Saturday
Sep192009
Iran: The Five Lessons of Qods Day
Saturday, September 19, 2009 at 7:54
Iran After Qods Day: What Next for the Green Movement (The Sequel)?
The Latest from Iran: Challenge Renewed (19 September)
The Latest from Iran (18 September): Qods Day
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Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
1. THE VICTORY OF THE GREEN WAVE...
Let's start with the basic but important observation. After all the attempts of the regime has tried to crush dissent in the last three-plus months --- the speeches, the threats, the shutdown of communications, the arrests, the raids, the trials --- the protestors came out yesterday. They came out not in scattered groups of hundreds across the capital, not in the "few thousand" of initial estimates on Friday, not in the "several thousand" of our judgement after President Ahmadinejad's speech, not in the "10,000" to which we cautiously moved, but in "tens of thousands".
How many? That is now a statistical game with no resolution. What matters is that, for all the regime's attempts to force a recognition of its legitimacy, it has still not succeeded. By 1000 GMT, even as Ahmad Khatami was delivering the Friday Prayers, the President had been eclipsed by the story of "No Gaza, No Lebanon, My Life for Iran". Despite the regime's portrayal of "Israel/Palestine" as the meaning of the day (a plot which many in the "traditional" media shamefully, if unwittingly, abetted --- see below), despite all the smokescreens and the restrictions, the images and videos came out. Al Jazeera's footage told the story that its reporter could not --- streets were filled not just with pro-Government supporters but with those who wanted to make Qods Day a renewed marker of their anger and their hopes. That footage was already being complemented and even surpassed by the videos that made it out of the regime's grasp. And the stories also came through: via phone calls, via the e-mails that could not be blocked, via blogs, via the curiosity-now-fixture called Twitter.
By 1000 GMT, no one noticed the Friday Prayers being led by Ahmad Khatami. The Ahmadinejad speech was down the list. The demonstrations had become Qods Day.
And that victory was obtained despite, not because of, some conditions that had been thought essential. Mir Hossein Mousavi played at best a marginal and belated role, whether this was because his genuine participation in the rallies had been limited and then twisted by the Government or because he was simply unable to make his presence felt. And former President Rafsanjani --- the chants rang out, "Hashemi, where are you?" --- was nowhere. The opposition's Web outlets were filtered, taken down, curbed.
And still the marchers turned out.
2. ...SETS A NEW TEST FOR ITS LEADERSHIP
This, however, is not a final victory. It's not even a triumph in the sense of making the Government alter its path. That awaits the political manoeuvres and power plays that will once more come to the fore.
Mehdi Karroubi passed his personal test yesterday. Three months, he was "just" a well-liked cleric and politician who --- by regime manipulation or by the limits of his political range --- had received less than two percent of the Presidential vote. Now he is the symbolic figure for many in the Green Wave. He has carried the fight in his letters, statements, and his encounters with Government officials. And today, by virtue of a well-organised office and communciations network, a focus on the injustices and abuses of the regime, and a personal charisma and persistence, he is at the head of the opposition as the next challenges are faced.
Mohammad Khatami is now in an important supporting role. His place yesterday was limited but quite visible, when the news and eventually pictures of his encounter with security forces, forcing him to withdraw from the rally, emerged. Now he returns to discussions with the reformist clerics and political parties who seek to link up with other factions to press their case against the President and, to an extent, the Supreme Leader.
And Mir Hossein Mousavi? The episode of the pictures --- "Was he at the rallies? And, if so, with whom?" --- has deeper roots in both the initial hope for his leadership of the Green movement and the later doubts as his public visibility was replaced by a series of statements. On reflection, I think this is more because of Government success than Mousavi's failure: this is one case where the threats and the sabotage of communications has drawn the net tighter and tighter around a leader. However, the return to basics brings this recognition: on 30 July, Mousavi was turned away from the "40th Day" memorial when Karroubi pressed on, and yesterday, when Karroubi (and Khatami) were able to show persistence and defiance, Mousavi could not.
