Thursday
Oct292009
Iran: The Supreme Leader's Threat --- Strength or Weakness?
Thursday, October 29, 2009 at 6:47
Iran: Towards 13 Aban — The University Protests
The Latest from Iran (29 October): Opposition Momentum?
The Latest from Iran (28 October): The Supreme Leader Jumps In
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I had just returned from a 2 1/2-hour roundtable on "Obama: The First 300 Days" when I read of Ayatollah Khamenei's Wednesday statement, via an activist on Twitter:
"Questioning the principles of the election is the biggest crime....The very next day after election without any proof or evidence some PPL called the election a lie....The enemy exploited this & those who from the beginning were not supporters of the state joined them....Within the first hours I sent a private message telling them what they R starting will be used by enemy....I told them what they are doing will be exploited by the enemy & this is exactly what has happened."
Getting the news via 140-character bursts heightens the impact, yet as I found the articles, inside and outside Iran, narrating the Supreme Leader's message, the initial reaction did not fade even as it evolved. Evolved from surprise to concern and then hope.
Surprise because I had not expected such a direct assault on the opposition leaders. This is the most pointed warning that the Supreme Leader has put out since his Friday Prayer address a week after the election. Since then, he has spoken more generally about the "foreign threat", letting others shake the fist against internal challengers.
And Khamenei's timing is intriguing. Why raise the stakes so publicly a week before the demonstrations on 13 Aban? Why not let the protest play out, expecting that, for all the efforts of the Green wave, the regime's restrictions on movement and communications would keep mass gatherings (or at least news of those gathering) below the numbers on 15 and 20 June? Of course, a threat may be intended to back down movement leaders keep people off the streets, but it can also have the opposite effect.
The concern is that the Supreme Leader's message is not rhetoric but the portent of action. It is more than the threat that "something will be done" if the protests materialise on 13 Aban; it is a signal that in the next six days moves will be taken to break up opposition.
Some Iranian activists are going even farther, claiming that the Supreme Leader is also intervening against the compromise of the National Unity Plan. The speculation is that Khamenei has decided there will be no reforms in the system; instead, former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the architects of that Plan, has gotten the message and warned the opposition that the hammer blow is imminent.
Perhaps. But that is not my reading of the situation. Indeed, after the shock of those initial Twitter flashes had eased, I found concern giving way to an optimism. The Supreme Leader's message is not one coming out of the decision for a coordinating response to knock down the opposition before it can mobilise; it is one forced by the fragmentation and uncertainty within the regime.
First, a personal belief. It is no more than a belief because I cannot verify this assertion, but the more I look at Iranian decision-making over the last month, the more I suspect that the Supreme Leader has been quite ill. The twists and turns of the Iranian tactics in the nuclear talks; the muddled responses to the Sistan-Baluchestan bombings (remember, Khamenei did not issue a statement until days later, after the over-the-top reactions of the Revolutionary Guard and the more measured deliberation of the Ahmadinejad Cabinet); the lack of any evidence that there has been a critique of and response to the National Unity Plan, supposedly sent to the Supreme Leader weeks ago.
If (and I know it's a big if) that is true, this is not just a question of Ayatollah Khamenei reasserting the authority of the regime. It is an issue of reasserting his personal authority, showing strength not only to opponents but to allies.
Yet I return to the point that this was not just a general declaration of Khamenei's firm hand and mind, it was a specific challenge. And it is a challenge issued not after a period of relative calm in the political situation, but after days of resurgent opposition --- the Karroubi statements, the Media Fair episodes, the Mousavi-Karroubi meetings, the signals from senior clerics the university protests.
This, in short, was not a statement which had long been planned by the Supreme Leader to top off the political reality: I'm Back, All is Well. This was a speech which was quickly prepared because the regime is shaken.
Shaken does not mean crumbling. But I think the greater concern this morning is not with the Green movement but with Ayatollah Khamenei. Far from shutting down the movement on 13 Aban, the Supreme Leader may have just indicated that this movement is very, very alive.
It is six days to the demonstrations of 4 November.
The Latest from Iran (29 October): Opposition Momentum?
The Latest from Iran (28 October): The Supreme Leader Jumps In
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
I had just returned from a 2 1/2-hour roundtable on "Obama: The First 300 Days" when I read of Ayatollah Khamenei's Wednesday statement, via an activist on Twitter:"Questioning the principles of the election is the biggest crime....The very next day after election without any proof or evidence some PPL called the election a lie....The enemy exploited this & those who from the beginning were not supporters of the state joined them....Within the first hours I sent a private message telling them what they R starting will be used by enemy....I told them what they are doing will be exploited by the enemy & this is exactly what has happened."
Getting the news via 140-character bursts heightens the impact, yet as I found the articles, inside and outside Iran, narrating the Supreme Leader's message, the initial reaction did not fade even as it evolved. Evolved from surprise to concern and then hope.
