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

3. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms;

4 Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and calls on all other States to join in this endeavor;

5. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force;

6. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, and welcomesthe Conference on Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009;7. Deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions,

8. Encourages efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

9. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I , II and III of the Treaty,

10. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

11. Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;

12. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:

a. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,

b. Calls upon all States to adopt and implement an Additional Protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,

c. Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;

13. Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;

14. Undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while recognizing ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirmsthat a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;

15. Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement or withdraw from the NPT, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, noncompliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

16. Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has in place an Additional Protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

17. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

18. Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment;

19. Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and affirms its commitment to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540 by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

20. Reaffirms the need for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, and calls upon Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of UNSCR 1540 provisions, and in this context welcomes the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and calls upon all States to participate actively in this review;

21. Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

22. Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;

23. Calls upon all States to improve their national technical capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;

24. Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing, shipments, or illicit trafficking, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;

25. Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;

26. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Middle East Inside Line: Talks with Iran To Start in Turkey; No Progress in Israel-Palestine Discussions

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Direct Talks with Iran on 1 October: The Jerusalem Post reports, from a senior European Union official that "talks on Iran's nuclear program will likely be held in Turkey". Referring to the meeting, scheduled for 1 October, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana said: "The Americans will be present in a formalized manner. This is new."

Europe is ready and waiting for a positive outcome from direct talks between Iranians and the Washington-led international community. Simultaneously, it seems that the US has given consent to Ankara's willingness to be the "bridge" in these negotiations.

No Progress in Israel-Palestine Talks: U.S. Mideast special envoy George Mitchell met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas on Wednesday. Haaretz reports that the talks were fruitless and no agreement came out at the end of talks.

After rounds of meetings, Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat blamed Israel for stalling the resumption of peace talks and insisted that all settlement building must stop. Mitchell also could not get "sufficient" concessions from Netanyahu, as the Israeli Prime Minister rejected concessions on "the natural growth" of the West Bank settlements, on the planned construction of 3,000 new apartments in the West Bank, and on his claim of Israeli ownership of East Jerusalem.

Mitchell said the U.S. is committed to the resumption of peace talks and that he hoped to bring this phase of the effort to a positive conclusion in the coming weeks. The envoy is hoping he can bring Netanyahu and Abbas together with President Barack Obama at the openning of the UN General Assembly session next week. Aides of Abbas reportedly said that he might agree to an informal meeting with Netanyahu in New York.

Transcript: Israel and Its (Lack of) Options on Iran

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Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor has told Reuters that "superpowers had to do stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons either militarily or through further sanctions". Yet what may be most striking in the interview is that, beyond that tough assertion, Meridor is unwilling or unable to pursue a specific line because of the positions of other countries. He cannot endorse military operations; he cannot condemn the engagement of President Obama, and his "concerted intensive action" is hostage to the support of China and Russia.

Meridor's statement:

The time is now. There is no more time to waste, and that's not only the Israeli perspective, it's much more general.

I remember that in 2003 they suspended enrichment because the Americans looked strong enough after the invasion of Iraq.

The clock is ticking, in the sense that when nothing is done (to dissuade Iran), something (enrichment) is done all the time. Time is relevant and of the essence here. How long? I don't want to go into that here...The trend is clear.

I'm not speaking of military action. I don't want to give any word that would be misinterpreted. I intentionally put this issue in its broader context. Of course there is a special case in Israel because Iranian leaders say, not only (President Mahmoud) Ahmadinejad, that Israel is not legitimate and should not exist, and one sees the building up of weapons, not to speak of the meaningful involvement in terror all over the place... One should not close one's eyes but we are in a way fortunate that this is not only Israel's problem.

Our policy is a good one and it worked well. And we are known to be quite a responsible country. We are in a unique position. There are formulas we use all the time (to address this issue). I will not say what we have, if we have or we don't have (nuclear weapons), but the fact is that the alarm in the Arab world is related to the fear that Iran may have it.

It [Iran's having a nuclear weapon] is not in the distant future. When they decide exactly this or exactly that is a good question but it's not the main question. The trend is clear and if you want to be an owner of nuclear weapons or have the capability of being a nuclear power it changes the balance of power.

I can't say that [the U.S. engagement's being called as a "waste of time"], because the other option didn't work either... If it works, it works. What I think we look for is the result, whether you do it with soft spoken language or with a heavy stick. I'd rather do it with a positive (method), but that doesn't always work.

It's important there is an understanding, a will, a capability, if all join hands, to enforce a concerted intensive action -- which is not military action, I speak of political and economic measures -- that may be taken if the Russians and Chinese can get on board.

If there is no perception of a concerted effort the other countries who are concenred with the possibility of a nuclear Iran could develop their own in the meantime... Then you will find a different world, one harder for a superpower to manage.

I don't think Russia has an interest in a nuclear Iran. Maybe they want to be considered as a partner, not to be told what to do. I am not for or against the Russians. I am saying they are important elements. Their have an important role in the world. Communism might be dead. Russia is not.