Yet, as I write, I recognise that this attention to "leaders" might be contributing to the regime effort to limit the movement and its achievements. For, while the MKK trio are significant, opposition to the Government and the system has come in the last month from a wider range of political and clerical voices. In particular, the message out of Qom is that a majority of the Grand Ayatollahs and Ayatollahs want significant change to preserve the Islamic Republic. The paradox is that, as their role has been increasingly constricted by a move by President and his allies away from "Islamic" and "Republic" to "secular" and "authoritarian", space for their views is being opened up by the complementary presence of public opposition. That is why the Government has swung at them with a heavy hand by jailing their relatives, a step which I suspect may produce more problems than solutions for the regime.
3. AHMADINEJAD STUMBLES
We have underestimated the President throughout this crisis and we may do so again, but yesterday --- at least inside Iran --- was a powerful slap in the face to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
It was a slap felt in an episode just after the President's attempt to seize and define the political agenda with his introduction of Friday Prayers. As he spoke to IRIB Channel 2, the chant rose up behind him, "Ahmadi, Ahmadi, Resign, Resign!" All the weeks of promoting himself, standing up to the Supreme Leader, challenging Hashemi Rafsanjani, and smiting his reformist opponents, and a few voices (may they be protected) had whipped off the Emperor's clothes.
There is a powerful paradox here: Ahmadinejad's speech in itself was a politically shrewd one. He avoided any recognition of internal difficulties by playing the Israel/Palestine card (and throwing in Native Americans as well). For those at home, it represented, "I'm in charge here leading Iran, and Iran leads the world." For those abroad, it was, "C'mon. Take me on. Recognise me."
And the second part of that effort worked. Outlet after outlet in the "West" fell for the "Ahmadi Denies Holocaust" line. This was supplemented by the President's interview with NBC television (added to the Iranian declaration that 137 foreign media representatives had been granted permits to cover Qods Day), which has now become, "Ahmadi Won't Give Up His Nukes". It is a repeat of the political cycle of the last four days, only this time it is more for the President's preservation than Iran's grand geopolitical contests.
Where Ahmadinejad failed was at home. He failed not because of the speech but because it followed a stark, heavy-handed effort to wipe out dissent. And all it took was the first signs of the dissent to realise that his contest is not over. Legitimacy may await him in New York this week, but it is not guaranteed at home.
4. THE WANDERINGS OF THE SUPREME LEADER
This is a lesson of absence. I'm not sure that our updates yesterday ever mentioned Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
If this was just a case of Qods Day, would not be that significant. After all, it is Hashemi Rafsanjani who has had the lead role on this occasion over the last 25 years; there is no requirement for the Supreme Leader to come to the fore for the political symbolism of supporting Palestine.
This Qods Day, however, is in a wider political arena, one which the Supreme Leader jumped into hours after the Presidential polls closed. With that decision, he put his own authority on the line, and much of the story of the last three months has been whether he ensured or damaged that authority. So absence yesterday comes not in the midst of certitude of his Supreme Leadership but in the question of whether Khamenei is now scrambling for position vs. his own President.
Nice mirror image: if Mir Hossein Mousavi has to re-establish his political relevance in forthcoming days, so does the cleric who denied him the Presidency in that very political move on the night of 12 June.
5. AND NEXT? THE LONG(ER) MARCH
My colleague Mr Smith projected yesterday that the outcome of the Qods Day protests and manoeuvres would be a continued stalemate, both between forces within the system and between the regime and opposition.
I can see the merit of the assessment but I beg to differ re "stalemate" (Mr Smith uses the word again today, but I think his surprise at the large turnout may have bring a shift in his analysis). Stalemate indicates no movement, and yesterday was a rejection of deadlock, both in the slogans and the politics.
This does not mean, to repeat, "revolution" (even if that was the goal of the protesters, which it most certainly is not). Rather, it is a quest to find spaces and to open up new ones for negotiation. In practical terms, that is likely to return us immediately to the dance over arrests and detentions. But, in addition to the less visible and flammable but equally important dimensions of the economy and governance --- take note that foreign policy and the nuclear programme are not on that list --- those issues carry the wider question of Ahmadinejad's authority.