Surprise because I had not expected such a direct assault on the opposition leaders. This is the most pointed warning that the Supreme Leader has put out since his Friday Prayer address a week after the election. Since then, he has spoken more generally about the "foreign threat", letting others shake the fist against internal challengers.
And Khamenei's timing is intriguing. Why raise the stakes so publicly a week before the demonstrations on 13 Aban? Why not let the protest play out, expecting that, for all the efforts of the Green wave, the regime's restrictions on movement and communications would keep mass gatherings (or at least news of those gathering) below the numbers on 15 and 20 June? Of course, a threat may be intended to back down movement leaders keep people off the streets, but it can also have the opposite effect.
The concern is that the Supreme Leader's message is not rhetoric but the portent of action. It is more than the threat that "something will be done" if the protests materialise on 13 Aban; it is a signal that in the next six days moves will be taken to break up opposition.
Some Iranian activists are going even farther, claiming that the Supreme Leader is also intervening against the compromise of the National Unity Plan. The speculation is that Khamenei has decided there will be no reforms in the system; instead, former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the architects of that Plan, has gotten the message and warned the opposition that the hammer blow is imminent.
Perhaps. But that is not my reading of the situation. Indeed, after the shock of those initial Twitter flashes had eased, I found concern giving way to an optimism. The Supreme Leader's message is not one coming out of the decision for a coordinating response to knock down the opposition before it can mobilise; it is one forced by the fragmentation and uncertainty within the regime.
First, a personal belief. It is no more than a belief because I cannot verify this assertion, but the more I look at Iranian decision-making over the last month, the more I suspect that the Supreme Leader has been quite ill. The twists and turns of the Iranian tactics in the nuclear talks; the muddled responses to the Sistan-Baluchestan bombings (remember, Khamenei did not issue a statement until days later, after the over-the-top reactions of the Revolutionary Guard and the more measured deliberation of the Ahmadinejad Cabinet); the lack of any evidence that there has been a critique of and response to the National Unity Plan, supposedly sent to the Supreme Leader weeks ago.
If (and I know it's a big if) that is true, this is not just a question of Ayatollah Khamenei reasserting the authority of the regime. It is an issue of reasserting his personal authority, showing strength not only to opponents but to allies.
Yet I return to the point that this was not just a general declaration of Khamenei's firm hand and mind, it was a specific challenge. And it is a challenge issued not after a period of relative calm in the political situation, but after days of resurgent opposition --- the Karroubi statements, the Media Fair episodes, the Mousavi-Karroubi meetings, the signals from senior clerics the university protests.
This, in short, was not a statement which had long been planned by the Supreme Leader to top off the political reality: I'm Back, All is Well. This was a speech which was quickly prepared because the regime is shaken.
Shaken does not mean crumbling. But I think the greater concern this morning is not with the Green movement but with Ayatollah Khamenei. Far from shutting down the movement on 13 Aban, the Supreme Leader may have just indicated that this movement is very, very alive.
It is six days to the demonstrations of 4 November.
Reader Comments (14)
The staging of a 140-character play is un-islamic. The principles in this drama, Karoubi, parsley-Sages, Rafsanjani and time, have been to the fair, fairly seen, and should now not be heard in prayers. The vote was counted carefully: Mahmoud counted 12 million ballots himself, and has seen the writing on the wall which he condemns. The opposition has sick plans, but I'm not a sick person. But I am informed of all the foreign writings and intrigues of the Crusaders of the Christian West. Si Deus nobiscum, quis contra nos? Who says I'm not a scholar: sile et philosophus esto.
Ali Khamenei,
The principals of evil are never pals to principled people. To cast a spell in a field of ignorance leads to bee stings. God is with the sea of green.
@doug
It took me a long while to get the riddle. It was well worth it....
and @ Ali Khamanei (loved your comment, had to read it 10 times before I could string its meaning together, but no pain no gain ; )
philosophize this: Green Imodium capsule smuggled by IRGC for leader
tweeter 1 - dictator 0
Focusing on the Scott Lucas analysis of the SL position (Scott, your initials are the same as him, if I did not like you I would have had to force you to change it.... just joking)
One important point to consider with respect to the events that have happened is this:
http://www.rouydadnews.info/pages/527.php
The article talks of a student from Sharif that stands up and directly insults the regime and the SL. This off course would have been unheard of even a few months ago, and even political heavy weights could have died or gone to jail for such criticism. To come from a student its significant.
Another important note is that university speeches given by high level Iranian officials are highly staged affairs. This student must have had deep Basiji credentials to be allowed to be present, and so it shows the deepness of cracks amongst many rank and file.
Finally it also shows that the whole affair may have been slapped together quickly, and it was not well choreographed, else this would have not happened or if it happened would have been stamped out faster.
WIMV,
By coincidence, read another account of the incident in Mowj-e-Sabz (link in updates) --- your interpretation of event is very useful. Could you summarise for us the remarks that student made?
"Fred" Lucas (FL)
Our Ali Khamenei,
You should read the Oct 24th thread entitled "Save Our Universities".
