Tuesday
Sep012009
UPDATED Iran: Law & Politics - Misinterpreting Mortazavi
Tuesday, September 1, 2009 at 6:45
The Latest from Iran (31 August): The Debate over the Cabinet
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UPDATED 1 September: Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Prize Laureate and human rights lawyer, offers an interpretation in support of the Mostaghim-Daragahi analysis: "The setting aside of Mortazavi from his position of Tehran's chief prosecutor and his installment as [one of the] deputy general prosecutors of Iran must not to be considered as a promotion....The latitude and power of Mortazavi in his new position is much less and this new position has made him more vulnerable to prosecutions."
An EA correspondent adds, "I suspect that Larijani's Mortazavi promotion/demotion was a stroke of diabolical cunning. First of all, a powerful official, accustomed to act independently (and, more importantly, from a political faction that is rather hostile towards the head of the judiciary, Sadegh Larijani) is removed from a sensitive post, placed under supervision, and therefore prevented from causing trouble for the Larijanis. Secondly, since this removal is "a promotion", Mortazavi and his cronies, however upset by the loss of power, cannot make a noise. Thirdly, placing Mortazavi in a higher position that at the same time is vulnerable to prosecution allows the Larijani-headed judiciary to control him. When Mortazavi was Tehran's prosecutor he could use his influence to block and stonewall all charges made against him, but in his new position this power has been taken away from him.
Yesterday, in a graphic illustration of the twists and turns of Iranian politics, Saeed Mortazavi went from being "fired" in the morning as Tehran's Chief Prosecutor to being "promoted" in the afternoon as Iran's Deputy Prosecutor General. The sudden shift led to some misleading headlines --- the New York Post is still crowing about the sacking of the "Butcher of Tehran" --- and a lot of uncertainty. What did Mortazavi's fortunes say about the intra-Establishment battle for power as well as the future of detentions and trials of post-election political prisoners?
A couple of Enduring America correspondents cautiously navigated the possibilities yesterday before concluding "wait and see". Others, however, have not been as cautious and, I fear, as shrewd.
Ramin Mostaghim and Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times are about as good as you get in reporting on Iran for US media (Mostaghim is based in Tehran, persisting despite the Iran Government's restrictions, and Daragahi is in Beirut), but they may have mis-stepped by jumping to the conclusion that Mortazavi now has "a fancy title" that "strips him of his power to pursue his hardline political agenda".
This is a favoured theory of some Iranian activists who are pushing the idea of a political overthrow of the President by the Larijani brothers, one of whom is the new head of judiciary, and Hashemi Rafsanjani. In this case, the LA Times reporters rely on two Iranian trial lawyers who claim that Mortazavi's" authority and power have been diminished almost to zero, nothing ... because he cannot make any judiciary decision".
That's a comforting thought for those who hope that Mortazavi, with his hard-line approach to detention and trials (and alleged abuses of prisoners), will no longer have influence. It ignores, however, the reality that his new role is as much a political matter as a judicial one.
The truth is that we simply don't know what impact Mortazavi will have until his relationship with his superior, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, and judiciary head Sadegh Larijani emerges.
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
UPDATED 1 September: Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Prize Laureate and human rights lawyer, offers an interpretation in support of the Mostaghim-Daragahi analysis: "The setting aside of Mortazavi from his position of Tehran's chief prosecutor and his installment as [one of the] deputy general prosecutors of Iran must not to be considered as a promotion....The latitude and power of Mortazavi in his new position is much less and this new position has made him more vulnerable to prosecutions."An EA correspondent adds, "I suspect that Larijani's Mortazavi promotion/demotion was a stroke of diabolical cunning. First of all, a powerful official, accustomed to act independently (and, more importantly, from a political faction that is rather hostile towards the head of the judiciary, Sadegh Larijani) is removed from a sensitive post, placed under supervision, and therefore prevented from causing trouble for the Larijanis. Secondly, since this removal is "a promotion", Mortazavi and his cronies, however upset by the loss of power, cannot make a noise. Thirdly, placing Mortazavi in a higher position that at the same time is vulnerable to prosecution allows the Larijani-headed judiciary to control him. When Mortazavi was Tehran's prosecutor he could use his influence to block and stonewall all charges made against him, but in his new position this power has been taken away from him.
Yesterday, in a graphic illustration of the twists and turns of Iranian politics, Saeed Mortazavi went from being "fired" in the morning as Tehran's Chief Prosecutor to being "promoted" in the afternoon as Iran's Deputy Prosecutor General. The sudden shift led to some misleading headlines --- the New York Post is still crowing about the sacking of the "Butcher of Tehran" --- and a lot of uncertainty. What did Mortazavi's fortunes say about the intra-Establishment battle for power as well as the future of detentions and trials of post-election political prisoners?
A couple of Enduring America correspondents cautiously navigated the possibilities yesterday before concluding "wait and see". Others, however, have not been as cautious and, I fear, as shrewd.
Ramin Mostaghim and Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times are about as good as you get in reporting on Iran for US media (Mostaghim is based in Tehran, persisting despite the Iran Government's restrictions, and Daragahi is in Beirut), but they may have mis-stepped by jumping to the conclusion that Mortazavi now has "a fancy title" that "strips him of his power to pursue his hardline political agenda".
This is a favoured theory of some Iranian activists who are pushing the idea of a political overthrow of the President by the Larijani brothers, one of whom is the new head of judiciary, and Hashemi Rafsanjani. In this case, the LA Times reporters rely on two Iranian trial lawyers who claim that Mortazavi's" authority and power have been diminished almost to zero, nothing ... because he cannot make any judiciary decision".
That's a comforting thought for those who hope that Mortazavi, with his hard-line approach to detention and trials (and alleged abuses of prisoners), will no longer have influence. It ignores, however, the reality that his new role is as much a political matter as a judicial one.
The truth is that we simply don't know what impact Mortazavi will have until his relationship with his superior, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, and judiciary head Sadegh Larijani emerges.