If this was a President and his allies inclined to compromise, I could see the way out. Stop mentioning the internal enemies, not only in yesterday's speech but in statements to come. Gradually release the detainees and stop the show trials. Do not crush but isolate Karroubi, Khatami, Mousavi, and the dissident clerics, hoping that with time fatigue and resignation will ensure no more large demonstrations.
This is probably the resolution sought by the Supreme Leader, notably in the meetings held by Ali Larijani with Mehdi Karroubi and with senior clerics. Already, however, the question has arisen whether there is any flexibility in the system: the smack-down of Karroubi's claims on detainee abuse by the Judiciary committee indicate either that bureaucracy is not prone to any meaningful talks or that the Presidency, rather than the Supreme Leader, has the upper hand in the system.
For this is not a President inclined to compromise. So he, and probably the Revolutionary Guard behind him, are likely to wield the heavy hand. There would seem to be limits to how far they can go --- dare they risk the arrest of the opposition leadership? --- but I am not sure, in a game of Political Chicken, whether they will let up on the accelerator and avoid a possibly catastrophic showdown with the opposition.
More importantly, and this is where the long(er) march comes, I am not sure whether Ahmadinejad yet realises that he may be aiding the opposition in the Iranian version of "What Does Not Kill You, Makes You Stronger". This President and his allies may have thought they would land a knock-out blow with their swinging of the last week, but when the bell finally rang last night, the opposition was still standing.
Welcome to a contest which just went beyond 15 rounds.
The Latest from Iran: Challenge Renewed (19 September)
The Latest from Iran (18 September): Qods Day
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
1. THE VICTORY OF THE GREEN WAVE...Let's start with the basic but important observation. After all the attempts of the regime has tried to crush dissent in the last three-plus months --- the speeches, the threats, the shutdown of communications, the arrests, the raids, the trials --- the protestors came out yesterday. They came out not in scattered groups of hundreds across the capital, not in the "few thousand" of initial estimates on Friday, not in the "several thousand" of our judgement after President Ahmadinejad's speech, not in the "10,000" to which we cautiously moved, but in "tens of thousands".
How many? That is now a statistical game with no resolution. What matters is that, for all the regime's attempts to force a recognition of its legitimacy, it has still not succeeded. By 1000 GMT, even as Ahmad Khatami was delivering the Friday Prayers, the President had been eclipsed by the story of "No Gaza, No Lebanon, My Life for Iran". Despite the regime's portrayal of "Israel/Palestine" as the meaning of the day (a plot which many in the "traditional" media shamefully, if unwittingly, abetted --- see below), despite all the smokescreens and the restrictions, the images and videos came out. Al Jazeera's footage told the story that its reporter could not --- streets were filled not just with pro-Government supporters but with those who wanted to make Qods Day a renewed marker of their anger and their hopes. That footage was already being complemented and even surpassed by the videos that made it out of the regime's grasp. And the stories also came through: via phone calls, via the e-mails that could not be blocked, via blogs, via the curiosity-now-fixture called Twitter.
By 1000 GMT, no one noticed the Friday Prayers being led by Ahmad Khatami. The Ahmadinejad speech was down the list. The demonstrations had become Qods Day.
And that victory was obtained despite, not because of, some conditions that had been thought essential. Mir Hossein Mousavi played at best a marginal and belated role, whether this was because his genuine participation in the rallies had been limited and then twisted by the Government or because he was simply unable to make his presence felt. And former President Rafsanjani --- the chants rang out, "Hashemi, where are you?" --- was nowhere. The opposition's Web outlets were filtered, taken down, curbed.
And still the marchers turned out.
2. ...SETS A NEW TEST FOR ITS LEADERSHIP
This, however, is not a final victory. It's not even a triumph in the sense of making the Government alter its path. That awaits the political manoeuvres and power plays that will once more come to the fore.