Scott,
I agree with your personal belief, his decision making has been lethargic through out this crisis always a step behind (day late and a dollar short).
The stresses of crisis situations are physically taxing on a person compounding their problems.
Also, as our friends from Iran pointed out, it explains the motive for the hasty actions of the coup leaders.
Initially I interpreted it as a challenge to the SL, but a fine point that someone pointed out to me was that this student was picked by the SL to ask him a question from the audience.
Having been told this, by some Sharif students, I am now not so sure as to the game play here. It seems (if confirmed to be true) to be the following:
SL picks a student to ask him a question. The student asks three challenging questions that not only challenge the SL authority, but also the post election events.
Question 1)
Focuses on the IRIB and its false conduct and its incorrect reporting and bad coverage. The supreme leader distances himself from the IRIB conduct and calls it wrong at times, but also blames the lies and false hoods. He then claims that although the head of IRIB selected by him, it is not under his direct control.
Question 2)
The student questions the criticism of the SL in public and in the AoE (or their lack of criticism it may be said) He then goes on to argue that something very small because it has been suppressed becomes something large and polar. It even may become false and unjust.
The student is asks to continue in light of time, and the SL gives him permission to continue.
Question 3)
The student criticizes the violent confrontation of the security forces against protesters and the response to protests. He questions the preaching of unity of people by the rulers, and asks whether its not best to reach unity through proper action of the security forces, and reservation of force for extreme times.
Question 4)
The student also questions the peoples actions against the government and the government action against the people. How one and the other are not proportionate and how they lead to a dangerous situation and escalation.
Then the response from SL was not direct, but amongst his speech he indirectly addressed these questions.
In response to criticism of him, he said that he always wishes in such gatherings of enlightened and educated students to hear critics of himself, but people are so shy and embarrassed of him and his presence that he never hears it.
In response to the criticism of IRIB he said he too has had criticism of this organization in times, but in criticizing a person or an organization we cannot become critical and create criticism (I still don’t understand the logic here). He also mentioned that he does not control directly this organization, even he appoints its head.
In general I don’t know what to think of this whole affair yet. Two scenarios.
A) The student was planted, and it was a way of showing a controlled soft side of the leader, encouraging a few of the points of change asked by Rafsanjani. This theory suggests this is the SL olive branch in having rejected the unity plan. This is supposed to encourage controlled criticism of the SL at the AoE and other levels, with his blessed pre approval.
B) The student was very brave and lucky to have been picked and launched into an attack of the SL and government on the four points. What luck, and why did the leader let him continue after 2nd question? He had an opportunity to shut him up.
B) seems unlikely but possible, A) seems more pausable.
Trying to find who the student was, but no one yet has said. There are rumors that he was taken away but the MOI and intelligence apparatus.
A question, please. for 'FL' - Is there a way to determine how much full information/reality does reach Khamenei's ears while his 'gatekeeper' son is in charge of the information flow? Thank you.
WMV,
Scenario A is not plausible. According to mowjcamp.com State-run broadcasting that was televising this meeting live had stopped its live broadcast during the exchange between this student and Kh.
Rafsanjani has previously recollected exactly when he, Ayatollah Khomeini, and other leaders of the Islamic Revolution all instantly knew that they would topple the Pahlavi monarchy. That moment came when the Shah appeared on television and announced that he had heard the people's calls for democracy, and that he would heed their demands. As Rafsanjani puts it, it was this moment of "weakness" -- this moment of compromise -- that made it clear to the revolutionaries that they would triumph. Regardless of how the experience molded the first wave of the Islamic Republic's leaders, one take-away was shared by all: concessions only weaken one's grasp on power.
It would not be surprising, then, if Khamenei (while lobbied by the extreme right) has retreated to this strategy of political survival. The significance of such a shift should not be understated, for it signals much more than the Supreme Leader's state of mind. Specifically, it may very well be an indication of what lies ahead in the fate of RASA's leadership.
While no one in the opposition has come out and directly challenged the authority of Khamenei or the doctrine of Velayat-eh Faqih, Khatami, Mousavi, and Karoubi have all come out and unambiguously and repeatedly called the election results a farce. Words have not been minced. If this defiance really does constitute "the biggest crime," as Khamenei suggests, then it paves the way for hardline elements within the regime to follow through on months of threats of arrest that they have made towards the leaders of the opposition.
Of course if it really did come to this, it would be an act of desperation by the regime, and not from a position of strength.
Observer,
I honestly don't know what Mojtaba Khamenei's position and role is now. There was a lot of chatter early in the post-election crisis about his manoeuvres but I've gotten less in the way of news since August. Any info/ideas from readers would be appreciated.
S.
Why is it that you guys make your site so difficult to follow? Is this a site, a blog? It's the most wonky and poorly designed hodgepodge of some news, opinion (often self-satisfied), analysis...and rarely from any real Iranians but just a bunch of imperialist Brits.
Beli,
Thank you. We always appreciate constructive criticism and are planning to unveil a major site re-design in the next few months.
S. (not a Brit)