Mehdi Karroubi passed his personal test yesterday. Three months, he was "just" a well-liked cleric and politician who --- by regime manipulation or by the limits of his political range --- had received less than two percent of the Presidential vote. Now he is the symbolic figure for many in the Green Wave. He has carried the fight in his letters, statements, and his encounters with Government officials. And today, by virtue of a well-organised office and communciations network, a focus on the injustices and abuses of the regime, and a personal charisma and persistence, he is at the head of the opposition as the next challenges are faced.
Mohammad Khatami is now in an important supporting role. His place yesterday was limited but quite visible, when the news and eventually pictures of his encounter with security forces, forcing him to withdraw from the rally, emerged. Now he returns to discussions with the reformist clerics and political parties who seek to link up with other factions to press their case against the President and, to an extent, the Supreme Leader.
And Mir Hossein Mousavi? The episode of the pictures --- "Was he at the rallies? And, if so, with whom?" --- has deeper roots in both the initial hope for his leadership of the Green movement and the later doubts as his public visibility was replaced by a series of statements. On reflection, I think this is more because of Government success than Mousavi's failure: this is one case where the threats and the sabotage of communications has drawn the net tighter and tighter around a leader. However, the return to basics brings this recognition: on 30 July, Mousavi was turned away from the "40th Day" memorial when Karroubi pressed on, and yesterday, when Karroubi (and Khatami) were able to show persistence and defiance, Mousavi could not.
Yet, as I write, I recognise that this attention to "leaders" might be contributing to the regime effort to limit the movement and its achievements. For, while the MKK trio are significant, opposition to the Government and the system has come in the last month from a wider range of political and clerical voices. In particular, the message out of Qom is that a majority of the Grand Ayatollahs and Ayatollahs want significant change to preserve the Islamic Republic. The paradox is that, as their role has been increasingly constricted by a move by President and his allies away from "Islamic" and "Republic" to "secular" and "authoritarian", space for their views is being opened up by the complementary presence of public opposition. That is why the Government has swung at them with a heavy hand by jailing their relatives, a step which I suspect may produce more problems than solutions for the regime.
3. AHMADINEJAD STUMBLES
We have underestimated the President throughout this crisis and we may do so again, but yesterday --- at least inside Iran --- was a powerful slap in the face to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
It was a slap felt in an episode just after the President's attempt to seize and define the political agenda with his introduction of Friday Prayers. As he spoke to IRIB Channel 2, the chant rose up behind him, "Ahmadi, Ahmadi, Resign, Resign!" All the weeks of promoting himself, standing up to the Supreme Leader, challenging Hashemi Rafsanjani, and smiting his reformist opponents, and a few voices (may they be protected) had whipped off the Emperor's clothes.
There is a powerful paradox here: Ahmadinejad's speech in itself was a politically shrewd one. He avoided any recognition of internal difficulties by playing the Israel/Palestine card (and throwing in Native Americans as well). For those at home, it represented, "I'm in charge here leading Iran, and Iran leads the world." For those abroad, it was, "C'mon. Take me on. Recognise me."
And the second part of that effort worked. Outlet after outlet in the "West" fell for the "Ahmadi Denies Holocaust" line. This was supplemented by the President's interview with NBC television (added to the Iranian declaration that 137 foreign media representatives had been granted permits to cover Qods Day), which has now become, "Ahmadi Won't Give Up His Nukes". It is a repeat of the political cycle of the last four days, only this time it is more for the President's preservation than Iran's grand geopolitical contests.
Where Ahmadinejad failed was at home. He failed not because of the speech but because it followed a stark, heavy-handed effort to wipe out dissent. And all it took was the first signs of the dissent to realise that his contest is not over. Legitimacy may await him in New York this week, but it is not guaranteed at home.
4. THE WANDERINGS OF THE SUPREME LEADER
This is a lesson of absence. I'm not sure that our updates yesterday ever mentioned Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
If this was just a case of Qods Day, would not be that significant. After all, it is Hashemi Rafsanjani who has had the lead role on this occasion over the last 25 years; there is no requirement for the Supreme Leader to come to the fore for the political symbolism of supporting Palestine.
This Qods Day, however, is in a wider political arena, one which the Supreme Leader jumped into hours after the Presidential polls closed. With that decision, he put his own authority on the line, and much of the story of the last three months has been whether he ensured or damaged that authority. So absence yesterday comes not in the midst of certitude of his Supreme Leadership but in the question of whether Khamenei is now scrambling for position vs. his own President.
Nice mirror image: if Mir Hossein Mousavi has to re-establish his political relevance in forthcoming days, so does the cleric who denied him the Presidency in that very political move on the night of 12 June.
5. AND NEXT? THE LONG(ER) MARCH
My colleague Mr Smith projected yesterday that the outcome of the Qods Day protests and manoeuvres would be a continued stalemate, both between forces within the system and between the regime and opposition.
I can see the merit of the assessment but I beg to differ re "stalemate" (Mr Smith uses the word again today, but I think his surprise at the large turnout may have bring a shift in his analysis). Stalemate indicates no movement, and yesterday was a rejection of deadlock, both in the slogans and the politics.
This does not mean, to repeat, "revolution" (even if that was the goal of the protesters, which it most certainly is not). Rather, it is a quest to find spaces and to open up new ones for negotiation. In practical terms, that is likely to return us immediately to the dance over arrests and detentions. But, in addition to the less visible and flammable but equally important dimensions of the economy and governance --- take note that foreign policy and the nuclear programme are not on that list --- those issues carry the wider question of Ahmadinejad's authority.
If this was a President and his allies inclined to compromise, I could see the way out. Stop mentioning the internal enemies, not only in yesterday's speech but in statements to come. Gradually release the detainees and stop the show trials. Do not crush but isolate Karroubi, Khatami, Mousavi, and the dissident clerics, hoping that with time fatigue and resignation will ensure no more large demonstrations.
This is probably the resolution sought by the Supreme Leader, notably in the meetings held by Ali Larijani with Mehdi Karroubi and with senior clerics. Already, however, the question has arisen whether there is any flexibility in the system: the smack-down of Karroubi's claims on detainee abuse by the Judiciary committee indicate either that bureaucracy is not prone to any meaningful talks or that the Presidency, rather than the Supreme Leader, has the upper hand in the system.
For this is not a President inclined to compromise. So he, and probably the Revolutionary Guard behind him, are likely to wield the heavy hand. There would seem to be limits to how far they can go --- dare they risk the arrest of the opposition leadership? --- but I am not sure, in a game of Political Chicken, whether they will let up on the accelerator and avoid a possibly catastrophic showdown with the opposition.
More importantly, and this is where the long(er) march comes, I am not sure whether Ahmadinejad yet realises that he may be aiding the opposition in the Iranian version of "What Does Not Kill You, Makes You Stronger". This President and his allies may have thought they would land a knock-out blow with their swinging of the last week, but when the bell finally rang last night, the opposition was still standing.
Welcome to a contest which just went beyond 15 rounds.
Reader Comments (10)
Why do you call Ahmedinejad the "President"?
He is not legally the President of Iran, and very likely never has been, if the previous election was rigged too.
Excellent analysis, will link to it at my blog!
Regards/
Always appreciate your analysis! Read it every morning before my e-mail.
It has begun to strike me more and more that besides being terrifying, both Ahmadi and the supreme leader have often begun to look ridiculous.
I intend to get to protests outside the UN this week, but doubt they will have that much effect on such an idealogue.
Recently I have been wondering about more ways to strike at any remaining appearance of legitimacy through humor. Can presidents survive long if they become laughing stocks? Ahmadi seems so obsessed with being internationaly recognized.... how would he respond (and how would the guard and the supreme leader) respond to becoming an object of international ridicule? I suspect it could be more threatening than being despised.
If so, how does one increase (and spread) the number of cartoons?
The fact is that the govt. played the whole protests situation very smartly denying the greenies their desire for any new martyrs. A movement like this wants, needs, requires new martyrs who then can exploit now and then after 40 days. It is the necessary oxygen to feed their flames.
To the horror of the reformimsts, and despite Iran's demon govt., more people were killed during the opening of a Walmart in the States a few months ago than during the protests on Qod's day.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/28/national/main4637170.shtml
Scott, for the first time, I'm angry about something you said
Re AN, from item #3
"Legitimacy may await him in New York this week, but it is not guaranteed at home."
Going to NY, speaking to the UN, meeting the leaders of the world... none of these things bestow legitimacy. All they mean is that the person who assumed the presidency of Iran is interacting on the world stage with the heads of other countries, be they legitimate or not. Heads of government have to work things out amongst each other, but such interactions do not legitimize the individuals holding the offices.
AN won't get much of a break. As he walks into the UN building, he will be hearing the same chants he heard Friday in Tehran. It will remind him of just how much legitimacy he has, tho he'll blame it on international conspiracy
Scott,
Not angry at you, just at that characterization. Intense day here ;p
Great image of AN spending weeks carefully crafting his new image only to have the voices of the crowd wash it away in seconds. Somehow I keep think of the Sarah Palin Thanksgiving turkey pardon last Nov.
Great analysis; however I think you're getting it wrong when it comes to "the leaders" & the Mirhossein presence in the rally.
I remember On Quds day, you were concerned whether Mirhossein had shown up "in a pro-government or opposition rally".
It's not like that. The experience of going to a divided rally like this, is different than what you assume. On the day of the rally, you go out & you have no idea what will happen; you pick a spot to turn up & you don't know by the time you get there, whether that place is filled with protesters, supporters, or security forces.
At times, the atmosphere of a certain place, changes within minutes; on the Quds day, my friend joined the protesters & they marched on till they were stopped by security forces at a cross road. He decided to go back when he suddenly heard a round of applause; the cops had gave in to the pressure. The crossroad now was open & protesters got in.
Now before the cops opened the crossroad, if you were on the other side, your pictures would look like a "pro government rally", while 10 meters behind you, it was all green. 5 minutes later, all that had changed!
There's nothing such as a pro or anti government rally. It's all one big chance for everyone to show up; it's a very dynamic scene.
When Iranians look at that picture of Musavi, where you can see many Ahmadinejad supporters, they don't think he's betrayed them. Musavi defied the supreme leader by announcing he will show up, as he has defied him all through the election aftermath. And then he showed up. This is all people look for.
Accordingly, in the case of 30th July, everybody was happy that he showed up. And I did not meet anyone who'd turned away from Musavi because of the fact that he had to go back. (Proof of this, is countless videos of Quds day, showing chants of "Ya Hossein, Mir Hossein". A chant, now very dangeroud to shout out in Iran.) And no one turned away from karrubi, when in one of the protests, they attacked him & he had to leave the scene. (I don't remember which protest this was. As we've been in many protests & I've lost the count)
On the persian blogosphere, everyone's happy about the last Friday & I've even seen some posts which ask readers to come up with ideas for Mirhossein's upcoming birthday.
The following two links are from the popular social news site "Balatarin", a persian Digg-clone. They have become "hot" submissions around 7 hours ago. They are both talking about what we can do for Mirhossein's birthday:
http://balatarin.com/permlink/2009/9/19/1763864
http://balatarin.com/permlink/2009/9/19/1763843
All this is not to doubt your great effort to bring true coverage of what happens in Iran. I thank you for that. I just wanted to point out that I can't see any sign of decline in Mirhossein's popularity among protesters, nor any doubts about his leading position. We, however, saw an increase in Karrubi's popularity due to his letters on abuse of prisoners. People are worried about his safety, a fact shown by Mirhossein's letter defending Karrubi.
We will see more focus on Karrubi as his upcoming trial will go forward. But it is wrong to assume this increase in Karrubi's popularity means a decrease in Musavi's popularity. To simply explain it, we all feel like a team!
Strider
Thanks for the fascinating inside look and feel of being on the streets
[...] [...]
People in Iran did their part to guarantee AN does not look legitimate and that his supposed victory looks hollow. We turned out and protested in big numbers.
Now AN will go to NY and the best that can happen is for an American to throw a shoe at him, for 10000 Americans to show up and protest him. Then the cycle will go forward. I hope that this happens